Will Boeing vs Bombardier dispute jeopardise F/A-18 or F-35 sales to Canada?

NGAD is so critical to Navy leadership that budgeted exactly 0 dollars for it in their FY18 request to Congress. Given the condition the Navy is in as far as its strike fighter recap and readiness is concerned, they need new airframes whichever way they can get them. This likely means short term boost to F-18’s and short-medium and long term acquisition of F-35’s, a program who’s major expenditure is carried by the sister service and international partners. They don’t have the cash to embark upon a $50 billion progam of record before the middile of the next decade so expect iterative improvements in F-18’s, MQ25, and F-35C until other big ticket programs become stable allowing them to take additional risks elsewhere as would be the case with a major ACAT-1 in support of NGAD/FA-XX etc. No matter what shape NGAD eventually takes (another 5th gen. , 5+ gen, or 6th gen) they can’t begin buying it in quantity until well into the 2030s..they are still burning through airframe life so would need to buy strike figthers every year until then, and this means they absolutely need the F-35C. Hence the CNO has been a supporter and makes it a point to mention that the Rhino, well liked as it is, is not comparable, with the F-35 being at another level.

with the F-35, the USN does what it can not to buy it but in the end, chances are that they’ll have no choice this time

Yeah, that’s just what the USN has intimated. Or the exact opposite. While I’m no “fan” of the F-35C, the USN is trying to play a game of “chicken” with Congress. They need the F-35C, they just don’t have any idea how to pay for it, CVN, Colombia class, ship maintenance, and a plethora of unfunded requirements.

I admit that there is a faction that would push for whatever comes out of the Navy’s “Next Generation Air Dominance” AOA, formerly F/A-XX at the expense of the F-35C, but realistically don’t see the Navy getting a new manned platform independent of whatever comes out of the Air force PCA AoA, or NGAD family of capabilities.

So, it’s not the Navy doing whatever it can not to buy the F-35C. It’s more indicative of funding shortfalls causing the Navy to become increasingly schizophrenic with their procurement and sustainment. They pushed back F-35C procurement, cut maintenance on aircraft and ships, sacrificing numbers within air wings, and deferring ship repairs, all while refusing to give up any future shiny new toys, and planning a major fleet expansion.

Not going to happen, very soon they will be faced with the problem of SLEP on the Super Hornets that are burning up airframe fatigue life, or ramping up F-35C. If they want their Ford class CVN to be anything more than a 11 billion dollar helo carrier, they will have to start budgeting F-35C procurement.

B-I-O would be able to provide a better insight into the NGAD initiative and PCA AoA, as well as the Navy’s recent air dominance AoA.

Talking of monopolies when you’re the only show in town the good news is after the F-35 debacle there will be no more “joint” fighters that compromise USAF mission requirements…

I’m pretty sure that some have said the same thing after the mess that led to the F-111 on one side and the F-14 on the other… thing being, at the time, they managed to stop it before it went out of hand… with the F-35, the USN does what it can not to buy it but in the end, chances are that they’ll have no choice this time

@Tomcat

Much of military aviation development costs are borne by governments…

….what do you say abut the contention that the $600 billion USA annual military budget is just effectively just a system of subsidies to US companies…..especially the contracts on a “cost” + guaranteed profit!

There is no shareholder risk for the US manufacturers under these type of contracts and a side effect is to kill or wipe out competitor companies in Europe and elsewhere that cannot compete against these subsidised American companies? Ultimately, the poor taxpayer in every country loses out because they have to pay more in a monopoly market when you’re the only show in town….only the shareholders in those companies benefit to the detriment of the national interest.

Talking of monopolies when you’re the only show in town the good news is after the F-35 debacle there will be no more “joint” fighters that compromise USAF mission requirements for say a VTOL for the Marines using the same airframe because it turned out there is no upside cost reduction in commonality (for example much of future software development and maintenance cost is not yet known with a fleet of only 150….when there are 2,400 flying we can talk then).

*hearing a sound on the street*

“FRESH RAFAAAAAALES, WHO WANT MY FRESH RAFAAAAALES…. GREAT PRIIICE.. FREEEEESH RAFAAAAAALES…”

😀

As usual Canadian taxpayers are the losers in all these dealings. But at least now we can get on with trying to select a new combat aircraft.

