I have just finished reading a book from around 1980, that tells the story of the UK’s Nuclear deterrent, ranging from the awsome V-FORCE to the POLARIS Sub based weapon, AFAIK Polaris was replace by Trident. Am I correct in thinking that Trident is now nearing its retirement age and its replacement is being discussed by the powers that be. Also the book describes the Submarine based deterrent as having only FOUR subs, And at any time only ONE on duty and in its intended position, where the other THREE are either in service/refit and en-route. Does anyone know if these facts are correct as the book describes………….
By: sealordlawrence - 12th February 2008 at 00:15
Although the TSR-2 continued a trend of insanely lavish RAF aircraft requirements it was probably more a victim of its doctrine than its complexity. Simultaneous to this the RAF was pursuing Phantoms and supersonic harriers whilst the RN had its own programmes. Had a single type been worked on, one that could have fulfilled most of the RAF’s sub-strategic requirements (if not to the same extent as individual types) the end result could well have been a survivable project and a far greater UK presence on international markets. The sad thing is that parts of such an aircraft are still tucked away in storage, the Hawker P.1121, largely constructed but never flown.
By: swerve - 11th February 2008 at 22:43
Calm down everybody! There is a lot of merit in both arguments.
– Nimrod as a bomber: this is pretty much the same deal as the B-52, it is not likely to survive more than ten minutes in hostile airspace. This does not negate its value, however, as a stand-off missile carrier, and as a long endurance bomber, it has value. In this role, it has pretty good survivability, though I would want something longer range than the normal Storm Shadow for use against higher threat level targets. …
Storm Shadow could have the sort of treatment proposed for KEPD-350, i.e. the development of an extended-range version, lightened (Less RAM? Smaller warhead?) and with more fuel. Or just more fuel, & a slightly more powerful engine to cope with the extra weight.
As for the TSR-2, it was very ‘advanced’ (I say this because I do feel it was too advanced for the resources available, literally bleeding edge) and as such, perhaps not ideal in the financial climate. I do agree that buying F-105s would actually have made a lot more sense, probably to be replaced by a new type in the ’70s (not TSR-2!). A batch of F-105s, plus Buccaneers would be sensible – F-105s carrying missiles (a British AGM-69 SRAM type?) and Buccaneers carrying free-fall nukes and anti-radar missiles would be worthwhile.
Agreed about the TSR.2. Lovely plane, but pushing things too far for our resources at the time. I think it was worth developing the avionics (or at least, some of them), but they should have been fitted to a less ambitious airframe, e.g. the Buccaneer. The TSR.2 was a last gasp of the over-ambition we suffered from throughout the 1950s, trying to develop everything, & ending up with less than what we could have had if we’d been more selective & better focused. No Javelin, develop the Sea Vixen more; no TSR.2, but a better Buccaneer (one of my pet ideas, I must confess), with all the trimmings (multi-bomb racks, more missiles, much better avionics . . . ). Half the aircraft rejected on the drawing board, & most of the unbuilt projects rejected at the conceptual stage. Less money spent for more results.
By: EdLaw - 11th February 2008 at 12:07
Calm down everybody! There is a lot of merit in both arguments.
– Nimrod as a bomber: this is pretty much the same deal as the B-52, it is not likely to survive more than ten minutes in hostile airspace. This does not negate its value, however, as a stand-off missile carrier, and as a long endurance bomber, it has value. In this role, it has pretty good survivability, though I would want something longer range than the normal Storm Shadow for use against higher threat level targets.
– The SSNs and their Tomahawks have one massive advantage, endurance. They can sit, hidden, off the coast and lob in missiles as needed. However, they also suffer from serious limits in terms of numbers (even four Astutes, carrying sixteen missiles each can only hit the same number of targets as eight Nimrods doing a single fully-loaded sortie each). I do not say this to belittle their important role, but there are limitations for all the options.
As for the TSR-2, it was very ‘advanced’ (I say this because I do feel it was too advanced for the resources available, literally bleeding edge) and as such, perhaps not ideal in the financial climate. I do agree that buying F-105s would actually have made a lot more sense, probably to be replaced by a new type in the ’70s (not TSR-2!). A batch of F-105s, plus Buccaneers would be sensible – F-105s carrying missiles (a British AGM-69 SRAM type?) and Buccaneers carrying free-fall nukes and anti-radar missiles would be worthwhile.
By: Mercurius - 4th February 2008 at 22:42
Thanks for that paper, Distiller – it’s a lot more complex than the neat but forgotten/mislaid rules of thumb I was taught all those years ago.
