United Arab Emirites – Military Profile

a couple articles profiling the UAE military. As most folks would know these chaps have some pretty speci gear. The first one deals with the UAE military over all so includes Land and Naval forces. I guess if anyone wants to discuss something realated to those then they should perhaps copy the relevant sections over to the appropriate forum.

COUNTRY BRIEFING: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES – Packing a bigger punch
Ed Blanche JDW Correspondent
Beirut

The United Arab Emirates is emerging as a formidable military power in the volatile Gulf region. Ed Blanche reports
* The most rapidly developing military power in the Gulf region, the UAE is contesting Saudi Arabia’s military domination of the region
* The federation has secured access to advanced military technology through negotiations and investment
* Diversity of suppliers is key to the UAE’s lack of reliance on any one foreign power
The United Arab Emirates (UAE), now in the closing stages of a 10-year, USD15 billion defence modernisation programme, has become the most rapidly developing military power in the Gulf region, challenging Iran and Saudi Arabia, which along with the now-departed regime in Baghdad, had been the region’s major powers.
At the same time, the UAE and the other smaller states within the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) are moving towards greater multilateralism and closer bilateral military and economic ties with the US. That has loosened Saudi dominance of the six-nation alliance, a cornerstone of the regional defence structure since its creation in 1984, and, along with the fallout from the events of 9/11, has reduced Riyadh’s influence in the Gulf.
As it gathers formidable military capabilities, the UAE – a federation of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah and Umm al-Quwain – is clearly determined to contest Saudi Arabia’s military domination of the GCC and Iran’s power-projection capabilities across the Gulf, particularly in the chokepoint Strait of Hormuz, a vital shipping route.
Abu Dhabi, the federation’s oil producer, is the UAE’s military driving force, providing the bulk of the defence funds and the personnel for the armed forces. The UAE has invested heavily in building up a strong defence posture in a strategic region that will remain volatile in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq and the US confrontation with Iran over its alleged clandestine programme to acquire nuclear weapons.
A major land-based threat was eliminated with the toppling of Saddam’s regime following the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. However, the power vacuum that ensued, and the relentless insurgency that continues to escalate, has plunged the region into a new crisis.
The bloodshed in Iraq, the emergence of a new government in Baghdad dominated by Shi’ite Muslims and the possibility of a sectarian civil war followed by the fragmentation of the country into Sunni, Shi’ite and Kurdish enclaves, causes deep alarm among the Sunni regimes around the region.
The Gulf Arab states are concerned that an alliance between Iran and a Shi’ite-dominated government in Iraq could ignite Shi’ite communities all the way down the western shore of the Gulf (including Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province), destabilise internal security and challenge the traditional Sunni hegemony in the wider Middle East.
At best, a stable Iraq is years, possibly even decades, away. In the meantime, the threat of Islamist terrorism, which has particularly afflicted Saudi Arabia, is ever present. The UAE, a major oil producer and financial hub, which hosts key US military installations, is seen as a particular target.
The elimination of Saddam’s military power has greatly benefited non-Arab Iran and this deepens the unease of the GCC states, particularly the UAE, which has for three decades been locked in a territorial dispute with the Islamic republic over the sovereignty of three strategic islands in the southern Gulf – Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs – currently held by Iran.
This is the most intractable territorial dispute in the Gulf and in this regard it may be significant that the UAE is currently expanding its amphibious naval force, although it is unlikely to be in a position to challenge Iran militarily for several years until its procurement cycle has been completed. The surprise victory of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran’s presidential election in June and the growing political power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), has intensified GCC worries about Iranian intentions and the growing confrontation between Iran and the US about Tehran’s nuclear programme is only deepening regional unease.
The GCC states still depend on the US for protection, but with the Gulf security situation in a severe state of flux, new mechanisms have become necessary. The US’s new reliance on bilateral links with the smaller GCC states, rather than on Saudi Arabia, underlines the changes that are under way and which observers in the region fear could undermine GCC unity.
Indeed, the UAE and the US have established a Joint Military Commission to formalise their growing defence co-operation. In 2004, NATO initiated discussions about bilateral security agreements with the GCC states. At the same time Bahrain and Oman signed bilateral free- trade agreements with the US in the face of bitter Saudi opposition and Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE are likely to follow suit.

