The Royal Navy and SSK's.

You’re one who is dismissive of other posters – and not just me. You dismiss detailed and nuanced posts, often falsely claiming that the content is a repetitive, when it most obviously isn’t. You also launch personal attacks, devoid of any real content. Need I mention your attempt to dredge up an old helicopter topic in a submarine thread?

So I’m not the only one who has noticed?

TinWing: SSGT DRAWS ADMIRING CROWDS AT PACIFIC 2004

Jesus mate, you are desperate if you have to go back four years to a media release that a company issued to tell everyone exactly how wonderful the reception to their wonderous new product was.

I was there, there was some interest, mostly from the Defence media, and since then not one Navy has shown any serious interest in that technology.

As for your comment, that “Considering the last boat was only commissioned in 2001, the Collins class is hardly in need of replacement, so there is plenty of time for study” the RAN is undertaking that study, with the first of class due to be enter service in the post 2020 time frame.

Very preliminary planning started two years ago, so is a decade and a half of planning for the next class of sub sufficiant for you?

By the time the first enters service Collins will have been in service for at least 24 years.

Surely you are not seriously trying to tell me that a quarter century is not long enough for a sub to remain in service?

Tinwing, what exactly is your experience in the operational requirements of the RAN, with particular emphasis on the mission profiles of the Collins class? You try and speak on what they should or should not try and do, but where is your expertise in the issues here?

Similarly, what non-nuclear, available technology boat was able to fulfil those requirements pray tell.

As for your comments about the book I referred you to, if you are basing your counter arguments on an exerpt then you are either trying to take the cr@p or are a complete bull-excreter artist.

Unicorn

I just throw this in here then……..

[size=5]HMS Superb Update – Arrival in Crete[/size]

(Source: UK Ministry of Defence; issued June 10, 2008)

The Royal Navy submarine HMS Superb, which suffered some damage when she struck an underwater pinnacle in the Red Sea on 26 May, has arrived in Crete for a short period.

Having carried out an initial inspection in Aqaba, Jordan to ensure her safe passage of the Suez canal, the submarine arrived at the NATO facility at Souda Bay on 9 Jun for a further assessment and essential repair in order to complete the rest of her passage back to the UK.

Whilst damage to her main sonar system and ballast tanks meant she remained on the surface whilst on passage as a sensible precaution, the submarine sailed under her own power from Aqaba to Crete.

The circumstances of the grounding, in which there were no casualties or environmental impact, are still subject to an investigation.

-ends-

http://www.defense-aerospace.com

You’re one who is dismissive of other posters – and not just me. You dismiss detailed and nuanced posts, often falsely claiming that the content is a repetitive, when it most obviously isn’t. You also launch personal attacks, devoid of any real content. Need I mention your attempt to dredge up an old helicopter topic in a submarine thread?

I merely like to establish the character of a poster, it can be very revealing, in your case your history shows you to be racist, prone to vague unsupported generalisations, a poor level of knowledge and a generally rude and patronising tone. Now swerve, Jonesey, Fedaykin et al show none of those attributes so they get my respect.

This post deals with the SSGT, the previous BMT concept for a large blue water submarine:

http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=28700&highlight=ssgt

http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/default.htm?ID=1

SSGT DRAWS ADMIRING CROWDS AT PACIFIC 2004

BMT Defence Services Ltd unveiled its concept for a high mobility submarine at the Pacific 2004 maritime exhibition in Sydney, Australia, at the start of February.

A model of the SSGT (Ship Submersible Gas Turbine) was displayed on the BMT Defence Services stand at the show, attracting interest from naval delegations and defence sector professionals from many Pacific Rim regions and countries including Australia and New Zealand; south-east Asia, Canada and the USA during the four day event that began on 3rd February 2004.

Marketing Director for BMT Defence Services, John Davis, explained the key benefits of the design to those viewing the disruptively-patterned submarine model: “SSGT is designed to provide effective mobility approaching that of an SSN without the financial and political costs of ownership associated with having a nuclear reactor onboard”.

Conceived by design engineers at BMT Defence Services in Bath, UK, the SSGT sees the first serious proposal for using gas turbines in a conventional submarine. Though gas turbines can be very compact they are voracious consumers of air and submarine designers have to date been unable to arrange sufficient volumes of air to feed gas turbines buried inside the hull of a submarine.

