Was Russian Air Force ever a threat?-Article!

interesting piece…

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Russia’s Best Kept Secret

Jay Miller

I’ve been privileged not only to tour Russian military bases, but also to spend a considerable amount of time reviewing sophisticated flightworthy hardware including the modestly capable but not particularly imaginative Mikoyan MiG-29 (NATO codename, Fulcrum), the world-class Sukhoi Su-27 (NATO codename Flanker), and the definitive Sukhoi Su-35 (also bearing the NATO codename Flanker) fighters. Though aesthetically appealing and capable of extraordinary brute performance, these Mach 2-plus-capable fighters are decidedly antiquated in an era now dominated by low-observables technology, non-metallic structural materials, proactive attention to cockpit/pilot interface, and a rapidly surfacing international military initiative in the direction of UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).

Conversely, the latest MiG and Sukhoi fighters, though offering a plethora of mildly innovative and utilitarian features, are simply behind the technological power curve…to the tune of about a decade. Though fighter design parity with the west was temporarily achieved by the Russian aircraft industry during the late 1950s and early 1960s with the advent of the midlife improvements to the Mikoyan MiG-21 (NATO codename Fishbed), this status was short-lived…and only accidentally achieved. As a point of interest, though now well into its fourth decade of operational service, the MiG-21 remains perhaps the single biggest threat to western combatants. This is due to its ubiquity, its exemplary maneuvering performance throughout much of its flight envelope, and its small size (which, by definition, brings it into the contemporary realm of low-observable technology).

Not surprisingly, the U.S. Department of Defense has fought long and hard during the post-World War Two era, the Cold War era, and now, the post-Cold War era to maintain a public image of Russian technological and numerical superiority. It had been, and in fact continues to be, a self-serving “spread the gospel” mission that exploits public (aka taxpayers) fears while concomitantly providing justification for continued–and exorbitant–government defense expenditures.

I write not theoretically from having seen a magnified review of classified reconnaissance imagery; not from having read third-party analytical verbiage assembled via the exploitation of a broad spectrum of eclectic public domain documentation; and not from having had access to reports that are the privileged viewing of only a select few high-level government bureaucrats, but rather from the perspective of one who has laid his hands on the metal, sat in the cockpit, hung out with the pilots and ground support personnel, smelled the combusted kerosene, and slept in working Russian’s apartments rather than overpriced hotels. I’ve been there, and I’ve done that, and I’m telling you the Russian Air Force is a threat no more. In fact, it never was.

The poor state of Russia’s infrastructure undoubtedly has an impact on the Russian Air Force. The problems are apparent everywhere you go. The buildings, sidewalks, and streets are old, poorly maintained (if they are maintained at all), and heavily utilized. Automobile traffic is an on-going accident waiting to happen. On one stretch of highway that effectively circled Moscow, over 200 fatal accidents a year are the norms. No one thinks anything about it…and even fewer have any desire to address the problem.

As these words are written, my associate Ben Lambeth, a researcher for the RAND Corporation think-tank, has just completed his long-awaited document, Russia’s Airpower at the Crossroads. Ben concludes, unequivocally, that the Russian Air Force, as a threat, is no longer a player. He claims, and I concur, that over half its operational fleet of approximately 5,000 aircraft now is grounded or unserviceable, and by the year 2000, only about a third of that will still be flyable.

Items that western military pilots don’t even blink at, like the most rudimentary of lap top and conventional desk top computers, remain an extremely rare commodity in Russia. As a result, computations, inventory management, and logistical issues are accomplished via the use of marginally capable manpower…and therefore are highly subject to human error, oversight, human foibles, and the generally deteriorating state of the union.

The reasons for this dramatic and drastic decline are many and real. Besides the simple lack of spare parts, poor morale, ongoing difficulties with insubordination of personnel, and defections, there are the more fundamental losses attributable to a disastrous fuel shortage, abnormally high fuel prices, a highly lopsided pilot-to-aircraft ration (allowing most pilots to accumulate no more than 25 flying hours per year…which is far from sufficient for even an exceptional pilot to maintain proficiency), and an ongoing collapse of the over-all Russian Air Force infrastructure.

Accordingly, the Russian Air Force, in any military emergency that might surface today, could not sustain even a modest combat capability. Broadly speaking, these shortcomings are the product of the national government’s sudden realization that it has no visible means of support.

In conclusion, and to reiterate, the Russian Air Force is not a threat…and it won’t be for years to come, if ever. Russian pilots are not fools and they are not incompetent, but they also know that the old Russian way is dead. The demise of Soviet communism and the infiltration of western capitalism and the freedoms represented by western democracy can not and will not be turned back.
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Link: http://www.geocities.com/redstaraf/russosecret.html
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