US Aircraft Carrier Vulnerable

Well, if you could fire a Klub missile from 100 km let’s say, or at the max range of the 650mm which is even smaller, you reduce the reaction time of the escorts and you could have the missile go faster as it won’t need so much fuel + the supersonic dart covers the last 20 or 40 km. I think this is much more effective than the 650mm torpedo launched at the edge of the envelope and the carrier has less reaction time (running away, escorts launching 324mm torps), nor the ability to sacrifice a frigate or two in order to stop the torpedo if all else fails (the Klub will likely be able to differentiate the carrier from the other ships easily).
Also, the Yasen is even larger than the 971, you probably won’t use such a sub to deliver swimmers and risk it close to the shore. It is more or less a golden fish right now.

1) Klub-S can be fired from normal 533mm topedo tubes, so why bother with 650mm.

2) Perhaps a big sub shouldn’t be used to deliver swimmers to shore but 650mm tubes allow the use of large tubelaunched swimmer delivery vehicles, allowing the sub to stand-off much farther than a normal sub (though perhaps not as far a an USN Los Angelos class attack sub with Advanced Seal Delivery vehicle on its back … that SSN not exactly being small).

3) Not all underwater vehicles are necessarily (or even primarily) for swimmer delivery. Think ‘unmanned undersea vehicle” or even ‘autonomous undersea vehicle’
Example: the USN AN/BLQ-11, formerly the Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS), a torpedo tube-launched and tube-recovered underwater search and survey unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV) capable of performing autonomous minefield reconnaissance as much as 200 kilometers (120 miles) in advance of a host Los Angeles-, Seawolf-, or Virginia-class submarine. LMRS is equipped with both forward-looking sonar and side-scan synthetic aperture sonar. Boeing concluded the detailed design phase of the development project on 31 August 1999. In January 2006, USS Scranton (SSN-756) successfully demonstrated homing and docking of an LMRS UUV system during at-sea testing.

Well, if you could fire a Klub missile from 100 km let’s say, or at the max range of the 650mm which is even smaller, you reduce the reaction time of the escorts and you could have the missile go faster as it won’t need so much fuel + the supersonic dart covers the last 20 or 40 km. I think this is much more effective than the 650mm torpedo launched at the edge of the envelope and the carrier has less reaction time (running away, escorts launching 324mm torps), nor the ability to sacrifice a frigate or two in order to stop the torpedo if all else fails (the Klub will likely be able to differentiate the carrier from the other ships easily).
Also, the Yasen is even larger than the 971, you probably won’t use such a sub to deliver swimmers and risk it close to the shore. It is more or less a golden fish right now.

Not to mention advantages for launching undersea vehicles, swimmer delivery etc.

Agreed, it has longer range, so the sub won’t need the un-natural amount of luck to get close enough as it would need with 533 mm. It also has bigger punch, which is also badly needed vs a super carrier. The only competition is a volley of Yakhont/Brahmos.

Yasen class subs still have 650mm tubes. You can always do more with a nice, big torpedo. 🙂

By the way, I have the impression that the 650mm torpedoes for the 971 are left unmodernized for the last 30 years and are 1980’s vintage, probably the boats don’t even carry them after the Kursk and the development of advanced 533mm torpedoes. If anyone has other information, please write.

IDAS eh? Well, we will have to see who buys it. Just as well that in these littoral days, naval helicopters will tend to have defensive avioinics, flares, chaff etc, I guess.

Surely any submarine that fires a missile gives her location away, whether or not it hits the target?

A rough position, perhaps. However, the under-sea vehicles for missiles including the Exocet maneuver prior to surfacing, so the sub’s exact location will remain hidden.

US to test capability against ASBM?

http://alert5.com/2010/09/16/minuteman-iii-test-anti-asbm-test/#more-3054

Tracking the missile and simulating engagement?

“Taking part in the exercise is the George Washington CSG including USS McCampbell, USS Chung-Hoon, and guided missile cruisers USS Shiloh and USS Cowpens. USS Shiloh is certified BMD-capable and USS Cowpens should be refitted with TBMD engagement capability by now.”

BMD and TBMD < these ships are to train their roles as part of forward BMD. And you don’t train that overland, I suppose (just in case you fail to intercept the training target). Seriously don’t this has any bearing on ASBM.

US to test capability against ASBM?

http://alert5.com/2010/09/16/minuteman-iii-test-anti-asbm-test/#more-3054

Tracking the missile and simulating engagement?

