USN FSC

http://www.shipbucket.com/images.php?dir=Never%20Built%20Designs/USA%20FF%20TSSE%20Combined%20Patrol%20Corvette%201995%201.gif

Is very much what I had in mind

The problems with going constantly high end and huge is that
a) USN runs the risk of not having enough platforms (at the moment this is mitigated by everyone else arsing up procurement at least as badly as the spams but that may well change)

b) with the exception of a tentative Israeli order US industry is not selling its fine warships overseas. The US is bankrupt and everyone (everyone who matters, my opinions and statements are of no import) is just being too polite to mention it as they don’t want their big trading partner going belly up; if the USN (and USAF) are to stay as worldbeaters then their funding nation/supporting society MUST find a way of offsetting defence spending as they have done historically

Al

Lots of room for basic improvements, besides computers, networks, UxV integration, cooperative engagement, &c. The electrical ship, nuclear power generation. Electrically driven shrouded screws, maybe the superconductive stuff NGCO works on. Options for hull shapes – mono, tri (swath). Sure a lot of new systems for full spectrum self defense in harbors, green and blue water.
Question what shall it be?

I agree totally. The Navy needs to define the mission before they define the ship(s).

If the Navy is confident that there will be eight or nine (or even ten) Fords built, a new nuclear escort might make sense. If not, if the whole balance of the Navy shifts (let’s see what the next QDR produces), the question of blue water setup and amphib setup has to be clarified first and only then a new generation of escorts can be started.

Here is where I disagree. Carriers have an effective service life of 50 years. The first Ford is not going to enter service until about 2015. Carriers take about (lets not quibble over exact time line, its the scale I am trying to get across) 5 years to build. You are looking at making a 75 year prediction. Who knows what will happen. What we do know is the current carrier escorts will be EOL in the next 10 -20 years. There is going to be a need to escort 10 carriers or so in that time period.

A smaller Frigate (although this being the USN i would expect ‘smaller’ to still be larger than Seven Provinces or F100)

Super-efficient Aegis (SPY-1E) using the floated idea of open source Aegis which would be suitable for export

Peripheral VLS (read a net rumour that peripheral VLS can quad-pack Standard, if so wonder how many ESSSSSSSSS will fit? i doubt that it will be 16 though!)

Medium calibre gun

Remote-controlled small calibres for assymetric threats

Torpedo countermeasures

LOTS of softkill

LOTS of ESM and ECM (modular)

Fully enclosed Work deck for MCM, minelaying, Survey, Troops or extra fuel/ordnance for long deployments (in USN i would expect mainly the latter as LCS, Coatguard and other assets would be tasked with former roles)

Big hangar and bigger flight deck

Build in quantity as new Frigates.
Cheap(er) enough to be put in harms way
Cheap(er) enough to go and rescue LCS ambushed by bigger boys on the way to/from littoral

Sell to allied nations (hence the SPY-1E, E for export, see? and modular EW a la SLQ 32’s 3 levels of system in one box)

Al

Lots of room for basic improvements, besides computers, networks, UxV integration, cooperative engagement, &c. The electrical ship, nuclear power generation. Electrically driven shrouded screws, maybe the superconductive stuff NGCO works on. Options for hull shapes – mono, tri (swath). Sure a lot of new systems for full spectrum self defense in harbors, green and blue water.
Question what shall it be? Cruiser? BMD Cruiser? Escort? Single-task? Multi-task? 50kts 25.000ts wavecutter tricat missile spewing SUW monster, like a Kirov on steroids gone mental? If multi-task 12.000ts might be a good estimate. Like the old Virginia/California cruisers. I think the strategic BMD role is not for surface ships, it’s not flexible enough temp and loc, not scalable at all, too vulnerable against a dedicated enemy.
But does the Navy need a new cruiser? Burkes will be here for ever. Better to rebuild them single-task if growth potential runs out for multi-task, put new propulsion complex in.
If the Navy is confident that there will be eight or nine (or even ten) Fords built, a new nuclear escort might make sense. If not, if the whole balance of the Navy shifts (let’s see what the next QDR produces), the question of blue water setup and amphib setup has to be clarified first and only then a new generation of escorts can be started.

no takers eh?

Enlarge a Burke so that the needed command facilities can be fitted and modernise the equipment fitout so that it requires a crew comparable to new designs from Europe (~150-180 rather then ~270).

Build however many are required and then start on the burke replacement, though IMO they should build a 5,000 frigate rather then LSC to replace the OHP’s.

no takers eh?

New Destroyer Emerges in U.S. Plans
Options Mulled As DDG 1000 Hits $6 Billion
By christopher p. cavas
Published: 2 February 2009 Print | Email
A “future surface combatant” (FSC) and the accelerated development of an anti-missile radar could be the U.S. Navy’s answer to new missiles under development by China.

The new ship could become even more central to Navy plans. The price tag for the DDG 1000 destroyer has hit $6 billion a copy, Pentagon documents show. The Zumwalts may be in a Nunn-McCurdy breach, which would require the Navy – already downplaying the ship – to recertify the program’s value to the nation’s defense.