The innovation proposed by BMT Defence Services, in consultation with gas turbine specialists Rolls Royce, is to locate two independent gas turbine-electric alternator sets in individual containments located in a bulb at the top of the submarine fin where they can draw sufficient air through an 8m tall induction mast. When operating on gas turbines, the submarine runs semi-submerged, with just the gas turbine bulb above the sea surface. In this mode, SSGT is able to travel up to 6,000 nautical miles at 20 knots, far in excess of the capability of a conventional diesel-electric submarine.

The SSGT design trades off tactical covertness of the submarine against strategic mobility on the assumption that the submarine will meet few, if any, threats during transit. Once in-theatre, SSGT shuts down its gas turbines, dives and can operate fully covertly for up to 25 days in an Air Independent Propulsion mode (AIP). A mixture of fuel cells and advanced ZEBRA batteries provide power for systems and permit submerged operations up to 10 knots and short tactical sprints at 30 knots respectively. Kerosene is used to fuel the gas turbines and (via reformers) the fuel cells thus giving deep flexibility between transit and in theatre operations. Liquid oxygen is stored to enable the fuel cells to operate when the boat is submerged. SSGT may also run its fuel cells at the surface taking air using a conventional snort mast. In this way the boat may be more covert whilst in transit and preserve the stored liquid oxygen to maximise discretion in theatre.

Well resourced in onboard power, SSGT supports a highly capable and comprehensive combat suite including chin, fin and flank sonar arrays, six heavyweight torpedo tubes, eight vertical launch missile tubes and stowage for four large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) or swimmer delivery vehicles (SDV). Accommodation for up to 12 special forces personnel and a six-man lock-in lock-out chamber complete a flexible design capable of undertaking a range of high and low level missions.

As you can see, it took an unprecedented operational concept and radical hullform to give a conventional submarine the deployability of a SSN – along with a remarkable admission:

The SSGT design trades off tactical covertness of the submarine against strategic mobility on the assumption that the submarine will meet few, if any, threats during transit.

In the end, you can’t snorkel at much more than 10 knots, no matter how large or small the submarine is, and the limiting factor on any deployment is the human element. It would take a radical, semi-submerged submarine concept like the SSGT to make a SSK globally deployable, with adequate transit speeds.

No anger at all, just yet another case of you posting some vague generalities without any supporting evidence. I have no problem with people posting their opionions as long as they back them up. Unfortunately you always take an aggresive and dismissive tone towards other posters who clearly know far more than you do, This thread being a classic example.

You’re one who is dismissive of other posters – and not just me. You dismiss detailed and nuanced posts, often falsely claiming that the content is a repetitive, when it most obviously isn’t. You also launch personal attacks, devoid of any real content. Need I mention your attempt to dredge up an old helicopter topic in a submarine thread?

[QUOTE=TinWing;1257018

]I responded at the time, which must be nearly 2 years ago. I doubt that you would have read or comprehended the the response, but merely would have made your typically ad hominem response.

The parallels between the RAH-66 and the Eurocopter Tigre were perfect obvious. Both programs suffered from mission creep, intolerable delay and massive per/unit costs. Both helicopter were successful in terms of flight dynamics and engine developement. The main difference is that the United States finally canceled the Commanche, and quite justifiably so, but equally obviously, employment concerns prevented the Europeans from doing the same with the Tigre. The issue at the time was the ridiculously protracted delivery schedule for the Tigre, with so few units actually being available for service at the time.

No you did not so dont make me dig up the thread to prove it, you should have provided the above answer in the aformentioned thread where it would have been very abruptly destroyed as obviously flawed. Commanche was cancelled after two prototypes whereas Tigre is in service and has been exported to two other countries.

You seem to have the habit of asking question and then getting angry when the responses don’t correspond to your own personal opinions. You don’t seem to be looking for answers as much as personal validation.

No anger at all, just yet another case of you posting some vague generalities without any supporting evidence. I have no problem with people posting their opionions as long as they back them up. Unfortunately you always take an aggresive and dismissive tone towards other posters who clearly know far more than you do, This thread being a classic example.

Nothing of use in that post but once again you have made yourself look rather silly (I remind you that this forum is still awaiting an explanation from you as to whay the Eurocopter Tigre is a ‘pan-European Commanche’).

I responded at the time, which must be nearly 2 years ago. I doubt that you would have read or comprehended the the response, but merely would have made your typically ad hominem response.

The parallels between the RAH-66 and the Eurocopter Tigre were perfect obvious. Both programs suffered from mission creep, intolerable delay and massive per/unit costs. Both helicopter were successful in terms of flight dynamics and engine developement. The main difference is that the United States finally canceled the Commanche, and quite justifiably so, but equally obviously, employment concerns prevented the Europeans from doing the same with the Tigre. The issue at the time was the ridiculously protracted delivery schedule for the Tigre, with so few units actually being available for service at the time.

