What happened to the British aircraft manufacturing industry?

I wonder if it is possible to crosspost this thread into the military and commercial forums also

Vega ECM has touched on the current reason we will not be designing and building whole aircraft for the foreseeable future. As soon as a company shows a steady profit and gets close to being of a size necessary to undertake such a project it is floated. Shareholders that end up owning the company care less about aeroplanes than short term profit. If there is one thing designing and building a new aeroplane will not bring you, it’s short term profit.

Oh don’t get me wrong… Im not trying to prove we have a aircraft industry, but we do have a aerospace one… in a lot of cases based in the same factories that used to house our late lamented prime contractors.

So no we can’t design a whole manned aircraft anymore… but then we haven’t done that since the early 1970s, everything since then has either been with international partners or a modification of an existing design… as for the reasons… well I think Alertkens posts give you a good idea…

Zeb

Its exceptionally simplified and slightly misleading… quick corrections.. will try and though a better one together later…

Zeb

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Zen
Ah no, your not comparing apples to apples. The original chart had companies that could make aeroplanes. The company’s you’ve added, Airbus uk, GKN, Spirit cannot;- there’s a massive difference between design, test, build, qualify and certify an aircraft against what these companies do. With the exception of three specific disciplines within Airbus uk they don’t design, only build things designed elsewhere.

I appreciate the whole industry is different to what is was 30 years ago, but In this time I’ve seen well established companies in the Uk shrink while similar but initially much smaller German companies have grown to comparable sizes. The U.K. Company is shareholder owned and the German one is still privately family owned, both are the subject of the same market forces. Considering the significanlty higher cost of labour in Germany how did this happen? In general the Uk has lost much more than most and some unlikely competitors have grown.

Nope… owned by Italian, German and Middle Eastern interests I am afraid…

Zeb

Morgan as the largest British-owned manufacturer?

Aston Martin.

Its exceptionally simplified and slightly misleading… quick corrections.. will try and though a better one together later…

Zeb

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SThe decline of the British motor industry would look superficially similar.

Morgan as the largest British-owned manufacturer?

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Somehow the scale of the tragedy seems worse when it’s simplified like this. The decline of the British motor industry would look superficially similar.

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We could discuss Whatever Happened to the British Aircraft Industry for ever and a day. The best way to find out is to read the published literature and start with PETER KING’S ‘KNIGHTS OF THE AIR’ published by Constable in 1989. It runs to 544 pages and has a brilliant set of notes and a comprehensive bibliography. After that you could try RICHARD WORCESTER’s ‘ ROOTS OF BRITISH AIR POLICY’ published by Hodder & Stoughton in 1966- Richard Worcester was an often outspoken critic of both the industry and Governments. KEITH HAYWARD’s ‘THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY’ published by Manchester University Press in 1989 is a good single volume, easily digestible history with a nice selection of key statistics to back up the analysis. Other works tend to be concerned with the issue of our overall decline as the workshop of the world and our abysmal record for making bad decisions that affected the performance of the aircraft industry as well as the quality of the products e.g. Hermes and Tudor versus the Douglas DC-6.
Read CORRELLI BARNETT’s ‘THE LOST VICTORY’, paperback by Pan, 1996 and NICHOLAS COMFORT’s ‘SURRENDER’ Biteback Publishing, 2012 also in paperback as:’ THE SLOW DEATH OF BRITISH INDUSTRY- A SIXTY YEAR SUICIDE 1952-2012′
It all adds up to pretty depressing reading. Today after the Warton mafia took over what is now BAe Systems we are within sight of the end of airframing in the UK and the company is as the name change suggested at the time, a defence systems manufacturer with a strong presence in the USA. Warton never did rate civil aerospace and both British Aerospace and BAe lost money even on big production runs.
Sad, sad business. Today mostly sub-contracting and we won’t even assemble any F-35s in Lancashire.

The two main factors for the decline of the world wide aviation industry are:

– The advance of technology has reached its end. In the 80s military aircraft technology reached its peak. In the 90s the advance of airline aircraft technology hit a technological end. There is no longer incentive for manufacturers to design new aircraft because there will be no perceptible improvement over previous models. So airlines don’t replace their aircraft for newer technology but just keep flying the same aircraft till end of service. Only the light/private aircraft market is still thriving.

