Underwater aircraft carrier

So its an SSK, thats 7000tons, but it wont go aground like the 7000 ton SSN’s do because its an SSK…that right Chaffers?.

You have to develop a conventional power plant capable of providing propulsion and all of the, considerable, hotel loads that a boat that size requires….spread those costs over just 4 hulls and you think you are getting a cheap boat?.

Then you have an SSK that, on-station, has to be indiscreet because of the need to keep a comms mast up to receive the calls for fire that are the whole reason for it being there in the first place. This immediately wipes out the ships usefulness for any tasking other than periscope recon…how does it stalk an opposing sub or surface vessel if it has to be ready to respond to a fire request at any time?!.

Your problem is that all you want is a stealthy, unreachable, 6″ howitzer battery that can be omnipresent and rain down shells from seemingly nowhere at seconds from the call. The rest of it you’re trying to fudge in is just half-arsed justification. As I said from the outset the concept is flawed by the fact that its target set doesn’t warrant the costs of developing the platform. There are far better ways to do the job than lobbing guided 155 shells in with 50m CEP’s and no need for a 7000ton SSK to dismantle insurgent Toyota’s, donkeys and unhardened compounds a few miles behind the beachhead.

We do need a platform to operate in the littoral and provide coverage for deployed forces. It was identified as the C2 Stabilisation Escort in the S2C2 study before we seemed to slip back to the old FSC concept for T26. C2 needed to perform a lot more roles than could be undertaken by a 7000ton SSK with or without guns though.

It sounds like a bad unworkable idea. I’m guessing it wont happen.

General Dynamics proposed that idea (using a Nuclear Sub, not a conventional one) to the US Navy a decade and a half ago, the answer was something in the line of “nuts”.

Erm right Chaffers?! You do realise how massive the gun system on the Zumwalt is to deliver a 155mm projectile! Even if we used a stripped out Astute as you are suggesting we wouldn’t be able to fit this single gun tube. Even if we could somehow shoehorn in the gun we would be left with a lousy Submarine unable to do any task well. The UK doesn’t need a patrol submarine and nobody has done NGFS from a Submarine since WW2 for good reason…it usually ends up bad for the submarine! A submarine doing NGFS has to give up its main advantage in the littoral…STEALTH. So in your scenario it comes up to periscope depth sticks up an antenna to await instructions then lobs off a few rounds at a target inshore. Well the crew had better hope and pray that there are no ASW aircraft or corvette/frigates nearby as they would be dead meat pretty rapidly! Anyhow any NGFS usually has to be for a sustained period meaning the submarine has to stay shallow for a sustained period to do anything worthwhile. You also forget that the Submarine will need to carry significant amounts of shells, again where is the space. Also say a shell explodes as it exits the gun tube, well now your submarine is stuck on the surface as it will be severely damaged and unlikely able to dive.

If NGFS is needed its usually because you are trying to coerce somebody on shore like in the recent Libya action or you are supporting the Amphibs. If it coercion you want the enemy to know you are there and if it is an amphibious operation the enemy are darn well going to know you are there so you are going to want your frigates and destroyers up to provide goalkeeper protection for the amphibs. If the frigates are forward with the amphibs then they can do NGFS.

Now I understand you have put together a pet theory and are eagerly trying to defend it but the concept of diesel subs with guns was proven to be flawed sixty+ years ago (even earlier actually going on the events of WW1). In later years it was only ever done in situations where you had nobody who could shoot back.

Dont bother. Sound logic doesnt compete with theology…

Erm right Chaffers?! You do realise how massive the gun system on the Zumwalt is to deliver a 155mm projectile! Even if we used a stripped out Astute as you are suggesting we wouldn’t be able to fit this single gun tube. Even if we could somehow shoehorn in the gun we would be left with a lousy Submarine unable to do any task well. The UK doesn’t need a patrol submarine and nobody has done NGFS from a Submarine since WW2 for good reason…it usually ends up bad for the submarine! A submarine doing NGFS has to give up its main advantage in the littoral…STEALTH. So in your scenario it comes up to periscope depth sticks up an antenna to await instructions then lobs off a few rounds at a target inshore. Well the crew had better hope and pray that there are no ASW aircraft or corvette/frigates nearby as they would be dead meat pretty rapidly! Anyhow any NGFS usually has to be for a sustained period meaning the submarine has to stay shallow for a sustained period to do anything worthwhile. You also forget that the Submarine will need to carry significant amounts of shells, again where is the space. Also say a shell explodes as it exits the gun tube, well now your submarine is stuck on the surface as it will be severely damaged and unlikely able to dive.