Missile threat

The prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran with Shahab 3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles controlled by the IRGC is one that dismays the Gulf Arabs. Such concerns could accelerate GCC states’ moves towards missile defence, something the US has been pressing them on for some time.
The UAE, in particular, has advocated the creation of a missile shield and is understood to be evaluating systems capable of intercepting Iran’s Shahab-3s and plans to acquire a surveillance satellite system of its own to monitor the entire region.
The most committed advocate is Major General Khaled bin Abdullah Al-Bu Ainain, the UAE air force and air defence commander. In May 2002 he outlined a blueprint for a proposed missile shield with an early warning system to cover the GCC’s northern and eastern frontiers. He maintains that the alliance is increasingly vulnerable to theatre ballistic attacks from several countries, primarily Iran and Iraq. “Ballistic missiles are an imminent threat to Gulf states because they’ve been used before in the [1990-91] Gulf War as well as less-sophisticated systems in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war,” Gen Al-Bu Ainain stressed.
The GCC states have, on paper at least, a military alliance, but progress towards a fully integrated defence system has been fitful at best because of regional rivalries and the reluctance of the smaller GCC states to be dominated by the Saudis. UAE Air Force chiefs have succeeded in bringing about some integration of member states’ tactical air forces, but there is still a long way to go.
The smaller GCC states have sought to move out from under Saudi Arabia’s traditional domination of the alliance by bolstering bilateral economic and military relations with the US in recent years. The UAE had been particularly successful in this regard. Through an astute procurement policy, initiated in the post-Cold War buyer’s market, the federation has acquired state-of-the art weapons systems at affordable prices, in part by maintaining competition between US and European suppliers.
More importantly, the UAE has secured access to advanced military technology through determined negotiations and by an unprecedented investment in the development of US and European weapon systems that is unique among the GCC states. The F-16 contract included a USD2.5 billion advance payment to assist in the development of an updated avionics suite and USD500 million towards development of the Northrop Grumman Agile Beam Radar. The federation helped fund development of the Black Shaheen cruise missile built by the Anglo-French Matra BAE Dynamics. In January 2000, it signed a memorandum of understanding with the European Aeronautics, Defence and Space consortium (EADS) for possible collaboration on developing the AT-2000 Mako trainer.
The UAE waited until 1995 to launch its modernisation programme, essentially starting from scratch. By comparison, the Saudis acquired much of their most advanced equipment in a buying spree following Operation ‘Desert Storm’, paying for US systems whose capabilities were impaired because the US refused to hand over cutting-edge technology. According to US analyst Michael Knights, the result is that Saudi Arabia “now fields an unwieldy and financially unsustainable Cold War military, while the other GCC states are building trimmer post-Cold War forces that were designed to undertake missions more relevant to the future external threat profile”.