Seems to me that Boeing has deselected itself. I understand that it is now arguing that tariffs should be applied to C Series even when assembled in USA by Airbus. Would the Canadian government choose to pay $billions to a US company hell bent on preventing the Canadian aerospace industry from selling $billions worth of airliners to the USA?

It only needs Donald to join the fray with some ridiculous protectionist announcements to further undermine US prospects of supplying Canada’s next fighter. F-35 may be the preferred option for the Canadian military but it is not the only option open to the Canadian government.

So much for Boeing protecting their ‘interests’ by using the big stick of the government in their trade war with Bombardier/Canada.
They were just bent over and made Airbus’ bitch again.
( see Airbus- Bombardier deal )

As usual Canadian taxpayers are the losers in all these dealings.
But at least now we can get on with trying to select a new combat aircraft.

F-18 did a “top gun ” to Rafale, “killing” air flow sensors…

There was a 5th loss in 2012 –

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=146597

ah, didn’t know about that one

Crazy that Canadian taxpayer will loose more money this way than just clearing Bombardier debt (they can found some artificies)

I’m curious as to why the repayable launch investment approach (as used to finance Airbus developments) was not used. On a project such as C Series the Canadian government might have earned $100’s millions in sales royalties. Boeing might have complained but I think that this form of financing was established as being acceptable when Boeing/USA complained of Airbus receiving unfair subsidies.

A “trade war” would indeed not be a good idea. In the context of this dispute Bombardier would lose a lot in terms of US sales. US suppliers would lose a lot in terms of sales to Bombardier – I think I read that over 50% of C Series parts are sourced from USA. In the context of Boeing’s relationship with the UK MOD, that would be damaged due to Bombardier’s plant in Northern Ireland losing work. And Boeing’s chances of selling fighters to Canada would be severely damaged.

I see Boeing’s actions putting USA and Canada in a lose/lose situation. Pointless way of doings things IMO.

Crazy that Canadian taxpayer will loose more money this way than just clearing Bombardier debt (they can found some artificies)/
In anyway you turn that story, nowhere are any benefits for Canada.

The worst would be “a trade war” and reduced defense capabilities…

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/canada-cements-interest-in-australian-hornets-441980/

How to buy a Boeing if you don’t want to pay Boeing for a Boeing? Seems like a good idea to me – a temporary solution to maintaining a fighter fleet while a long term F-18 replacement is decided.

A decent idea but a few issues.

The RAAF Hornets are currently more capable than Canadian jets, having gone though a comprehensive upgrade. It will probably introduce a sub-fleet of airframes that have to be managed and maintained differently.

Any transfer of RAAF hornets will still require US approval. I don’t see any issues with that but it is not simply a straight purchase between Australia and Canada.

Lastly Canada has a whole lot of Hornets in storage, might be easier to just MLU a few of those instead of introducing a different fleet of aircraft which, while well looked after, have had a different operator, and assembled in Australia. Compared to Canadian assembled jets which already have their specific mods installed.

Yes, thx to “topgun like manoeuvre killing airflow. (5th accident)

Canada has formally expressed interest in Australia’s used Boeing F/A-18A/B Hornets, marking a significant development in the Royal Canadian Air Force’s search for a fighter that could temporarily fill the CF-18’s mission.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/canada-cements-interest-in-australian-hornets-441980/

How to buy a Boeing if you don’t want to pay Boeing for a Boeing? Seems like a good idea to me – a temporary solution to maintaining a fighter fleet while a long term F-18 replacement is decided.

When I speak about “marvel”, I don’t specifically aim at the safety record, but rather at the mantra that, in pretty much every aspect, its fans describe it as the “fabulously magnificent example of perfection leaving everything else in stone age..” more or less

I don’t recall “magnificent”, “perfection”, etc. being mentioned on this thread. The current discussion has been more on the lines of you talking about the likelihood of dead pilots and mostly everybody else stating that the aircraft was safe to fly.

From memory, losses of the Rafale:

There was a 5th loss in 2012 –

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=146597

And for the record, Canada can exclude any aircraft from the running without jumping through hoops, military aircraft are not subject to WTO regulation. They have no obligation to entertain Su-35, for example.