If NGFS is needed its usually because you are trying to coerce somebody on shore like in the recent Libya action or you are supporting the Amphibs. If it coercion you want the enemy to know you are there and if it is an amphibious operation the enemy are darn well going to know you are there so you are going to want your frigates and destroyers up to provide goalkeeper protection for the amphibs. If the frigates are forward with the amphibs then they can do NGFS.

Now I understand you have put together a pet theory and are eagerly trying to defend it but the concept of diesel subs with guns was proven to be flawed sixty+ years ago (even earlier actually going on the events of WW1). In later years it was only ever done in situations where you had nobody who could shoot back.

It sounds like a bad unworkable idea. I’m guessing it wont happen.

Reasonable comments which deserve an answer Al….

Yes it fires whilst submerged. Think of a medium sized coastal patrol submarine without anything particularly remarkable about it. Just a basic diesel and battery job which we could have produced 20 years ago but with software and components nicked from the Astutes where their costs aren’t too high. Keep it similar but low key.

In the NGF scenario it comes to periscope depth and extends a barrel, it fires the same ER munitions developed for the Zumwalt straight up in the air. According to the designers this is near optimal, hence why the original system was designed as a vertically firing gun. They are having some problems with the rocket boosted projectiles (to get them to the extreme ranges they are designed for) hence lets assume they stick with the already tested 45nm variant.

The only clever part of the system is the projectile itself, the mechanics and engineering behind the gun assembly are old hat. It effectively glides to it’s target using GPS coordinates supplied by a third party, no different to the conventional mount on the Zumwalt. It will still be supersonic by the time it hits and CEPs of 50m are quoted which is exceptional for 155 at the best of times.

Hence it doesn’t matter greatly whether the projectile is thrown truly vertical due to the GPS guidance. Close to vertical would be enough for most ranges. I doubt anything particularly fancy in terms of active stabilization would be required, submarines already launch ICBMs, 3500lb cruise missiles etc.

As for costs, strip the reactor out of an Astute and you’re left with £600million worth of sensors, steel and weapons in a 7000tonne frame. That would be comparable to the cost of a diesel SSN lite of comparable size, same sensors and weapons. The Upholders cost roughly half of what the Trafalgars did and represented the most advanced SSKs ever built in terms of sensor fit. Saying that in the Upholder’s case we would indeed have realised far better value for money with sticking to SSNs.

Currently the luxury end of the market in the 214 goes for 500million euros export, or about the same cost as a modern frigate.

The Astute class, and it’s cost, is designed to keep Barrow in Furness ticking over whilst they build a boat every two or three years. That’s a long time to build a boat, though the Trafalgars were similar. Constructing a boat containing a nuclear reactor is many orders of magnitude more difficult, compared to the 2-3 years for Astutes or Trafalgars the Upholders were much quicker, the lead of class took 10 months. Most importantly the software and integration work has already been done and is mature. We’ve spent an awful lot of money on it.

SSNs cannot fulfil the same role with Tomahawks, even if the system was capable of providing timely support a single costly missile with a large warhead is not what NGFS is all about. Timely weight of accurate fire is the key, Tomahawks provide a different capability against vertical fixed structures. Their weight of fire is only sufficient for point targets though it is immensely useful as a diplomatic tool.

Economies of scale are inherent in the system. Same torpedoes, software, some sensors, training and maintenance. The only ways in which such a system would differ are in terms of technologies which are inherently familiar to any medium sized navy. Some efficiencies of scale would be of huge benefit, notably in terms of crewing, training and availability of trained personnel. Others are more abstract but valuable in terms of impact upon the design of our future frigates, freeing up SSNs from perisher or patrol duties and SF tasking.

Skimmers are, by their nature, visible. Some duties such as fisheries patrol would certainly benefit from the stealth afforded a submarine. Indeed the Canadians have brought prosecutions against illegal fishing activity due to the reach of their Upholders where a frigate would merely have prevented that one instance. This is of particular relevance to the UK, but a role which an SSN would be wasted on. They also find that the Upholder / Victoria’s patrol three times as much ocean as an equivalent skimmer, with a third as many men.

Submarines simply make better patrol boats, they can observe without influencing events whereas our tiny pool of skimmers, which require complements of 190-250 souls compared to 47 for the Upholders (though I suspect this figure could be lower for a new design), are relatively manpower intensive by comparison.

Freeing our future frigates from the contradictory demands of NGFS and ASW escort would save a great deal of time, space and money in their design. Freeing our SSNs from roles for which they are not deeply suited would enable a $2billion weapons system to do what it is peerless at.

SSK gunboats needn’t be expensive, they are inherently force multipliers even without their potent NGF threat.

With the US Navy largely withdrawing to the Pacific realm operations such as the most recent one in Libya are likely to represent the future. A small class of (say 4 boats) gunboat SSKs could have provided the same, or more likely far greater, capability than the hugely expensive RAF operation operating from friendly airfields. Indeed the costs of that one deployment would almost certainly have paid for the entire class.

