THAAD Extended Range

UAE THAAD Site Reaches Milestone

The UAE operationally deployed the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system for the first time in 2016, a review of imagery suggests. The U.S.-built system was co-located at a recently constructed Patriot site, positioned immediately to the south of the UAE Naval College.

The THAAD site, constructed in 2014-2015, features four hardened munitions shelters, a support area and six prepared firing positions. All launch positions have been occupied with the unit’s transporter erector launchers (or TELs) since early 2016. In the most recent imagery in Google Earth, several additional TELs have been noted in the support area.

The THAAD system—designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles—works in concert with the country’s existing assets including the Patriot PAC-3s, Hawk batteries and other associated radar elements. Together, they form a multilayered missile defense network protecting population centers and critical infrastructure.

In 2011, the UAE became the first international customer to procure the advanced missile defense system as a Foreign Military Sale under the Arms Export Control Act. According to the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the initial contract, estimated $1.135 billion, included 48 missiles, 9 TELs and two Radars.

Initial deliveries were made to the Middle Eastern country in late 2015. Around the same time, 81 Emirati air defenders graduated from the first foreign THAAD Operator/Maintainer course at Fort Bliss; a 2nd class graduated in May 2016.he same year in October, the system reached a milestone when it was observed with the X-band AN/TPY-2 fire control radar. Prior to the radar’s employment, the system was likely operational, as it’s capable of utilizing fire control cues from other deployed sensors, including those potentially linked by allies protecting the region. (Previous imagery, for example, shows various TELs on alert, with missile canisters elevated in the launch position.)

When not deployed as a fire control radar, the AN/TPY-2 can operate in “Forward Based Mode” relaying tracking and IFF data to remote missile defense systems. However, switching between the two modes can take up to 8 hours. (A discussion of the radar’s ranges in both modes as publicly reported, can be found here.)

In total, a THAAD battery consists of six truck-mounted M1075 launchers, 48 interceptors (8 per launcher), a THAAD Fire Control and Communications (TFCC) unit aka Tactical Station Group (TSG), and one AN/TPY-2 radar. The truck platform used for THAAD is the Oshkosh M1120 HEMTT LHS.

Outside of the UAE, the U.S. Army has deployed a battery to the U.S. territory of Guam and has plans to setup a THAAD site in South Korea. A Qatari order was also in the works but has since been delayed due to the country’s declining hydrocarbon revenue.

Its test are scripted for success…

On SM Testing –

Continuing Aegis BMD’s approach of operationally
representative, no notice testing, FTM-22 begins as
the Aegis BMD ship receives operational intelligence
that hostile forces are making preparations to take
aggressive action against a friendly nation. The
ship’s mission is to protect a defended area or
deployed forces from ballistic missile attacks. The
ship’s crew uses this intelligence information with the
Aegis BMD Mission Planner to determine an
acceptable ship patrol area (Ship Operating Area)
along with recommended search sectors for the
Aegis AN/SPY-1B(V) radar. The timing of the threat
target launch is not revealed to any of the
participants

As required for other systems, the SM (and indeed the THAAD) testing is conducted under the watch of the DOT&E and this includes those intercepts where operational assets are involved (like the one listed above). Same goes for target development. Earlier they used to give details on targets and what countermeasures they were developing within those. Now, they simply refer to threat-representative targets in non-classified breifings, taking the details to a more secure setting. IRBM and ICBM targets are in short supply but that is because of the reduction in MDA budget. Rest assured they are going to be working to shore up this aspect, as well as develop targets that would be required to test the anti glider capability of particularly the ER version of THAAD once it is ready. I would love to see a more robust and well stocked BMD test program with the sort of test-asset, range and testing regime that the MDA brings to the table.

One could argue that the non-proliferation and the anti-BMD mafia have far more information available through the various transparency mechanisms available for access with the Pentagon, MDA and other agencies than the rest of the world’s BMD system. Try getting similar level of access to Russia’s, Israel’s, China, or India’s BMD programs. Could you share with me an OT&E or an audit report on the S300 and S400 systems?

