WW3 in 1985: Assault on the Kola Peninsula

they order a full system release over the loss of a few submarines?

Not a full system release. A nuclear strike on the attacking forces. Not the same thing.

Uhm… you’re joking right!?

The Soviets had a tremendous conventional advantage. The Warsaw Pact held an overall 2:1 advantage in conventional forces, and a 3:1 advantage across the entire length of the Central European Front.

As a quick example, the Warsaw Pact had three times as many tanks as NATO (29000 vs 10000), they had a 2:1 advantage in artillery, 3:1 advantage in anti-tank missiles and a 1.5:1 advantage in armored fighting vehicles. And more than a 2:1 advantage in fighters and attack aircraft.

Again, some research before posting might be a good idea.

Hahahahaha…. Yeah… NATO figures. Most of those figures that show superiority of numbers in favour of the warsaw pact ignore French forces in the region, as well as the substantial US naval forces including carrier group air power and marine forces. It also assumes third line Soviet units are included but third line NATO forces are not included. Basically the time it would take to mobilise the third line Soviet units would be about similar to the time required to bring similar forces from the US. Reality is there would have been rough parity in forces in Europe… But NATO doesn’t like to admit that.

the Warsaw Pact had three times as many tanks as NATO (29000 vs 10000),

Actually it was closer to 30,000 for the warsaw pact vs 25,000 for NATO, with a large proportion of these vehicles obsolete and the majority of the WP tanks being on Soviet Soil and unlikely to get anywhere near the front line any time soon. (many were facing the Chinese in the far east).

and the ‘Fulcrum A’ wasn’t a particularly impressive bird anyway.

With helmet mounted sight it was the most capable dogfighter in the world at the time.
Considerng the performance of BVR missiles at the time like Sparrow that is rather important.

The Soviets wouldn’t tollerate SSBNs being sunk and conventional strikes on Soviet Soil… any more than the US would accept the reverse.
If conventional forces weren’t stopping the US carriers then nuclear means would be used. There was a reason why about 25% of missiles carried on Soviet Ships were nuclear armed… including some model SAMs.

The Soviets were quite relieved by the change in US nuclear doctrine. The Soviets were also very well aware of the problems associated with the nuclear spiral, and how easily things get out of control. Would they order a full system release over the loss of a few submarines? I’m afraid your thinking is based too heavily on the myths associated with nuclear warfare, and again I would suggest you do some research on this subject.

In fact, the Soviets had a conventional advantage on the Central Front, so why give all that up by resorting to nuclear weapons.

No they didn’t.

Uhm… you’re joking right!?

The Soviets had a tremendous conventional advantage. The Warsaw Pact held an overall 2:1 advantage in conventional forces, and a 3:1 advantage across the entire length of the Central European Front.

As a quick example, the Warsaw Pact had three times as many tanks as NATO (29000 vs 10000), they had a 2:1 advantage in artillery, 3:1 advantage in anti-tank missiles and a 1.5:1 advantage in armored fighting vehicles. And more than a 2:1 advantage in fighters and attack aircraft.

Again, some research before posting might be a good idea.

Plus the thousands of interceptors and not to mention the Naval Aviation forces as well. The west knew very little about the Mig-31, or for that matter flankers or fulcrums… the former two models being the more important in that their long range missiles would certainly give them an edge in combat against US naval aircraft.

No Flankers were in service in 1985. These came later due to technical difficulties with their radar. The long-range AA-10 did not enter service until 1987. The first Kola Su-27 regiment did not arrive until 1988. There were no Fulcrums on the Kola Peninsula, very few had been built by 1985, and the ‘Fulcrum A’ wasn’t a particularly impressive bird anyway. There was one MiG-31 regiment on Kola in 1985, which was one of only three operational MiG-31 regiments at the time. So the majority of the fighters on Kola there were Su-15 Flagons and other older types.

Hm I’m afraid you may be mixing the immediate post-war U.S. nuclear doctrine/tactics/strategy with that of the 1970s and 1980.

I’m not interested in US doctrine/tactics/strategy of any period… I am sure the Americans would have loved to have an all conventional war with naval forces… it would have suited them down to the ground, but the soviets didn’t base their doctrine/tactics/strategy on US doctrine/tactics/strategy so the US’s doctrine/tactics/strategy are moot.
The Soviets wouldn’t tollerate SSBNs being sunk and conventional strikes on Soviet Soil… any more than the US would accept the reverse.
If conventional forces weren’t stopping the US carriers then nuclear means would be used. There was a reason why about 25% of missiles carried on Soviet Ships were nuclear armed… including some model SAMs.

