UK Trident Replacement

Try to plough through any of the behavioural, rational-actor-driven treatises on nuclear deterrence – say, H.Kahn, On Nuclear War – and the head hurts. It’s like astronomy.

So, assume that I am Leader of the Realm, and must defend it against…well, inherently, I know not what, but anything and everything. I have been taught that WW1 was triggered by a brief window, where the balance of Central Powers’ Dreadnoughts v. UK/France’s left the outcome open to doubt. And that WW2 was provoked by the brief window Hitler saw before Russia’s Pe-2, UK’s Warwick/Stirling/Halifax/ Manchester, and France’s Consolidated LB-30 Heavies would Paralyse his transport/production. And that in Berlin, 1948 and Korea, 1950, Allies had little more than bluff to deter Stalin rolling onto Antwerp (“shoestring” US inventory, 50 inoperable Mk.3 Bombs, 1948, changeover 1950 to Mk.4, maybe 250; dodgy B-36 readiness).

Never again! What to do as my hulls rot?
Option 1: rollover, talk to my Threat, cause him to see sweet reason. But M.Foot and N.Kinnock lost 2 Elections that way, 1983, 1987.
Option 2: delegate defence to US and hope their interests and mine always align. Ah.
Option 3: invent my independent system. But I can’t even do health software.
Option 4: European Multilateral Force. Monty called that poppycock in 1962. All true, I feel.
Option 5: I have an Agreement with US from 12/1962 which gives me access to Polaris/SSBN and its successors (the sense of this – exact phrase not to hand right now). The 1981 successor has been very cheap. Evidently USN is to lead the 2020 successor, so, I’ll stay on board, because it is cheap…and I do not risk any consequence of having no nuclear shaft in my quiver. Just do it. Next!

The cost of an SSBN is in the deterrent component, not really the boat, the cost of an advanced SSN and a SSBN are not that different, including life cycle costs. The SSBN element of this Trident upgrade is estimated to be between 1/3 and 1/4 of total cost of the program, based on a £15 billion estimate that comes out at very similar to an Astute SSN. Also, there is building capacity, the UK has a very narrow industrial base for projects of this type, and a projected 7 SSN’s and 4 SSBN’s over the next two to three decades is probably all the UK could build anyway.

Who is going to pay for 24 SSN’s? The cost of an Astute SSN will probably not be that much different to a follow up Trident SSBN. The cost is in the nuclear element.

24 was just a rough estimate i pulled out of the air, the point is that you would be able to afford more SSNs if you didn’t buy SSBNs. The cost of an SSBN would be significantly greater then an SSN, but more critcally, the operating costs for the life of the two are vastly different. 24 (or however many the bean counters have worked out) SSNs might cost more to buy up front compaired to 12 SSBNs, but the overall lifetime costs of the two projects may well be similar.

About war with China. It would not be “all-out-war”, China will not have that capability for the next 20 years. I’m talking about a decapitation strike with ballistic missiles against the nuclear capabilities of a country, e.g. China.
NMD-like systems play no role here, they are so far not designed for MIRVs, and they could easily be saturated, as long as we don’t go back to Reagan’s orbital Star Wars ideas. In a nuclear decapitation strike there is no retaliatory strike (at least not within a couple of years …).
I don’t wish the U.S. to go to war with China, but there are fine differences between tactical and strategic strikes, or strikes in a naval-dominated scenario. When I write about a warning shot, a shot across the bow, it could in certain situations (like a new Formosa crises or certain steps China takes) be a missile aimed at the South China sea to draw a hard line. The most realistic war scenarion US vs China I guess is a deep economic crises of the US and parallel a rapid rise of China. That might lead some circles in the US to seek a quick strike against China at a certain point to keep the supremacy in the Pacific and southeast Asia. And what are weapons good for if you don’t use them? Going under silently like the Soviet Empire? Hardly an option. Anyway.

And that UK want a piece of this because? I think you are taking the ‘poodle’ mentality of some in the UK way past any measure of reality.

It is one thing for the UK to go it alone with the US to invade a seemingly push-over country led by a tin-pot like Iraq (even a repeat of such a commitment would seem extremely unlikely given the fierce hostility of the vast majority of the British population to the idea and the bitter fight being fought there now), it is something on another plain of existence for any British government to be willing or able to commit to a nuclear first strike against another nuclear power (a superpower most likely for what you are suggesting to be remotely likely) for the sole reason of trying to allow the US to cling onto its top dog position.