You seem to have the habit of asking question and then getting angry when the responses don’t correspond to your own personal opinions. You don’t seem to be looking for answers as much as personal validation.

No, I question the original requirement that lead to the Collins class and I question the mistaken logic of pursuing a replacement along the same lines. The RAN deliberately wrote a peculiar requirement that would require a SSK of unprecedented size, opting for a expensive and unprecedented “paper design,” despite the obvious risks and costs. It is time to question the rationale behind a potential Collins class replacement. If the Collins class needs replacement, it is time to reject the limiting notion of a large domestically produced SSK, and to consider a smaller number of more effective SSN, or a larger number of smaller SSKs with innovative forward basing concepts.

Having read the excerpt form the publisher’s website, I can only conclude that the author is woefully ignorant of contemporary economics:

The reality is that protectionism and organized labor, with the resulting wage-price spiral, were at the heart of the economic crisis of the 1970s in Australia. In the end, the Collins class program was just as “focused solely on the domestic market” because of its complete failure in the export market. Of course, the Collins class program exemplifies how Australia has failed to make a break with the economic past. Domestic submarine production maintains Australian trade union employment, while producing a product that is unsuitable for export. In a broader sense, this state of affairs is hardly different that the shipbuilding practices of the 1960s, and although the outlays have been far greater in relative terms, the outcome has been the same – no exports.

In that case, please explain the absence of any export orders?

The uniqueness of the capability speaks volumes.

It is wrong to push forward procurement without re-considering the very peculiar basis of the operation requirements. It is time to question every aspect of the Collins class replacement program, from the seemingly premature nature of the program, driven largely by employment concerns, to the basing of the current subs on the west coast – which only places the submarines farther from potential operational areas, driving up the size and costs of the platform. Other options should be explored. Considering the last boat was only commissioned in 2001, the Collins class is hardly in need of replacement, so there is plenty of time for study.

Nothing of use in that post but once again you have made yourself look rather silly (I remind you that this forum is still awaiting an explanation from you as to whay the Eurocopter Tigre is a ‘pan-European Commanche’).

Why no exports? unique requirement with most other countires requiring smaller SSK’s, the uniqueness of the requirement is the answer to the question.

Perhaps you could tell us where Australia is going to find affordable (both financially and in terms of manpower and logistic foot print) SSN’s from given that with the exception of the still paper Barracuda design most are rapidly growing in size to 7000tons +.

Or maybe you could tell us something about your forward basing concepts, where, how many etc etc? Are there many facilities around the Australian periphery that could forward base an SSK and keep its presence quiet, otherwise how much is the establishment of such bases to cost?

Sure evaluate the procurement costs but anybody with sufficient intellect to dress themselves should be able to see that the large SSK route is really the best if not the only option for Australia.

There speaks someone who doesn’t have a clue to the operational profile and capabilities demanded by the RAN to undertake their required duties.

There is NO ‘off the shelf’ design that is available that matches the requirements of the RAN. Most SSKs are too small and too range limited to allow the long range transits to operational areas. The ones that are not too small are not available (Japanese basically).

No, I question the original requirement that lead to the Collins class and I question the mistaken logic of pursuing a replacement along the same lines. The RAN deliberately wrote a peculiar requirement that would require a SSK of unprecedented size, opting for a expensive and unprecedented “paper design,” despite the obvious risks and costs. It is time to question the rationale behind a potential Collins class replacement. If the Collins class needs replacement, it is time to reject the limiting notion of a large domestically produced SSK, and to consider a smaller number of more effective SSN, or a larger number of smaller SSKs with innovative forward basing concepts.

I suggest you get yourself a copy of the recent book analysing the project, including the operational requirements, why the Colins class was selected and who was responsible for what issues with the class, plus what was done to fix those issues, it is called “The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin” and is essential reading for any layman to understand what transpired with the Collins.

Having read the excerpt form the publisher’s website, I can only conclude that the author is woefully ignorant of contemporary economics:

Naval shipbuilding reflected deeper problems in the Australian economy. While manufacturing expanded rapidly in the 1940s and 1950s, stimulated first by the war and later by a rapidly rising population, it was dependent on high tariffs on imports. Australian manufacturers were small-scale, technologically backward and focused solely on the domestic market. Industrial relations were poor, labour costs high and productivity low. These factors lay behind the malaise of the Australian economy in the 1970s and early 1980s when high inflation and unemployment accompanied a rapid decline in the country’s manufacturing base.