– There is no longer any competition in the military sector. The US and European governments used to have many different models of aircraft of the same type in service at the same time. Starting in the 80s governments would only award one contract for each type of aircraft. This created a winner-take-all market that killed off competition and innovation in the defense industry forcing may contractors to go out of business. There is effectively only one aviation defense contractor in existence now in Britain, there are only two in the US. This has caused the prices of aircraft to skyrocket because the contractors have no competition so they can name any price and have every incentive to drag out development time and create cost overruns. As an example, the planning for the Eurofighter started in 1980, the contract was awarded in 1983, the first flight wasn’t till 1994, production didn’t start till 2003. This also has killed the export market, developing and third would nations can no longer afford to buy new hardware.

pp & s Thank you. CloudyKen

Case Study: HP: Fokker.

Estimable pioneers. Both busy in 1952 on Korean War US-funded licenced production (Canberra B.2; Meteor F.8).
Both saw the Dakota-Replacement market (though already then addressed by Convair and Martin, CASA and SAAB).
(I do not know what {if any} subsidy Neths. gave Fokker). UKGovt. Launched Dart Herald by imposing 3 on BEAC 4/62-10/68 on not-for-profit routes. HP sold 48 Heralds; 786 F-27 were sold, inc. 205 by licencee Fairchild. Launch Customer was not KLM (who would take 0; RNethAF later took 14), but BEAC Associated Co., Aer Lingus, who, like all 1950s’ European flag carriers, were subsidised to exist, but not to buy Design X v.Y. We may presume the BEAC Director on EI Board was party to the selection.

HP ceased trading 1/6/70; Fokker, 15/3/96. Why?

Myths include: – “massive US Protected Home Market”, thus subsidising…Convair, to fail on CV880/990, Martin, on 2-0-2/4-0-4. But DH (Dove) and Vickers (Viscount) found a way;
– “HP was destroyed by Sandys because Sir Fred would not merge”. But Sandys funded Victor B.2: by 1962: 62 on order, reduced to 34 for military reasons; partly-balanced by 25 K.1 conversions. HP.137/C-10A Jetsteam was accepted in 1966 by DoD as offset to UK’s US package, >300 planned (lost with F-111K, 1/68).

In 1995 a 1971-built F-27 was bought for $1.2Mn. to replace the last earning Herald whose 1963 new price had been less. Is it possible that Channel Express found Herald to be less estimable than F-27?

Could all this “decline” talk obscure the point: maybe Convair/San Diego, HP/Radlett…died for the same reason Detroit-as-MoTown has.

I agree, a unique style that requires an effort to digest but the factual content rarely proves to be in error and I generally find that I concur with his analysis and conclusions.

Alertken, I enjoy your posts. They are more densely packed with facts than a morning muesli drawn into a black hole! I have to use a fork to pick through it all, but every bit is a good feed. Thanks.

The Myths of the “Sandys Storm” and of US striving to do us down.

UK spent 10% of its wealth on Defence during the Korean War and received vast $ – much kit was US-subsidised; UK GW industry was created on Burns/Templer Data “Exchange” Agreements, 2/50; UK avionics industry rested on US licences, such as Ferranti/Westinghouse: much of all this was genuine two-way street. From 1955 the $ flow was transferred to Re-Arm FRG, just as techno moved up in expense (supersonics/H-Bomb…) Macmillan at Treasury+Defence Minister Monckton, 20/3/56 to PM: Defence spend is “little more than a façade” RAFHS P’dings/4,9/88,P.11. Then.. Suez, omni-shambles: iron did not fall tightly: “serious weaknesses in conventional forces (Nav/attack un)suitable or non-existent (fairly) high unserviceability rate”: 2 of 1st. 5 Valiant sorties Wynn,RAF Nuc. Det. Forces, P131/2.

Mac. as PM 10/1/57, appoints Sandys to Defence (13/1/57-14/10/59, then to new M. of Aviation – 27/7/60) tasked to cut: so, if you want to moan, do so at the boss. He inherits professional advice from Marshals and boffins that high is about to become unhealthy (as Gary Powers would soon agree), so he chops Avro 730 (M.2.6/60,000ft. stainless steel…Hands up if you wish to champion this…thought not).

Dispersal is the solution to airfield vulnerability to Badgers, so Fighter Command need only see off try-on probes: he confirmed 40 Lightning, many more later: he deleted F.155T – a long-loitering patroller, and SR.177 – a sprint-to-height, incendiary nightmare, superseded by RR eventually making reheat work on Avon 301. Serve no purpose, as Bomber Command would already be up and out. Hands up….

He spent abundle on: Bomb, Mk. 2 V-Craft, Blue Streak IRBM, much, very much GW…he did not spend on Hawker P.1121, model long on Camm’s desk…great blunder &tc. Mud mover (lost British Phantom). He did not cancel this…he simply did not buy it, because nobody asked him to. Surplus (part US-funded) Hunter F.6 did the job as free FGA.9/FR.10. So, if you think your taxes should have been put into unnecessary duplication…hands up… Or if you are Camm and can foresee vast exports…then so pursuade the Boards of DH Engines and Hawker Siddeley Group to, ah, put their money where your mouth is.