Such a base motivation for war and utter disregard for all the morals and values the west seem to hold dear is almost enough reason for a democracy like the UK (assuming it is still a democracy then) to go to war AGAINST the US.

PS, regarding MRVs, well remember the nuclear deterent is meant to last for several decades at least. In that time, it is entirely possible that NMD style systems will have matured and proliferated.

Who says that the Trident system is a retaliatory weapon?

I never said it is, I said it should be. Any nation that hold nuclear weapons with a view of actually using them in an offensive manner is unfit to have such weapons.

Even in the ‘good old days’ of the cold war, only a few loonies on either side seriously considered using nukes offensively, the defence strategies of both sides were dominated by parania that the other side would attack at the first sign of weakness and so both sides were arming up to be able to deliver a killing blow to the opposition even in the event of a completely successful surprise first strike by the enemy.

Strategic nuclear weapons are offensive weapons if ever there were some. Offensive is their only capability.

And how many weapons systems are really only defensive in nature? A weapon is designed to kill, its how they are used that determine if they are offensive or defensive.

Its charm lies in the fact that an enemy can’t be sure if and when they are launched.

That is only the case with a very small strike. A massive, comprehensive nuclear attack will become blindingly obvious within moments of its commencement (to the major nuclear powers at least, and thats all that really matters).

“Retaliatory” is primarily a political statement, from the military standpoint the question of a retaliatory strike is only to increase the chance of survival of large enough parts of your capabilities in case of a suprise (strategic) nuclear attack (by means of numbers, dislocation, stealth, response time, early warning, …) to hit back against the enemy’s centers of population.

I do not understand what you are saying. Retalitory strikes have zero baring on the chances of anything you have surviving because a retalitory strike, by its very definition is a second strike, thus your opponent has already fired all the missiles they are going/able to. The only scenario where what you are suggestion would make any sense is in the case of a pre-emptive attack against an imminent first strike by your opponent.

But no one plans for a retaliatory capability, it only determines your minimum force level. (Your maximum force level is determined by a 99.999% chance to take out the enemy weapons in a single strike. Aiming at population centers only becomes neccessary when you can’t be sure of that percentage, to increase the price).

Everyone except the US and Russia only plans for a retalitory capacity. Everyone bar China (there are India, Pakistan and NK of course, but they don’t count here) has stopped making weapons. Some say China has stopped as well, but even if they haven’t, it is only because they don’t have enough weapons to have a reliable and survivable second strike capacity against the US. There is nothing that suggestion any current or future nuclear power has any plans to aquire the kind of capacity you are talking about.

I really can’t see a realistic option other than Trident boats for the UK strategic nuclear forces. Cruise missiles are too slow. The ballistic missile is the only current weapon fast enough to launch a preemptive attack in case of an imminent enemy strike with ICBMs.

A good, solid reason for Trident at last! I was begining to dispair that anyone was going to come up with one.

However, the problem with that argument is that such a scenario is extremely remote. To be able to find out about a nuclear attack in the nick of time. Very James Bond, but not very reaslistic.

Also, even in the event of such a discovery, it would be extremely unlikely for any government to order a pre-emptive attack. If the enemy is readying their birds to fly, then its extremely unlikely your birds will be able to hit all their silos and mobile launchers (assuming you can find them all) before the attack is notice and they launch everything they have right back at you. In such an event, the most likely thing that would happen is for your and their birds to pass each other as they annialate everything.

No, what would happen in the light of such a discovery is for your leader to give the order to move all your strategic forces to maximum alert and scream at the other leader over a hotline or any means of communication. Knowledge that they have lost the element of suprise would take away any motivation to attack as the only result would be MAD.

Enemy SSBNs have to covered by some of your SSN all the time to prevent a launch.

And the chances of being able to cover all of them at all times for the next several decades is?

One more remark: That was all calculated over and over again during the Cold War. Nothing changed in nuclear war gaming. Just the numbers are a little lower currently.

And the cold war never turned hot because every calculation anyone competant ever did said that the odds against being able to successfully take out the opposing side’s nukes before enough of them are lobbed at you to make such an attack prohibitive are astronomically small. As you said, nothing changed.

I talked about the C-17 because somebody brought up that old air-launched Minuteman idea.