Thats what makes ABM dangerous , Its test are scripted for success…

There is a big difference between a test being scripted and a test being scripted for success. A development test that is not conducted under conditions that will assess a specific aspect of the weapon’s capability would be a waste of money.

If I want to demonstrate my new antitank missile to an audience of politicians and press, a medium-range shot in good weather against an old obsolescent tank whose armour is easily penetrated would be a good scenario, and could be called scripting for success. But the trial will add nothing to the design team’s knowledge. It would be a public-relations operation.

But if I ask my systems engineers to define the worst possible tactical scenario, and they say “a T-90 seen head-on and travelling on a downward five degree slope”, then a firing conducted against simulated T-90 armour under those conditions would demonstrate the missile’s performance under what are seen as worst-case conditions. Such a trial would be scripted, but not scripted for success. It would be scripted to stress the system.

I wont dismiss Postol claim outrightly because as we have seen with GMD test even a very controlled test lead to repeated failure.

If you wish to believe a claim without requiring any proof or evidence, have at it. I just hope you use similar standard when discussing everything else. As I have mentioned quite a few times already, as a system and as a deployment concept, THAAD IS NOT GMD or AEGIS. It does not run into the same widespread discrimination challenges that pure exoatmospheric systems run into (such as those in the US, Israel and elsewhere). This should be a fairly easy concept to grasp.

He his providing his analysis on what he thinks can make THAAD useless it may be true or untrue but we have neither seen MDA refuting those claims from Postol or providing public evidence to prove him wrong

Why would the MDA bother to refute a totally unsubstantiated, and baseless claim that someone has cooked up without supplying even an iota of evidence? It really doesn’t work that way. Next you will be saying that Pierre Sprey is always right in his analysis because the USAF and the USN does not officially come out and provide evidence to debunk his theories every time he opens his mouth.

The very fact is that his claims about the THAAD go against the very concept that it has been designed to be deployed as is enough ‘proof’ that he is simply rehashing the arguments he used against the mid-course defense and porting them over to the THAAD. You don’t need to go in and provide evidence for that, you just need to look up the available information on the system, what it does and how it is designed to fit right between the mid-course, and the lower tier terminal defense. All the information one needs is already available out in the open.

All I would ask for you to do is draw up ballistic missile attack scenarios for missiles launched from North Korea, towards South Korea using the type of missiles NoKo is said to possess and developing and see how many actually provide exoatmospheric intercept opportunities and how many provide multiple such opportunities outside of 100-110 or so km altitude. The centerpiece of his argument is flawed and it doesn’t require the government or its agencies releasing extra evidence to prove him wrong.

All it does require is a basic understanding of the system and how it is designed to operate using the Shoot-Look-Shoot concept along with the lower and upper tier defensive layers such as AEGIS and PATRIOT. Poor arguments that aren’t backed by supporting facts or assumptions require a certain level of ignorance from a reader and the hope that most of them would read a news story and the tall claims and won’t be bothered with actually doing some fact searching and looking into matters themselves.

Major General Cai Jun, with the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, described the plan to deploy THAAD as “damaging to global strategic balance and regional security and stability”, according to the pope

Again, instead of pointing to links all I asked for was an explanation of how a single THAAD battery and its associated AN/TPY-2 can provide round the clock ballistic missile defense to South Korean and US troops stationed in South Korea, as well as situational awareness that contributes to a reduced Chinese deterrence.

He has made that claim, and you have taken it at face value. Now its up to the believers to show us how one radar that can only operate in one mode at a time, and requires a down-time and associated hardware changes to be able to switch to FBM can do two missions concurrently while looking in two different directions .

Finally even Janes has something on THAAD and China but I dont have access to Janes site.

http://www.janes.com/article/64877/t…-defence-plans

Its recycling of the same arguments. There are 3 AN/TPY-2’s in the region already, in addition to the AEGIS ships that rotate there. Those AEGIS ships will soon be transitioning into the AMDR ships and as such have a multi-fold increase in sensor capability. A single AN/TPY-2 (the fourth such radar in the region) that is slaved to a battery and is looking into North Korea, providing ballistic missile defense to the troops in SoKo has practically negligible impact on the picture the US gets through all of its collective assets in the region. The concerns aren’t about this radar as is being made out to be, but the fact that South Korea is now firmly in the US missile defense shield.

