UK-US pact on WWII transport aircraft…it didn't exist.

L8 is allowed to quote from Putnams – our basic resource, to be moderated only by “Security” for jet-age military schemes, by later research on precise production quantities…and by the tendency of (firm-friendly) authors to skate over some turkey qualities.

Volkert’s exposure to DC-2 was in 1935. Fokker bought the licence in 1934. Mollusc Airspeed had taken in Swan Hunter equity and moved down from York to Portsmouth also in 1934, such that Fokker saw them as credible Trojan Horse to surmount tariffs/Imperial Preference and provide assembly/Product Support for Empire sales, so agreed a sub-licence, in 1934.

There was indeed a laziness in UK airframers’ approach to market – a perception that if you don’t play cricket, it’s just too hard to talk to you. Compare: Fokker, again, with HP, again:

Aer Lingus (then a BEAC-Associate) launched F-27 in 1956, unimpressed by weight of Victors in work, underwhelmed by HP’s priority on the richer product. They sought performance guarantees, fixed prices/specs/delivery, including spares and tools: Greek to HP. It was quite difficult to buy a Herald: R.Jordanian A.F. took 2, R.Malaysian A.F.10 as HP knew his way around military business (though 3/62 MoA chose 31 HS780 as RAF Andover C.1). But airlines were alien: HP Ltd. had ventured beyond Dover to terra incognita only twice – 1919 to China for 6 bombers-as-transports, and SABENA, Belgium, 1922, 2 (+13 licenced) others. HP preferred to sell in Whitehall’s one-stop shop to RAF and Imperial A/W. Civilians despaired and went to Fokker: 48 Heralds cf. 786 F-27 (and then F-50). Flight Intnl.23/12/98 Herald obituary: “the pilot feels he is exercising some skill if he taxies (smoothly…cockpit: ) tolerably comfortable for relatively short flights” but its virtue had been seen as “pleasant handling characteristics…pilot appeal.” Airliners are not sold to pilots.

On DH’s Mr.Nixon: disingenuous: Brabazon Projects funding released to (Committee Member) Sir Geoffrey in February,1944 were for prototype construction of the Rapide Replacement Type VB (Dove), for initial scheming of the Express Type IV (Comet I) and Continental Type II (AS.57 Ambassador).

I understood it was Airspeed which took out the licence for the DC-3, from Fokker who had European rights to the type. I’ve not seen reference to HP’s involvement, but as an ex-employee (not at that time!) I would be particularly interested in knowing more.

At risk of becoming known for quoting from Putnam’s books, the one on Handley Page mentions it. I’m sure I’ve read a more detailed account which talks about a licence, but I can’t find it just now. The Putnam talks about Volkert visiting various American automobile and aircraft manufacturers, investigating production methods as well as design concepts. He was apparently particularly impressed with the DC.2 and the design for the Harrow successor, the HP.55, is described as being virtually a Harrow fuselage and tail with a (low-mounted) DC.2 wing – although the wing structure is modified a bit to allow internal bomb carriage amongst other things. The 55 evolved into the Vulture-powered HP.56 project – Handley Page’s ‘Manchester’, if you like – and with four Merlins that was eventually built as the Halifax.

As for the B-17D’s superiority over the Stirling, this is true of altitude performance but does not appear in payload/range or defensive armament, both which would seem to be prime design requirements for a bomber. Being critical of 1930s British large aircraft is one thing, and too-often well deserved, but a sense of proportion should be kept regarding what was achieved.

I wasn’t picking on the Stirling or 30s British aircraft…rather defending the B-17D. Remember, it was superceeded by then much improved “E” by the time the US entered the war.
Basically, most late 30s aircraft were terribly obsolete by 1940-41…even early marks of the sainted Spitfire.

I understood it was Airspeed which took out the licence for the DC-3, from Fokker who had European rights to the type. I’ve not seen reference to HP’s involvement, but as an ex-employee (not at that time!) I would be particularly interested in knowing more.

Neither the DH Albatros nor Flamingo, whatever their faults, can be described as old school types for visiting the colonies. Nor does the C Class appear that different in principle to the Boeing 314 or Martin Clipper. The US benefitted from a large demand for internal air travel which was just not present in the UK or even in Europe as a whole.