Air force

The UAE has arguably become the region’s most potent air power over the past decade through the acquisition of some 140 advanced strike aircraft. Its strike capabilities are largely seen as a counter to possible threats from Iran.
The air force’s procurement cycle is essentially complete, with a significant quantity of new and improved equipment slated for introduction over the next few years. Improvements are expected in a number of areas, such as pilot training, transport aircraft and more attack helicopters.
The UAE’s 1995-2005 procurement programme was well timed, coinciding with a buyer’s market and toughly negotiated, maintaining competition between US and French contractors and securing access to top-of-the-line technologies rather than the downgraded export systems the US sold to Saudi Arabia and others during their buying spree in the 1980s and 1990s.
The core of the UAE’s air strength is the 80 F-16E/F Desert Falcons – 55 single-seat E-model and 25 two-seat F-model aircraft – it is acquiring under a USD6.8 billion purchase from Lockheed Martin, signed in May 2000. Deliveries are due for completion in 2007. These aircraft are likely to stay in service beyond 2030, and their weapons systems significantly enhance the air force’s over-the-horizon capabilities and will provide greater interoperability with US forces. The Northrop Grumman AN/APG-80 multimode Agile Beam Radar is particularly important in enhancing air force capabilities. It can detect targets at far greater ranges than earlier scanned-array systems and has a 20-target air-to-air multitrack capability that could be boosted to 50 targets over time.
Despite intense Israeli objections, the US also agreed to provide the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile and the High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile. These significantly enhance UAE strike capabilities that are fully integrated with US forces in the region and go a long way to ensuring air superiority.
The UAE put pressure on Lockheed Martin to issue a USD2 billion bond in 2000 to guarantee the delivery of the F-16s as well as a USD160 million advance cash offset to conclude the deal. Obtaining such concessions was a major departure in the relationship between the US and Arab buyers of its military hardware. Just as unique was the UAE’s collaboration in helping fund the development of several major weapons systems by Western defence companies, underlining the Emirates’ intention to acquire advanced technology for its emerging defence industry.

Not US-reliant

The other key air component is the 33 multirole Mirage 2000-9 aircraft that the UAE bought from France in June 2003 in a USD1.78 billion deal that included upgrading the 30 Mirage 2000-5s it already had to 2000-9 standard, enhancing their air-to-air capabilities. That contract with Dassault Aviation underlined the UAE’s intention not to depend on one supplier and, as with its acquisition of French systems for the army and navy, made it clear to the US that it will not be reliant on Washington. Delivery of the new 2000-9s began in April 2003.
The acquisition of in-flight refuelling aircraft, further enhancing the air force’s striking power and penetrative capabilities, is possible as well. The purchase of three aerial tankers, capable of supporting the F-16s and the Mirage 2000-9s, has been mooted, but no decision has yet been made. Refuelling aircraft would allow Mirages carrying stand-off, air-launched cruise missiles, to fly within striking distance of Tehran.
The air force seeks to acquire an Airborne Warning & Control (AWACS) capability, possibly by acquiring up to five former US Navy Northrop Grumman E-2Cs upgraded to Hawkeye 2000 configuration in a deal worth around USD400 million. So far, the only GCC state with AWACS is Saudi Arabia.