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That’s one 120 degrees radar in terminal mode (or else no ballistic missile defense) covering all or most of North Korea. How does it look deep enough into China to threaten their deterrent? Postol and co. are shilling a totally baseless argument just because of their opposition to anything ABM. They know it, and I suspect you know it as well. If not, a simple proof how a single TPY-2 can do concurrent missions would lay to rest all the opposition that myself and others have to this theory.

In fact vis-a-vis China, what Japan decides to do with its own purchase of THAAD and/or AEGIS Ashore is probably more of a direct threat. If I were Japan I’d develop the Stacked TPY-2 and get best of both world’s since they already have AEGIS vessels but I guess the new Gallium Nitride standard makes it less relevant now given the higher power and performance.

Japan may accelerate missile defense upgrades in wake of North Korean tests: sources

The outlays, currently in a budget request for the year starting April, includes money to assess a new missile defense layer – either Lockheed Martin Corp’s (LMT.N) Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system or Aegis Ashore, a land-based version of the ballistic missile defense system used by vessels in the Sea of Japan.

It also covers money to improve the range and accuracy of PAC-3 Patriot batteries, said the sources familiar with the proposal, who asked not to be identified because they are not authorized to talk to the media.

Thats what makes ABM dangerous , Its test are scripted for success and then you follow it up with political rhetoric.

Your foe thinks this ABM is indeed dangerous and would seriously blunt my Offensive system and that leads to building or more/better offensive system , in worst he thinks it would be used as filter post first strike.

Why would a foe armed with deep pockets, an army of scientists and technological prowess, not see what you are seeing using information available on the internet (that all this is is a bunch of scripted tests backed up by political rhetoric)?

Most surface-to-air and air-to-air missile-development tests are conducted in a controlled environment. This is done in order to check a specific aspect of the system performance, and to validate the simulation used for development work.

The system engineers will specify the exact target presentation (including any decoys or other countermeasures) and target behaviour that is needed to demonstrate this. If the incoming simulated threat is not exactly as specified, the missile will not be launched.

The cost of ABM trials being what it is, no programme manager is going to ask for an unscripted trial that may at best produce limited engineering data.

Thats what makes ABM dangerous , Its test are scripted for success and then you follow it up with political rhetoric.

Your foe thinks this ABM is indeed dangerous and would seriously blunt my Offensive system and that leads to building or more/better offensive system , in worst he thinks it would be used as filter post first strike.

All in All ABM is highly destablising.

Why is the goalpost now being shifted to the SM3? The SM3 is totally irrelevant in the Korean context outside of some highly unlikely missile trajectories. All Merc. did was point out the hypocrisy in Postol’s claims where on one side he is taking the position that countermeasures make these systems useless, and on the other he is claiming that SM3’s European deployment threatens certain Russian ICBM’s launched at CONUS. Certainly, the Russian weapons are equipped with countermeasures which would as per his own claims render the SM3 useless. You can’t have it both ways unless of course you are arguing in favor of a blanket anti-BMD position as opposed to a neutral position that is looking at it analytically. Those that can read b/w the lines should know exactly what agenda he is driving.

I wont dismiss Postol claim outrightly because as we have seen with GMD test even a very controlled test lead to repeated failure.

If I were a Russian I would be really be wary of any ABM system even if countermeasure etc could defeat 90 % of those ABM in any conflict , I would still think they blunt the detterent and consequently MAD and would abandon the START & INF treaty as the corner stone of these treaty the ABM treaty was abolished by US and the US has rejected the idea of joint ABM system.

That would make the Russian suspect as they claim that ABM is a precussor to first strike by US which would take care of remaining leakers post the first strike.