That’s not to say there aren’t problems with the idea, I’m amazed that no-one has mentioned the prospect of a breach explosion, jammed rounds, maintenance, servicing or barrel warping. Whilst these are not factors in computer games they are the primary factors in real life.

By instinct and inclination I would go for a boat over a skimmer every time but:

I don’t quite understand how this mooted NGS SSK would work
Does it fire whilst submerged?
Does it extend one barrel when firing?
Does it surface fully?
Will it use some kind of ER ammunition?
Will the ammo be guided?
Is there some active stabilisation of the boat?
Or just some clever fire control system?

I don’t know whether you have fully understood the economies of scale with military kit (the USAF could have bought another 400 of the hideously expensive f22 with the r and d money for f35 and that is without the unit cost of f22 coming down with such a large order so too make economic sense they have to buy far more than 400 f35s) with only a few of these boats their unit cost will be high would it be so high that it is actually more economic sense to buy more Astutes and tomahawks (or the affordable weapon system if that hasn’t been killed off yet) or some existing SSKs fitted with the same?

If your knowledge of physics was anywhere near your knowledge of computer games you would know that Ramjets don”t work below supersonic speeds. A rocket propels them to high mach numbers before the ramjet even operates.

Ramjets have been made to work (inefficiently) at about 100 mph, & without difficulty at anything above M0.5. Depending on design choices, ignition speed for a boosted ramjet missile will be from high subsonic up to maybe M2.

BTW, I gave up playing computer games when Pacman was new.

Name every occasion on which this has happened…

Your bored and yet engaging in this kind of pedantry?. As described the, public-source, instances of ASM engagement at Latakia, in the Gulf, in the South Atlantic have all shown the same evidence.

Both of which were damaged, one of which would have been terminal with a correctly fuzed bomb.

My mistake I assumed by stating that the system was only deployed on 2 ships in the Task Force the point was clear that in 1982 GWS25 was still a little immature. The fact that one of the instances of ship damage was down to human error in ship-handling, by a consort vessel, and nothing to do with the missile system itself is also noteworthy. The fact is that, operating properly, GWS25 was fully capable of defeating opposing air targets. You can try and make a generalised point that vagueries of technology mean you cant depend on a system, but, that applies equally to attacker as defender doesnt it?.

In computer games… You need a beachead for logistics, which most computer games ignore.

I cant see us rebuilding a Mulberry harbour any time soon Chaffers. Securing a port with a full transport infrastructure behind it is going to be far more the strategic goal than trying run the LSTs we dont have up on the shingle?!!!.

It would be for the Petrel, it was subsonic.

Now try Google again….this time your keywords are Petrel Sounding Rocket, supersonic target, Aberporth, Woomera.

A months transit time certainly is wasteful but at least it is in the open ocean. In open media our 7 SSNs have run aground at least 6 times.

No the months transit time is for the SSK to get there. SSN gets there in 10 days. If they are running aground the answer is training…not spending billions on new SSK’s and UNREP vessels.

There is no subsurface threat to any oil production facilities that may appear off the Falklands.
I never said there was.

You dismissed OPVs for having no sub-surface capability?. Why would that be an issue if you agree there is no subsurface threat?.

In computer games…. I’ve given numerous real world examples.

Yes you have, but, you are ignoring the basic fact that none apply to us.

After that they’d become the largest skipping stone in history. This has been seen empirically in tests where the defending platform has been destroyed by debris.

Skipping stone?. Quick empirical test for you….try and skip a housebrick or an irregular shaped lump of metal. What tends to happen is that a flat edge digs in, especially to waves, and it skips like a bulldozer. This is why, when planes ditch, they dont generally skip blissfully across the water surface. Please do provide the results of your empirical testing though.

If your knowledge of physics was anywhere near your knowledge of computer games you would know that Ramjets don”t work below supersonic speeds. A rocket propels them to high mach numbers before the ramjet even operates.

Correct on the booster to get airflow into the ramjet. Incorrect on the ‘high mach number’. The booster gets the missile to ramjet ignition and then there is an acceleration curve as the ramjet gets the missile up to cruise/sustain speed.

So…. SSKs are useless

SSKs are great in your own littoral performing sea denial. They are no good for sending into the other guys littoral to do NGFS or any kind of offensive role – unless he happens to be an immediate neighbour. We may not like the French very much but we arent going to war with them anytime soon.

SSNs can operate freely and effectively close to shore

Correct.