The reality is that protectionism and organized labor, with the resulting wage-price spiral, were at the heart of the economic crisis of the 1970s in Australia. In the end, the Collins class program was just as “focused solely on the domestic market” because of its complete failure in the export market. Of course, the Collins class program exemplifies how Australia has failed to make a break with the economic past. Domestic submarine production maintains Australian trade union employment, while producing a product that is unsuitable for export. In a broader sense, this state of affairs is hardly different that the shipbuilding practices of the 1960s, and although the outlays have been far greater in relative terms, the outcome has been the same – no exports.

The issues of the Collins class involved most of the players involved, including the Australian Government and the RAN, the manufacturer (ASC) and the designer (Kockums) but the issues have been overcome and there is a reason that the Collins class are considered one of the best SSK classes available anywhere.

In that case, please explain the absence of any export orders?

It cost a lot of money to get where the Collins class are now, but the capability was not available anywhere else.

The uniqueness of the capability speaks volumes.

In the future those same operational requirements exist, and once again there is no ‘off the shelf’ design that meets the requirements, so the decision has been taken that a replacement will be designed and built in Australia, leveraging off the expertise created to build and maintain the Collins.

It is wrong to push forward procurement without re-considering the very peculiar basis of the operation requirements. It is time to question every aspect of the Collins class replacement program, from the seemingly premature nature of the program, driven largely by employment concerns, to the basing of the current subs on the west coast – which only places the submarines farther from potential operational areas, driving up the size and costs of the platform. Other options should be explored. Considering the last boat was only commissioned in 2001, the Collins class is hardly in need of replacement, so there is plenty of time for study.

Personally, I question the need to replace the Collins class in the near term. Perhaps the best bet is a service life extension, and failing that, an honest appraisal of long term needs. Instead of seeking yet another oversized, over-specified design, it would be better for Australia to either chose a conventional, off the shelf SSK or consider a smaller number of SSN hulls, sacrificing numbers for greater capability. Either way, the Collins class proves that it make absolutely no sense to maintain a submarine production base in Australia – unless a future government is eager to engage in yet another embarrassing program for the sake of maintaining employment.

There speaks someone who doesn’t have a clue to the operational profile and capabilities demanded by the RAN to undertake their required duties.

There is NO ‘off the shelf’ design that is available that matches the requirements of the RAN. Most SSKs are too small and too range limited to allow the long range transits to operational areas. The ones that are not too small are not available (Japanese basically).

I suggest you get yourself a copy of the recent book analysing the project, including the operational requirements, why the Colins class was selected and who was responsible for what issues with the class, plus what was done to fix those issues, it is called “The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin” and is essential reading for any layman to understand what transpired with the Collins.

The issues of the Collins class involved most of the players involved, including the Australian Government and the RAN, the manufacturer (ASC) and the designer (Kockums) but the issues have been overcome and there is a reason that the Collins class are considered one of the best SSK classes available anywhere.

It cost a lot of money to get where the Collins class are now, but the capability was not available anywhere else.

In the future those same operational requirements exist, and once again there is no ‘off the shelf’ design that meets the requirements, so the decision has been taken that a replacement will be designed and built in Australia, leveraging off the expertise created to build and maintain the Collins.

Unicorn

I direct you to the

The real question is a bit more pragmatic then all of that and forces us to retrace a little history.

Back in the late 1980’s the RN maintained a mixed submarine force because SSK’s are cheaper than SSN’s and they couldn’t possibly afford to go to an all-SSN force while maintaining Cold War force level requirements. Back around 1990 IIRC that force included some 16-17 SSN’s and 10-11 SSK’s with 12-18 of the latter planned as new construction.

Then along comes the 1990’s, the threat is dramatically reduced and the budget is reduced accordingly, plus a little extra. As a consequence the force level is reset much lower than before. Instead of say 25-30 boats the navy has to make do with less than half that (last I checked that level was just 11, with noise being made about possibly dropping to only 8). This level can be maintained merely by using existing SSN’s thus resulting in an all-SSN force . Acquiring or keeping SSK’s at this point becomes a really bad idea because they effectively become one-for-one replacements for the far more capable and flexible SSN’s. In other words, if you can only have X number of submarines you want them all to be the most capable possible. In a navy that still has worldwide commitments the SSN will likely be the preferred choice, whatever niche the SSK might fill.