The Russians would certainly be welcome to bid but the supply and sustainment risks associated with acquiring a Russian aircraft would weigh heavily on the selection criteria…

When I speak about “marvel”, I don’t specifically aim at the safety record, but rather at the mantra that, in pretty much every aspect, its fans describe it as the “fabulously magnificent example of perfection leaving everything else in stone age..” more or less

From memory, losses of the Rafale:

– one crash in Afghanistan operations, when over sea with fuel management problem

– one pilot crashed in night fight training due to disorientation or G-Loc (dove from high altitude into the ground)

– two aircraft lost in probable midair collision (both disappeared simultaneously)

“with 125000 hours clocked” it still hasn’t even ended its initial development, had one aircraft lost due to engine fire (Rafale lost 4 aircraft due to human error, not one for a technical problem), was grounded and then flight envelope reduced for months because of engine overheating (from memory, engine used to bend too much for the tolerances applied).

Initial development has nothing to do with ‘safety’ – 125,000 hrs without crashes is very much a relevant statistic (only software dev. is pending anyway). At most, you can chalk up the engine fire to development. And even that one was still recoverable to a large extent.

P.S. What was the human error behind the 2012 crash?

Is it the worse aircraft in history? no, far from that, is it the marvel some want us to believe it is? I have my doubts… in any case, what I (or you for that matter) think about it won’t change a single thing anyway

I said “its perfectly safe”. If you read that as “it is a marvel”, I think the problem lies at your end. No well-informed & reasonable individual (i.e. not distracted by nationalism) would assess the F-35’s safety record as one that incites ‘doubt’. Whatever you and I think about it, its certainly isn’t dissuading air forces around the world from backing its acquisition.

TooCool_12f
TooCool just reminds the fact that the Canadians themselves have said more than once, and the fact that a twin engine is safer than a single one if anything, because it can afford to loose one engine

And, once more, this whole discussion about twin vs single engine aircraft started because someone asked how Canada could prevent the F-35 to compete.. and I gave an answer that is obvious: all they have to do is ask for a twin engine aircraft. You can argue about how marvelously safe the F-135 is (it was already grounded a couple of times, but hey, let’s imagine it is safe), the fact remains, if they want to eliminate the F-35, they can easily, and perfectly legally do so .. end of story

I’ve already indicated the prospect of that is highly unlikely.

Ozair
It would be politically very difficult to claim an open and fair competition and then exclude an aircraft from participating. Even more so given the article I linked earlier shows that even in 1979 the RCAF was happy to operate the single engine F-16 and down selected this airframe over other twin engine aircraft.

To add to that, when writing the requirement it would be essentially impossible to state the airframe must have two engines because the requirements have to not only be justified but also verifiable and traceable. The requirements would have to be written around the number of safe flight hours between engine incidents. Given what we know of twin engine flight safety and the USAF experience over the last ten years that type of requirement may exclude twin engine airframes.

The best source doc that I have found on Canadian Hornet crash history so far is provided here, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no4/page30-eng.asp

Some excepts,

In the early-1980s Canadian Forces pilots and technicians were introduced to their new fighter aircraft, the CF-18 Hornet. A slightly modified variant of the US Navy and Marine Corps’ F/A-18A, it promised a near revolutionary improvement over the three aircraft it was replacing, the CF-5 Freedom Fighter, the CF-101 Voodoo, and the CF-104 Starfighter. One area where there were major hopes was a significant improvement in the air force safety and availability record. The Starfighter was a notorious aircraft in this regard, difficult to fly in its demanding roles, and it suffered from numerous technical issues. Consequently, 111 of the 238 aircraft originally purchased were lost due to accidents or failures during its operational life with the Canadian Armed Forces. Yet, hopes for a dramatic improvement were quickly dashed. By 1991, its selected replacement, the CF-18, had been involved in a string of tragic crashes, leading to the deaths of 11 pilots. It was only in the 1990s that a significant improvement with respect to the CF-18 flight safety occurred. It should be noted that early operational attrition is an unfortunately common occurrence with new operational fighter-type aircraft. Every air force faces teething issues with the introduction of a new aircraft, even if it has been in service with other countries.