Battleships are useless as anything other than TLAM launchers or eating a couple of Kingfish

Nope they are useless for launching TLAM as well. Battleships are just generally useless today…which is why no-one has them.

no-one needs NGFS or logistics

Logistics yes…NGFS only sometimes.

patrolling is pointless…

Patrolling can be wasteful of scarce resources. In infantry terms, if there is hearts and minds to be won….sure….but you patrol under cover of a surveillance asset. You dont win hearts and minds when the locals see your patrols chopped to bits by IEDs and ambushes. Arm the surveillance asset and you get a very short fire-chain.

short range self defense systems only fail when they run out of ammo, sensors and radar always work perfectly even when close to land and frigates should be loaded out with TLAMs to take out inland airfields.

….and, in your view, only defensive systems fail?. Frigates ARE being armed with LACMs to take out inland airfields…as they should be.

I’m talking about real life scenarios, you’re talking about beating computer games.

No, you are talking about a platform unsuited to power projection (an SSK) being fitted with a vertical gun system to provide NGFS in support of a beachead against low or peer threat states. This resulting in a platform that must patrol in an indiscreet configuration with, at very least, a comms mast extended – if it expects to receive calls for fire – while apparently at the same time proving an elusive target with all of the normal virtues of an SSK. The irony of you calling me a fantasist is amusing.

I think it is irrelevant to argue about the vulnerability of surface ships inshore on a hostile coast facing supersonic missiles. It is undoubtedly a difficult threat to deal with.

The real point is on Chaffers proposal to get around with this. It is unfortunate therefore that he has not answered my question to allow us to understand what he is proposing and highlight any difficulties that such a solution might present

Well…..in my mind…..your dismisal of Sea Wolf’s performance in the Falklands War ( a brand new system with tech guys still on board tweeking the system) has shot down any credibility you might have had. That you have failed to grasp the fact that Sea Wolf was one of the bright spots of that conflict really says something.

Those ships who have used countermeasures have defeated inbound missiles

Name every occasion on which this has happened…

NGFS is an ancillary role in surface escort design. Useful to have certainly but not something that you would allow to dictate the design beyond a nod to stability. Strike ashore, in the naval context, means more than just NGFS…a lot more.

In computer games like Harpoon it does…

Seawolf in the Falklands was not ineffectual. It was deployed on only 2 escorts and, in one attack, destroyed 2 out of 4 aircraft on a dumb ordnance delivery profile and forced a third into a manoeuvre kill. Current GWS26 improves on the capability of the original GWS25 variant.

Both of which were damaged, one of which would have been terminal with a correctly fuzed bomb.

Lessons learned in previous opposed amphibious landings have been marginalised by technology. Vertical envelopment and OTH deployment are now the target concepts.

In computer games… You need a beachead for logistics, which most computer games ignore.

Intercepting supersonic inbounds is nothing new. Petrel rockets as targets from Aberporth and the US NAVSEA’s Vandal targets were/are supersonic and have been intercepted over the course of several decades by several missile types.

It would be for the Petrel, it was subsonic.

Dispatching SSN’s to the South Atlantic during times of increased tension is not wasteful.

A months transit time certainly is wasteful but at least it is in the open ocean. In open media our 7 SSNs have run aground at least 6 times.

There is no subsurface threat to any oil production facilities that may appear off the Falklands.

I never said there was.

There are few taskings that our SSNs do that an SSK could replace them in..

In computer games…. I’ve given numerous real world examples.

Physics dictates that supersonic travel is difficult for fragments of destroyed antiship missile. They do not travel much more than a 1000yds or so and are pretty much spent as projectiles by the end of their journey.

The main mass of a Moskit or Brahmos wouldn’t even hit the water till well after 1000 yards, if it was catastrophically intercepted.. After that they’d become the largest skipping stone in history. This has been seen empirically in tests where the defending platform has been destroyed by debris.

A heavy, supersonic, antiship missile is likely to be within min range inhibit at 10nm. You’d have to question whether the ramjet could get a 6000lb 30ft long missile up to high mach numbers in such a short distance??

If your knowledge of physics was anywhere near your knowledge of computer games you would know that Ramjets don”t work below supersonic speeds. A rocket propels them to high mach numbers before the ramjet even operates.

So…. SSKs are useless, SSNs can operate freely and effectively close to shore, Battleships are useless as anything other than TLAM launchers or eating a couple of Kingfish, no-one needs NGFS or logistics, patrolling is pointless because you just read the scenario description, short range self defense systems only fail when they run out of ammo, sensors and radar always work perfectly even when close to land and frigates should be loaded out with TLAMs to take out inland airfields.

You are a Harpoon computer nerd and I claim my £5. 😀

I’m talking about real life scenarios, you’re talking about beating computer games.

You see why it’s boring for me?

Well I’m getting bored of this but one last reply…

Fair enough. The best thing I can do then is list the inaccuracies and false assumptions you’ve posted. That way there is nothing you have to come back on but, hopefully, you can get the idea of why you are so far off the mark here?