To make SSK’s viable in the RN again would require a dramatic shift in threats and priorities. Current force level numbers are simply far too low to support a mixed fleet.

We are all well aware of the history.

Tinwing

In retrospect, it seems that the Upholders were never fully operational in the strictest sense, and the supposed lack of upkeep during storage wasn’t the true source of all of the later difficulties.

Guess what – the Upholders were’nt new and were sold as such with a remarkably small price tag!. An operational ‘dent’ is the sort of thing that happens to submarines sometimes. Did the Canadian Forces not drydock the sub and check its hull?. I can tell you yes they did!. All the Upholders weren’t fully operational by the time they were left tied alongside I believe I said that earlier so I dont quite see the revelation there???

The Barrow built Chicoutimi/ex-Upholder was altogether unfit for service as an operational submarine, as proven by the fatal 2004 fire

The 2004 fire that was caused by them running on the surface with the tower hatch open whilst having watertight electrics runs open below you mean?. A fire that would have been utterly preventable if they’d shut the hatch and drained the spaces before opening the electrics run?. Yeah thats the fault of a shoddy design isnt it!.

Of course, the cracked diesel exhaust valves in all of the class, and the transformer fire aboard HMCS Windsor hardly give any great confidence in the material quality of the Victoria/Upholder class. The fundamental design and material quality faults go well beyond the lead ship of the class.

Fundamental design and materiel quality faults based on a bad set of valves and component failure on a 10 years old transformer….are you joking?. Tell you what – you leave a Rolls Royce parked outside in the elements for 10 years, with no routine maintenance, and then go back to it…see how good its alternator is!. You going to say a Rolls Royce has ‘design and quality’ issues based on that???. Behave!. The fact that they have two of the four operational at all I think is absolutely amazing and about all they paid for!.

The fact that the Upholder class aren’t really very well optimised for Canadian requirements is entirely the Canadians issue…they decided they wanted them!?.

Crikey how many times do we have to endure ill-educated claptrap about the Upholder class Patrol sub.

Once and for all the Upholders were only just entering service when they were discarded. The initial boats that went through proper shakedowns were fine. The later boats didnt get this and then got tied up, without maintenance, for a decade. You take the very finest ship money can buy, dont subject it to proper sea trials, then let it rust for 10 years with scarce maintenance and see what the result is!!!

I can honestly believe that the Upholders weren’t properly “mothballed,” but the fact remains that there is some doubt about their RN service histories. The now infamous “dent” found in the hull of the Victoria in 2002, was the result of an unreported incident in RN service. In retrospect, it seems that the Upholders were never fully operational in the strictest sense, and the supposed lack of upkeep during storage wasn’t the true source of all of the later difficulties.

Love to see your justification of ‘inherently flawed and poorly built’ Tinwing. Given that three of the four boats were built at Cammell Lairds, my brother QI’d on them, and I saw them being built I will TELL you, from first hand observation, that those boats were built properly and by people who cared about the quality of their product.

You should have read my post more closely. The Barrow built Chicoutimi/ex-Upholder was altogether unfit for service as an operational submarine, as proven by the fatal 2004 fire. As I said, “…3 out of the 4 Upholders might have successful in British service given time, and a far great financial investment.” The Chicoutimi/ex-Upholder is a uniquely bad example of bad shipbuilding practices.

Of course, the cracked diesel exhaust valves in all of the class, and the transformer fire aboard HMCS Windsor hardly give any great confidence in the material quality of the Victoria/Upholder class. The fundamental design and material quality faults go well beyond the lead ship of the class.

Crikey how many times do we have to endure ill-educated claptrap about the Upholder class Patrol sub.

Once and for all the Upholders were only just entering service when they were discarded. The initial boats that went through proper shakedowns were fine. The later boats didnt get this and then got tied up, without maintenance, for a decade. You take the very finest ship money can buy, dont subject it to proper sea trials, then let it rust for 10 years with scarce maintenance and see what the result is!!!.

Love to see your justification of ‘inherently flawed and poorly built’ Tinwing. Given that three of the four boats were built at Cammell Lairds, my brother QI’d on them, and I saw them being built I will TELL you, from first hand observation, that those boats were built properly and by people who cared about the quality of their product.

As to the reason why Patrol subs were discarded?. Really its the same reason as to why the Royal Navy has no interest in them now. No mission for them. Patrol subs do what they say on the label – for us they were great for trolling up and down the GIUK gap at a few knots above steerage and laying in wait for Red Banner Fleet units coming steaming down into the Atlantic approaches. No need for an SSN on that one, ‘specially not when there are dozens of MPA’s and SOSUS pushing out your sensor range for you.