Land forces

The UAE’s diversity of arms suppliers is most pronounced in the land forces sector. In May 2004, the Abu Dhabi-based army took delivery of the last of 388 tropicalised Leclerc main battle tanks (MBTs) ordered in 1993 from France’s Giat Industries following delays stemming from disagreements over the contract. The army also ordered 46 armoured recovery vehicles under the USD3.5 billion contract. The military, 59,000 strong, is now able to equip two additional armoured brigades and can field an armoured division with six or seven tank battalions.
The UAE’s drive to upgrade its air-defence forces also caused friction with the US. When Washington learned in 1997 that the federation was considering the Russian Antey S-300V low- to high-altitude surface-to air-missile system, the Pentagon, which wanted to provide the Patriot system, reportedly warned that the US military would refuse to fly in UAE airspace if the system was purchased, on the grounds that it was not compatible with US and NATO systems and could lead to the accidental downing of US aircraft.
The UAE has not so far acquired the S-300V, but in 2000 it was reported to have signed a USD734 million contract for 50 Russian 96K6 Pantsir S1 self-propelled air-defence systems: 26 on tracked chassis and 24 wheeled. There are reports that the deal had stalled with no deliveries yet made, but buying this system, which incorporates missiles and 30 mm cannon, would be a pointed reminder to Washington that it does not have the monopoly on providing arms to the Emirates.
In October 2002, the Russian business daily newspaper Kommersant reported that the UAE had opted to pay for the design and development of a new air-defence system rather than purchase an existing Russian system. It added that the federation further required an air-defence system that “combines means of localisation and destruction of airborne targets along with electronic warfare” capabilities. It said that a new consortium specialising in air-defence systems, a merger of the Almaz and Antey companies to be known as the Almaz-Antey Air Defence Corporation, was formed in 2001 and was hopeful that a USD4 billion contract with the UAE could be signed, with payment spread over several years.
The Russian daily Pravda reported from Moscow on 2 October 2002 that the deal involved “the development and supply of a new-generation anti-ballistic missile and air-defence system. The UAE will virtually finance the development of the fifth-generation integrated advanced air-defence system, which would be simultaneously deployed in the UAE and Russia. Moscow would be barred from exporting it to any other country within five to seven years of its deployment in the Emirates”.
Consolidating the links with Russian arms suppliers, the UAE is upgrading part of its fleet of 415 BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles (IFVs) supplied by Russia’s Kurganmashzavod in 1992-97. This is believed to be the first time the Russians have modified such vehicles abroad and underscores the growing defence relationship that has emerged and which could deepen as Arab hostility towards the US grows. Some of the BMP vehicles have been fitted with new Russian explosive reactive armour panels, capable of defeating 100 mm high-explosive anti-tank rounds, on the front and sides along with improved ballistic protection. Giat’s Fast Information, Navigation Decision and Reporting System, which has been fitted to the Leclerc MBT fleet, has also been delivered for installation into the BMP-3 IFVs.
The UAE took delivery of 24 French Panhard Vehicule Blindé Leger 4 x 4 scout cars in mid-2004. In a possible further diversification of arms suppliers, the UAE was reported in November 2004 to be discussing the acquisition of the German Cobra wheeled counter-battery active-array radar system. In November 2004, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress that the UAE was seeking to acquire 1,000 Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Javelin 127 mm medium-range anti-tank missiles, 100 command launch units, along with support systems, spares and training under the Foreign Military Sales programme. The contract has a potential value of USD135 million. The Javelin would probably replace the Euromissile Milan anti-tank guided weapon, which has a range of 2,000 m.

Navy

The UAE has been building up its navy from a small, well-integrated coastal defence force to one with bluewater capabilities and reach. For a long time it was heavily dependent on foreign personnel, but training programmes, established mainly as part of major arms acquisitions, has reduced, although not eliminated, that shortcoming. The navy is to get 12 amphibious troop-carrying assault craft and has ordered three 64 m landing craft vehicle/personnel to carry heavy weapons and equipment, a capability generally considered to counter Iran’s hold on the disputed islands. Deliveries began in 2003.
The navy’s marine battalion is also being strengthened with the acquisition of 90 Guardian 8 x 8 amphibious armoured personnel carriers, based on the Russian BTR-80 vehicle and powered in the water by a single waterjet. These APCs, produced in Ukraine and fitted out by the ADCOM Military Industries based in Abu Dhabi with 30 mm cannons, 7.62 mm coaxial machine guns and anti-tank missiles, constitute another element in the UAE’s build-up of amphibious forces, presumably for possible confrontation with Iran.
There has been some talk of acquiring submarines, including ex-Italian Navy Toti-class boats that were retired in 1996. These small boats would be suitable for the Gulf’s shallow waters. German Type 206 vessels have also been put forward. So far, however, no decision has been made, although the UAE needs to bolster its anti-submarine capabilities to counter Iran’s three Russian Kilo-class vessels.
The USD776 million Baynunah programme is the centrepiece of the naval upgrade. This involves the construction of six 88 m, 500 ton multirole corvettes, which will have covert all-weather surveillance capability, by Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding (ADSB) as prime contractor in collaboration with design partner Constructions Mécaniques de Normandie (CMN). The project has significant political importance because the high-speed, missile-armed corvettes will be the first such vessels to be constructed in the Gulf region.
It is therefore the most ambitious naval construction programme undertaken within the UAE and the Gulf as a whole and it emphasises the federation’s effort to build up an indigenous defence industry. The 2003 contract established the UAE as the industry leader within the GCC. The programme will involve significant technology transfer to ADSB as well as training by CMN engineers, giving a major boost to its future production capabilities and making it a potential exporter within the region.
Delivery of the lead vessel, currently being built at CMN’s Cherbourg facility, is expected in early 2008. ADSB will build the rest at its Mussafah Industrial Zone in Abu Dhabi.
The programme is designed to allow the UAE Navy, which has to cover coastlines on the Gulf and the Arabian Sea, to conduct sustained operations throughout the Gulf region, and, in the wider GCC context, potentially as far afield as the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Together with the expanding deep-water naval capabilities of Saudi Arabia and Oman, the GCC in theory could deploy sizeable naval forces around the region and its vital oil and gas export routes.