Sandys was the father of TSR.2, Concorde, Harrier (jointly with US MWDP Paris Office) and more. Stop traducing him. Or benevolent Uncle Sam.

I find your pronouncements clouded at best.

So, I have rubbished various conspiracies…so, what is the A to OP’s Q?

Tom, #38 and me – flourishing as never before – are suggesting there has been no “decline”, merely structural change – e.g loss of appetite to Prime or assemble. There is a tenure-guaranteeing academic industry of Industrial Decline, so…no trite A to the Q. We each are allowed our own view on this.

Try these thoughts:
– Cheap distant labour. No. Chunks of (cheap Brazil labour) Embraers come from Basque Spain and from Belgium. There would zero UK employment in Aero, or much else, if labour hourly wage were decisive, yet more Brits today have jobs than ever before (some are zero hours, many are lousy).

– Dump by new hopefuls. No, at least not in exchange for ready $. I doubt USSR ever sold anything to anybody for real money. China declined VC10s, to take Il.62: paid by trainloads of pork bellies.

– Wrecking labour Unions,
– Useless or worse Management,
– Uncompetitive Product Support, indeed incomprehension of the words Customer Care…
– Designers from Planet Zog, never dirtying paws trying to find lube points on the cleverly transverse engine (yet Issigonis won plaudits for the Mini)…

Well, yes, all of the above…but none was peculiarly Aero…or British: assertions of industrial decline are not confined to UK. Try these points:

– Protection is not politically acceptable for Govts. answerable to voters who do not relish tax rises. Even France has abandoned Cognac to the market …and is now slurping Scotch. UK has just placed its Military Flying Training System with aircraft from Brazil, Germany and Switzerland via Wichita. This time with no idiocy of expensive local content. Because the Buyer assessed that to be the best deal for us, taxpayers. If so, quite right; if not objectively conducted, then redress by due process. Now, you might prefer Protection, if that keeps you in a job you have not earned at market, but…

– Free Trade is the World’s flavour, in EU Competition Law, in WTO (nee GATT) and in bi-laterals. That permits Centres of Excellence to emerge here, selling their specialist subject there – even on the other side of the globe…due to the minimal transport cost-per-unit of behemoth container vessels. So Daimler-Benz make little of any Mercedes, Boeing on 787 first batches, near-nothing. High labour-hourly-rate Japan makes many bits for both.

– Whose Money Does Aero Now Spend? Thankfully, rather less of UK taxpayers’ than throughout Aero history. And, I submit, that is the A to the Q. Boeing is foolishly persevering with legal expense in challenging in WTO the funding practice of Airbus Industrie, despite Preliminary Findings of pot and kettle: subsidy endemic to the Large Transport Aircraft sector. Just done differently by Federal than by Central Administrations. Bombardier and Embraer abandoned their Cases when they were given the same Findings.

Now…does any of this matter? We have a Q on this board: can an economy survive the demise of manufacturing? Bombardier has just fired a bunch of Brits not now to make chunks of Challengers and such. If they had still been owned by the UK taxpayer (as Shorts & Harland largely was from 1936) would they still be gainfully employed making….something? Well, that’s the stuff of AH speculation.

The Myths of the “Sandys Storm” and of US striving to do us down.

UK spent 10% of its wealth on Defence during the Korean War and received vast $ – much kit was US-subsidised; UK GW industry was created on Burns/Templer Data “Exchange” Agreements, 2/50; UK avionics industry rested on US licences, such as Ferranti/Westinghouse: much of all this was genuine two-way street. From 1955 the $ flow was transferred to Re-Arm FRG, just as techno moved up in expense (supersonics/H-Bomb…) Macmillan at Treasury+Defence Minister Monckton, 20/3/56 to PM: Defence spend is “little more than a façade” RAFHS P’dings/4,9/88,P.11. Then.. Suez, omni-shambles: iron did not fall tightly: “serious weaknesses in conventional forces (Nav/attack un)suitable or non-existent (fairly) high unserviceability rate”: 2 of 1st. 5 Valiant sorties Wynn,RAF Nuc. Det. Forces, P131/2.

Mac. as PM 10/1/57, appoints Sandys to Defence (13/1/57-14/10/59, then to new M. of Aviation – 27/7/60) tasked to cut: so, if you want to moan, do so at the boss. He inherits professional advice from Marshals and boffins that high is about to become unhealthy (as Gary Powers would soon agree), so he chops Avro 730 (M.2.6/60,000ft. stainless steel…Hands up if you wish to champion this…thought not).