Doubts over China’s ‘wonder weapon’
By Jens Kastner and Wang Jyh-Perng

___Snip__ read rest at Asia Times Online______ key parts are below___

One of these is Professor Arthur Ding, a research fellow at the China Politics Division at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University. Apart from this assignment, he also holds the position of a professor at the Political Warfare Cadres Academy in Taipei. Ding spoke to Asia Times Online on the DF-21D.

Asia Times Online: The DF-21D can strike US aircraft carriers and sink them in a very short time. Will this development have an impact on the naval balance in the East China Sea?

Arthur Ding: This is the ultimate goal China aims to achieve. But technically speaking, it’s not feasible. That is because when the missile re-enters the atmosphere, its speed would be somewhere around Mach 7 [2,382.03 meters/second]. That is so fast that there would not be sufficient time to re-direct the warhead to hit an US aircraft carrier precisely. A carrier could only be hit indirectly by a special warhead, such as a fuel-air explosive.

AToL: How will the DF-21D affect Taiwan’s security situation?

AD: There’s no doubt that China’s military modernization does increase the risk for US involvement. Nevertheless, aircraft carriers are unlikely to be the only instruments the US will have at hand. As time goes by, many more weapons may be developed. If this is the case, China will be frustrated and disappointed if it’s only focusing on scenarios involving aircraft carriers. Thus, the DF-21D mainly serves as a psychological deterrent for the US.

Jens Kastner is a Taipei-based writer. Wang Jyh-Perng is a reserve captain of the Taiwan Navy and associate research fellow at the Association for Managing Defense and Strategies.

Interesting points..

It does!

A naval task group will know where its helicopters are, and will you that it is investigating in a certain area.

You could be dealing with a lone ship, or a landbased heli or an MPA. I’m sure there are scenarios where it is a usefull selfdefence measure. While IDAS (based on the IRIS-T air-to-air missile) is primarily targeted against air threats, such as ASW helicopters, it is also for use against small or medium-sized surface vessels or coastal land targets.

It does!

A naval task group will know where its helicopters are, and will you that it is investigating in a certain area.

The helo will most likely be linked in over Hawklink (or something similar) so any sensor info from the helo will be relayed back to the ship, so destroying the helo probably won’t help the sub in the long run.

Not if it is in a one on one with a single ASW helicopter or MPA. Incidentally, the above – about missile firing giving away position – would apply to SSBNs and SSGNs too, or any sub firing an encapsulated antiship missile.

It does!

A naval task group will know where its helicopters are, and will you that it is investigating in a certain area.

Surely any submarine that fires a missile gives her location away, whether or not it hits the target?

I think the idea is that you use it only when you believe your location is no longer possible to keep concealed.

IDAS eh? Well, we will have to see who buys it. Just as well that in these littoral days, naval helicopters will tend to have defensive avioinics, flares, chaff etc, I guess.

Surely any submarine that fires a missile gives her location away, whether or not it hits the target?

Not if it is in a one on one with a single ASW helicopter or MPA. Incidentally, the above – about missile firing giving away position – would apply to SSBNs and SSGNs too, or any sub firing an encapsulated antiship missile.

IDAS eh? Well, we will have to see who buys it. Just as well that in these littoral days, naval helicopters will tend to have defensive avioinics, flares, chaff etc, I guess.

Surely any submarine that fires a missile gives her location away, whether or not it hits the target?

Well, as far as I know, the subs used during Falkland war, weren´t the quietest ones…..
And the ASW assets, used by the Argentinians were not top notch that time….

When I am the opposing commander, facing a US carrrier group in my area, I would defintely try a combined attack……

A key role would play the air strike, but the other emphasis would bw an attack by subs.
The Conqueror used Mark VIII Torpedos, which were developed backin the 20ies, and propelled by a 4 cylinder gas motor. So this is a very strong hint, that the Belgrano battle group had catastrophic misperfomances regarding ASW…..

Try it a different way.
Remember the Tornado attack??Well it could be coordinated with an effective sub attack….

The only submarine I can think of, performing such an attack is the german type 212A.

It´s predecessor, the 206 class, was often able, to penetrate the carrier ASW ring during NATO- Exercises in the North Sea, I saw a couple of pictures showing Ticonderoga cruisers and carriers photographed through the sub´s periscope. And this happened despite the ASW cover provided by Los Angeles class subs and Seahawk missions flown in the inner ring. And the 206 was a diesel sub……:p

Now imagine what a class 212 A could do…..:eek:
IDAS is supposed to be operational in 2014…
So the ASW- Helis have to be very careful. Almost silent, these subs could be a serious threat for US carrier groups……
All nuclear subs a louder than the 212….
So a longe range torpedo lauch could turn in a short underwater dogfight……
And two of these subs in the vicinity of a carrier and an well planed air strike, could ruin the day of an US admiral commanding a carrier group……

Wilk, you’ve fixed nothing. Your entire point is predicated on the fact that a ship (carrier) can’t detect the inbound torpedo so would not turn and would not outrun the inbound.