As for the B-17D’s superiority over the Stirling, this is true of altitude performance but does not appear in payload/range or defensive armament, both which would seem to be prime design requirements for a bomber. Being critical of 1930s British large aircraft is one thing, and too-often well deserved, but a sense of proportion should be kept regarding what was achieved.

There’s a 3-view in the Putnam on Shorts, p.344.
It’s described (paraphrasing wildly here) as a landplane G-Class with a wing similar to a Stirling, but extended. Circular-section, pressurised fuselage and a twin tail. Quoted range is 3400 miles with a top speed of 330mph at 25000 feet. That’s a bit more like it!

Anyone got a drawing of the Short S.32…my online search was in vain except for a diversion 🙂 http://mainescenery.proboards.com/index.cgi?board=hangar&action=display&thread=1199 . I suspect the Short, the Fairey FC.1 and the original DC-4(E) all had too low a wing loading

At risk of drifting off topic…

I don’t disagree with you, Mr Boyle.

Read any account of British large-commercial aircraft production in the 1930s and before very long you will come across a phrase something like “In discussion with Imperial about their requirements, the manufacturers…” Nothing wrong with that, except you almost never see mention of them talking to anyone else. That’s the point I made about the government of the day getting exasperated because Imperial are pushing all the relevant manufacturers in the wrong direction. And I already drew the parallel with the much more competitive domestic marketplace in which the American manufactureres operated. A quote from the Putnam ‘Fairey Aircraft since 1915 by H.A.Taylor might be appropriate here. On p.296 the chapter on the F.C.1 starts thus: “In 1938 the Air Ministry, and the Directorate of Civil Aviation in Particular, were becoming concerned, with good reason, about the way in which Britain was lagging behind in the development and production of civil landplanes.” You might think they were a bit slow reaching this conclusion. The F.C.1 was one of the answers, and the Short S.32 was the other. (It’s also interesting to note that many Armstrong Whitworth’s design studies that evolved into the Ensign were much more modern-looking, low wing aircraft, some quite similar to a DC.2, but these were not proceeded with. I understand that Handley Page took out a license on the DC.2/3 series, but in the event the only use they made of it was to incorporate some of the design features into the Halifax wing.) Here is the competition for the American products – one might be forgiven for wondering why there were only two. Too little, too late, certainly – although Fairey considered the F.C.1 design good enough that they thought about putting it into production after the war. You don’t see the British designs because they were never built, and some of the blame for that falls to Imperial and most of the rest to the deteriorating political situation in Europe.

Putting all that aside, the point I was really trying to illustrate is how the difference between ‘full detail’ and what makes it into the public domain can fuel myths and legends, and in the case of this thread, apaprently lead many to assume – and find supporting ‘evidence’ for – a detailed agreement where one probably did not exist.

So, when the Americans enter the war of course they have better transport designs, and by then of course the British have better fighters. What do you expect – that the Brits would scale back Spitfire production to build a massive fleet of Bombays, while the Americans hand us a couple of thousand Kittyhawks and B-17Ds for the front line? That really would be a story, but I might well be writing it auf Deutsch!

Allow me to point out that the B-17D was more than a match for British bombers of the pre-1941 era….especially the Sterling, Whitney, etc.

And it’s not accurate to say the UK lost airline sales only because of the war, that the US magically produced airliners in the 39-41 era. That might be true of the DC-4 and Lockheed Constallation, but that’s far from the entire story.
I don’t see anthing from the UK that could match the DC-2, 3 or fast Lockheeds of the period long before civil aircraft production ceased. What did Chamberlin return to the UK in waving his piece of paper? A Lockheed. Look at the international sales success of those aircraft pre-war. It wasn’t just the American airlines buying the twins from Long Beach and Burbank.
Yes, De Havilland and Shorts were turning out airliners, but they seem to be from the “old school” types for the upper classes to visit the colonies.
Not fast, modern, profitable types that could sell abroad.

