World War One Strategic Bombing Doctrine?

(Targets, purpose, return on investment). Churchill was 1918 Minister of Munitions. In his The Great War (my copy: Ch.LXX, P.1108: ) he reproduces his Survey to War Cabinet on the 1919 Munitions Programme: “how are we going to win the war in 1919?” “there are 4 new arms…Aeroplanes…Gas…if either side possessed the power to drop not 5 tons but 500 tons of bombs each night on the cities and manufacturing establishments…the results would be decisive. If the Germans had used poison gas on a sufficiently large scale…they could undoubtedly have broken up our whole front in the West….(for 1919)we should create an army essentially different in its composition and methods of warfare from any that have yet been employed by either side…we may contemplate drawing upon the artillery and the material which supplies it…to raise chemical warfare to its proper proportionate position in our organisation. It is unnecessary to speak of the air, for this is already accepted. We have..the power…of making such decisions fully effective…if we act…upon a…ruthlessly pursued plan…and revolutionary changes in…the methods of warfare are unhesitatingly faced…”

Tom Mangold, Plague Wars, may have more on this. WSC saw CBW as legitimate (in April,1944 he broadcast en clair that if our landings met gas, we would drench Berlin). He also dispatched captured German tabun bombs in June,1945 to Tiger Force: Mangold says MacArthur would have used CBW for Coronet. In 1918 WSC was not the decision maker, but he is unlikely to have printed these quotes if the notion had been rejected by his colleagues.

Interesting Ken. However I have to say that the ability of Bomber command to kill 100,000 people in one night did not prove decisive in round two so I find it unlikely that CBW would have been much more effective in 1919. I tend to agree with the Germans, aircraft are better used in support of the Army (via Plan-1919) than being wasted on very costly and largely pointless strategic bombing efforts.

(Targets, purpose, return on investment). Churchill was 1918 Minister of Munitions. In his The Great War (my copy: Ch.LXX, P.1108: ) he reproduces his Survey to War Cabinet on the 1919 Munitions Programme: “how are we going to win the war in 1919?” “there are 4 new arms…Aeroplanes…Gas…if either side possessed the power to drop not 5 tons but 500 tons of bombs each night on the cities and manufacturing establishments…the results would be decisive. If the Germans had used poison gas on a sufficiently large scale…they could undoubtedly have broken up our whole front in the West….(for 1919)we should create an army essentially different in its composition and methods of warfare from any that have yet been employed by either side…we may contemplate drawing upon the artillery and the material which supplies it…to raise chemical warfare to its proper proportionate position in our organisation. It is unnecessary to speak of the air, for this is already accepted. We have..the power…of making such decisions fully effective…if we act…upon a…ruthlessly pursued plan…and revolutionary changes in…the methods of warfare are unhesitatingly faced…”

Tom Mangold, Plague Wars, may have more on this. WSC saw CBW as legitimate (in April,1944 he broadcast en clair that if our landings met gas, we would drench Berlin). He also dispatched captured German tabun bombs in June,1945 to Tiger Force: Mangold says MacArthur would have used CBW for Coronet. In 1918 WSC was not the decision maker, but he is unlikely to have printed these quotes if the notion had been rejected by his colleagues.

A quote from an old Boss.

” A 5% aircraft loss rate on a strategic bombing mission may not initially appear that excessive:

until you realise that, if sustained, you will have had to to replace your
entire force including almost all of the crews, every 20 missions. “

That is a very important point. The amount of R&D that goes into strategic bombers and their weapons, the amount they cost to build and construct both in terms of money and strategic materials and the fact that they are crewed by the brightest and best of a population makes this a very expensive prospect.

A quote from an old Boss.

” A 5% aircraft loss rate on a strategic bombing mission may not initially appear that excessive:

until you realise that, if sustained, you will have had to to replace your
entire force including almost all of the crews, every 20 missions. “

Well I have just done some very illuminating reading, and well, it was all there if only we had joined the dots.