Prior to the CF-18’s introduction, the then-Canadian Air Force (CAF) had predicted its catastrophic mishap rate (known as Category ‘A’ mishaps) would be 5.6 crashes per 100,000 flight hours.2 This would be a major improvement over the CF-104, which experienced a Category ‘A’ rate of 18.5 incidents per 100,000 flight hours.3 The CF-18 predicted rate, it was believed, would be more in line with the other fighter aircraft operated by Canada at that time, the CF-101 and CF-5, which experienced rates of 5.68 and 6.74, respectively.

Unfortunately, the expected safety dividend did not emerge. While the CF-18 was inherently safer to fly than the CF-104, its early attrition rate was significantly higher than expected. In the first eight years of operation, the Canadian Air Force’s loss rate was 7.14 aircraft per 100,000 flying hours.4 By comparison, the American mishap rate during this time frame was only 3.75 aircraft per 100,000 flying hours.5 In essence, Canadian Hornet pilots were therefore twice as likely to become involved in a major crash as their American counterparts.

While greater transit time was a factor, it may not be salient. Although Canadian Hornets flew a substantial number of low-level training flights, such missions accounted for only two of the Category ‘A’ mishaps (see Table 1: Crash 1 and Crash 8). The majority of crashes occurred as a result of ‘human factors,’ where pilot error was determined to be a primary cause. These often occurred during take-off, or at medium-to-high altitude, where the pilots’ situational awareness was impaired in a way that caused them to crash into the ground. The USN and USMC appeared to experience proportionally fewer such incidents; over 50 percent of their Category ‘A’ mishaps occurred, due either to technical faults or mid-air collisions, based upon the data available to this author.

Further corroboration of the difference between Canadian and US fighters can be found in the USAF’s statistics with respect to the F-16 Fighting Falcon. This aircraft generally flew similar flight patterns, although again, less in low altitude operations. The USAF’s figures indicate a mishap rate of 6.51 per 100,000 hours for the first decade of service.7 While this may seem comparable to the CF-18, it should be noted that the F-16’s Pratt and Whitney F100-200 engine was notoriously unreliable at the time, and it factored into a disproportionate number of crashes. Once the engine failures are factored out, the F-16’s crash rate is around 4.7, or even lower.

The overall CF-18 Category ‘A’ incident rate is a worrying trend, but in itself, it is far too blunt a measure to understand the issues relating to the aircraft’s early history. An in-depth analysis of the thirteen crashes provides a much better sense of the problems faced (Table 1). Only one of the early CF-18 mishaps was primarily attributed to a mechanical failure. Of the twelve remaining, two aircraft were lost in a mid-air collision during basic fighter maneuvering. In this case, although the 1000-foot safety distance rule was violated, the accident cannot necessarily be attributed directly to a lack of proper training.

The leading cause of catastrophic mishaps in the remaining ten incidents was the lack of situational awareness either just after take-off or in-flight, which resulted in a “controlled flight into terrain,” or CFIT. In most of those cases there was an additional factor that degraded the pilot’s situational awareness [sit awareness], or ability to control the aircraft. The most common primary cause for CFITs were either G-force induced loss of consciousness (GLOC), where a violent maneuver incapacitated a pilot who was unable to regain control before flying to the ground, or Somatogyral effects in low light situations. The latter occurs in absence of visual cues due to poor weather or low light, and the pilot can misinterpret his or her actual situation, occasionally leading to crashes. Of the remaining accidents, two involved an improper aircraft configuration as a major factor, with the pilot failing to apply a proper corrective procedure. In those incidents, better aircraft knowledge may have helped the pilot safely recover the aircraft.

So one aircraft lost from the first thirteen crashes was due to mechanical failure and this was attributed to a maintenance error, not an engine failure. As already stated, the misplaced hysteria over single engine operations is just that, hysteria, with no logical or supportable evidence to back it up. Aircrew and ground crew remain the single biggest threat to military aviation safety and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

“with 125000 hours clocked” it still hasn’t even ended its initial development, had one aircraft lost due to engine fire (Rafale lost 4 aircraft due to human error, not one for a technical problem), was grounded and then flight envelope reduced for months because of engine overheating (from memory, engine used to bend too much for the tolerances applied). Is it the worse aircraft in history? no, far from that, is it the marvel some want us to believe it is? I have my doubts… in any case, what I (or you for that matter) think about it won’t change a single thing anyway 😉