The mentality of designing a aircraft too closely tailored for a set of government issued specifications for specific customers (Imperial Airways and BOAC) didn’t just happen after the war (Hermes, Tudor, Brittania, Trident, etc), it seems to have been in effect in the 30s as well. Is it overly simplistic to suggest that government planning doesn’t work well in a time sensitive, competitive market like building commercial aircraft for international sales? For every hit like the Viscount and Dove, there are several less successful efforts.

[QUOTE=longshot;1895839]

….the late 1930s, we have:
Imperial Airways ruling the skies……

I would have said by (edit)1939 KLM ruled the skies from Europe down to Australia and Pan Am the Transatlantic skies

Fair point. Without doubt they were complacent and had lagged behind the competition, but Imperial still liked to portray themselves as ‘The’ way to travel. I reckon much of the British public of the time would have subscribed to that viewpoint – quite likely out of patriotism. If the public perception is wrong, and the progress of events take advantage of the real state of affairs, this just aids the development of the ‘We Wuz Robbed’ culture.

[QUOTE=Lazy8;1895817]….the late 1930s, we have:
Imperial Airways ruling the skies……

I would have said by (edit)1939 KLM ruled the skies from Europe down to Australia and Pan Am the Transatlantic skies

Seems to me that much of the discussion on this, and many other topics, rests on the difference between ‘public perception’ and ‘reality’. Both, of course, are somewhat subjective.

Seen from the (British) public viewpoint of the late 1930s, we have:

‘Reality’ is going to be a hugely complex picture. We can start with the different economic and geographic situations in (largely protectionist and isolationist) America and Imperial Britain. There is an imperative for the American industry to develop transport aircraft to allow airlines to compete with railways; in Britain this is not the case. Looking at Britain we should include a lot of fairly frantic ‘behind the scenes’ stuff involving rearming the RAF with modern aircraft. A lot of this was done by producing ‘good enough’ aircraft in the knowledge that they will have short service lives but the simple fact that they were built helps the industry sort out the problems of large-scale fast production, and the simple fact that they were operated gives the RAF a means of learning the lessons of the Spanish Civil War and others. And in the next round of production there will be significant improvements – you know the story. In Britain in the late 1930s, civil aviation is less of a priority, and it shows.

Perhaps this is how the ‘myth’ of the infamous ‘agreement’ gets started.

Take a snapshot of the industry in the summer of 1939. With the benefit of hindsight we know that, say, the DC-4(E) wasn’t quite what it’s makers hoped; and that had the peace gone on a little further the Fairey FC-1, for instance, might have shown great potential, or the Ensign might have been given more powerful engines, or… What actually counts is that America stayed out of the war for a couple of years, during which time they were able to develop some really useful large ‘modern’ transports from the bunch of underpowered concepts they had started that period with. During that time, Britain was absolutely flat-out on combat aircraft production as a matter of survival. So, when the Americans enter the war of course they have better transport designs, and by then of course the British have better fighters. What do you expect – that the Brits would scale back Spitfire production to build a massive fleet of Bombays, while the Americans hand us a couple of thousand Kittyhawks and B-17Ds for the front line? That really would be a story, but I might well be writing it auf Deutsch!

So, what of this ‘agreement’? Did the two governments get together (at any level) and ‘agree’ that the British would stop transport development because the Americans were better at it? I think it highly unlikely and I see no evidence for it. Did they ‘agree’ that they’d largely carry on doing what they were already doing, largely to their mutual benefit? Hardly needs answering, does it? Of course they did. Just because, seventy-odd years later, we can see that that mutual benefit was only short-term, and then became rather one-sided, doesn’t change the reality of the time. As GS points out, Nixon, and others, could see where that course of action would lead them. They knew they had little option during the war, and were determined to ‘restore the balance’ as soon as possible afterwards.

GS: Pls go back to my #5, last para. Mr Nixon is not wrong to say “by agreement…British effort was devoted to fighters and other combat types”. He and others would be wrong to imply (as here he does not) that 1941+ immediate production priority on combat types (for UK) and for transports (US) was exclusive, permanent, with some kind of sanction if UK were to initiate a transport, or US initiate a new bomber. That’s my we wuz robbed shoddiness.

