The military is building a third missile interceptor field at Fort Greely

More importantly this so called ABM is a large ICBM sized interceptor missile designed to detect and Identify and close with targets outside our atmosphere… sounds like an ideal ASAT weapon to me. Stationed in Europe knocking 10 Glonass satellites out of operation over Europe in the initial stages of WWIII and shutting down GPS would be a bit of an advantage…

I think the problem is not about the 10 interceptors currently but also future expansion. And what is more, the Americans are more interested in monitoring the trajectories of the lastest formidable BULAVA missiles, and the improved TOPOL-M missiles which have depressed tracjetories. Up until now the have not been successful in tracking them due their high hypersonic velocities as well as the manauverabilty. The X-band radars could be used, but I don’t know how far they could be sucessful in doing this.

Both sides clearly did not really adhere to the treaty to begin with, so it really never held that much weight, and in truth neither side had a credible leg to stand on when talking about how the other side was violating the treaty.

Come now, the Soviets were working on a system that would have violated the treaty, but it never got to operational status… the US radars on the other hand were completely operational and represented clear cheating. The Krasnoyarsk radar covered a path that no ICBMs would follow, and operated in a frequency that wasn’t very good for tracking incoming warheads. Nor was it possible to use as a central battle management type radar as it pointed out of Soviet territory over Mongolia.
Sure both sides cheated but the US clearly benefitted more from their cheating, the Krasnoyarsk radar clearly not intended to be part of an ABM system at all, whereas Thule and Flyingdales are very well placed for such a role…

While US radars in Flyingdales and Thule (UK and Greenland respectively) were near which US border exactly?

You’re right, they were violations. Also, in the case of the disputed Krasnoyarsk radar, that one was also more centrally located and not along the periphery of the USSR and was also a violation. My point, by the way, wasn’t to make the Russians appear as the only bad guys in this case, just to point out that they clearly violated the treaty themselves, so they really didn’t have a leg to stand on when complaining about US violations. Both sides clearly did not really adhere to the treaty to begin with, so it really never held that much weight, and in truth neither side had a credible leg to stand on when talking about how the other side was violating the treaty.

and as such was a violation of the treaty in two ways: its mere existance (development continued well after 1972 although it was initiated in 1962), and it’s placement on the Kamchatka peninsula, given that it was a known ABM component (and not a pure EW radar).

While US radars in Flyingdales and Thule (UK and Greenland respectively) were near which US border exactly?

About FLAT TWIN:
“…In these moves, the Soviets demonstrated a capability to transport and redeploy the radar in a matter of weeks or months…”
Mobile….
“The two Flat Twin radars, as currently constructed and tested, cannot be said to be truly mobile, but neither can they be considered to be immobile.”
And..
“The only permitted functions for a large, phased-array radar (LPAR) with a location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be space-tracking and national technical means (NTM) of verification. Based on conclusive evidence, however, we judge that this radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, not for space-tracking and NTM as the Soviets claim. “
But in this letter* there is no mention of any of these conclusive evidences.

*Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate Transmitting a Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements December 2, 1987

That’s a public-record document from 1987. The true nature of FLAT TWIN and the existance of the S-225 mobile ABM program have only recently been documented in the open press. The reason for the apparent non-mobility back then was the fact that the relocated system came, I assume, from Sary Shagan. Radars at Sary Shagan were usually mounted as part of special test rigs as that was Russia’s ABM development site. Given that fact it is likely that it did take a while to dismantle the radar and move it to a new location. Either way, FLAT TWIN was developed as part of the S-225 mobile ABM system, and as such was a violation of the treaty in two ways: its mere existance (development continued well after 1972 although it was initiated in 1962), and it’s placement on the Kamchatka peninsula, given that it was a known ABM component (and not a pure EW radar).