Dispersal is the solution to airfield vulnerability to Badgers, so Fighter Command need only see off try-on probes: he confirmed 40 Lightning, many more later: he deleted F.155T – a long-loitering patroller, and SR.177 – a sprint-to-height, incendiary nightmare, superseded by RR eventually making reheat work on Avon 301. Serve no purpose, as Bomber Command would already be up and out. Hands up….

He spent abundle on: Bomb, Mk. 2 V-Craft, Blue Streak IRBM, much, very much GW…he did not spend on Hawker P.1121, model long on Camm’s desk…great blunder &tc. Mud mover (lost British Phantom). He did not cancel this…he simply did not buy it, because nobody asked him to. Surplus (part US-funded) Hunter F.6 did the job as free FGA.9/FR.10. So, if you think your taxes should have been put into unnecessary duplication…hands up… Or if you are Camm and can foresee vast exports…then so pursuade the Boards of DH Engines and Hawker Siddeley Group to, ah, put their money where your mouth is.

Sandys was the father of TSR.2, Concorde, Harrier (jointly with US MWDP Paris Office) and more. Stop traducing him. Or benevolent Uncle Sam.

The “US Demanded No UK Transports” Myth.

also

Flight Oct 28th 1943

Post-war Civil Aviation debate in House of Lords

On the subject of aircraft, Lord Brabazon* said he hoped the machines evolved from bombers would not become known as converted bombers. They were not, and they were quite serviceable, but it was important that new types and new engines should be thought of now. We were always told that we must not disturb the war effort, and that America would be cross if we built such machines. Air transport was either a war help or it was not. If it was not, why was America building so many transport aircraft? If it was, why were we not building any? There were committees to make recommendations, but it was for the Government to implement those recommendations.

* Ex-MAP and heading future civil transport committee

The “US Demanded No UK Transports” Myth.

11/3/41: Lend/Lease – an Act to Promote the Defense of U.S. It then took awhile to resolve just how this would work: Congress did not wish UK to sell-on end-items or to apply US Intellectual Property to commercial exports post-War:
23/2/42: US/UK Mutual Aid Agreement (“Master L/L Agt”) and:
24/8/42: US/UK Patent Interchange Agt., waiving patent protection in the interest of defence.
(These Agreements dispose of the endless “US stole stuff” myths, like M.52 all-flying tail: UK was very happy with this result: e.g: for UK’s cavity magnetron to be enhanced/returned as radar end-items en masse from sites beyond Luftwaffe range…oh, did I mention…free!)

UK Minister of Production O.Lyttleton was in US 6 and 11/42; then ex-MAP J.Llewellin was Chairman Br.Supply Council in US, 22/11/42-11/11/43, sitting on the Head Committee of a plethora of Joint Boards assigning resource priorities (e.g Drop Forgings: L/L did not only cover end-items: L/L Administration Stores at all UK Munitions sites were full of raw materials, extrusions. There were no all-British aircraft, or much else, after mid-1942). “The Lyttleton Agreements” are the root of the no UK transports myth. But what he did was agree broad priorities for 1943 Production, where UK would concentrate on Bombers, US on transports…not to the exclusion of US work on new Bomber types, nor UK ditto transport. 11/41 UK had received under L/L the prototype (to be) C-46 Commando, operated by BOAC Lisbon-Malta, pressurised, so above Macchis; for hard cash UK had bought 16 DC-2 for RAF/India, RAAF 14+4 DC-3: RAF was then still flying Bombays, Harrows…Valentias! Lyttleton’s prioritising was instrumental in the King’s Forces receiving, free, 1,810 C-47s – to be the sole aircraft named by Supreme Allied Commander, Europe as the 5 war-winning utensils

UK War Cabinet Minutes W.M.(43).35,25/2/43, SofS/Air: “We will not accept a (Civil) solution on the basis that we won’t build any a/c and we want (Cabinet) authority (now to) plan some production”. Instruction to Bristol to start T.167 Brabazon I was 11/3/43; DPM Attlee informed HofCommons 1/6/43: “design jobs have been allocated for 4 types of (C’ttee) planes (other) arrangements are in hand for the adaptation of existing types for civil service”. (M.Phipp/Brabazon,P18 has the other 3 as Airspeed/Type II (to be AS.57 Ambassador), Avro/Type III (to be 687 Civil Lincoln, superseded 9/44 by 688 Tudor I), DH/Type V (to be D.H.104 Dove).

Dove became “supreme”; after expiry of L/L, 2/9/45, UK 9/3/46 funded (to be) Viscount, also “supreme”. It was not due to any US action that nothing else was before the Airbus collaboration.