As I said USN wet dream.

No SA-10 were deployed to East Germany until about 1988, etc.

Didn’t realise that East Germany was near the Kola Pennisula… Most new systems did go to East Germany, but they often went to important Soviet bases first.

In fact, the Soviets had a conventional advantage on the Central Front, so why give all that up by resorting to nuclear weapons.

No they didn’t.

So the Soviet Air Defense Forces in 1985 would rely primarily on SA-2/3/5, with sporadic SA-10a battalions and a handful SA-10b battalions.

Plus the thousands of interceptors and not to mention the Naval Aviation forces as well.
The west knew very little about the Mig-31, or for that matter flankers or fulcrums… the former two models being the more important in that their long range missiles would certainly give them an edge in combat against US naval aircraft.

Okay people, here’s another one for you, the nuclear version of ‘Return to the Kola Peninsula’:

http://www.harpoonhq.com/harpoon3/scenarios/plot-ww3in1985.html

Scenario #4: Return to the Kola Peninsula – Nuclear Version

This scenario is an “off line” excursion into the topic of nuclear warfare. The scenario is not part of the original battleset, which covers a protracted conventional war, and is meant to explore the possibility of a nuclear exchange.

There has been a considerable amount of war termination negotiations in the last few days. But a settlement to the war seems virtually impossible to attain. It is unthinkable for the Soviets to give up what they have fought so hard for, and they insist on a cease-fire that recognizes their territorial gains. NATO, on the other hand, is unwilling to recognize any Soviet gains and calls for a return to status quo ante bellum.

The Soviets are strongly seeking a decisive military and political result before the industrial might of the West can be mobilized. However, having failed to destroy NATO in a short war, the Soviets are unlikely to regain a conventional military advantage. Facing total defeat in the Central European theater, the Soviets would eventually be forced to choose between surrender and escalation. To retrieve the losing situation, a decision was made to launch a limited nuclear and chemical attack on NATO front-line units. 44 missile-delivered 5-20kT nuclear warheads and a dozen persistent chemical agent warheads were employed against NATO troops in the most hard-pressed areas.

The NATO response was swift. 49 warheads were detonated over Soviet frontline units, four army garrisons, five air bases and two rail yards. NATO announced this as a one-time strike in retaliation for the Soviet attack. The Soviets struck back with a volley of missiles targeting eight NATO air bases, three ports of disembarkation in the Netherlands and France, as well as key command, control and communication facilities (C3) and several storages for nuclear weapons. NATO responded by employing nuclear warheads against another ten Soviet air bases in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, four major naval bases in East Germany and around Kaliningrad, several nuclear weapon storage sites, C3 nodes, and logistical centers.

The situation was now fast spiraling out of control, and the war was rapidly escalating to a central system exchange. In order to shock the Soviets into realizing the seriousness of NATO’s resolve, it was decided to launch a nuclear attack on the Kola Peninsula, the Soviet Union’s most concentrated naval base complex. It is hoped that this operation, combined with a threat of SIOP release, can force the Soviets to return to the negotiating table with a different attitude.

The objective of Limited Attack Option Two (LAO-2) is to destroy the Soviet military/nuclear capabilities on the Kola Peninsula. This counterforce attack will cover the six target categories that currently make up the infrastructure of the Soviet forces in the region. The categories are airfields, naval bases, army bases, nuclear warhead storage sites, C3 facilities, and civilian/military infrastructure.

Go directly to the download section here:
http://www.harpoonhq.com/harpoon3/scenarios/

__________________________________________________
The Harpoon HeadQuarters: By the Players, For the Players
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By 1985 the Soviets had just as many nukes as the US did… in fact they probably had a few more… and most importantly both sides knew this. A conventional strike on the US from Cuba would ahve caused WWIII. A conventional strike on the Soviet Union would have done the same. The only reason Kruschev backed down to Kennedy was because the Missile gap and the Bomber gap were in the wests favour and both Kruschev and Kennedy (thanks to U2 flights) knew this. It doesn’t apply to 1985 where both sides knew what they had and what they didn’t have.

Hm I’m afraid you may be mixing the immediate post-war U.S. nuclear doctrine/tactics/strategy with that of the 1970s and 1980.