I should have learned from all those Saturday sessions in the local cinema during the 1950s that whenever anyone looks out from the circled wagons and says “It’s very quiet out there” that the action is about to start. My ‘few days spare’ are rapidly vanishing as a result of alleged new Chinese air-to-air missiles, and Iran’s recent ‘space rocket’. Historical ‘what-ifs’ are going to have to take a back seat for a while.
By: Distiller - 4th February 2008 at 21:04
As I half-expected, in looking at V-bomber survivability I keep needing facts I don’t have to hand. Many years ago, a former V-force pilot taught me a rule of thumb for estimating the time of flight of a free-falling bomb from high altitude, and for how far its impact location will lie ahead of the release point.
I can’t lay my hands on it. Does anyone know it?
Today I made the mistake of starting with the worst-case endgame – the SAM defences around Moscow. Now I know why the RAF wanted Blue Steel so urgently. The number of SA-1 sites that could simultaneously ‘see’ a high-altitude bomber was a bit depressing, given the number of SAMs available at each site.
The low-altitude case will look a lot better, especially once I’ve taken account of terrain effects.
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19930091140_1993091140.pdf
Against Moscow in the 1960s? What approach do you assume? I guess back then coming from the south could have worked. Rolling landscape down there with woods, most of the AD looking west and north. Out from Cyprus or Crete, cross Anatolya, trying to buddy-buddy refill low over the Black Sea, landfall somewhere around Odessa, then straight north. Low and fast all the way. Take care not to hit one of the Stalin sisters on final. (Stupid thoughts!)
By: Turbinia - 4th February 2008 at 15:50
Personally, I think we should have a Joint UK Forces command, trim out the top brass and throw out a lot of high level time servers with a leaner, more front line focused command structure. These days given the down sizing of all three forces I no longer see a reason for three sets of bloated hierarchy when one should do, especially as joint force ops are now almost essential in any deployment. And despite the ambitions of the RAF, their main role is in support of ground ops (either land or sea) given that they have no strategic capability, and I say that as a former RAF man.
By: Mercurius - 3rd February 2008 at 17:50
As I half-expected, in looking at V-bomber survivability I keep needing facts I don’t have to hand. Many years ago, a former V-force pilot taught me a rule of thumb for estimating the time of flight of a free-falling bomb from high altitude, and for how far its impact location will lie ahead of the release point.
I can’t lay my hands on it. Does anyone know it?
Today I made the mistake of starting with the worst-case endgame – the SAM defences around Moscow. Now I know why the RAF wanted Blue Steel so urgently. The number of SA-1 sites that could simultaneously ‘see’ a high-altitude bomber was a bit depressing, given the number of SAMs available at each site.
The low-altitude case will look a lot better, especially once I’ve taken account of terrain effects.
By: Jonesy - 3rd February 2008 at 09:42
Jacko
Not to give the responsibility for CAS to an organisation that has proven incapable of maintaining and supporting complex aircraft types, or that misuses its air power assets whenever a senior officer needs an airborne taxi (the Army Air Corps).
Absolutely no way in hell you can get away with that swipe at the Pongo’s if your trying support the RAF!!!. If you are unaware of the number of air taxi hops that Senior Crabs undertake in bloody Tornadoes I suggest you try and get access to a source or two at Cranwell air ops. I’ve never seen or heard of profligate wastage like it.
By: Mercurius - 2nd February 2008 at 19:36
SLL, MC: you’re tussling over kilometers, but are not in significant dispute.
I think that he and I are in very significant dispute, but it isn’t over kilometres; it’s over how you analyse and present information. I try to use the academic approach, including a willingness to cite my sources, particularly primary and secondary sources.
He is quick to tell people they are wrong, but rarely cites primary or secondary sources or any other kind of published material that supports his views. But he’s quite ready to dismiss the source material offered by his opponents; for example, he tells me that I need to interpret the sources I’m citing in historical context.
Alas, such interpretation still has to be backed by evidence that support one’s ideas. (Some first-year students often have a hard time in grasping this.) If the available evidence is minimal, the resulting discussion provides entertainment at High Table and keeps us from falling asleep at conferences – but at the end of the day, no-one can claim to be ‘correct’. However, in the case of TSR.2 there is no shortage of published or archived material.
I’m always happy to be proved wrong; that’s how we learn. (I’ve committed my share of significant errors in print over the years.) But I do expect that suggestions that I’m wrong be backed up by evidence rather than mere repetition of unsupported opinions.
The task of the Medium Bomber Force would have been to delete Moscow. 1956’s grand notions of 144 V-Bombers each dealing with one target had by 1964 come down to sending the serviceable element of 40 Blue Steel and 48 Yellow Sun 2 carriers in hope through attrition.
Allocating that number of aircraft against a single target seems rather pessimistic. The contemporary Mirage IV force was numerically smaller but is reported to have targeted a number of major Soviet cities.
In retrospect, we now know the poor kill probability of the first-generation of Soviet SAMs – and from my memory of a report that hit my desk following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Kub/Kvadrant (SA-6 ‘Gainful’) proved not much better. The RAF planners of the early to mid 1960s probably had no way of knowing this.
Having just finished a major job, I’ve got a few days to spare. As a sort of gedankenexperiment, I’ve begun a quick first-order ‘back of an old envelope’ estimation of likely V-Force survivability in the face of Soviet mid-60s defences, but using only such information that contemporary RAF planners would have had. It’s going slowly – it took me most of Saturday afternoon to locate one important bit of information I needed. Unless I hit another headwind, some figures might emerge by the end of the weekend.
By: sealordlawrence - 2nd February 2008 at 12:43
SLL, It is clear that you like a good on-line debate. I suggest that you join PPRuNe and actually debate the issue with serving and retired members of the RAF. The politicians wouldn’t even go near this issue.
You do realise that such re-location to ‘appropriate commands’ would simply be a disaster for retention of personnel? People would simply walk! How on earth would you replace the experience of those walking?
SLL, seriously if you were in charge and actually tried to oversee this change, then you would see that it is purely a pipe-dream.
People, would not simply walk, that might say they would now but its doubtful they would in reality.
Of course it will never happen but I see no reason not to discuss it.
By: sealordlawrence - 2nd February 2008 at 12:40
“The correct results?”
The correct result is for air power to be wielded by a specialised organisation that actually understands air power, that is able to use and exploit it, and for whom air power will always be a funding priority.
Not to give the responsibility for CAS to an organisation that has proven incapable of maintaining and supporting complex aircraft types, or that misuses its air power assets whenever a senior officer needs an airborne taxi (the Army Air Corps).
Nor to an organisation that regards air power as being so unimportant that the career progression of its professional aviators depends on them leaving any air-power related post in order to waste time driving a big grey ship around. An organisation that has failed to recruit and retain enough high calibre aviators to meet its manning commitments in either Joint Force Harrier or Joint Helicopter Command.
And Air Power remains a crucial, war-winning capability, arguably more important than sea or land forces. I’m not silly enough to suggest putting the RN under RAF Marine Branch command, nor to put forward the idea of absorbing the Army into an enlarged RAF Regiment – though such ideas would be no less barking than the anti-RAF nonsense that you’ve been spouting, Lawrence.
:rolleyes:
I ignore as a force of habit so I will continue.
By: Distiller - 2nd February 2008 at 12:30
Joint Tactical Air Corps is the way to go anyway.
Not enough ressources for two seperate services.
Plus it ads flexibility, now that the main ops are expeditionary.
By: Mercurius - 2nd February 2008 at 11:52
“The correct results?”Not to give the responsibility for CAS to an organisation that …misuses its air power assets whenever a senior officer needs an airborne taxi (the Army Air Corps).
That was certainly perceived to be a potential problem with the Lynx TOW system prior to its entry into service – the demands made on the aircraft fleet for other roles, including airborne taxi, were seen as likely to restrict its availability for the anti-tank role. Can anyone with experience of the Lynx TOW operations tell us how it worked out in practice?
“An organisation that has failed to recruit and retain enough high calibre aviators to meet its manning commitments in either Joint Force Harrier or Joint Helicopter Command.
When the JHF scheme was first mooted, the RAF Harrier pilot community was dismayed by the idea that they were expected to accept shipboard deployment. One senior member told me he was planning to leave the service, and expected a significant number of his more experienced aircrew to do likewise. (In practice, the RAF had earmarked him as for higher things, so had to swap his Harrier for a desk and a promotion.)
By: TEEJ - 2nd February 2008 at 07:52
From the RAF. By disband I dont mean eradicate, simply realocate existing forces to more appropriate commands and wait for time to produce the correct results.
SLL, It is clear that you like a good on-line debate. I suggest that you join PPRuNe and actually debate the issue with serving and retired members of the RAF. The politicians wouldn’t even go near this issue.