Now coming back to the actual topic of this thread, THAAD, what he is trying to pass on as analysis is essentially the countermeasures argument recycled in the THAAD exoatmospheric context and in this he falls tremendously short even if one were to pass over the fact that he provides ZERO evidence to support his claims. He falls short for the reasons mentioned by me earlier, essentially that the THAAD is a terminal system and is equipped with the best discriminating sensor on the planet (for sucha mission) and can easily adjust shot doctrine if challenged by better than expected countermeasures. The are still advocating launching 2 missiles per target and for a weapon with an apogee between 100-120km (his example, not mine) they can easily go for an exo and an endo intercept.

He his providing his analysis on what he thinks can make THAAD useless it may be true or untrue but we have neither seen MDA refuting those claims from Postol or providing public evidence to prove him wrong

Finally, he falls short once again when he makes the argument vis-a-vis CHINA, when it is clear that a single AN/TPY-2 CANNOT operate concurrently in forward based and terminal based mode, and that the THAAD interceptors and batteries can’t really work without the radar acting in terminal mode. So his china argument will only be valid if there is an extra TPY-2 deployed that is not supporting a THAAD battery. As expected, he fails to make this distinction or add such a caveat to his claims.

Finally even Janes has something on THAAD and China but I dont have access to Janes site.

http://www.janes.com/article/64877/the-thaad-factor-beijing-s-problem-with-seoul-s-missile-defence-plans

Finally this is what China thinks about THAAD

http://www.janes.com/article/64627/russia-china-to-hold-joint-anti-missile-drills-in-2017

Major General Cai Jun, with the Joint Staff Department of China’s Central Military Commission, described the plan to deploy THAAD as “damaging to global strategic balance and regional security and stability”, according to the pape

Not to mention Russian own fear on THAAD http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/thaad-and-worsening-russia-us-relationship

Most surface-to-air and air-to-air missile-development tests are conducted in a controlled environment. This is done in order to check a specific aspect of the system performance, and to validate the simulation used for development work.

The system engineers will specify the exact target presentation (including any decoys or other countermeasures) and target behaviour that is needed to demonstrate this. If the incoming simulated threat is not exactly as specified, the missile will not be launched.

The cost of ABM trials being what it is, no programme manager is going to ask for an unscripted trial that may at best produce limited engineering data.

Why is the goalpost now being shifted to the SM3? The SM3 is totally irrelevant in the Korean context outside of some highly unlikely missile trajectories. All Merc. did was point out the hypocrisy in Postol’s claims where on one side he is taking the position that countermeasures make these systems useless, and on the other he is claiming that SM3’s European deployment threatens certain Russian ICBM’s launched at CONUS. Certainly, the Russian weapons are equipped with countermeasures which would as per his own claims render the SM3 useless. You can’t have it both ways unless of course you are arguing in favor of a blanket anti-BMD position as opposed to a neutral position that is looking at it analytically. Those that can read b/w the lines should know exactly what agenda he is driving.

Now coming back to the actual topic of this thread, THAAD, what he is trying to pass on as analysis is essentially the countermeasures argument recycled in the THAAD exoatmospheric context and in this he falls tremendously short even if one were to pass over the fact that he provides ZERO evidence to support his claims. He falls short for the reasons mentioned by me earlier, essentially that the THAAD is a terminal system and is equipped with the best discriminating sensor on the planet (for sucha mission) and can easily adjust shot doctrine if challenged by better than expected countermeasures. The are still advocating launching 2 missiles per target and for a weapon with an apogee between 100-120km (his example, not mine) they can easily go for an exo and an endo intercept.

In fact this strategy actually makes a lot of sense even when opportunities are available to intercept closer to the THAAD max altitude. Do also keep in mind that the entire point of having a high altitude exoatmosheric system (THAAD), a high altitude endoatmospheric system (THAAD) and a low altitude system (Patriot) is to enable the Shoot-Look-Shoot concept..With a larger exoatmoshpheric envelope the THAAD ER would actually allow better employment of this concept in the absence of SM3 cover against MRBM’s and IRBM’s.