Essentially both the Germans and the British sustained very heavy casualties bombing with heavy bombers both by day and by night. The Germans officially abandoned strategic bombing on the 5th August 1918 as a result of heavy losses. On the night of the 19th-20th May 7 out of 43 German bombers dispatched against the UK were lost, that is a 15% casualty rate. No more aeroplane raids were made against Britain after that night. In the last five months of the war the RAF lost 69 heavy bombers, 51 of those were wrecked and 18 recorded as missing. These planes were apparently crewed by the cream of the RAF and were well versed in defensive fire and formation.

Essentially the lesson that should have been taken from WW1 (and arguably was by the Germans) was that strategic bombing by either day or night was very very dangerous and costly. Increasingly my opinion is that strategic bombing of peer rivals is an exercise of very limited utility but very high cost.

I will not beat around the bush, it is my opinion that Britain took almost all the wrong lessons from WW1. The failure to pick up on the real lessons of tank warfare are well documented but now it seems to me that it was also a mistake not to realise the weakness and cost of strategic bombing. To follow on from that it seems to me that therefore the best way to use the vast force that was being assembled would have been in sub-strategic theater operations on the western front.

As always comments are welcome, thank you in advance sealordlawrence.:)

Independent Force 1918

Have just been rereading ‘Handley Page Bombers of the First World War’ by Chaz Bowyer. It contains much valuable information about the squadrons of the Independent Force efforts to use the bombers HP 0/100 and HP/400 since the formation of such Force in 6 June 1918. One of the disadvantages stated was the fact that the prevailing wind was against the returning bombers and reduced the range available or load carried! Only when the HP V/1500 came into service in late 1918 and two were detailed for a raid on Berlin taking off during the morning of November Eleventh! This of course was aborted because of the Armistice although the squadron was on standby in case the Armistice arrangements were not carried out within sixty days.
Ray

No problem, I’m happy to ramble on this one but it’s not really my area except in reference to WW2 so apologies if my thoughts are a bit random.

My first thought is rather than concentrate on a single ‘target set’ why not concentrate on a ‘tactic set’?

Was it Rommel who said “the best form of defence is attack”? Well I tend to agree but only if you add that “the best form of attack is defence”!

In WW2 at one time Bomber Command accounted for 25% of all British production so for there to be any advantage it must have had to account for at least 25% of all German production (oversimplification since Allied/Axis etc.) but did it? Germany undoubtedly lost production to bombing plus devoted huge resources to producing AAA (plus ammunition), radar and fighters (and lost negligible amounts to enemy action) while the frontline strength of Bomber Command (1000 aircraft) was wiped out every few months (yes, oversimplification again, sorry). Was this a sensible ‘tactic set’ to employ against a ‘target set’, the U-Boat menace for example?

Very few WW1 targets differ significantly from WW2 targets, with the possible exception of ‘oil targets’ (fewer and WW1 forces less reliant on them anyway), but the WW1 bombers are hopeless in comparison, Germany is big, far away and the weather rarely on the side of the attacking bomber.

Also unless 1000 bombers are assembled in secret and employed at a stroke will Germany sit by and let “military logistical and tactical installations” be molested? What would your response be; AAA, defensive fighters? And so to protect the bombers, offensive fighters, fighter sweeps, close escorts? And for that how many fighters, 500, 1000?

Wouldn’t the maintenance of such a force in such circumstances possibly outweigh their benefit to the ground offensive and hand the ‘tactical initiative’ to the defender as in the ground war?

That is actually an exceptionally good ramble. When I have a bit more time I will prepare a longer post on the development of strategic air defence in World War One to see how effective it would/could have been against such a force. The World War 2 example is very important and in many ways is illuminated by World War 1. There does seem to be a creaping and expanding revision to history that argues that the Allied Strategic Bombing effort in this camapaign (especially against Germany) was largely a waste of time. I would not go that far myself but I would agree that the cost/benefit analysis does raise some very serious questions. I have heard it argued that Allied strategic bombing was the WW2 equivilant of of western front attacks, ie merely an effort to maintain the image of the offense.