1, Those ships who have used countermeasures have defeated inbound missiles. Those who have either not had them or had countermeasures and not employed them (including Hanit and her CIWS) have been hit. There is nothing ambiguous there. These were not ‘inferior’ missiles as you suggest as the ships of the day (targets) were no more advanced.

2, NGFS is an ancillary role in surface escort design. Useful to have certainly but not something that you would allow to dictate the design beyond a nod to stability. Strike ashore, in the naval context, means more than just NGFS…a lot more.

3, Seawolf in the Falklands was not ineffectual. It was deployed on only 2 escorts and, in one attack, destroyed 2 out of 4 aircraft on a dumb ordnance delivery profile and forced a third into a manoeuvre kill. Current GWS26 improves on the capability of the original GWS25 variant.

4. Lessons learned in previous opposed amphibious landings have been marginalised by technology. Vertical envelopment and OTH deployment are now the target concepts.

5. Intercepting supersonic inbounds is nothing new. Petrel rockets as targets from Aberporth and the US NAVSEA’s Vandal targets were/are supersonic and have been intercepted over the course of several decades by several missile types.

6. Dispatching SSN’s to the South Atlantic during times of increased tension is not wasteful. Quite the reverse in the 70’s the dispatch of an SSN had a stabilising effect. Given that Argentine ASW has not reached a point where it can reliably counter an SSN the factors involved are unchanged.

7. There is no subsurface threat to any oil production facilities that may appear off the Falklands. If the Argentine Govt decided to initiate hostilities it would be to gain access to those resources. Destroying them with a submarine attack defeats the only plausible reason for hostile action in the first place.

8. OPVs can be excellent sea-boats. The Castle class performed extremely well as duty Falklands Islands Patrol Vessels and displaced circa 1500tons. The Leanders were not a great deal larger and were legendary for their stability in a heavy sea and, ironically, as gun platforms.

9. Just as with E-3D SURTASS would be a force-multiplier. SURTASS would direct deployed SSNs to be where they need to be only when they need to be there. It has a direct impact on warfighting potential…similar to the earlier examples of UAVs directing forces onto convoy chokes etc only when opposition is detected. Saves a lot of useless patrolling.

10. There are few taskings that our SSNs do that an SSK could replace them in…this is why we got rid of SSKs in the first place. SSK advantages in the littoral etc are not significant enough to warrant the spend. If we had the money extra to build SSK’s we’d use it for Astute 8 and 9.

11. Physics dictates that supersonic travel is difficult for fragments of destroyed antiship missile. They do not travel much more than a 1000yds or so and are pretty much spent as projectiles by the end of their journey.

12. A heavy, supersonic, antiship missile is likely to be within min range inhibit at 10nm. You’d have to question whether the ramjet could get a 6000lb 30ft long missile up to high mach numbers in such a short distance??. Regardless of that though the weapon has an active seeker head and, if the launch had somehow been missed by the ship, the immediate seeker activation would be unmistakeable and trigger an immediate reaction. 10nm puts the inbound squarely in the FLAADS envelope so not only could the surface ship defend itself against that threat, but, extend that defence to any surface vessel within visual range. FLAADS quad-packing and active seeker also mean volume/saturation coverage so it would require an unrealistically large, coordinated, strike to take down one ship….10nm offshore. Thats before inner-layer CIWS and softkill behind the FLAADS are mentioned as well. FLAADS/Sea Ceptor being already funded – a point worth reiterating.

Chaffers, I certainly would not dispute that a frigate is very vulnerable close inshore if attacked by Brahmos et al, I doubt anyone would. However the weapon you are promoting, is it
a) A missile which can be launched from underwater (like Tomahawk)
b) A gun which can be fired from underwater
c) A gun which can be fire with the submarine underwater but the gun projecting above water
d) a gun which requires the submarine to surface in order to fire?

Chaffers,

Tell me, why is it that your submarine can use extended-range precision-guided shells, but a frigate can’t? Why do you assume that a surface vessel can’t have anything more than a 4.5″ gun with standard ammunition? Haven’t you heard of Vulcano? Even with standard ammunition a 127/62 or 127/64 gun does a lot better than what you claim is the limit.

You’re obviously not interested in evidence-based argument.

Hit either of those with your SAM or CIWS and the supersonic debris will likely as not sink your frigate. Forget about the warhead, a single 76mm small calibre round would probably mission kill you.

This made me laugh.

Well I’m getting bored of this but one last reply…

And Hanit was perfectly capable of dealing with the missile that hit her – if the crew hadn’t been complacent.

You assume. She was 10nm off the coast, close enough in to be vulnerable. Successfully evading an ASM has certainly happened but it is a very limited data set and some of the examples quoted could have been as much due to luck as anything else. Hanit had CIWS which, to the best of my knowledge has only damaged a battleship in actual combat. Sensors were off due to EMC issues however close to a threat environment actual crews end up expending a great deal more ordinance on non-existent threats than real. I’m not decrying this in any way, however the frigate is completely reliant upon its sensors to stay safe. If you had any military experience you’d know that they break, quite often.