About war with China. It would not be “all-out-war”, China will not have that capability for the next 20 years. I’m talking about a decapitation strike with ballistic missiles against the nuclear capabilities of a country, e.g. China.
NMD-like systems play no role here, they are so far not designed for MIRVs, and they could easily be saturated, as long as we don’t go back to Reagan’s orbital Star Wars ideas. In a nuclear decapitation strike there is no retaliatory strike (at least not within a couple of years …).
I don’t wish the U.S. to go to war with China, but there are fine differences between tactical and strategic strikes, or strikes in a naval-dominated scenario. When I write about a warning shot, a shot across the bow, it could in certain situations (like a new Formosa crises or certain steps China takes) be a missile aimed at the South China sea to draw a hard line. The most realistic war scenarion US vs China I guess is a deep economic crises of the US and parallel a rapid rise of China. That might lead some circles in the US to seek a quick strike against China at a certain point to keep the supremacy in the Pacific and southeast Asia. And what are weapons good for if you don’t use them? Going under silently like the Soviet Empire? Hardly an option. Anyway.

Who says that the Trident system is a retaliatory weapon? Strategic nuclear weapons are offensive weapons if ever there were some. Offensive is their only capability. Its charm lies in the fact that an enemy can’t be sure if and when they are launched. “Retaliatory” is primarily a political statement, from the military standpoint the question of a retaliatory strike is only to increase the chance of survival of large enough parts of your capabilities in case of a suprise (strategic) nuclear attack (by means of numbers, dislocation, stealth, response time, early warning, …) to hit back against the enemy’s centers of population. But no one plans for a retaliatory capability, it only determines your minimum force level. (Your maximum force level is determined by a 99.999% chance to take out the enemy weapons in a single strike. Aiming at population centers only becomes neccessary when you can’t be sure of that percentage, to increase the price).

I really can’t see a realistic option other than Trident boats for the UK strategic nuclear forces. Cruise missiles are too slow. The ballistic missile is the only current weapon fast enough to launch a preemptive attack in case of an imminent enemy strike with ICBMs. Enemy SSBNs have to covered by some of your SSN all the time to prevent a launch.

One more remark: That was all calculated over and over again during the Cold War. Nothing changed in nuclear war gaming. Just the numbers are a little lower currently.

Who is going to pay for 24 SSN’s? The cost of an Astute SSN will probably not be that much different to a follow up Trident SSBN. The cost is in the nuclear element.

So far the ballistic long range missile is the only reliable (and rapid) global delivery system. Nuclear warfare is all about numbers and probabilities. And why rule out a more massive nuclear strike against an enemy? A dozen or so missiles are well in scope. And talking about air launched ICBM/IRBM: How would you manage to download MIRV missiles to a single-warhead configuration for warning-shots or rapid tactical use? A SSBN can always carry one (better two) missile configured for single-warhead tactical strike, while the rest is fully loaded with MIRV. Doing the same with a C-17 would require even more aircraft and would provide less flexibility.

I think you are getting way to fixated on the C17. In air launched weapon, I was thinking more in terms of nuclear capable superlong range stealthy/hypersonic cruise missiles.

Cruise missiles would offer you far more flexiblity in terms of how you can use your weapons, although in my book, thats not really a good thing as the temptation to actually use the things would be all the greater because of it.

The only downside is time, but seeing how the world’s major cities are not going to go anywhere in the few days to maybe a week max time lay from a cruise missile based retalitory strike, the same deterant capacity is still fulfilled.

You ask about an enemy? Well, China, obviously. In the long run India, but that I doubt. I don’t believe in the “no-war-possible-because-of-integrated-world-commerce” theory. In 1914 the world economy was even more integrated than today, and Europe still went to war.

And the likihood of total nuclear war with China is…what? One thing the ‘number crunchers’ seem to be unwilling/unable to fully grasp is that there is no winner in nuclear war, only loosers. The only time nuclear weapons are going to used is when one side doesn’t have them or the means to effectively deliver them after first strike.

As long as a nation maintains a credible nuclear second strike capability, then they are immune from nuclear attack from another state. Its as simple as that.

Next gen cruise missiles are just as effective if not more so then SLBMs (NMD, TMD anyone?) in terms of penetration reliability. Thus the ‘nuclear deterent’ line is a poor excuse to use to justify monstrustly more expensive systems like SSBNs and their SLBMs.

About the refuel scenario for the C-17: With enough humint on the ground you could pretty well tell the whereabouts of such a fleet. How long does it take to refuel a C-17? 30 minutes? Well, in about the same time an ICBM or SLBM can strike against that very base.