All of this leads me back to the idea that sub-strategic operations may well have been the best way forward, especially given the timescale and the already intrinsic role air power would have played in Plan 1919.

First of all, sorry to reawaken this thread.

No problem, I’m happy to ramble on this one but it’s not really my area except in reference to WW2 so apologies if my thoughts are a bit random.

My first thought is rather than concentrate on a single ‘target set’ why not concentrate on a ‘tactic set’?

Was it Rommel who said “the best form of defence is attack”? Well I tend to agree but only if you add that “the best form of attack is defence”!

In WW2 at one time Bomber Command accounted for 25% of all British production so for there to be any advantage it must have had to account for at least 25% of all German production (oversimplification since Allied/Axis etc.) but did it? Germany undoubtedly lost production to bombing plus devoted huge resources to producing AAA (plus ammunition), radar and fighters (and lost negligible amounts to enemy action) while the frontline strength of Bomber Command (1000 aircraft) was wiped out every few months (yes, oversimplification again, sorry). Was this a sensible ‘tactic set’ to employ against a ‘target set’, the U-Boat menace for example?

Very few WW1 targets differ significantly from WW2 targets, with the possible exception of ‘oil targets’ (fewer and WW1 forces less reliant on them anyway), but the WW1 bombers are hopeless in comparison, Germany is big, far away and the weather rarely on the side of the attacking bomber.

Also unless 1000 bombers are assembled in secret and employed at a stroke will Germany sit by and let “military logistical and tactical installations” be molested? What would your response be; AAA, defensive fighters? And so to protect the bombers, offensive fighters, fighter sweeps, close escorts? And for that how many fighters, 500, 1000?

Wouldn’t the maintenance of such a force in such circumstances possibly outweigh their benefit to the ground offensive and hand the ‘tactical initiative’ to the defender as in the ground war?

I agree totally.

Where we disagree is the strategy these 1000 aircraft should use.

First of all, sorry to reawaken this thread.

With all due respect I am not sure that we do disagree. My contention is that had these aircraft have been used for a single purpose, be it sub-strategic (ie against German military logistical and tactical installations outside allied artillery range) or orientated solely against German naval bases, that in one of these roles the bombers could have had significant impact. However it is also my contention that anything other than a single target set would have diluted the effort to the extent that it would have been wasted.

There is a bit of an ‘elephant in the room’ in this – namely Trenchard.

He was not a fan of the idea of the Independent Force (the idea behind it was fine, it was the timing and fact that it risked disgusing the fact [in his thinking] that WW1 would be won on the ground) which caused him irritation. He felt that there was a risk that building a large bomber fleet would deny the RAF aircraft that could be better employed on the Western Front in support of the BEF.

He didn’t want to be the head of the IF in 1918, and the prospect of commanding the inter-allied bombing force when it was formed wasn’t the most appealing – the reason for him assuming command of the IF was that he was skilfully forced into accepting the post by Lord Weir (Sec of State for air).

If you look at the way Trenchard used the IF, I suspect there’s a chance that a lot of ‘sub-strategic’ attacks would’ve been made in areas behind the battlefront – airfields, railway stations/sidings, etc, etc – where the attacks might make a difference. We might have seen a flexibly used bomber force attacking both Germany and key targets that might influence the battle – a sort of early approach at effects based targeting in some ways.

That seems to me to be the best approach, and frankly seems like one which should be re-instilled in the minds of some of todays officers.

There is a bit of an ‘elephant in the room’ in this – namely Trenchard.