A Frigate using it’s main sensors however is broadcasting it’s presence and range to anyone with primitive equipment and yet the Hanit was at extreme range for providing even close to shore NGFS and not radiating. It was hit by an ASM best described as mediocre or cheap. indeed the Sa’ar 5 was often hailed s an example of what could be done with a small Frigate or corvette, admittedly without providing for the NGFs role.

By the very nature of the multiple missions for which they are designed they always choose mobility and firepower to the massive detriment of protection. Armour is present immateriel of complacency but no surface combatant in the last few generations has provided it.

NGFS is a role which requires unique, and contradictory, attributes for a surface ship. The need to get relatively close inshore means a shallow draft, the need to pack a decent piece or artillery means sea keeping, stability and size. Because size is a given you are a largish target hence mobility is the key, but this in itself impacts upon the accuracy of your artillery. Similarly shallow draft ships don’t generally do well in much more than a flat calm. The only options which help this equation are stealth, range or armour, all of which the US can afford and has tried, or is trying.

C3 was cancelled because Frigates have to be useful in multiple roles and the compromise of the equation is a platform which is a jack of all trades and master of few. ASW is the focus, ASuw a second and NGFS almost an after thought.

The only realistic alternative to NGFS is landing and supplying artillery batteries. Bear in mind that the vast majority of the logistics tail for a Battalion or above sized formation is keeping the guns firing. In amphibious warfare, of which the RN devotes a great deal of it’s manpower and tonnage to, landing and supplying the artillery is a logistical equation which is almost impossible to solve. Attacking in the face of artillery support without any of your own is suicide, and on a beachead you have no option but to attack.

So if NGFs is a ‘peripheral’ mission then we can scrap the Royal Marines and fully half of the RN tomorrow, as without it they are a paper tiger at best. We are left with our escorts to provide it, and numerous programmes over the years have failed to bring anything in terms of capability to the table.

Missiles or UAVs are incapable of providing the weight of fire needed. Our current platforms are stretched in their current roles and several, the Darings, are unlikely to be risked in such a role. That leaves our T23s, which bend the frigate equation as far towards ASW as any modern vessel ever has.

The need for a survivable platform to provide NGFS is clear given the weight our Navy devoted amphibious warfare yet the total escort fleet is both less likely to be risked and less numerous than that devoted to the Falklands campaign, where frigates could not always be spared to provide it. Those frigates which did ran their magazines empty to be unrepped by rope and bucket. In one attack it took 3 days of bombardment by various weapons, with the naval mounts being key, to suppress the opposition forces to an extent which allowed an attack.

Any argument about NGFS being peripheral or a luxury is not imbued with every lesson ever learned from opposed amphibious landings. The statistical lessons learned of the vulnerability of ships close to shore ignore the meagre capability of the weapons deployed.
Exocets, Styx, silkworms and the like only rank in the lower leagues or even conference of ASMs.

Tell me, how will you deal with those Brahmos launchers from your submarine, which has no idea where they are unless someone tells it?

Brahmos shore batteries are no threat to an SSK. Only the gun barrel and a comms mast would be above the surface. No threat at all.

Taking out such batteries would be a likely tasking for such an SSK though so your question is pertinent. The answer is you would detect them with great difficulty. One obvious answer is SF, another ship launched UAVs such as the Fire Shadow. I believe trials are ongoing as we speak though don’t get too excited, it is cheap and cheerful and probably capable of taking out anything it finds on it’s own.

Compare this to a surface ship. The Brahmos crew has no need to radiate, they can use spotters on high ground until something wanders into their view as it takes GPS or intertial guidance until it reaches it’s terminal phase, after which the small ship is toast whether it intercepts or not. The chances of intercepting a mach 3 missile are exceptionally slim to mathematically improbable, most especially so with VLS launchers.

Time spent in reconnaisance is seldom wasted’

Excellent, but NGFS is about killing the enemy. In a proper engagement your toys would be little use. Timely weight of accurate fire is all that is important. Your toys would only provide the latter in a policing capacity, the former two not even close.

Sea Wolf rectified that and the GWS26 installation on the 23’s enhanced it.

Seawolf was present and ineffective in the Falklands.

With FLAADS our next gen frigates will be tough/expensive targets to engage from the air and FLAADS is already funded.

I’m not disagreeing, it is a national disgrace that our FF fleet stands at 13 hulls and whilst I’m a big fan of the T23 design, and frigates as GP ships in general, the primary role that they are designed for is a long way from NGFS. There is no hope for frigate hulls before the 2015 SDR and realistically before 202x. All of the designs indicate a similar platform.

