Turkish Airlines crash at AMS

Perhaps the pilots were distracted while trying to work out why they were getting conflicting readings in their instuments.
Remember the Eastern 1011 that went down in the Everglades…

Best Regards Steve

______________________________________________________________________
…In light of the latest release from the actual investigators, the armchair quarter-backs are again looking quite goofy!

You’re off to a flying start …sh*t stirring on your very first post!!!

The press release from the DSB, there’s an awful lot of Swiss-cheese here.
http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/index.php/onderzoeken/onderzoeksraad-start-onderzoek-crash-turkish-airlines-op-schiphol/

In my airline we call out speed deviations +10/-5 kts from Vref with the “check speed” call out.
I do know that CVR recordings are not usually released, but it would be interesting to know what was going on in that cockpit at approx 1900 feet on the altimeter with throttles at idle and speed disappearing as well. A three man cockpit should surely be able to spot something wrong?:confused:

It begs the question: what was going on in that cockpit! Three pilots sitting in the cockpit, Autopilot/Autothrottle goes into land mode at about 1900 feet on the altimeter, airplane goes 40 kts below Vref, and apparently no-one had anything to say!

I am sure a lot was said, but you are not going to hear it as CVR’s are not usually released. It looks as though a quicker rather than later conclusion has been reached about the cause of the accident.

It begs the question: what was going on in that cockpit! Three pilots sitting in the cockpit, Autopilot/Autothrottle goes into land mode at about 1900 feet on the altimeter, airplane goes 40 kts below Vref, and apparently no-one had anything to say!

If this is the case there would have been so many ways to see that they were well below glide… again, I’m not going to comment on what they may or may not have done… leave it to the professionals, eh? :rolleyes:

I think they’ve hit the nail on the head…it all points to wake turbulence or fuel starvation…you can rule out wind shear as the weather was quite calm on the fatal day!!!

Best Regards Steve

______________________________________________________________________
…In light of the latest release from the actual investigators, the armchair quarter-backs are again looking quite goofy!

This is circulating through some forums including Turkish ones. Not 100% sure about its authenticity though.

FROM: THE BOEING COMPANY
TO: MOM [MESSAGE NUMBER:MOM-MOM-09-0063-01B] 04-Mar-2009 05:29:01 AM US PACIFIC TIME
Multi Operator Message

This message is sent to all 737-100,-200,-300,-400,-500,-600,-700,-800,-900,-BBJ customers and to respective Boeing Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association, and Airline Resident Representatives.

SERVICE REQUEST ID: 1-1228079803
ACCOUNT: Boeing Correspondence (MOM)
DUE DATE: 10-Mar-2009
PRODUCT TYPE: Airplane
PRODUCT LINE: 737
PRODUCT: 737-100,-200,-300,-400,-500,-600,-700,-800,-900,-BBJ
ATA: 3400-00

SUBJECT: 737-800 TC-JGE Accident at Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam – 25 February 2009

REFERENCES:
/A/ 1-1222489391 Dated 25 February 2009

Reference /A/ provides Boeing’s previous fleet communication on the subject event. The US NTSB, FAA, Boeing, the Turkish DGCA, the operator, the UK AAIB, and the French BEA continue to actively support the Dutch Safety Board’s (DSB) investigation of this accident.

The DSB has released a statement on the progress of the investigation and has approved the release of the following information.

While the complex investigation is just beginning, certain facts have emerged from work completed thus far:

– To date, no evidence has been found of bird strike, engine or airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear.
– There was adequate fuel on board the airplane during the entire flight.
– Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs during the entire flight.
– The airplane responded normally to flight control inputs throughout the flight.

The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was using autopilot B and the autothrottle for an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. During the approach, the right Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) was providing accurate data and the left LRRA was providing an erroneous reading of -7 to -8 feet. When descending through approximately 2000 feet the autothrottle, which uses the left radio altimeter data, transitioned to landing flare mode and retarded the throttles to the idle stop. The throttles remained at the idle stop for approximately 100 seconds during which time the airspeed decreased to approximately 40 knots below the selected approach speed.