In the 1950s and better parts of the 1960s Eisenhower’s policy of Massive Retaliation ruled military thinking. By the late 1960s this had changed to Flexible Response, where conventional forces offered alternatives to total nuclear war. This consisted of an increase in conventional weapons systems and introduced the concept of limited nuclear war.

I would suggest you do a google search on LAO or Limited Attack Option (and also MAO, Major Attack Option), and take a look at some of that material.

Does your simulation take into account that most of the USNs codes were compromised by the Walker spy ring?

You know I was just WAITING for that one to come up hehe. I’ll prolly dedicate one or two of the scenarios in the battleset to this mess 😀

By 1985 they had operational systems the US barely knew about. S-300, S-300V, Tor, even Igla would have been a shock.

Nah, these systems came later. The baseline S-300V was not operational until 1988, SA-15 (aka 9K33x Tor) went into service in 1986. SA-18 (Igla) entered service in 1983 and were only deployed in limited numbers by 1985.

Likewise, the SA-10a (S-300PT with 5V55K missile) entered service in the very late 1970s but wasn’t a particulary impressive system. The missiles had relatively short range (25nm or so) and were SARH guided. The SA-10b (S-300PS with 5V55R missile) came in 1984 but by 1985 there were only a handful systems in service, and most if not all were probably deployed around Moscow and not at the Front. No SA-10 were deployed to East Germany until about 1988, etc.

So the Soviet Air Defense Forces in 1985 would rely primarily on SA-2/3/5, with sporadic SA-10a battalions and a handful SA-10b battalions.

By 1985 Gorby had tripled the budget for bio warfare. They had already weaponised Ebola and Marburg Fever. A pandemic across europe or the United states of a hemmoraging disease that has a 80-90% kill rate would be interesting to watch. SS-18s in their 6,000 psi silos were the preferred mode of transport as they had the volume for 20-30 cannisters instead of decoys.
Corner a rat, you don’t expect it to play by your rules do you?

Yes. But again the Soviets would probably not go to a full system release at the first sign of trouble. In fact, the Soviets had a conventional advantage on the Central Front, so why give all that up by resorting to nuclear weapons. Especially when NATO’s retaliation would destroy this advantage. It doesn’t make much sense I’m afraid.

By 1985 the Soviets had just as many nukes as the US did… in fact they probably had a few more… and most importantly both sides knew this. A conventional strike on the US from Cuba would ahve caused WWIII. A conventional strike on the Soviet Union would have done the same. The only reason Kruschev backed down to Kennedy was because the Missile gap and the Bomber gap were in the wests favour and both Kruschev and Kennedy (thanks to U2 flights) knew this. It doesn’t apply to 1985 where both sides knew what they had and what they didn’t have.

Does your simulation take into account that most of the USNs codes were compromised by the Walker spy ring?

Okay you would probably argue that the Vietnamese, Iraqi and Libyan air defenses were not equally trained and not nearly as motivated, which is probably right, but those wars might still give some clues.

By 1985 they had operational systems the US barely knew about. S-300, S-300V, Tor, even Igla would have been a shock.

But what about NATO’s anti-SSBN campaign? If one dozen Soviet SSBNs died in the first week of the war, would this automatically lead to attacks on London and Washington? Considering the number of warheads each SSBN carries, any significant loss (20-30%) translates to a serious reduction in the Soviet Union’s first strike and retaliation capabilities. That’s a bigger problem for the Soviets to solve than three strings of M117s across the runways at Severomorsk…

By 1985 Gorby had tripled the budget for bio warfare. They had already weaponised Ebola and Marburg Fever. A pandemic across europe or the United states of a hemmoraging disease that has a 80-90% kill rate would be interesting to watch. SS-18s in their 6,000 psi silos were the preferred mode of transport as they had the volume for 20-30 cannisters instead of decoys.
Corner a rat, you don’t expect it to play by your rules do you?

Hahahahahahaha… There is a fair chance that a large bomber attack on Britain/France/US by Soviet Backfire and Blackjack bombers might lead to some form of nuclear retaliation… Gee, you really think NATO would wait that long? I know the Soviets wouldn’t.

Dude, give the guy a break eh? He’s only trying to put out a scenario and he’s pretty good at it. It would be better off if you played it first and got a handle on the scenario first, then comment on it.

Later
D

Retaliation would likely also arrive in London or Washington too if any targets inside the Soviet Union are attacked.

This would depend on the scale of the attacks. If the Soviet heartland with its massive ICBM complexes and bomber bases is left undamaged, it is rather unlikely that the Soviets would take such a big step up the escalation ladder. A Soviet attack on London or Washington would most likely cause the war to escalate out of control due to NATO’s limited retaliation options.