He also falls short when he assumes negligible degradation in SRBM performance when factoring in warhead like decoys..This only gets more challenging when you enter MRBM territory where you are looking at re-entering from hundreds of km altitude instead of just flirting with the Karman line (setting aside atmospheric effects on decoys well outside of the karman line). Finally, he falls short once again when he makes the argument vis-a-vis CHINA, when it is clear that a single AN/TPY-2 CANNOT operate concurrently in forward based and terminal based mode, and that the THAAD interceptors and batteries can’t really work without the radar acting in terminal mode. So his china argument will only be valid if there is an extra TPY-2 deployed that is not supporting a THAAD battery. As expected, he fails to make this distinction or add such a caveat to his claims.

There is still some benefit in actually researching the system and applying one’s own mind to see how it is meant to be deployed and integrated with other systems as opposed to taking an article at face value, that provides ZERO evidence, and makes a bajillion assumptions without clearly stating them.

I repeat all these ABM test are done in a controlled environment favouring the ABM system and using words to play around with any thing that a practile war would put across from hostile countries

Why not show us how ABM tests are conducted in non-controlled environments where the ABM is not allegedly ‘favored’? Of course, with supporting evidence.

Countermeasures and decoys are PITA for exoatmoshperic intercepts. Everyone that is designing exoatmospheric interceptors knows of this and what you have to look at are countermeasure-capability assessments of your adversaries vs seeker improvements you have in the pipeline. That and shot doctrine. If you can’t keep pace with decoys and countermeasures of your primary intended threats you have no business to seek exoatmosheric intercepts. Those that do however constantly improve the odds of completing a succesfull intercept, either by upgrading off board discrimination (AEGIS and THAAD have both had this and the Homeland systems are getting this through both space based sensors, and the LRDR) and onboard discrimination (Two colored seeker, new common KW and MOKV). You simply don’t build intercepts, fix them and forget about them. These things will be upgraded multiple times over their life-time to keep up with the threat.

Postol is a well-known opponent of missile defence, and has published many articles claiming that various systems do not work. along with at least one claiming that the land-based SM3 not only works, but works so well that that it threatens Russian ICBMs.

So he is hardly an unbiassed observer.

Postol has also known to say GBD does not work and indeed it failed thrice after it was operational iirc and it involved no decoys.

http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-missile-defense-failings-20160714-snap-story.html

I have yet to see any SM-3 do any intercept involving simple decoys forget about threathening Russian ICBM

I repeat all these ABM test are done in a controlled environment favouring the ABM system and using words to play around with any thing that a practile war would put across from hostile countries

^ Precisely, that is why the more success these systems have that affect their survival as programs, the higher the stakes for folks that want them dead. Not only has he provided NO actual threat weapon with North Korea, that may pose a discrimination challenge to the seeker, he has also failed to provide evidence that demonstrates the seeker’s weakness against his totally ‘made up’ weapon and deployment scenario. I’m afraid that unless he provides this, he is likely to only convince the faithful that are just looking to shill anti-Missile-defense agenda and don’t require reason or evidence.

As he is a well known missile defense opponent, its quite clear that he is pushing against the THAAD deployment in South Korea at a time when the South Korea military and government have openly embraced it. It appears to be a two pronged approach – On one side he is pushing that the system is useless, and the other side that the radar is so good that it poses a threat to China.

I wouldn’t be surprised if the anti-missile defense mafia start drawing up trajectories of how a possible THAAD-ER negatively impacts Chinese deterrence vis-a-vis CONUS. Just as your example shows, they haven’t really shied away from dismissing these systems as useless while also attributing mythical capabilities to them when it suits their agenda.

Postol is a well-known opponent of missile defence, and has published many articles claiming that various systems do not work. along with at least one claiming that the land-based SM3 not only works, but works so well that that it threatens Russian ICBMs.

So he is hardly an unbiassed observer.

Postol has been very reliable wrt to his analysis and if he says that THAAD seeker has discrimination issues then I will take it seriously.

So you don’t seek or require any proof? No such thing was provided in the article.