He was not a fan of the idea of the Independent Force (the idea behind it was fine, it was the timing and fact that it risked disgusing the fact [in his thinking] that WW1 would be won on the ground) which caused him irritation. He felt that there was a risk that building a large bomber fleet would deny the RAF aircraft that could be better employed on the Western Front in support of the BEF.

He didn’t want to be the head of the IF in 1918, and the prospect of commanding the inter-allied bombing force when it was formed wasn’t the most appealing – the reason for him assuming command of the IF was that he was skilfully forced into accepting the post by Lord Weir (Sec of State for air).

If you look at the way Trenchard used the IF, I suspect there’s a chance that a lot of ‘sub-strategic’ attacks would’ve been made in areas behind the battlefront – airfields, railway stations/sidings, etc, etc – where the attacks might make a difference. We might have seen a flexibly used bomber force attacking both Germany and key targets that might influence the battle – a sort of early approach at effects based targeting in some ways.

It is my opinion (for what it is worth) that a continual, concentrated effort by a fleet of over 1000 aircraft could have created an accumulative effect that would have seriously disabled the overall U-Boat effort.

I agree totally.

Where we disagree is the strategy these 1000 aircraft should use.

I don’t think there would have been any chance of this in 1918-1919.

The targets, U-boat construction, steelworks, sound alarmingly similar to those of the RAF in WW2. To try to do significant damage to these with the lumbering bombers of 1918 with their small bomb-loads (of tiny bombs) and against defending fighters is surely asking the impossible.

Navigation, even in daylight, and the weather would be much more difficult for a bomber of 1918, as would hitting the target with the bomb-sights available.

As with my point about the Western Front why put our forces into a position that so overwhelmingly favours the defender?

If we want to have an impact on the war better that our aircraft find a U-boat on the high seas when it’s isolated, far from home, where it can be shadowed and hounded at very little risk, where relatively minor damage would prove decisive, where bad weather is a problem for the U-boat too and where if it is destroyed the entire crew will perish.

I am afraid that I have to disagree. It is my opinion (for what it is worth) that a continual, concentrated effort by a fleet of over 1000 aircraft could have created an accumulative effect that would have seriously disabled the overall U-Boat effort.

Also, taking into account the capabilities of the aircraft available it is possible that a concerted bomber effort against a specific element of the German war effort could have bought results, for instance consistent, repetative and concentrated attacks against U Boat bases and construction and repair facilities could have dramatically reduced the capacity of that force to function. As could similar attacks against steel works.

I don’t think there would have been any chance of this in 1918-1919.

The targets, U-boat construction, steelworks, sound alarmingly similar to those of the RAF in WW2. To try to do significant damage to these with the lumbering bombers of 1918 with their small bomb-loads (of tiny bombs) and against defending fighters is surely asking the impossible.

Navigation, even in daylight, and the weather would be much more difficult for a bomber of 1918, as would hitting the target with the bomb-sights available.

As with my point about the Western Front why put our forces into a position that so overwhelmingly favours the defender?

If we want to have an impact on the war better that our aircraft find a U-boat on the high seas when it’s isolated, far from home, where it can be shadowed and hounded at very little risk, where relatively minor damage would prove decisive, where bad weather is a problem for the U-boat too and where if it is destroyed the entire crew will perish.

In addition to wondering about the strategic elements of the war…
If the allies had launched large bombing raids with Vimys and 0/400s, one wonders what tactics they would have used?

Boxed formations? Large numbers of fighter escorts?
Would it have been a less technolgically advanced version of 8th AF FC vs Luftwaffe or an altogther looser system?

I suspect that a closed system would have developed very quickly. Fighter escorts would have taken more development to get the required range but I think it would only have taken a matter of months to create systems very close to those used in the early part of world war 2. My personal opinion is that the heavy bombers of the time would have been far more survivable against attacks from contemporary fighters than was the case in World War 2. The V/1500 for instance was armed with up to 8 .303 MG’s, very impressive considering that the average fighter armament of the time was just 2 such weapons.

Exactly.