Why are we patrolling oil platforms with an SSK?. Why not use an OPV like everyone else does?.

We’re currently patrolling with at least one SSN open sources suggest. That is a waste I’m sure you’ll agree. C3 cancelled, OPVs have limited or no sub sea surveillance capabilities… SSKs make more than enough sense to be realistic. 60 billion barrels of oil is worth an insurance policy, SSKs are cheap and capable for such a task.

Deploying there is no waste…you cant have it both ways!.

It’s a good use of our current resources I grant you, but definitely overkill considering the threat. This is just the sort of task that an SSK such as I have outlined would be ideal for, with or without a gun!

Daring’s deployment brought diplomatic consequences, militarising the S Atlantic was the phrase used I believe. OPVs are good littoral boats, the conditions down there however are atrocious to bad, during the summer. You might as well use a row boat.

Exactly. We have no MPA so the answer is to buy MPA’s when we can afford them not waste money on one-trick pony SSK’s with some ludicrous gun system aboard!.

Despite the seedcorn initiative our skills in this area are toast. They may start thinking about buying airframes in 2015, but more likely they will think about designed airframes in sometime after 2015. Shortsighted and indefensible as it is this would be unlikely to generate any real capability in the next 10- 15 years. Training submariners in comparison is something we are still good at.

Agreed. I’ve been an advocate of us buying at least three, preferably five, SURTASS boats/arrays off the Americans for decades.

A surprisingly reasonable proposal, though adding no warfighting capability per se. SSKs add to this by freeing up SSNs as described at length. Of our SSN fleet, only half or less will be actively deployed, the rest in refit, training or conducting tasks either better or adequately suited to SSKs.

Please note that I’m not advocating SSIs, as you point out our T and A boats provide the muscle. Cheap and cheerful patrol boats would suffice,.

Closer to shore is more vulnerable for a surface vessel as its easier to employ less sophisticated and more prevalent weapons against the ship. That said though even a conventional frigate can deliver effect from over the horizon ranges and that is effect against a bigger target set than just basic NGFS allows for.

There is no data set for more sophisticated weapons, and a very limited one for mediocre ones. Even that data is nigh on damning close to shore. It can deliver effect but not with the response times ( even a sophisticated frigate with Tomahawks at 450kts) or weight of fire. Even accuracy against mobile targets is poor given the transit time of the missile. I think you misunderstand the dynamics of combat.

The vessel I outlined…absolutely…especially against those missile systems you list.

Hit either of those with your SAM or CIWS and the supersonic debris will likely as not sink your frigate. Forget about the warhead, a single 76mm small calibre round would probably mission kill you. Any torpedo hit and you’re dead. Dumb or guided bomb of any size? Dead. Lucky hit from a 105mm shore battery? Probably sunk. Small or outdated ASM? You might be lucky or alert enough.

Absolutely deluded more like, and the risk is an order of magnitude higher close in to the shore. The reality is that a $2m Brahmos would defeat a $500m Frigate close to the shore with such a high degree of probability that missile failure is the most likely discrepency.

From launch you would have less than 20 seconds before impact at 10 nautical miles. Say you were alert and actually launched your SAM which scored a hit 3-4 nm out. The debris would sill cripple or sink you 2 seconds later.

At 10nm you’d be at extreme range with a Mk8 mod 0.

Still fancy polishing those UAVs?

You’d be happy polishing UUVs on this craft whilst shore batteries containing Brahmos or Sunburns were 10nm away? Frankly the Hanit was better armed than what you just posted.

And Hanit was perfectly capable of dealing with the missile that hit her – if the crew hadn’t been complacent.

You keep switching your ground. You don’t need boots on the ground, because you know the GPS location of every target. But you can hit mobile targets because there will be boots on the ground to locate them for you. Tell me, how will you deal with those Brahmos launchers from your submarine, which has no idea where they are unless someone tells it?

As to buying UUV’s equalling the costs of an off the shelf SSK buy you only need to buy enough for the deploying SSNs you know? So you’re not going to train with them? Can’t afford 7 of them? None will ever be U/S? Lol

Assuming this is a joke by the LOL?. You were the one who stated a UUV for every boat so, as you so correctly note, that means one per boat PLUS training and reserve units. I said they only need be tasked to deploying units so you are immediately saving a few units arent you?. Is this not glaringly obvious?.

But your entire argument is based upon SSNs being faster!! In other words speed isn’t an advantage in the littoral… Neither is size. Even endurance isn’t, 1 month pottering is more than enough, unless you’re volunteering to clean their UUVs without seeing daylight for months on end.