When it became obvious that the Red Banner Fleet threat was disintegrating with the Soviet Union the patrol subs lost their real raison d’etre. We could use them to patrol the western Med from Gib, possibly forward base them in the Gulf or down in the Falklands, but, really they would be resource intensive platforms that offer little really worthwhile capability – certainly not capability that cant be better addressed in other ways.

The littoral battlespace is not somewhere to send your own SSK’s to as transits take time and support – look at how long it took HMS Onyx to get down to the oparea in the Falklands and that was predominantly a surface transit on diesels. Not always wise to use your own SSK’s to challenge enemy SSK’s either as, usually, they would have home field advantage. Best to use LFA sonar and lots of FLASH-kitted choppers to create a ‘beaten zone’ to keep enemy SSK’s away.

Interesting thread and I won’t profess to come up with original points given most have been covered already!

I would have made the point about speed and refuelling myself, along with stealth. Even an AIP SSK needs to surface from time-to-time – a SSN can stay submerged for months. Most SSK nations do not seek to use their submarines in a “global blue-water” fashion.

I agree that there isn’t a threat in our backyard that requires SSKs as well as SSNs. Although I wouldn’t be surprised if they were cut out for mostly financial reasons, that doesn’t mean there was another good argument to get rid of them.

… Either way, the Collins class proves that it make absolutely no sense to maintain a submarine production base in Australia – unless a future government is eager to engage in yet another embarrassing program for the sake of maintaining employment.

If you listen to Australians, you’ll hear that the problems were due to the Swedes (hull, acoustic management) & Americans (combat system), & ironed out by both with the help of Australians. But I have no way of assessing the accuracy of those claims.

Consider the troubled history of the Upholder/Victoria class in Canadian service. It should be clear that the Upholders were “lemons,” and the RN did well to dispose of them, although it was hardly right that the unsuspecting Canadians were the beneficiaries of such British generosity. ….

The subs operated satisfactorily (if briefly) in RN service, without the problems the Canadians have had, which probably have more to do with the subs being put into storage as soon as their teething troubles had been ironed out, then ignored for 5 years, allowing them to deteriorate, than any flaws in design or construction. The two faults RN service uncovered were corrected, & the corrections tested in service, & AFAIK neither has resurfaced in Canadian service.

The real question is a bit more pragmatic then all of that and forces us to retrace a little history.

Back in the late 1980’s the RN maintained a mixed submarine force because SSK’s are cheaper than SSN’s and they couldn’t possibly afford to go to an all-SSN force while maintaining Cold War force level requirements. Back around 1990 IIRC that force included some 16-17 SSN’s and 10-11 SSK’s with 12-18 of the latter planned as new construction.

Then along comes the 1990’s, the threat is dramatically reduced and the budget is reduced accordingly, plus a little extra. As a consequence the force level is reset much lower than before. Instead of say 25-30 boats the navy has to make do with less than half that (last I checked that level was just 11, with noise being made about possibly dropping to only 8). This level can be maintained merely by using existing SSN’s thus resulting in an all-SSN force . Acquiring or keeping SSK’s at this point becomes a really bad idea because they effectively become one-for-one replacements for the far more capable and flexible SSN’s. In other words, if you can only have X number of submarines you want them all to be the most capable possible. In a navy that still has worldwide commitments the SSN will likely be the preferred choice, whatever niche the SSK might fill.

To make SSK’s viable in the RN again would require a dramatic shift in threats and priorities. Current force level numbers are simply far too low to support a mixed fleet.

Well lets just agree to disagree:D

I think the RN should have kept them they certainly found use for them prior to getting rid of them and they certainly could have a place now.

Consider the troubled history of the Upholder/Victoria class in Canadian service. It should be clear that the Upholders were “lemons,” and the RN did well to dispose of them, although it was hardly right that the unsuspecting Canadians were the beneficiaries of such British generosity. Currently, only a single Upholder is partially(?) operation in Canada, and of the four, the Chicoutimi/ex-Upholder will not re-enter service until 2012 because of the fatal 2004 fire!

I suspect that 3 out of the 4 Upholders might have successful in British service given time, and a far great financial investment, but it seems probable that a like number of SSNs would have been sacrificed to keep these SSKs in service. It was far better to sacrificed the inherently flawed, and poor built, Upholders, to maintain the Swiftsure SSNs, in hopes of receiving a like number of Astutes, especially since there was absolutely no chance of obtaining an export order to the Type 2400.