About FLAT TWIN:
“…In these moves, the Soviets demonstrated a capability to transport and redeploy the radar in a matter of weeks or months…”
Mobile….
“The two Flat Twin radars, as currently constructed and tested, cannot be said to be truly mobile, but neither can they be considered to be immobile.”
And..
“The only permitted functions for a large, phased-array radar (LPAR) with a location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be space-tracking and national technical means (NTM) of verification. Based on conclusive evidence, however, we judge that this radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, not for space-tracking and NTM as the Soviets claim. “
But in this letter* there is no mention of any of these conclusive evidences.

*Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate Transmitting a Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements December 2, 1987

Legally, yes. It does not serve to reinforce Russia’s trust though, it’s not like both sides mutually agreed to end it 😉

True, but both sides didn’t have to agree to end it. Like it or not, what the USA did was perfectly legal within the treaty (with regards to ending it, that is).

Well, wouldn’t the former rather have been a breach on the Soviet Union’s behalf? Small but important difference in this context, I’d say. About the latter, is this really an actual breach, there is only the radar after all (serious question, I really would like to know why)? It could even be described as being located on the periphery of the country 😉

Here’s the first bit of Article V of the treaty:

“1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.”

Given that the FLAT TWIN was a component tested in an ABM role, and it was mobile, it had no business being there insofar as the treaty was concerned.

Now, EW radars are different, covered in Article VI:

“To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.”

Had FLAT TWIN not been associated with the S-225, it would have been legal to place it on the Kamchatka peninsula.

The US didn’t renounce the ABM treaty till after many of the components were ready for testing. They were likely in material breach too.

Article IV:

“The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.”

Testing the things was permitted, provided they weren’t mobile, sea-based, air-launched, or space-based. The MOU signed in ’72 listed Kwajalein and White Sands as the US test ranges. As long as they didn’t test one from Vandenberg (I can’t remember, I can only recall Kwajalein launches and my books are in boxes) the US was legal. When the system was ready for deployment, the US withdrew, legally.

ABM radars were allowed to be placed on or near national borders.

True. But only EW radars. The FLAT TWIN array, according to the treaty, was illegally placed there as it had been tested in an ABM role, let alone being a mobile ABM component!

That was the question I was asking you, you were the one who dragged the CFE into this.

Both agreements restrict Russian forces more than they restrict NATO forces. The Purpose of the CFE treaty was to stop cascading, or the passing on of large amounts of obsolete but still servicable equipment to European allies to form large pools of otherwise unused equipment in Europe. The fear that this equipment might be used in potential civil wars or wars of independance, or to threaten or intimidate neighbours with military build ups on their borders.
The INF treaty restricts medium range Russian nuclear missiles but does nothing to stop France of the UK or for that matter any NATO nation other than the US from possessing such weapon types and deploying them.

No suggestion that withdrawal from one will trigger the same for the other.

No suggestion that it couldn’t either.

There are also no clauses in either treaty’s dealing with any other missile defence systems. I am trying to understand your earlier statement that if the US goes ahead with a facility in Eastern Europe then the INF and the CFE treaty’s will collapse.

Those statements are based on statements made by various Russian officials regarding US talks with Poland regarding the siting of an ABM system on their territory. Since the talks have expanded to include mention of the UK, czech republic and even georgia I don’t doubt the Russians will use this as an excuse to get out of two treaties that have been inconvenient for some time now and are clearly patently out of date. It makes no sense for the rules regarding IRBMs to be much stricter than those for ICBMs.

include multilateral operating procedures for the SVC’s concurrent continuous monitoring under the START I and INF Treaties, and inspection procedures for new missiles exiting from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia.

How old is that report?

When did the CFE treaty become a strategic nuclear treaty?

The CFE treaty was a treaty to balance the forces of Europe between East and west to prevent potential conflict. Now that everyone that was in the warsaw pact plus most of the former soivet republics are either in NATO and wanting to get into NATO it is now a nonsense.

That was the question I was asking you, you were the one who dragged the CFE into this.