I doubt these tests are done with decoys for ABM system and with multiple BM launches , All tests are done under controlled condition that favours the ABM and using pure Ballistic trajectory

Tests are done against threat representative systems. Could you point to me the tests did not properly simulate the representative threat in the Korean context? ABM tests are done with decoys but primarily for the mid course intercepts since that is where decoys play a very major role since you can use cheap, non payload compromising decoys and they’ll still pose similar challenges as actual multiple warheads. There is no threat in that region that has multiple warheads on short or medium ranged weapons that can re-enter.

This is precisely the advantage of a THAAD vis-a-vis the SM3 in that you can essentially hold off on to the second shot till the warhead has reentered the atmosphere and the atmosphere has taken care of the decoys – i.e. you look to do the first intercept at say 120 km for a longer ranged weapon, and the second one at say 60-80 km altitude. That’s why you have a GIANT X-Band radar sitting there so that you understand the picture vis-a-vis discrimination and adjust your shot doctrine accordingly. Below that you have the PAC-3 that can also deal with the type of missiles he is referring too.

Target systems include launch vehicles, payloads (including surrogate re-entry vehicles and countermeasures), launch support equipment, extensive instrumentation, and flight control stations. Since 1993, the targets program has successfully delivered more than 200 Short Range Ballistic Missiles (up to1000km), Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (1000-3000km), and Long-range (Intermediate (3000-4500km) and Intercontinental (>4500km)) Ballistic Missile threat realistic targets for test

THAAD has been shooting down both non separating and separating ballistic missiles for well over a decade now, and by all accounts has had a stellar test record after early development troubles. Recently (FTI-01, FTO-02-E2), the THAAD has been intercepting SM3 threats, either leakers or targets that were designed for the SM3. The last few tests have involved exoatmospheric kills of MRBM’s and soon they’ll be taking this to IRBM level ranges as well.

Again, one can either say the countermeasures being fielded by the MDA are inadequate (since the NO COUNTERMEASURES exist argument of the past has been proven wrong or is now irrelevant) or that the MDA has proper countermeasures but its seekers don’t perform well against them. Either way, you have to (in a reasonable/rationale scenario) provide evidence to back up your assertions.

One can also take a look at the entire THAAD-ER package being draw up. They are looking at approximately $ 1 Billion worth of upgrades to the system, yet aren’t even touching the seeker beyond upgrades that tackle part obsolesce. This is as good an indication as any that they are satisfied with its seeker’s ability to discriminate against the representative threats (Which in this case would be the immediate threats posed by systems coming from Iran and North Korea). Anyone is free to make all sorts of claims regarding performance and performance shortfalls..However, if you don’t/can’t back it up only a small minority are going to take you seriously.

The dubious scenario makes little sense. You can’t pack multiple warhead like decoys on a short range ballistic missile and not compromise its performance. You have to do that if you want to complicate the discrimination problem well inside the atmosphere.

Never mind Postol confirming THAAD radar would be used against China confirms the recent China-Russia initiative on Missile Defence when they made similar assertions and Postol just confirms what Chinese already know.

Could you elaborate how one THAAD battery and TPY-2 deployed in Korea, operating in terminal mode (which it has to otherwise there is nothing guiding the missiles) poses a threat to china? The only scenario where one TPY-2 does that is when it looses its ability to defeat missiles and acts solely in the forward-Based mode which requires hardware changes and isn’t as easy as just pressing a few buttons on a computer. This essentially means that as long as the Koreans get around the clock coverage against ballistic missile attacks the radar can’t really be used for other things. You could however place another radar in Korea and use it to build SA. You could also just as well add an extra Aegis ship with the new AMDR and place in the region and get the same SA.

I doubt these tests are done with decoys for ABM system and with multiple BM launches , All tests are done under controlled condition that favours the ABM and using pure Ballistic trajectory

Classified and non classified decoys and countermeasures are widely deployed by the MDA. Of course they aren’t going to come out, quite publicly and say what kind, and provide details that may influence the threats directly. Similarly, there is open source data out there that points to missiles simulating different trajectories – that is the entire point of having targets in the first place.