Air Warfare Centre – a key training hub in the Gulf

The UAE’s Air Force, like other military forces in the GCC, has long suffered from chronic shortages of trained personnel. However, the federation is currently leading the way in setting up a localised infrastructure of military training programmes and facilities that are designed to enhance GCC-wide military integration and interoperability with US-led forces in the region.
A 2004 defence ministry report said these formed “the core policy in the strategy for modernisation”. The ministry is establishing a network of academies and specialised training facilities. These include a language institute that teaches English to personnel who will train abroad. A multiservice electronic warfare facility is planned.
The main focus of this effort so far is the Air Warfare Centre set up in 2003 at the Al-Dhafra airbase in Abu Dhabi. It is modelled on NATO’s Allied Command Operations Tactical Leadership Programme at Florennes Air Base, Belgium. The UAE’s Desert Falcons will be deployed at Al-Dhafra, which is also to be a permanent US Air Force (USAF) F-16 base for regional operations.
“Al-Dhafra will become the leading air training centre for F-16s for the whole GCC,” a US officer serving at the base told JDW. “We’ll use the base to help improve GCC air forces and establish interoperability … We hope a lot of the Gulf countries will benefit from this.” Eventually, the UAE hopes to open up the centre to non-GCC air forces, such as those in Jordan and Egypt, which also operate F-16s.
The UK and France are also involved in the unfolding training programme at Al-Dhafra, which USAF officials say provides flight exercises on a similar scale and scope to those offered at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.
The indigenous programmes are assuming growing importance in the UAE’s military modernisation plans and will hopefully reduce dependence on foreign support programmes in the future. The air force currently has some 200 pilots, but will require double that number by 2007.
The Air Warfare Centre is expected to play a key role in training UAE and GCC fighter pilots, but for now overseas training programmes remain essential. Up to 1,000 UAE personnel are trained in the US every year, most at the US Army Aviation Centre at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Personnel involved in the F-16 programme are currently undergoing training with the USAF’s 162nd Fighting Wing at Tuscon, Arizona – six to12 months for aircrew and 12 months for ground echelon specialists.
The Air Warfare Centre has hosted several exercises involving aircrew from several GCC states, as well as US personnel attached to the Central Command Air Forces. The centre provides three- to four-week courses that include classroom instruction and flight activities using aggressor aircraft to refine tactics and interoperability between GCC and US air forces.
The Emirates “are trying to be a world player”, said one USAF officer who helped establish the centre, “and they’re doing a good job”.