The viability of the Zumwalt class was already in question because of its price tag, which the Navy has declared to be $3.3 billion per ship but which non-Navy analysts put at $5 billion to $7 billion.

A Jan. 26 Memorandum for the Record by John Young, the Pentagon’s top acquisition official, said that the per-ship price as of last July is $5.964 billion. That’s $2.7 billion, or 81 percent, over the Navy’s estimate.

A Nunn-McCurdy breach takes place when a program’s cost hits 15 percent of the baseline cost.

Defense News obtained a copy of the document.

Young, who championed the DDG 1000 a few years ago as the Navy’s weapon buyer, apparently proposed several options to avoid the breach, including placing the FSC in the DDG 1000 budget line. That could bring down the unit price and possibly avoid the Nunn-McCurdy issue – but only technically.

In reality, the FSC may bear little resemblance to the futuristic Zumwalt.

The Navy has not decided what it wants the FSC to be – perhaps a ship based on the DDG 1000; more likely, a version of the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that Navy leader Adm. Gary Roughead wants to buy in its place. Some observers said Young seems to be using the indecision about the FSC to protect the DDG 1000.

They also say Young appears to be using the uncertainty about the FSC to criticize the service’s handling of the major radar program – the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR).

A year ago, AMDR was the name of the radar for the new CG(X) cruiser, which the Navy intended to order in 2011. But plans for the radar have evolved. It is now intended, in an Increment I form, to be fielded in 2015 aboard the FSC. An Increment II version is still to be installed on the new cruiser – but the first CG(X) has been pushed back to 2017, according to Navy planning documents.

The AMDR could represent an opportunity for companies other than Lockheed Martin, which builds the Navy’s Aegis system, to garner a key position in the Navy’s radar programs. Roughead’s decision last summer to “truncate” DDG 1000 production from seven to three ships and instead buy more Aegis-based DDG 51 destroyers was seen as a blow to Massachusetts-based Raytheon, which is leading the effort to develop the Zumwalt-class radar.

Although the Navy said the switch reflected a change in operational requirements, a number of observers viewed the move as a triumph for the Lockheed-led “Aegis mafia.” Raytheon officials and congressional representatives, led by Sen. Ted Kennedy, D-Mass., also decried the move.

The Navy and Lockheed, however, have spent considerable effort to move the 1970s-era Aegis system into a modern, open architecture environment, opening up the possibility that more companies could graft their systems and programs into the system. Although no Navy official would speak on the record for this story, privately officials agreed that companies such as Raytheon could, in theory, bid on the new radar, even if were to be an evolution of Aegis.

At a recent review of the AMDR program, Young reportedly criticized the service for its failure to define the FSC.

But it seems clear the Navy wants to further develop the DDG 51, which dates from the early 1980s.

At the recent Surface Navy Association symposium in Washington, Navy officials, from Roughead on down, repeatedly talked about the advantages of hewing to only a handful of basic hull designs and working to extract the maximum from each design’s potential. None mentioned the FSC, but the new ship type seems to be a direct application of the concept.

It is not clear, however, whether the Navy wants to sanction a redesign of the DDG 51 to accommodate more missile launch tubes, a more powerful engineering plant or a much bigger radar. Several sources said the service was directing design studies to hold to the 51’s existing dimensions, but others said those improvements would mean lengthening or otherwise enlarging the hull.

The Navy sees a need for a radar that can handle emerging threats such as a ballistic missile with independently targetable warheads, a weapon under development by China. The roughly 22,000-ton CG(X) will have an integrated power plant that can drive the powerful radars needed to pick up the fast, small warheads. It will be a challenge, Navy and industry experts concede, to create a radar and power plant that are up to the task yet able to fit in the less-than-10,000-ton DDG 51 hull.

But Navy plans show a total of only eight CG(X) cruisers over the next 30 years, far less than the stated requirement for 19 of the ships. That leaves a smaller, “CG(X) light” version of the FSC as a possibility – able, perhaps, to be fielded faster and more cheaply.

The shape of the CG(X) program has been in limbo for more than a year. An Analysis of Alternatives was to have been released in the fall of 2007, but the Navy spent all of last year reviewing and revising the plan, and has yet to announce when it could appear.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3927940

my personal opinon would be to build a big ship 12000+ tons around 600 but use a more tradtional design.

I would incourpate SPY-3 and the new AMDR if it is ready and a tradtional 96 to 120 cell VLS system I would also like more then one 5 inch cannon.. maybe 2 5inch and one 57mm or 76mm NGS

strong ASW capablities and the ability to hanger and support three UH-60 sized helocopters

i would also like to shoot for a crew of 250-280 including air det and a marine det

Also importantly will be future proofing the ship for future equitment

Can you link to a source on this new combatant? I haven’t heard anything about it.

What is it supposed to be replacing? Frigate/Destroyer/Cruiser?