Furthermore, multiple Ballistic Missile Target launches that test out not only the command and control but the ability of the integrated defenses to layer up in support of each other have now become routine. The last THAAD test iirc. was where 2 missiles were intercepted, one with the THAAD as a primary interceptor, while the second where THAAD intercepted after the SM3 failed to do so. Both the TPY-2, and the SPY-1 were used to provide a common picture, and they even roped in the Lower tier sensor for an added layer of situational awareness.

Postol has been very reliable wrt to his analysis and if he says that THAAD seeker has discrimination issues then I will take it seriously.

I doubt these tests are done with decoys for ABM system and with multiple BM launches , All tests are done under controlled condition that favours the ABM and using pure Ballistic trajectory

Never mind Postol confirming THAAD radar would be used against China confirms the recent China-Russia initiative on Missile Defence when they made similar assertions and Postol just confirms what Chinese already know.

US expert says THAAD can’t distinguish between real and decoy warheads

Thats a tall claim without much substance to back it up. Where is any data on its seeker performance that shows its performance against decoy’s based on which the claim that it is not able to distinguish between them? Unfortunately, its tough to recycle arguments used against mid course defense systems to attack terminal systems especially when you can easily adjust shot doctrine to favor lower altitude intercepts (40 km – 100 km) if the decoys challenge cannot be handled with reasonable degree of confidence. TPY-2’s have by all accounts excellent discrimination (one reason why they went in with an X-Band sensor), and it has been improved over its operational life through hardware and software upgrades. Any threat that begins to field extremely challenging decoys will simply make them reset their ripple fire procedures. Same is the case with the lower tier systems where discrimination is more capable now than ever, and even better capability is being desired from their recap efforts. With them the idea is to take the intercepts higher since lower quality missiles have in the past broken up making discrimination challenging at lower altitudes.

The problem with the anti-proliferation mafia vis-a-vis their roles of discrediting ABM efforts is that they are essentially going around telling folks that live under the threat of ballistic missiles that they are idiots for layering up, when the only ‘sane’ defense against a proliferating ballistic missile threat (complicated with the leakage and false alert problems) is to layer up.

Postol also said that if North Korea fired a missile from a high angle, it could take advantage of the limitations of the infrared seeker on the THAAD interceptors. If a Scud-B were fired at 55 degrees (a high angle), for example, its range would decrease from 300 km to 280 km, but its maximum altitude would increase from 75-80km to 100km. Since the air density at 100k m is 1/2,000,000 to 1/3,000,000 of sea level, decoys that were deployed there could fall with the real warhead to 50-60km of altitude, Postol said.

And who says the intercepts have to occur at apogee? and if you want the decoys to survive reentry much like the warhead you would have to design them for such a role which would impact design weight and therefore range, payload and all other characteristics that make these systems a threat in the first place. What you are essentially looking at with such a concept are independent reentry vehicles and not just sidekick cheap decoys designed to pose a challenge to discrimination outside the atmosphere. THAAD interceptors deployed in South Korea will be an added layer to the PAC-2, PAC-3’s deployed there and will provide higher altitude intercepts to maximize the probability of intercepting ballistic missiles launched at them. Taking THAAD away will logically result in loss of coverage and reduced protection.

The only valid argument is vis-a-vis China and the TPY-2’s where you can use the radars to develop situational awareness provided you have more than one given that there are hardware changes required to convert the TPY-2’s from one mode to another and it generally takes a few hours to a day to do so. You can’t have constant ABM protection against North Korea and still develop comprehensive SA that may threaten China w/o having at least 2 radars.

china is not in the same nuke league

China does not share any data on its nukes so you cant be sure unlike START Treaty that obliges Russia-US to disclose deployed warhead

According to US official China Russia are in same league as only these two countries are described as existential threat by Pentagon

US expert says THAAD can’t distinguish between real and decoy warheads

What the SM3 Does – Exoatmospheric-Mid-Course Intercept.

What the THAAD (Baseline and ER) does – Endoatmospheric and Low Exoatmospheric terminal intercept.