Wrong. My entire point is that there is no reason to believe that it can reliably detect a torpedo at sufficient distance to still have time to turn and outrun it.

The OPERATIONAL experience from the Falklands is that naval forces can take a sensitive stance to torpedo detects and turn on contact even before that contact is fully appraised, this was what was happening, by definition that means that even if the contact is a torpedo that evasion is already in progress.

Absolutely false. Neither fleet in the Falklands detected every torpedo attack. In fact, there’s no credible evidence to believe that *any* torpedo attack was detected:

May 1 – San Luis attack on HMS Brilliant and HMS Yarmouth (+ Sea Kings): Disputed. The captain of the Brilliant later claimed that the attack had been detected, but strangely no counterattack was attempted against the San Luis.

May 2 – Conqueror attacks Belgrano: Confirmed undetected.

May 10 – San Luis attacks HMS Arrow and HMS Alacrity: Confirmed undetected. Possibly a torpedo hit the Arrow’s towed decoy but failed to explode, which would explain the damage to the decoy.

So why you continue to make your completely false Falklands torpedo detection claim is beyond me.

You point about late detection is rendered moot by the tactics employed in the fleet under attack.

Silly statement which contradicts itself. If there is a late detection then the fleet is not aware that it is “under attack” and cannot be certain of the direction of a possible attack.

You cannot bring Cheonan or Belgrano in to this as examples of undetected torpedo attacks because we are talking about maximum range launches.

You do realize that a max range shot can decrease probability of detection, right? (lower probability of target to detect the launch) And can you please explain to us how you know the range of the Cheonan attack? Did you just pull it out of thin air like most of your other “facts?”

My point was that, even for a 650mm weapon, ensuring that the target is in the torpedoes NEZ (if you prefer that to the word ‘guarantee’) means that you are not firing at the 50k yards value listed for the weapons range at the 50knts performance setting. That is not my opinion, IF that value is accurate for torpedo performance, that is a simple mathematical fact.

Agreed and I’ve never claimed that a long range shot is high PK or within the NEZ.

The rest of what you write really is semantics

So a discussion about the effects of sinking pickets is semantics? Or a historical comparison to other underestimated threats to capital ships is also semantics? And so on… Really, Jonesy, if you have no response to those, then don’t write one. Otherwise, attempting to cherry pick a few of my responses whilst screaming “semantics” just looks silly.

– as stated I’m not going to spend hours arguing whether, for example, a He-115 is more or less legitimately termed a ‘low-performance’ type just so you can try and cover up the fact you forgot about that type!.

Or you are trying to cover up the fact that you don’t know the difference between biplanes and monoplanes. I was specifically talking about biplanes after all.

Or dispute whether 25000yds is close range or not just because the mathematics is clear on that.

In a discussion about “long-ranged shots” it’s quite important to define what long range and close range are, is it not?!

imho outrunning a long range torpedo shot is a good option but in addition we should keep in mind that for shooting a torpedo on a target 50 km away travelling with 20 or 30 kn you first need a very accurate firing solution. if course, bearing or speed of your solution is a little bit wrong the torpedo may not even hit the target if it’s not maneuvering because a torpedo seeker has a very limited detection range.
if the target starts changing course and speed your torpedos will end nowhere. on top of this a early torpedo alert gives you a good chance and much time to place some torpedo decoys to distract the torpedo.

so it’s always a good idea to shot a torpedo as close as possible to the target to get the best chance for a hit. but for sure it’s also more dangerous for the sub.

The Argentine Torpedo claims themselves are also suspect.

On one hand all the evidence (including ships logs IIRC) has there submarines operating close inshore, on the other hand they report 3 or 4 attempts on invincible – which was closer to Durbans beaches than Stanleys.

However It is not unfeasable that they did have a couple of goes at frigates etc inshore.

As to Jonesys claim about the different requirements of Littoral Vs Blue water ops, All the information I have ever read also suggests this to be the case so hes probably right on this one .

Certainly all the air defence systems performance was hampered by being in a coastal enviroment.

Although not a submariner myself I have no problem with the concept that firing at maximum range is unlikely to hit its intended target.

Did the Belgrano have any ASW capabilities??, her escorts supposedly did but must have been asleep. They were not aware of what had happened to the belgrano for quite a while.
Im not sure how much credence to put to the claim but allegedly the worked out what had happened when a connection was made between Belgranos disaperance and a heavy thud heard on one of the escorts (the 3rd torpedo)
any one who can prove or disprove this.