If this is true then the INF treaty is dead, adn the CFE treaty not far behind it.

This clause allows the Russians to withdraw if necessary, but as it clearly states that the two parties this treaty applies to are quote It really doesn’t need to withdraw from anything as Russia is not the Soviet Union, and vice versa.

From http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/inf1.htm

Following the December 25, 1991, dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States sought to secure continuation of full implementation of the INF Treaty regime and to multilateralize the INF Treaty with twelve former Soviet republics which the United States considers INF Treaty successors.2 Of the twelve successor states, six — Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan — have inspectable INF facilities on their territory. Of these six, four — Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine — are active participants in the process of implementing the Treaty. With the agreement of the other Parties, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, each with only one inspectable site on its territory, while participants, have assumed a less active role, foregoing attendance at sessions of the SVC and participation in inspections.

The multilateralizing of what was previously a bilateral U.S.-Soviet INF Treaty required establishing agreements between the United States and the governments of the relevant Soviet successor states on numerous issues. In the SVC and through diplomatic contacts with the actively participating successor states, the United States worked to secure agreements to ensure continuation of the viability of the Treaty regime and to assure the exercise by the United States of its rights under the Treaty. Among the tasks undertaken were: arrangements for the settlement of costs connected with implementation activities in the new, multilateral Treaty context; the establishment of new points of entry (POE’s) in Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine through which to conduct inspections of the former INF facilities in those countries; and the establishment of communications links between the United States and those countries for transmission of various Treaty-related notifications. Other issues that have been discussed in the SVC include multilateral operating procedures for the SVC’s concurrent continuous monitoring under the START I and INF Treaties, and inspection procedures for new missiles exiting from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia.

To answer your point however the INF treaty was signed when the ABM treaty was in force and also at a time when it was seen as not likely to be withdrawn from. Withdrawl from the ABM treaty could be considered extraordinary reason enough for the Soviets to withdraw from the INF treaty… if the ABM treaty is obsolete and a cold war dinosaur, then so is the INF, and even more so the CFE treaty, which borders on the rediculous.

So we are talking assumptions and opinions here then, no actual fact? As far as I can see there is no mention anywhere in the INF documents of the ABM. No suggestion that withdrawal from one will trigger the same for the other. Similarly there seems to be no similar clauses contained within the CFE. There are also no clauses in either treaty’s dealing with any other missile defence systems. I am trying to understand your earlier statement that if the US goes ahead with a facility in Eastern Europe then the INF and the CFE treaty’s will collapse.

Daniel

I had a look through the INF and CFE treaty’s the other day but didn’t really see anything along the lines of what you are saying.

When did the CFE treaty become a strategic nuclear treaty?

The CFE treaty was a treaty to balance the forces of Europe between East and west to prevent potential conflict. Now that everyone that was in the warsaw pact plus most of the former soivet republics are either in NATO and wanting to get into NATO it is now a nonsense.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

This clause allows the Russians to withdraw if necessary, but as it clearly states that the two parties this treaty applies to are quote

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

It really doesn’t need to withdraw from anything as Russia is not the Soviet Union, and vice versa.

To answer your point however the INF treaty was signed when the ABM treaty was in force and also at a time when it was seen as not likely to be withdrawn from. Withdrawl from the ABM treaty could be considered extraordinary reason enough for the Soviets to withdraw from the INF treaty… if the ABM treaty is obsolete and a cold war dinosaur, then so is the INF, and even more so the CFE treaty, which borders on the rediculous.

The ABM treaty is mentioned as part of the basis for all strategic nuclear treaties. You don’t negotiate arms control and ban having more than one magazine of rifle ammo and then let the other guy build an APC.

I had a look through the INF and CFE treaty’s the other day but didn’t really see anything along the lines of what you are saying. Perhaps you could illuminate the relevant passages?

http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/index.html

http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/index.html

cheers

Daniel

Stop being such a drama queen. Russia has had ABMs for decades and now that the US has them it’s the end of the world? Please.