Humour again?. Transit time to get to station is an issue – SSN does this in days unsupported – SSK in weeks with an UNREP or two. Spot the difference. In the littoral sensor capability and crew training count more than speed. SSNs have, generally, more room and available power for sensors, installed processing power, cooling etc. A competent SSK with a well trained crew and a command team who know their waters can challenge an SSN in the littoral….no question of that….but we’re back to the local sea denial versus expeditionary strike issue. SSK’s can only do one SSN’s can do both.

What use is a two shot fragile toy in a firefight? What sort of support are you suggesting here, moral support? Comedic value?

‘Time spent in reconnaisance is seldom wasted’ as the saying goes. Why have your NGFS SSK barrage a dozen shells into a set of coordinates to catch a single Toyota with a pintle KPV and three lads when an LMM or Viper Strike can pick it off with a single shot while its moving?. Why have your NGFS platform suppressing insurgent positions ambushing your convoys if your ARGUS/A160T watched them lay their IEDs and set the ambush?. Mate of mine is a REME Recce Mech always used to quote the 7P’s to me. Wasnt something the was especially big in the mob, but, the pongo’s love their 7P’s apparently. Worth looking up and having a think.

We are talking about frigates being vulnerable. Add in the ships damaged or destroyed by dumb bombs from aircraft incabale of anything but VFR and the 5 Styx kills in the Indo Pakistani war.. If I were being harsh I’d count the unexploded ordinance in the Falklands as mission kills. Thats 20+ easily.

Ahh goalposts shifting now the humour isnt working. OK. Dumb bomb delivery profiles were successful in the Falklands because we had allowed ourselves to focus on a one dimensional air threat – Soviet high alt bombers and big diving antiship missiles. Close in defences had been neglected. Sea Wolf rectified that and the GWS26 installation on the 23’s enhanced it. FLAADS/Sea Ceptor takes that to the next level with horizon range area defence and quadpacking. With FLAADS our next gen frigates will be tough/expensive targets to engage from the air and FLAADS is already funded.

The South Atlantic is going to be teeming with oil rigs in 2020 and you think we have nothing to patrol?

Why are we patrolling oil platforms with an SSK?. Why not use an OPV like everyone else does?.

You don’t think our SSNs are currently tasked there? You don’t think their month long transit alone is a waste of a $2billion asset? Give me strength….

I dont think there is one down there on permanent station. Remember what you said before about training though. Deployments down to the Southern oceans maintain familiarity in those waters. There is no substitute for observing the operational environment. Learning where the shoal waters are…getting a feel for flow patterns and the bathymetry. Deploying there is no waste…you cant have it both ways!.

We have no maritime reconnaissance and you think we have nothing to patrol?

Exactly. We have no MPA so the answer is to buy MPA’s when we can afford them not waste money on one-trick pony SSK’s with some ludicrous gun system aboard!.

Completely wrong, there is a gap in our wide area undersea surveillance capabilities you could drive an SSBN powered by air raid sirens through.

Agreed. I’ve been an advocate of us buying at least three, preferably five, SURTASS boats/arrays off the Americans for decades. No one questions the Crabs need for AWACS or its effect as a force multiplier yet no-one seems to appreciate that the same factors exist sub-surface. Dont see where your SSK comes into this though as SSK’s have a very limited sensor footprint.

And little use for NGFS. Looks more expensive than the $500m cheap frigate you posted earlier. Wouldn’t be allowed within 15nm of the shoreline if even a small ASM threat was present.

Remember no ship that has been equipped to defeat a missile and has actually employed countermeasures has been hit by a missile….that is simple fact.

Closer to shore is more vulnerable for a surface vessel as its easier to employ less sophisticated and more prevalent weapons against the ship. That said though even a conventional frigate can deliver effect from over the horizon ranges and that is effect against a bigger target set than just basic NGFS allows for. At the SAME TIME its on station for a raft of other missions that your SSK is just not getting near.

You’d be happy polishing UUVs on this craft whilst shore batteries containing Brahmos or Sunburns were 10nm away? Frankly the Hanit was better armed than what you just posted.

The vessel I outlined…absolutely…especially against those missile systems you list. I’d be a hell of a lot more scared if I knew the opposition had truck launched NSM 30 miles away. The answer to that is surveillance UAV’s on the frigate though…not a new class of SSKs.

He refuses to accept that. He says it can fire a quick barrage from periscope depth (don’t ask me to explain the mechanics of that), & be gone before anyone locates it.

He reckons that a surface ship bristling with self-defence weapons & softkill systems is more vulnerable. He claims that it will know the GPS location of every fixed target, & can get locations of transient targets instantly from troops on the ground while lurking undetected offshore, so doesn’t need any onboard or deployable sensors to locate ground targets. He thinks the sub will be stable enough to fire accurately without a stabilised gun mount, & it’ll be able to fire enough shells, fast enough, to wreck an airfield or port before it’s located & destroyed. :confused: