AWJG Ord-Hume’s magnificent Br. Commercial A/c 1920-40, GMS,2003 from P.543 has Projects & Designs Unfulfilled, inc:
A.M Specs 15/38 (short/medium haul), and 14/38 (Transatlantic, pressurised):
– Fairey FC.1/Taurus, 12 ordered 4/3/39 for (intended to be BOAC), cancelled 17/10/39, it “would have been one of the most advanced airliners”. “…curiously it only recently came to light…9-10/45 proposal(for) FC.1/Hercules …production run upto 200 a/c…must have been conducted in great secrecy”;
-Miles X-2 (A.M thought to be too radical, but) “probably the most advanced commercial designs (of 1939)“;
– Short S.32: 3 prototypes ordered (regs. allotted 19/12/38), cancelled 13/11/39. (In 1943 Short was) “not permitted to tender (to any Brabazon Type) nor did any thought of resurrecting the S.32 arise”;
– V-A 1937 “foreplane” Centaurus/108-seater: “extended range of futuristic airliners”…”neither Imperial A/W nor A.M showed any interest” (though canard Super Heavy Bombers were later schemed). And, P.317:
– DH.95 Flamingo Mk.II, pitched 1/8/43 “as a direct rival to DC-3…sane and sensible…estimated (?by DH presumably) to be better than L.14/18(but) stillborn”.
So: Q: why was that legacy ignored by First Brabazon Committee (no manufacturer representation), 23/12/42-3/43, who instead recommended new design, Types I-V (and some bomber-variant Interims)?
My A: MAP, 11/42 had seen/knew of US work, thus:
– Transatlantic behemoths (Lockheed XROE-6 and Convair XC-99). Brabazon matched that with Type I, relying on a propeller-turbine Mk.II to defeat US advantage of funded prototypes (became Bristol T.167);
– C-46 Commando, C-47: alarm and despondency, obvious base for Continental types, as is at scrap price, enhanced as new-build. Matched with Type II, hoping for an early propeller-turbine Mk.II (became Ambassador, Apollo, Viscount);
– C-54 (DC-4), C-69 Constellation: alarm, &tc. Matched by Empire Type III, hoping…&tc (became, belatedly, Britannia);
– Beech C-45 Expeditor, Lockheed C-60 Lodestar: matched by Feeder Type V (became Dove, Marathon).
(No US contender had turbines so Type IV, Express was added – became Comet I);
– Boeing/Sikorsky/Coronado/Mars big boats: Committee omitted any marine Type, because Short/Saro Shetland was already funded to prototype build, No.2 soon redefined as transport.
So: why discard legacy schemes, even as Interims? Exactly as the First Report was being drafted Minister Cripps was buying Short Bros., so why not employ them, free of further cost, to resurrect S.32 and/or the Golden S.26 boats? There are, of course, conspiracies that Lend/Lease was conditional on UK not doing any of these things, inc the myth of an “Agreement” to that effect.
So, early 1943: let us be Minister of Aircraft Production Cripps, about to buy Shorts to eject the Board because Oswald is evidently incapable of building Stirling in quantity, and (barely) dissuaded by Sir Richard (his man in US), from ditto likewise at Fairey, failing to deliver the Barracudas and Fireflies vital to any British Pacific Fleet. So: no distraction into S.32 or FC.1. Simples.
Cripps/Brabazon’s remit was that civil was not to impede the War Effort, so leave V-A to do Windsor – which might anyway spawn a civil variant, so let’s go slow on Type III, with Interims first.
By autumn, 1943 neither Miles’ nor DH’s Design Office was swamped with military: both pitched that thought to Cripps, who offered Miles M.52 flying test bed for one of Whittle’s gyres, plus M.60 to Type V. Thank you kind Sir, and let’s put X-craft (or M-craft) back in the drawer. Sir Geo.DH was on Second Brabazon Committee and wangled (to be) Ambassador, Dove and Comet. Thank you..&tc and into the drawer with Super-Flamingo.