My point was that retalitory strikes would not be high on your list of priorities if the ‘enemy’ had already lobbed enough nukes at you to take out all your airbases. At that point in time, you would have already lost completely and absolutely no matter what you do after, thus preparing for such an eventuality is utterly pointless.

Nuclear weapons is about deterence first and foremost. You have them to stop others using them against you. That is the fundermental reason why any nuclear power should have for maintaining their nuclear arsenals. Thus when choosing a replacement, that should the most important factor to consider. What happens after your have been hit is so secondary as to be irrelevent.

If you are using the refueling example as arguement against the surviverability of C17 based nuclear deterents, then I’m sorry for the above lecture, but must also point out that you are getting a little overly fixated with the C17 idea. My point is that Trident is not the ONLY reliable second strike option for the UK, and just because one alternative delivery method might not work all that well does not automatically mean that it has to be Trident.

Something else: In the case of the RN I would go for more boats. I think that six is the minimum, maybe only with 12 missiles instead of 16 (still up to 144 warheads per boat).

I would rather have 24 more SSNs, or 12 SSGNs (? not sure if the designation is correct for SSBN hull coverted to carry cruise missiles instead of SLBMs) with an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventially armed next gen cruise missiles. The rational is that 24 SSNs are bound to be far more surviverable then 12 SSBNs, and 12 SSGNs would offer you the same (effectively, even if the number of nukes might be reduced) deterence factor but also gives you a very useful ‘secondary’ function for the 100% of its service time these boats are not spending turning the world to glass.

Is the suggestion about loch ness meant to be a joke :confused:

It defeats the object of them being an water borne system (ie mobility) if you stick it in a lake!

And i am rather sure that a nuclear strike would still kill it.

And in any case, you forget the ecological implications, we wouldn’t nessie to start glowing would we? 😀 😀 :diablo:

How about a simple underwater launcher on land? Place a couple of Tridents in Loch Ness – being underwater makes it almost impossible to destroy, even with a near-direct nuclear strike (it can be behind a shield to protect from depth charge type effects)! Since it is inland, there is no chance of sinking it (it’s already sunk!), and very little chance of it being defeated by a first strike. Even just 16 missiles MIRVed could be 128 warheads (Trident can carry 8 MIRVs). Hey presto, your second strike capability, to go with my C-17 bases bomber fleet!!! :diablo:

So far the ballistic long range missile is the only reliable (and rapid) global delivery system. Nuclear warfare is all about numbers and probabilities. And why rule out a more massive nuclear strike against an enemy? A dozen or so missiles are well in scope. And talking about air launched ICBM/IRBM: How would you manage to download MIRV missiles to a single-warhead configuration for warning-shots or rapid tactical use? A SSBN can always carry one (better two) missile configured for single-warhead tactical strike, while the rest is fully loaded with MIRV. Doing the same with a C-17 would require even more aircraft and would provide less flexibility.

You ask about an enemy? Well, China, obviously. In the long run India, but that I doubt. I don’t believe in the “no-war-possible-because-of-integrated-world-commerce” theory. In 1914 the world economy was even more integrated than today, and Europe still went to war.

About the refuel scenario for the C-17: With enough humint on the ground you could pretty well tell the whereabouts of such a fleet. How long does it take to refuel a C-17? 30 minutes? Well, in about the same time an ICBM or SLBM can strike against that very base.

Something else: In the case of the RN I would go for more boats. I think that six is the minimum, maybe only with 12 missiles instead of 16 (still up to 144 warheads per boat).

Oh come on! You know it’s about power in the international kindergarten sandbox. Against blackmailing and for blackmailing. Saying ‘I can throw you a bomb on your head, so you better behave!’. Do you think the UK’s international status would remain the same w/o the bomb? As a side effect a couple of hundred rocket and nuclear specialists living on tax-payers money are educated and remain in country. If you think in terms of the nation-state a sovereign state can’t do without the bomb plus gloabl delivery system. The bomb is the strongest political symbol in todays game.

That is the reason for having the bomb, I was asking for the kind of foe people here think you would need Trident to counter. All of the above would still be valid if the UK gave up SLBMs but still retains nuclear weapons and some other sort of reliable global delivery system (like a similar if not greater number stealthy/hypersonic cruise missiles deployed in a larger SSN force and/or some sort of air launched weapon system).

There is no alternative to the SLBM. An air launched ICBM or IRBM system is a one-missile system, cause you can’t pack more than one missile per C-17 (for weight and survivability reasons).