The ABM treaty allowed a single ABM system to be built by each country (US and USSR). The options were you could build it around an ICBM field or around your nations capital. The Soviets built theirs around their capital, while the US built theirs around an ICBM field. I believe the US system was deactivated the day it opened because they realised how pointless it was. (After building up a nuclear capability for a first strike what is the point of defending an empty ICBM field that would take days if not weeks to repair the silos and load new missiles for a second strike… even if it wasn’t hit by enemy ICBMs).

If Russia built and ABM system in Cuba the US would invade. In comparison the Russian reaction to the US doing the equivelent is actually quite mild.

As far as I can see the only way the ABM program violates the INF treaty is with the HERA target rocket. Not sure how it affects the CFE treaty.

The ABM treaty is mentioned as part of the basis for all strategic nuclear treaties. You don’t negotiate arms control and ban having more than one magazine of rifle ammo and then let the other guy build an APC.

Well, Russia’s is compliant with the (now defunct) ABM treaty while the US system, being nation-wide, isn’t AFAIK.

Actually the US violated the ABM treaty anyway with radars in Greenland and the UK (flyingdales) they had radars capable of tracking incoming RVs, while the ABM treaty requires that such radars can only be positioned along international borders. In fact the US often tried to claim the Soviets were violating such agreements because of the position of a radar station near Krasnoyarsk, though it could be argued that it is within 900km of the border of Mongolia and is at least within the borders of the Soviet Union… unlike Greenland or the UK.

And unfortunately for the USA it doesn’t matter what message it *intends* to send,

It doens’t matter what message the US wants to send with this, it creates a capability that could be misused in the future by subsequent govenrments. It effects the strategic nuclear balance and measures will be taken to correct that unbalancing.

Dont get me wrong, this is a fantastic peace of engineering, but its usefulness is limited.

Even self defeating. Iran and NK aren’t stupid. Once an operational ABM system is there why on earth would they be stupid enough to plan to fire a BM over it? Stick the warhead in a small remote control submarine and sail it submerged into NY harbour, or put some patriots on board to manually sail her in.

Developing a mobile ABM system, the S-225, while being a signatory to the ABM treaty was a breach on Russia’s behalf.

The US didn’t renounce the ABM treaty till after many of the components were ready for testing. They were likely in material breach too.

Placing the S-225’s FLAT TWIN radar on the Kamchatka peninsula is a technical breach as well, albeit an amusing one since you can see it in Google Earth.

ABM radars were allowed to be placed on or near national borders. Kamchatka is a more legitimate place for a Soviet ABM Radar than Thule in Greenland or Flyingdales in the UK is.

That’d put them in the loop and help allay their concerns about how a few silos in Eastern Europe somehow mean all their ICBMs are irrelevant now.

reducing down to 2,000 warheads means that 1/3rd of those will be in ICBMs. That is about 650 odd warheads… or 200 odd ICBMs total with 3 warheads per missile as with Topol, or 65 missiles with SS-18s with 10 warheads per missile. If it is 65 missiles then having 10 interceptors is significant wouldn’t you agree? Considering that probably 10-15 would be heading for Europe and another 10-15 would be heading for China and Japan, with about 30 going over the pole to the US then 10 interceptors in Poland and 10 more in the UK and 10 in Japan and also any sea based ABM missiles plus 50 interceptors in alaska it starts to look like a very credible shield. Add some stealth bombers for a preemptive strike to reduce the numbers launched in the first place and some US president down the line might want to restart the cold war and launch a real war to get access to all that oil in Siberia…

The US should consider bringing Russia into the fold for a wide-scale ABM network given the numerous ABM radars they still possess.

Nice idea, but if they don’t trust each other now how can they put trust in each other to do this? For its part Russia has been offering for some time to help in the development of a European ABM system. This has been repeatedly rejected. What has changed?

Given that the ABM treaty is defunct, non-compliance is irrelevant.