Please would quiet observers join in this?

Don’t leave it to us blogging autists that don’t have a life. It’s actually very important, because Western media think all wars are bad.

Nobody who spends time here is stupid. No sincerely-held view is wrong. Facts might be, like “cavalry” Trenchard, but not your viewpoint.

Conventional wisdom, and marks at GCSE, are that militarism is bad, and that talking can resolve all problems.

A contempory of my son has just won a (posthumous) VC. We sent him there to do a job for us. His parents need to know he did a good thing.

Put yourself in leaders’ boots. Imagine Gothas, Heinkels overhead.

In the situation under discussion (SLL‘s WW1 Strategic Bombing Policy), what would you do? You are GAY – as Good As (You) me.

I agree with all of the above entirely!

I have already mentioned the potential for the use of the allied heavy bomber assets against sub strategic targets to the rear of the Hindenburg line. Also, taking into account the capabilities of the aircraft available it is possible that a concerted bomber effort against a specific element of the German war effort could have bought results, for instance consistent, repetative and concentrated attacks against U Boat bases and construction and repair facilities could have dramatically reduced the capacity of that force to function. As could similar attacks against steel works. However I believe that there would only have been sufficient capacity to engage one element and that any effort to systematically demolish the entire German war effort (as seems to have been attempted in round 2) would have failed.

In addition to wondering about the strategic elements of the war…
If the allies had launched large bombing raids with Vimys and 0/400s, one wonders what tactics they would have used?

Boxed formations? Large numbers of fighter escorts?
Would it have been a less technolgically advanced version of 8th AF FC vs Luftwaffe or an altogther looser system?

Creaking Door. Germany’s position in 1918 was theoretically very strong, they had just defeated their eastern opponents and seized vast natural resources in the process. With proper management theses resources could have ended the social problems at home. There was really no need for a German offensive, from a grand strategy perspective they had already won having aquired a vast centrally located European empire. Indeed they would have effectively been the European hegemone under even the most favorable peace settlement the allies could have got without breaking the status qou on the western front. What was important about plan 1919 was that it was not really about ‘pushing’ the Germans back but about destroying their fighting potential and rolling up their defensive line on the Western Front. I use the Rhine as a purely hypothetical stop line on the basis of the limitations of any allied advance and the fact that it represents major physical barrier upon which a new defensive line could have been established. Allied war aims could only have been achieved by forcing a decision on the Western Front and Plan 1919 represented the best realistic prospect of achieving that.

Exactly.

Please would quiet observers join in this?

Don’t leave it to us blogging autists that don’t have a life. It’s actually very important, because Western media think all wars are bad.

Nobody who spends time here is stupid. No sincerely-held view is wrong. Facts might be, like “cavalry” Trenchard, but not your viewpoint.

Conventional wisdom, and marks at GCSE, are that militarism is bad, and that talking can resolve all problems.

A contempory of my son has just won a (posthumous) VC. We sent him there to do a job for us. His parents need to know he did a good thing.

Put yourself in leaders’ boots. Imagine Gothas, Heinkels overhead.

In the situation under discussion (SLL‘s WW1 Strategic Bombing Policy), what would you do? You are GAY – as Good As (You) me.

I read Ken as meaning ‘it’s all arms, stupid’ in the same sense as ‘Keep it simple, stupid’ – the ‘stupid’ being generic rather than person-specific.

Forgive the pedantry, but Trenchard wasn’t a cavalry officer – he was a Scots Fusilier.

I suggest that Richard Overy’s The Air War 1939-1945 and Why the Allies Won are worth consulting over the efficacy (or otherwise) of the bombing campaign of WW2.

The reason for British offensives in 1916 and 1917 owe as much to alliance politics as to Haig being mad keen on offensives. The Germans went in 1918 because it was the last chance they had: Russia out of the war and large numbers of Americans on their way, therefore try to win before the numbers game goes totally against you.