There’s always a simple, logical reason – Ministers are simple folk: but US-“interference/fear of competition” myths are more fun.
By: Pondskater - 27th September 2012 at 22:11
A very interesting summary. I do agree with your assessment – far more likely to be simple politics (small p). Giving projects to those seen likely to be able to do them, bad boys like Short Bros who couldn’t manage Stirling and couldn’t design the new flying boat to spec, put in the naughty corner. Why would you give a big development project to a firm who had so recently been great but currently couldn’t prove they could stay on spec and meet production targets yet?
Yes, agree, no US conspiracy, just everyday reactions of people.
As for interim types, remember the G-Class jigs were destroyed and recycled back into the war effort. Short Bros had to be stopped from building one last C-Class boat (the un-named G-AFRB) and told to ramp up Sunderland production.
So for an interim boat, surely easier and cheaper to either convert what you had (Sunderland to Sandringham and civil Sunderlands) or use the jigs and tooling still extant – Sunderland IV/Seaford to new build Solents.
And a lot of technoglogy had developed. When G Class was first drawn up it needed six engines but Bristols made a four engine boat possible. Arthur Gouge had made huge steps (pun intended) in streamlining the flying boat hulls – so why go back to old tech when the world was moving so fast? Just a couple of examples.
One little thing – why criticise only Oswald? I think the problems at Shorts came from his not being there and the board not being capable 😉
AllanK
By: Pondskater - 27th September 2012 at 22:11
A very interesting summary. I do agree with your assessment – far more likely to be simple politics (small p). Giving projects to those seen likely to be able to do them, bad boys like Short Bros who couldn’t manage Stirling and couldn’t design the new flying boat to spec, put in the naughty corner. Why would you give a big development project to a firm who had so recently been great but currently couldn’t prove they could stay on spec and meet production targets yet?
Yes, agree, no US conspiracy, just everyday reactions of people.
As for interim types, remember the G-Class jigs were destroyed and recycled back into the war effort. Short Bros had to be stopped from building one last C-Class boat (the un-named G-AFRB) and told to ramp up Sunderland production.
So for an interim boat, surely easier and cheaper to either convert what you had (Sunderland to Sandringham and civil Sunderlands) or use the jigs and tooling still extant – Sunderland IV/Seaford to new build Solents.
And a lot of technoglogy had developed. When G Class was first drawn up it needed six engines but Bristols made a four engine boat possible. Arthur Gouge had made huge steps (pun intended) in streamlining the flying boat hulls – so why go back to old tech when the world was moving so fast? Just a couple of examples.
One little thing – why criticise only Oswald? I think the problems at Shorts came from his not being there and the board not being capable 😉
AllanK
By: pagen01 - 22nd September 2012 at 22:17
Which Brabazon class did the Viscount come under?
IIB, though I think the design and particularly the turbo-prop power was driven from the Vickers end.
Coincidentally, IIA was the aforementioned, conventionally powered Airspeed Ambassador (I can see the Flamingo influence there).
Time for that book, surely Ken?!
By: Lazy8 - 22nd September 2012 at 21:31
Super Flamingo
I reckon you’ll find the ‘Super Flamingo’ became the design that was eventually built as the Ambassador. The project Airspeed were originally working on was much smaller, and by that time they were owned by DH.
By: longshot - 22nd September 2012 at 19:46
The ‘long-range types’ projected in 1939 had wing sections too thick, and wing and power loadings too low even from the viewpoint of 1943. The DH Flamingo was handicapped by being about a third smaller than the DC-3 (are there any drawings of the ‘Super-Flamingo’?). The Viking, York and Hastings/Hermes derivatives of the Wellington ,Lancaster and Halifax were adequate types and even notched up a few export sales. The ‘gaping hole’ was the lack of a capable transoceanic British type not filled till the Britannia 300 ‘s very delayed service entry in 1958. Which Brabazon class did the Viscount come under?
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September 22, 2012 at 1:21 pm