Legally, yes. It does not serve to reinforce Russia’s trust though, it’s not like both sides mutually agreed to end it 😉

Developing a mobile ABM system, the S-225, while being a signatory to the ABM treaty was a breach on Russia’s behalf. Placing the S-225’s FLAT TWIN radar on the Kamchatka peninsula is a technical breach as well, albeit an amusing one since you can see it in Google Earth 😀

Well, wouldn’t the former rather have been a breach on the Soviet Union’s behalf? Small but important difference in this context, I’d say. About the latter, is this really an actual breach, there is only the radar after all (serious question, I really would like to know why)? It could even be described as being located on the periphery of the country 😉

Both sides need to take a deep breath and realize that the ABM treaty is no more, and neither side is obligated to abide by it anymore. The US should consider bringing Russia into the fold for a wide-scale ABM network given the numerous ABM radars they still possess. That’d put them in the loop and help allay their concerns about how a few silos in Eastern Europe somehow mean all their ICBMs are irrelevant now.

I agree. Giving Russia financial assistance for building/upgrading/maintaining those of their own radars that provide coverage of North Korea and Iran in return for access to the data they provide would be a powerful confidence-building measure. It would make radars in Eastern Europe redundant and perhaps even convince Russia to accept silos for interceptor missiles there (zero danger of them being used to target Russian missiles, because the data comes from their own radars).

Well, Russia’s is compliant with the (now defunct) ABM treaty while the US system, being nation-wide, isn’t AFAIK.

Given that the ABM treaty is defunct, non-compliance is irrelevant.

That in itself can be seen as a breach of trust and placing radars and interceptors on what amounts to Russia’s doorstep most certainly is too.

Developing a mobile ABM system, the S-225, while being a signatory to the ABM treaty was a breach on Russia’s behalf. Placing the S-225’s FLAT TWIN radar on the Kamchatka peninsula is a technical breach as well, albeit an amusing one since you can see it in Google Earth 😀 Both sides need to take a deep breath and realize that the ABM treaty is no more, and neither side is obligated to abide by it anymore. The US should consider bringing Russia into the fold for a wide-scale ABM network given the numerous ABM radars they still possess. That’d put them in the loop and help allay their concerns about how a few silos in Eastern Europe somehow mean all their ICBMs are irrelevant now.

Too many times we see the phrase missile shield used to describe the NMD program, in reality it is nothing more than a anti North Korea shield. Any concerted Russian Strike would overwhelm it and the Chinese are heading towards being able to do the same thing.

Dont get me wrong, this is a fantastic peace of engineering, but its usefulness is limited.

Well, Russia’s is compliant with the (now defunct) ABM treaty while the US system, being nation-wide, isn’t AFAIK. That in itself can be seen as a breach of trust and placing radars and interceptors on what amounts to Russia’s doorstep most certainly is too. Now, realistically it is probably correct that these bases are neither aimed at undermining the Russian ICBM force nor even have any significant capability to do so in practise, but it sends a message. And unfortunately for the USA it doesn’t matter what message it *intends* to send, what counts is the message that reaches the recipient (or his interpretation thereof) which can be *very* different indeed. The fact that the West has broken promises made to Russia before (such as not to expand NATO eastward) doesn’t help either – although the Russian belligerence is admittedly quite disconcerting, the West must accept part of the blame for it themselves.

As far as I can see the only way the ABM program violates the INF treaty is with the HERA target rocket. Not sure how it affects the CFE treaty.

Daniel

If this is true then the INF treaty is dead, adn the CFE treaty not far behind it.

Stop being such a drama queen. Russia has had ABMs for decades and now that the US has them it’s the end of the world? Please.

If this is true then the INF treaty is dead, adn the CFE treaty not far behind it.

Perhaps it is intentional provocation by the US to take international attention off Iraq so they can withdraw quietly and declare victory and hope to smooth things over with the Russians later…