ADSB spearheads defence industry

The Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding Company (ADSB) is arguably the most advanced defence contractor in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). As such it spearheads a nascent defence industry among the six states of the alliance that is being bolstered by the transfer of Western technology and joint ventures with Jordan.
Its long-awaited December 2003 contract to build five of the six planned Baynunah corvettes for the UAE navy is its biggest undertaking since it was established in 1995 as a joint venture between Newport News Shipbuilding of Virginia (now owned by the Northrop Grumman Corporation of Los Angeles, California) and the UAE Offset Group. It is now owned by the Abu Dhabi government, which has 50 per cent of the shares, having bought out Newport News’s 40 per cent in 2001-02. The other 50 per cent is held by 15,000 citizens of the federation.
ADSB, headquartered at its USD33 million construction facility in Abu Dhabi’s Mussafah industrial zone, bills itself as the only shipbuilder in the region with the capability to construct and repair complex naval vessels. As its capabilities grow it is looking towards potential exports as well. The Oman Coast Guard signed on as its first export customer in 2003 with an order for 12 9.5 m high-speed assault boats, 30 of which had been supplied earlier to the UAE Navy. The 50 kt aluminium-hulled craft are designed by Sea-Spray Aluminium Boats Emirates of Ajman, one of the smaller states that form the UAE. Other regional customers may be in the offing. In the meantime, ADSB, with close links to French shipbuilders, has the contract to maintain French naval vessels deployed in the Gulf region.
The company has been expanding and now boasts a facility quadrupled in size to 175,000 m2, an increased shiplift capacity of 2,000 tons that can raise vessels of up 85 m, additional drydock facilities for up to nine ships and two 38 m-high assembly installations where four to six ships can be built simultaneously. The work force has grown from 100 to more than 750.
ADSB has also signed to build three 64 m landing craft, each able to carry 56 soldiers, under a March 2001 contract valued at USD10.3 million and 12 aluminium-hulled Ghannatha-class amphibious 24 m troop transports, based on the Swedish Navy’s Transport 2000 craft, under another USD30 million contract. The first ship was delivered in February 2003. ADSB only carried out final outfitting on the first Ghannatha, built by the Swede Ship Marine, which will also build the following two vessels, but the Abu Dhabi yard will construct the final nine ships.
ADSB is upgrading the navy’s six Ban Yas TNC-45 missile craft built by Lürssen Werft of Bremen in 1990. The refit programme, under which two vessels a year will be completed, includes upgrading the MBDA MM40 Exocet 2 missiles aboard the 45 m vessels to Block 3 variants, with improved guidance and a land-attack capability.
The Abu Dhabi yard is also to produce four 26 m fast supply vessels designed by Swede Ship Marine AB under a USD48.6 million contract announced in July 2004.
The Baynunah programme is by far the company’s most ambitious contract and points towards more complex operations that will consolidate it as the Gulf’s paramount naval construction and repair facility. The contract “confirmed ADSB as a major player in international naval shipbuilding,” said Chief Executive Officer Lawrence Holliday. “Baynunah is the most significant defence contract ever awarded to a Gulf company,” according to Chairman Abdullah Nasser bin Huwaileel al Mansuri.

Can the UAE wield its power?
Robert Hewson Editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons

The UAE Air Force’s inventory of modern fighters and strategic warfighting capabilities will make it a formidable force once it has the support infrastructure in place to exploit it. Robert Hewson reports
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has made good its plans to become one of the world’s most capable combat air arms, at least on paper. While the United Arab Emirates Air Force (UAEAF) inventory is far from the largest in the region, its unique mix of modern fighter aircraft and strategic warfighting capabilities should make it a formidable force. The question is: does the UAE have the support infrastructure and the tactical insight to wield that force effectively?
While it is easy to tick off the numbers of aircraft delivered to the Emirates it is not at all clear if the UAEAF is yet capable of exploiting all its heavy-metal resources.
The UAEAF is now entering a period of consolidation, absorbing continuing deliveries of its Lockheed Martin F-16E/F Block 60 Desert Falcons and bedding down its freshly upgraded Dassault Mirage 2000-9s. These two aircraft types are the key to the UAEAF’s future, and both fulfil different needs.
The F-16 purchase established good faith with Washington and provides a solid political and military link to the US. However, it should be noted that – because it is so advanced – the Block 60 configuration is not as interoperable with US Air Force F-16s as, for example, the Block 50 F-16C/Ds being delivered to Oman.
The USD6.8 billion Block 60 contract was a boon to Lockheed Martin at a time when there were fears for future F-16 sales. UAE money also provided a huge technology boost for the F-16 – and US industry – in funding the development of its ultra-sophisticated electronic warfare and sensor suites and, most importantly of all, the Northrop Grumman active electronically scanned-array AN/APG-80 agile beam radar.
The first 10 Block 60 aircraft were delivered to the UAE on 3 May. Such a massed delivery was unusual and was clearly intended to send a message – as was the fact that each aircraft was flown home by a UAE pilot. Lockheed Martin now says that deliveries will be concluded by mid-2006: earlier than expected. The company also says that it will continue to enhance the aircraft’s operational capabilities in a series of staged upgrades (applied both on the production line and in the field) that are contracted through to 2007. With their delivery to the UAE, the Block 60s are officially rated as operational in the air-to-air and air-to-ground role.
Some questions remain over the full level of technology access released to the UAE. Lockheed Martin will make no comment on the subject and says that all such questions were resolved on a government-to-government basis during the contract negotiations. The company notes that it follows strict US government guidelines on technology release issues – the same answer it gives to its unhappy band of foreign Joint Strike Fighter customers. The UAE may have had the financial and political clout to ensure full access to its own aircraft. However, if it is locked out (to whatever degree) of key items such as computer source code or electronic warfare libraries then it will be unable to exploit the full capabilities of the Block 60 without Washington’s permission.
To counter this, the UAE followed a policy of strategic diversification and acquired the second elements of its front-line combat force from France. The Mirage 2000-9 fleet of 63 new-build and upgraded aircraft is credited with a level of sophistication and capability approaching that of the Rafale. Of greatest importance to the UAE is the fact that the Mirage 2000 gives access to the Black Shaheen cruise missile, purpose-built for the UAE by MBDA Missile Systems. An undisclosed number of missiles were ordered in a direct deal with the French government in 1998. The Black Shaheen is a derivative of the French SCALP EG: a sister weapon to the UK Storm Shadow. The UAE originally planned to equip its Block 60s with the Black Shaheen but the US stamped on these plans and prohibited the missile’s integration with such a long-range strike platform. The Mirage 2000 thus became doubly important to the UAE’s power projection capability. By February this year missile deliveries were under way.
MBDA has developed a second purpose-built weapon for the Mirage 2000-9 and the F-16E/F. This is the Al Hakeem family of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) – rocket-boosted glide bombs with either a 500 lb (227 kg) or a 2,000 lb warhead and a range of about 50 km. Al Hakeem is not in the same performance class as the Black Shaheen but it is another important layer in the UAE’s inventory. Like Black Shaheen it is designed to destroy infrastructure targets with the added ability to strike targets in the maritime role. Also like Black Shaheen, Al Hakeem is a tailored system unique to the UAE and purpose-built to a national specification.
The rapid expansion of the UAEAF’s fighter force poses some serious questions about whether it can meet the huge demand for new qualified pilots. In just a few years the air force will grow from a small line-up of about 30 Mirage 2000-5s to more than 150 advanced combat aircraft. The pilot shortage has already been a serious problem for the UAE and it has had to draw on foreign pilots to maintain its operational tempo. For example, at one point during the 1990s just one UAE national was cleared to fly the Mirage 2000 – all other personnel had been sourced from elsewhere. This fact was treated as a major security issue by the US when it came to providing the F-16 Block 60.
The UAE has still to undertake a meaningful expansion of its training capacity. The air force still has a modest fleet of ageing Hawk Mk 63 trainers, with ‘clockwork’ cockpits that do not provide an effective bridge to today’s combat force. The UAE has considered the EADS Mako advanced trainer, which it ultimately refused to support, and is now assessing the KAI/Lockheed Martin T-50. However, even if a massive expansion of the national training infrastructure is undertaken immediately, it will be many years before the UAEAF can fully exploit it. The Tucson Air National Guard currently trains F-16 pilots but is only effective in delivering flight-ready pilots, not combat-ready crews.
The UAE has also espoused a doctrine of network-centric warfare that cannot be implemented without a radical revision of its command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) capabilities and the acquisition of new combat support platforms such as airborne warning and control aircraft and even airborne tankers.
To date, the front-line force has absorbed the lion’s share of procurement funding, but this must change. Only by addressing some new, and less obvious infrastructure inadequacies, can the UAE hope to use its potent assets to best effect.