There are probably a good number of ballistic missiles that have trajectories that are too low for the SM3 (MIA considered to be 100-120 km), but can be handled by the THAAD (MIA considered to be 40-50km). Similarly, THAAD requirements are really meant to take over the speeds and altitudes where the PAC-3 MSE cannot successfully intercept. While there is some overlap, particularly when it comes to the ER majority of their (SM3 and THAAD) engagement envelopes are distinct. Besides, THAAD system is deployable while the SM3 system is fixed when it comes to land based application. It is going to be cost prohibitive to shoot down MRBM’s guided towards ground targets using ship based SM3’s even if they COULD intercept those.

SM3’s provide mid-course protection for a very larger coverage area, while THAAD baseline provides terminal protection over a much smaller area but ALSO against types of weapons the SM3’s cannot handle, such as Short and some Medium Range Ballistic Missiles that are outside of the patriot envelope. The ER will have more overlap with SM3 but that is an added benefit of designing a two stage weapon that can divert to counter the gliders – That is to say that the higher altitude capability (compared to baseline thaad) wasn’t the design driver but a consequence of other changes to make the weapon more capable against a BG system.

For all practical purposes, the SM3 (particularly the newer blocks) is an Anti Longer Ranged IRBM weapon ( 3000 km+ ranges)

What is THAAD-ER doing that SM-3 isn’t?

AUSA 2016: All future Raytheon AN/TPY-2 radars to be built with GaN – Jane’s IDR

The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has awarded Raytheon a contract modification to transition the company’s future AN/TPY 2 radar to Gallium Nitride (GaN), making the ballistic missile defense radar the latest to move away from Gallium Arsenide (GaAs), to improve reliability and efficiency while lowering cost.

The award, announced by Raytheon on 30 September, will be used to transition the production piece of company’s Andover foundry in Massachusetts, which had been used to produce GaAs Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuits (MIMIC) to produce GaN, Jim Bedingfield, director, missile defence and C4I systems for Raytheon, said at a company briefing on 29 September.

“The work has begun as we’re on contract and will continue for the next few months,” Bedingfield told IHS Jane’s on 30 September.

Raytheon is working with MDA on a plan to upgrade existing TPY-2s that were built with GaAs MIMIC transmit and receive modules. If and when that would occur is up to the MDA, Bedingfield said.

“We are working closely with MDA on those options for a clear upgrade modernisation path. Our intent is to make it as affordable and efficient as possible as these radars are in worldwide demand,” he said. “GaAs will continue to be produced for systems that require it.”

TPY-2 will now be built using GaN modules just like Raytheon’s SPY-6(V) for the Arleigh Burke-class of guided missile destroyers and the new enterprise air surveillance radar (EASR) for future Ford class aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. GaN is also a key component in the new Patriot radar that includes an Active Electronically Scanned Array and is used in the Next Generation Jammer.

GaN is a wideband gap semi-conductor so it has a higher voltage breakdown, which provides radars a higher power density on the radio frequency (RF) MIMIC amplifiers that Raytheon builds.

“With GaN you can increase your search capability by 5x the search volume, Bedingfield said on 29 September. “It allows the power to be much more effectively used.”

The transition from GaAs to GaN occurs just below the transmit and receive modules at the MIMIC level, he said.

GaN enables the search volume to be greatly enhanced and the range increased by upward of 50%, Bedingfield said. “And you can increase the discrimination capability.”

It is also possible to decrease a radar’s aperture size because the system is operating more efficiently. “You could package the same capabilities into a smaller aperture size”; however, TPY-2 is not going that path, Bedingfield added.

AN/TPY-2 is an X-band radar that has a high degree of discrimination; it clears up the complexity of dense scenes allowing operators to understand what is the difference between a threat and non-threat, Bedingfield said.

Raytheon has produced 14 radars so far: 12 for the United States, and two for Foreign Military Sales customers. Of the 12 US radars, seven are with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries and five in forward bases: Two in Japan, one each in Israel, Turkey, and US Central Command and one is deployed to Guam

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This in addition to the Spare GaN Antenna Unit that was ordered earlier.

One day China, Russia and the USA will make a treaty. It makes no sense to ignore China for treaties in the future.

china is not in the same nuke league