You do realise that such re-location to ‘appropriate commands’ would simply be a disaster for retention of personnel? People would simply walk! How on earth would you replace the experience of those walking?
SLL, seriously if you were in charge and actually tried to oversee this change, then you would see that it is purely a pipe-dream.
By: Jackonicko - 2nd February 2008 at 00:48
“The correct results?”
The correct result is for air power to be wielded by a specialised organisation that actually understands air power, that is able to use and exploit it, and for whom air power will always be a funding priority.
Not to give the responsibility for CAS to an organisation that has proven incapable of maintaining and supporting complex aircraft types, or that misuses its air power assets whenever a senior officer needs an airborne taxi (the Army Air Corps).
Nor to an organisation that regards air power as being so unimportant that the career progression of its professional aviators depends on them leaving any air-power related post in order to waste time driving a big grey ship around. An organisation that has failed to recruit and retain enough high calibre aviators to meet its manning commitments in either Joint Force Harrier or Joint Helicopter Command.
And Air Power remains a crucial, war-winning capability, arguably more important than sea or land forces. I’m not silly enough to suggest putting the RN under RAF Marine Branch command, nor to put forward the idea of absorbing the Army into an enlarged RAF Regiment – though such ideas would be no less barking than the anti-RAF nonsense that you’ve been spouting, Lawrence.
:rolleyes:
By: sealordlawrence - 2nd February 2008 at 00:15
You have to live in the real world here. Where on earth would the RN get the personnel from? How many Nimrod aircrew do you think would re-badge to the RN? Think about the whole re-organising of UKs forces for this to take place? It is a complete non-starter. A complete Colonel Tim Collins fantasy land. How ever much people jump up and down and bump their gums over this issue nothing is going to change.
http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/index….ID=1&subID=482
The debate ‘Disband the RAF’ has been done to death on the Mil Aircrew forum at PPRuNe.
From the RAF. By disband I dont mean eradicate, simply realocate existing forces to more appropriate commands and wait for time to produce the correct results.
By: TEEJ - 1st February 2008 at 23:47
You have to live in the real world here. Where on earth would the RN get the personnel from? How many Nimrod aircrew do you think would re-badge to the RN? Think about the whole re-organising of UKs forces for this to take place? It is a complete non-starter. A complete Colonel Tim Collins fantasy land. How ever much people jump up and down and bump their gums over this issue nothing is going to change.
http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/index….ID=1&subID=482
The debate ‘Disband the RAF’ has been done to death on the Mil Aircrew forum at PPRuNe.
By: sealordlawrence - 1st February 2008 at 15:50
So by your own arguements for the Nimrod missle wagon being gifted to the Royal Navy, or indeed that that such a missle truck isn’t needed since the RN’s SSN can do the job.
Then yes a Warship should belong to the Army
The USAF has the B-1B and B-2 for just such occassions, but then again by you own arguement the USAF shouldn’t have B52s, B-1Bs or B-2s since SSNs are apparently so capable in your opinion.
Quite the contrary, if the US or the UK feels the need to have a real strategic bomber (for which the doctrinal justification is questionable anyway) and not a re jigged 1940s airliner I see no reason why it should not be operated by the navy who could then form a unified power projection and deterrence force, much as handing over CAS activities over to the Army should result in a real battlefield capability. The last time Britain developed a viable CAS plane was 1918.
By: Portagee - 1st February 2008 at 14:59
Name such occasions?
A warship has to go into port, does that make it an Army asset?
Thats why the US procured the B-1B and the B-2.
So by your own arguements for the Nimrod missle wagon being gifted to the Royal Navy, or indeed that that such a missle truck isn’t needed since the RN’s SSN can do the job.
Then yes a Warship should belong to the Army
The USAF has the B-1B and B-2 for just such occassions, but then again by you own arguement the USAF shouldn’t have B52s, B-1Bs or B-2s since SSNs are apparently so capable in your opinion.
By: sealordlawrence - 1st February 2008 at 08:13
How long? As I said, just as long as a B-52
An occasion where strike missions have been caried out without political build-up doesn’t exist, you name a naval asset that can’t be detected days out from a target and obliterated
Why so laughable? are you going to launch a nimrod off a carrier? No, you are going to use a land based runway, at which point stop being a naval asset.
MR2s have stormshadow capable hardpoints, MRA4 was designed with stormshadow capability in mind, any MRA4 bomber would have the same capability
Name such occasions?
A warship has to go into port, does that make it an Army asset?
Thats why the US procured the B-1B and the B-2.
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January 26, 2008 at 10:17 pm