The two LRRA systems provide height above ground readings to several aircraft systems including the instrument displays, autothrottle, autopilots and configuration/ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides erroneous altitude readings, typical flight deck effects, which require flight crew intervention whether or not accompanied by an LRRA fault flag, include:

– Large differences between displayed radio altitudes, including radio altitude readings of -8 feet in flight.
– Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel APP (Approach) mode
– Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command Bars during approach
– Unexpected Configuration Warnings during approach, go-around and initial climb after takeoff
– Premature FMA (Flight Mode Annunciation) indicating autothrottle RETARD mode during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL. There will also be corresponding throttle movement towards the idle stop. Additionally, the FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the throttles have reached the idle stop

Boeing Recommended Action

– Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is released. In addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for autoflight modes. More information can be found in the Boeing 737 Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual.

Operators who experience any of the flight deck effects described above should consult the troubleshooting instructions contained in the 737 Airplane Maintenance Manual. Further, 737-NG operators may wish to review 737NG-FTD-34-09001 which provides information specific for the 737-NG installation. Initial investigations suggest that a similar sequence of events and flight deck indications are theoretically possible on the 737-100/-200/-300/-400/-500.

Consequently the above recommendations also apply to earlier 737 models.

Thanks for the info regarding the use of the radio altimeter with the autopilot/thrust. I’m only used to working with a barometric altimeter. 🙂

The barometric altimeter is not connected to the autoland function of the Autopilot/Autothrust. All autolands are done with reference to Radio Altimeter only. So it has to be a Radio Altimeter fault to cause the autothrust to close like it would do in a normal autolanding.

Hmm I never post anything on forums about crashes until the AAIB has done their bit as I never like to speculate however one of the things I thought of was that the altimeter could of been part of the problem because the crews, as far as I know, never made a ‘brace for impact’ call to passengers suggesting they may not of even been aware of the problem.

I suppose with the altimeter being faulty, combined with 2 mile visibility it would of made the crews job harder. Visibility always looks worse when you’re higher up than it does on the surface. I wonder what the fault was exactly with the altimeter, incorrect QNH or an actual altimeter fault?

Yeah, I was just going to post that. Should the pilots not have been keeping an eye on this kind of thing? Or would it not have been noticeable? I’m not pointing any fingers, I’m just asking out of my own ignorance on the subject 🙂

An update from the investigation suggests an altimeter problem:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7923782.stm

Also as far as I can tell there doesn’t appear to be eny evidence of a wire strike on the fin or flight deck window frame. So the mystery of the missing winglet tips remains.

Rgds Cking

Perhaps they broke off with the initial impact.

Looking at the pictures on airliners.net. It look like the front two slides were not engaged but the warning flag was placed across the door window.?????:confused: I have never heard of the slides being dis engaged deliberately in flight.
Also as far as I can tell there doesn’t appear to be eny evidence of a wire strike on the fin or flight deck window frame. So the mystery of the missing winglet tips remains.

Rgds Cking

That struck me as odd too, along with the slides being disarmed? .

Yes very odd. I can’t see anybody being in such a state of mind after the accident to dis arm them. Particularly as the 737 slides are not dis armed by a lever and anyone bending down to dis arm them would stand a chance of being “Trampled under foot” during the evacuation.

Rgds Cking

I think they’ve hit the nail on the head…it all points to wake turbulence or fuel starvation…you can rule out wind shear as the weather was quite calm on the fatal day!!!

A number of witnesses have said they heard the engines accelerating shortly before the impact. As good is the data in the DFDR should be release today and that should clear it up. According to the tracks, the a/c was under the glide-path for quite a while.

The curious thing I noticed about the wreckage is that the top of both winglet are missing. Did it hit some wires on the way down maybe? The rest of the damage looks pretty standard although I was supprised that the crew died looking at the relatively intact flight deck.
Tis sad and my thoughts go out to the families

Rgds Cking

I think they’ve hit the nail on the head…it all points to wake turbulence or fuel starvation…you can rule out wind shear as the weather was quite calm on the fatal day!!!