Use your imagination …

Ok everyone, blank page scenario …

In a recent interview with the OC of the Austrian Air Force (http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRheft/FRH0108/FR0108b.htm) some very pertinent points are made about air defence and small European countries. Now, obviously, Austria is neighbour to some relatively unstable regions, and there is a clear argument to be made for providing a Air Defence infrastructure. Other countries may have a more difficult time justifying large amounts of capital expenditure on weapons systems, people and training in a time of relative peace. The case remains however that most European countries, of all sizes, have a realistic defensive capability. There is one very obvious exception, that of Ireland.

The country has no air defence capability beyond a point defence system revolving around Bofors RBS 70 MANPADS and a Giraffe radar. There is an active Air Corps, but it does not possess any realistic combat capability (unless you count SF260s armed with 68mm unguided rockets …). The Naval Service is small and lightly armed, particularly when the size of the maritime area is considered. Both services are relatively professional, Naval training being provided at the RN college at Dartmouth. The country is not a member of NATO (technically, the country is still neutral), but has agreed to take part in the EU RRF. It has long been speculated (since the 1960s at least) that, at some stage in the future, the states involvement in the EU will require a more rigid stand on defence and an abandonment of the traditional stance on defence. Effectively, even though people are loath to admit it, the country is under the protective umbrella of NATO, or to be more specific, the RN and the RAF.

The question is as follows. If, in a relatively short period of time, the Ireland is required to take a central role in its own defence, what is the most effective way of doing so? The perceived threat would be from Russia, or to be more precise, from any attempt to sever lines of communication in times of heightened tension. Essentially, this force would not have to be equipped to deal with an invasion per se, but rather from (a) the naval threat (submarine and surface fleet, the current state of the Russian fleet not withstanding) (b) nuisance attacks from long range bombers. The current Naval Service has 8 patrol ships, with no ASW weapons whatsoever, the Air Corps Maritime Patrol fleet is two CASA CN 235 MPA, with provision for weapons, but none fitted. The Air Corps also have two ‘navalised’ AS 365F Dauphin 2 helis, which are similarly unarmed. There are no other naval or air assets presently available.

The funding available for such a venture is limited, say 2 Billion Euros over 5 years … say your put in charge, what do you do? And lets be realistic, Aegis is out of the question …