And can you think of a likely situation where more then one missile would be needed per plane? Even if additional missiles are needed, can you think of a likely situation where the C17s would not have anywhere left to land and refuel/rearm? Seems to me that in a situation where all your dispersal bases had been taken out and all your own standby weapons had been launched, it becomes a somewhat academic question as to who had ‘won’, and all this talk about having to rearm is akin to the soviet idea of reloading SSBNs out at sea.

And before anyone starts, I am not arguing for any delivery system in particular, I actually prefer the SSBN approach. I am just pointing out the flaw in the logic of some of the arguements thus far.

I have already said the system is vulnerable to pre-emptive strike, I do not dispute that. The question I ask is whether this is genuinely as much of an issue now – when it was the Soviets we faced, the threat of them wiping out the first strike force was very real. Now the threat would be mostly from countries without this real capability – and in the event that someone like Russia tries to strike, then the US would be obliged to use its second strike capability. Is it necessary for the entire UK nuclear deterrent to be second strike?

Why not give up the sovereignity and become the 51st state…

Here is a general question for everyone, what kind of threat is SSBNs meant to counter in the modern world? I have seen rouge states come up, and then arguements about bombers being vonerable because all their bases might be knocked out in a first strike (not by the same persons albertly). Know any rouge states or terrorists that can do that or are even remotely likely to aquire that kind of ability within our livetimes?

Thus I think the discussion might become a little more focused if people could at least agree what kind of threat the UK nuclear forces are meant to counter.

Oh come on! You know it’s about power in the international kindergarten sandbox. Against blackmailing and for blackmailing. Saying ‘I can throw you a bomb on your head, so you better behave!’. Do you think the UK’s international status would remain the same w/o the bomb? As a side effect a couple of hundred rocket and nuclear specialists living on tax-payers money are educated and remain in country. If you think in terms of the nation-state a sovereign state can’t do without the bomb plus gloabl delivery system. The bomb is the strongest political symbol in todays game.

There is no alternative to the SLBM. An air launched ICBM or IRBM system is a one-missile system, cause you can’t pack more than one missile per C-17 (for weight and survivability reasons). Instead of the C-17 idea: Why not rent a couple of B-1B (there are still some in the desert) plus a couple of dozen AGM-129 from the U.S.? Like the UK rents Tridents?

Here is a general question for everyone, what kind of threat is SSBNs meant to counter in the modern world? I have seen rouge states come up, and then arguements about bombers being vonerable because all their bases might be knocked out in a first strike (not by the same persons albertly). Know any rouge states or terrorists that can do that or are even remotely likely to aquire that kind of ability within our livetimes?

Thus I think the discussion might become a little more focused if people could at least agree what kind of threat the UK nuclear forces are meant to counter.

I have already said the system is vulnerable to pre-emptive strike, I do not dispute that. The question I ask is whether this is genuinely as much of an issue now – when it was the Soviets we faced, the threat of them wiping out the first strike force was very real. Now the threat would be mostly from countries without this real capability – and in the event that someone like Russia tries to strike, then the US would be obliged to use its second strike capability. Is it necessary for the entire UK nuclear deterrent to be second strike?

(I actually agree that it is, and think they made the right decision in choosing SSBNs, I just think that the alternatives might have had benefits worth discussing!)

As for the supposed need for high capability self defence capability (beyond that already fitted, which is actually quite capable), this ignores the fact that launch is not happening anywhere near hostile territory! The launch would happen out over the North Atlantic or the UK itself, so there is nobody there to shoot down the aircraft! As for being an ‘orphan system’, this is only partly true, since the basic missile design would almost certainly be a modified version of an existing rocket (i.e. either an ICBM conversion of the Falcon launcher already tested, or a slightly modified Minuteman). The modifications to the missile are actually not very major, and the physical missiles would be reasonably cheap. In terms of the missile handling at Faslane, this is in part because the missile are around 60 tons, and need to be put into a submarine. In air launched form, the missiles would simply sit on a platform in a hardened structure for storage, with part of the C-17 fleet sitting loaded with missiles, ready to go at short notice. Logistics for a smaller air launched missile would be a lot easier than for the sub launched missiles.

Rely on the US for Nuclear defence? good move. Investment in this system is very long term thus it is best to have the highest level of affordable survivability, assume the worst ulness you can predict everything that will happen in the next 50 years.