Think it through, as if it were today and you were Minister. Each myth – M.52 “theft” as X-1; TSR.2 “sacrifice” v. an IMF Loan; this one – assumes a conspiracy, where UK Ministers accepted US’ intent to demean us: that simply would not have happened.

This myth, like so many others affecting UK:US Aero inter-action, rests on shoddy homework by writers employed by the industry.

This response has concerned me since I first read it – and it took me until today to discover why. I knew I had seen it quoted somewhere, and I have just located it.

In a paper presented by Wilfred E Nixon, the Chairman and Managing Director of the De Havilland Aircraft Company at a seminar on Problems of Industrial Relations held at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences on February 6th 1951 he said in paragraph 37 – and I quote –

‘Because we were ahead of the Americans in turbine development we saw in the jet airliner an opportunity to re-establish British leadership on the airways of the world, which had been denied us from the middle thirties when British airline operations had not been encouraged to anything like the degree enjoyed by American airlines. The leeway had been increased by the war period in which, by agreement, America concentrated on heavy bombers and transport aircraft while British effort was devoted to fighters and other combat types’.

Somehow I cannot believe that a man of Nixon’s calibre would be capable of shoddy writing – and given his position, I would have thought he would have been at least close enough to what had gone on to accurately report it. I’ll keep on searching!

I think the Viking/Valetta/Varsity sold because George Edwards was a go-getter. The Hermes/Hastings program was a success for Handley-Page….the RAF seemed to manage OK with the latter, anyway. What happened to this one, in the snow?
http://www.criticalpast.com/video/65675035478_British-people_stand-near-a-medical-van_man-on-crutches_people-jump

Why Viking?

The early-1943 Interim proposed by Brabazon was to have been Warwick-based. The Nov.’44 ITP for a Wellington-base reflected dismay that the nearest Warwick might come to utility would be with R-2800 Pratt-power, defeating much of the ($-sparing) purpose. So off we went to copy Dak. We did not then know:
1- that swathes of them would be unloaded, 1946/47, as is where is, (at reported $50,000); nor:
2 – that in early-46 Lord Keynes would be able to extinguish all Lend/Lease obligations, net of Reverse, on terms where 600xKing’s Forces, +72 civil were transferred within US $ Reconstruction Loan – i.e: Uncle Sam loaned us the $ to keep them, even at scrap price. HDHall, Official History, N.American Supply, P.480.

Of the 163 Vikings, 5 were open civil sales (to Denmark: but even they were bartered for bacon). All others were barter (Argentina) or Aid-for-a-Higher-Purpose (Pakistan). BEAC was overall co-ordinator of UK civil involvement in the Berlin Airlift, but chose not to bring in its Vikings (a charterer flew 118 Viking sorties). Last one phased out of BEAC in 1955; last (DC-3) Leopard Freighter, 19/5/62. BBMF treats their Dak. today as an earner, not a Museum-piece.

So: Q: after Keynes’ coup, why did we press on with Viking and add Valetta then Varsity – where Daks could have been kept/converted to do all of those things, like they did for everyone else on earth, such as today in SAAF?

My A: by early-1947 we decided that Vickers-Armstrongs, Weybridge might serve some purpose in Peace, so how do we keep it going for now? Lucky, because first Medium Bomber bid was declined. Not until 16/4/48 did Valiant sell: it needed additional assembly capacity, so the ex-BOAC Hurn sheds were transferred and were baptised by Varsity. So: markb is right: transport Wellington-variants kept men and plant warm for better things to come. Like Viscount.

Even the national BEA was using them in standard form and for first turboprop passenger runs.

The BEA aircraft (G-ALXN and AMDB) were used for freight and to gain experience with Darts pending the arrival of the Viscounts. Their lack of pressurization ruled out passenger flights at efficient turboprop altitudes.
In his book, Douglas Propliners, Arthur Pearcy recounts a bottle of champagne popping at 25,000 feet, so bottles weren’t carried. “Nor, for health reason, neither were livestock or fresh fruit”.
Perhaps they didn’t want the fruit to freeze.

Pounds, not dollars

Simply that buying ex-Lend/Lease Dakotas would have cost dollars, and the government of the day was loath to let anyone send that much out of the country. Never mind what it would have cost to buy brand new, larger, longer range kit.