I have already said the system is vulnerable to pre-emptive strike, I do not dispute that. The question I ask is whether this is genuinely as much of an issue now – when it was the Soviets we faced, the threat of them wiping out the first strike force was very real. Now the threat would be mostly from countries without this real capability – and in the event that someone like Russia tries to strike, then the US would be obliged to use its second strike capability. Is it necessary for the entire UK nuclear deterrent to be second strike?

(I actually agree that it is, and think they made the right decision in choosing SSBNs, I just think that the alternatives might have had benefits worth discussing!)

As for the supposed need for high capability self defence capability (beyond that already fitted, which is actually quite capable), this ignores the fact that launch is not happening anywhere near hostile territory! The launch would happen out over the North Atlantic or the UK itself, so there is nobody there to shoot down the aircraft! As for being an ‘orphan system’, this is only partly true, since the basic missile design would almost certainly be a modified version of an existing rocket (i.e. either an ICBM conversion of the Falcon launcher already tested, or a slightly modified Minuteman). The modifications to the missile are actually not very major, and the physical missiles would be reasonably cheap. In terms of the missile handling at Faslane, this is in part because the missile are around 60 tons, and need to be put into a submarine. In air launched form, the missiles would simply sit on a platform in a hardened structure for storage, with part of the C-17 fleet sitting loaded with missiles, ready to go at short notice. Logistics for a smaller air launched missile would be a lot easier than for the sub launched missiles.

As I mentioned before, the modifications are minimal, and not permanent – it consists of a roll-on pallet which holds the missile. The actual aircraft needs no modifications, and all the command and control gear could also be palletised. The aircraft doesn’t need any greater defensive gear, since the launches would be conducted from over friendly territory! As for the targetting gear, with modern systems, this would all fit easily into one or two consoles.

The missiles would need a new storage facility, but since they are quite small missiles (they only weigh around 35 tons), they could simply be stored on the airbase. The actual facilities would all fit onto a regular RAF base, probably one of the now unused bases.

– No real modifications to the aircraft, just a roll-on roll-off pallet for holding the missile
– Relatively cheap missiles, since they are smaller than Trident, and do not need the heavy modifications for submarine launch
– Existing RAF bases could be used, and the storage facilities for the missiles would be relatively simple hardened weapons bunkers (a bigger version of the ones used to store B61s and WE177s

Be clear, I am not against the SSBNs, but I feel that the true alternatives should be considered, not just disregarded!

Your still ignoring the problem of vulnerable airbases, making it worse by proposing ideas which reduce the reaction speed of the system.

Even if missile handling is a modular system easily removed, what about the missile targetting and secure comms system? That equipment is not cheap, and it’s a lot more involved than just plugging a module into the flight deck. Given their mission the aircraft would need a good self defence suite unless you accept the system is vulnerable to minimal counter attack, again not so cheap. And this would be an orphan system, the UK would have to fund it ourselves, again not cheap. And if you’ve ever seen the missile handling systems at Faslane you’d see that the systems for handling Trident are a lot more involved than for the old 177’s and ALCM.
I’m not anti- RAF but in this case I really think the MoD got it right, there was a review of alternatives and ultimately they came back to the SSBN.

As I mentioned before, the modifications are minimal, and not permanent – it consists of a roll-on pallet which holds the missile. The actual aircraft needs no modifications, and all the command and control gear could also be palletised. The aircraft doesn’t need any greater defensive gear, since the launches would be conducted from over friendly territory! As for the targetting gear, with modern systems, this would all fit easily into one or two consoles.

The missiles would need a new storage facility, but since they are quite small missiles (they only weigh around 35 tons), they could simply be stored on the airbase. The actual facilities would all fit onto a regular RAF base, probably one of the now unused bases.

– No real modifications to the aircraft, just a roll-on roll-off pallet for holding the missile
– Relatively cheap missiles, since they are smaller than Trident, and do not need the heavy modifications for submarine launch
– Existing RAF bases could be used, and the storage facilities for the missiles would be relatively simple hardened weapons bunkers (a bigger version of the ones used to store B61s and WE177s

Be clear, I am not against the SSBNs, but I feel that the true alternatives should be considered, not just disregarded!

Nt too mention that you still have the problem of highly vulnerable airbases and by the time you have done all the needed modifications to a C-17 it would in all probability still be a single role system.

Quite, in my own view it’d end up as expensive, if not more so, than the SSBN option. And an SSBN offers 16 launch tubes, to keep a force of 16 C17’s available to launch at short notice would need a lot more C17’s than 16 which would end up seriously expensive.