It created jobs for British workers making it.

As much as I agree with that, and hand on heart glad that is the way it worked out, I don’t think that’s how the cold minded business works or looks at things.

It is a genuine question, what could the Viking offer to the airlines that the DC-3 (in developed forms even) wouldn’t have been able to?
Even the national BEA was using them in standard form and for first turboprop passenger runs.

None of the Brabazon Committee’s 5 Types was a boat, but not because concrete had sunk Empires and Clippers – Ministers, Members, PMs and Presidents flew 4-motor Transatlantic on BOAC/PAA Boeing (C-98) 314/A Clipper and Am.Export A/L Sikorsky (JR2S-1)VS-44 Excaliburs: 18 hr. sectors! Brabazon did not need to seek funding for a large civil boat because he had been gazumped: already funded were transport variants of MR Sunderland/Seaford; massive MR Short/Saro S.35 Shetland Mk.I was in prototype build. It would match any civil variant of USN boats, so 2nd. prototype was redefined as Mk.II transport – on RAF budget.

In Feb,1944 5 UK shipping lines serving S.America registered Br.Latin American A/L. Argentina was, and remained almost to outbreak of the Korean War, crucial to the $-sparing feeding of the British. The Coalition Govt. announced, 3/45, that Civil Air Transport would be undertaken by 3 National Corpns., whose fleet would be bought by MAP and leased to them by the new Ministry of Civil Aviation. The Labour Govt. announced, 1/11/45 they would be State owned: trading began 1/8/46 as BOAC, BEAC, and (ex-BLAAL) BSAAC.

Br.S.American A/L inaugurals were on Lancastrians, then Yorks, with Tudors onway. But they wanted (or Ministers believed they wanted) Clipper-beating boats – Bermuda, Caribbean, River Plate. Firms were funded to scheme such a thing, 1945/46. RAF believed it would retain a Trade Routes Protection role on Empire littoral bases, with a post-Sunderland/Seaford type, comparable to Pacific schemes in hand for USN. MoS prepared Spec. 10/46 for BSAAC and R.36/46 for RAF MR. In May,1946 an ITP was issued to Saro to design and build for BSAAC 3xSR.45, then with coupled RR Tweed. In 1948 4x(now, T.167-led coupled Proteus) were added for BOAC. (On 27/1/47 MoS ITP to DH for {to be} Comet 1 design included 7 “for” BOAC and 7 “for” BSAAC. We may wonder what S.Atlantic network needed Comet 1 and Princess).

Also in 1948 an invitation to tender was issued for 80 (!!) RAF MR boats. Bids were Blackburn B.78 Clydesman, Short P.D.2, VS.524, and the winner, 12/48 to Spec. R.2/48: Saro P.162, Turbo-Griffon (later, Napier Nomad), derived from SR.45.

BOAC absorbed BSAAC, 30/7/49; it ceased splashing 10/11/50. But RAF retained interest in marine MR: MoS drip-funded P.162 study to 1955! If procured, Vickers-Armstrongs would have been involved (deja vu: Vickers Ltd. had owned S.E.Saunders & Co.Ltd, 1918-1921). That is why, to sustain Cowes’ empty Columbine Works, V-A sub-contracted to Saro production of Valiant nose and Viscount wing.

(JB: what were Saro thinking? Like almost all UK Aero firms, then, before, and after, what they were thinking was how to spend our money. Short Vice Chairman,(to be Sir)Arthur Gouge, displaced by Nationalisation in 1943, became Saro Vice Chairman &Chief Executive: Shetland was his, and a successor was Saro’s only prospect: better men than they were baying for any Heavy landplane business).

And I would think Vickers made money with the Viking/Valetta/Varsity series

Later on I think the biggest blunders were made in the civil engine field…the downsizing of the Trident so the Spey was developed instead of the Medway then later on Rolls going for the RB-211 instead of building an engine for the market sector that the CFM-56 had to itself ten years later

[QUOTE=pagen01;?
Don’t misunderstand me, I love the British post-war aircraft, but what real advantage did the Vickers Viking/Valetta really have over the ten year older Dakota?[/QUOTE]