So from the Soviet Union’s point of view there would usually be more appropriate targets for retaliation than the opponent’s capital. Carrier battle groups, isolated bases such as Guam and Diego Garcia, and the radar at Thule are good examples.

(…which brings us to another interesting subject: how would NATO respond to nuclear attacks on its carrier battle groups? What targets would be appropriate for retaliation? This is a very difficult question, and one that plagued NATO planners for years.)

Okay, NATO air attacks on the Kola Peninsula is one thing. But what about NATO’s anti-SSBN campaign? If one dozen Soviet SSBNs died in the first week of the war, would this automatically lead to attacks on London and Washington? Considering the number of warheads each SSBN carries, any significant loss (20-30%) translates to a serious reduction in the Soviet Union’s first strike and retaliation capabilities. That’s a bigger problem for the Soviets to solve than three strings of M117s across the runways at Severomorsk…

BTW last time I looked a US carrier strike group has never penetrated successfully any air defence network as capable as the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Naval forces are not amazing, but then US carriers with no planes left aren’t that exceptional either.

Well, they did it on a daily basis in Vietnam. And again in Iraq in 1991. And in Libya in 1986. Okay you would probably argue that the Vietnamese, Iraqi and Libyan air defenses were not equally trained and not nearly as motivated, which is probably right, but those wars might still give some clues.

On the other hand, the full wartime capabilities of the Soviet air defense network were never tested, but neither were the USN carrier battle groups. That’s where aerial/naval warfare simulators like Harpoon3 come in 😀

Well, retaliation would most likely come in the form of nuclear-tipped anti-ship missiles and torpedoes against the carrier task force.

Retaliation would likely also arrive in London or Washington too if any targets inside the Soviet Union are attacked. BTW last time I looked a US carrier strike group has never penetrated successfully any air defence network as capable as the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Naval forces are not amazing, but then US carriers with no planes left aren’t that exceptional either.

Well, retaliation would most likely come in the form of nuclear-tipped anti-ship missiles and torpedoes against the carrier task force. It is very unlikely that conventional NATO air strikes on the flanks would lead to a nuclear exchange on the Central Front. And certainly not a central system exchange where you have bombers and ICBMs straddling the North Pole.

The Soviets also had plans to use SS-18 against NATO naval forces, probably because of its small CEP and it’s ability to pulverise even a widely-dispersed CVBG by showering it with MIRVs. In addition, several of the at-sea Yankee SSBNs were earmarked for the mission at one point or another. The low trajectory of the SS-N-6 meant a very small flight time, and at the planned engagement range (much smaller than the missile’s maximum range) the CEP was estimated to be sufficiently small to do the job.

So once the air strikes get underway you REALLY don’t want the Soviet reconnaissance assets to locate your carrier battle groups. (Yupp, we’ve added a little surprise for you in case you fail to keep your CVBGs hidden hehe…)

Sounds like a USN wet dream.

There is a fair chance large bomber raids against the Soviet homeland may drive them to some form of nuclear escalation.

Hahahahahahaha… There is a fair chance that a large bomber attack on Britain/France/US by Soviet Backfire and Blackjack bombers might lead to some form of nuclear retaliation… Gee, you really think NATO would wait that long? I know the Soviets wouldn’t.

The next scenario in the ‘World War Three’ battleset, Return to the Kola Peninsula, is now available for download:

http://www.harpoonhq.com/harpoon3/scenarios/plot-ww3in1985.html

Scenario #3: Return to the Kola Peninsula

The first NATO offensive against Kola was a resounding success. The Soviet air assets and command and control structure has been dealt a major blow. Key bases have been damaged or temporarily put out of operation altogether, storages and depots have been hit, and logistical links have been severed. The Northern Fleet, what was left of it, failed to deal with the US Navy Strike Fleet and was unable to even weaken the screening forces. The few remaining Soviet Naval Aviation reconnaissance assets could not penetrate the well-prepared defensive ring around the battle groups, and no bomber raids ever materialized.

NATO commanders are determined to complete the victory up north. Amphibious operations against the Kola Peninsula have been considered but the plans were quickly shelved when the Soviets deployed Atomic Defensive Mines (ADMs) on the Kola coast along with a promise to detonate them should Royal and US Marines land. Instead, NATO commanders have decided to neutralize the military and industrial complexes through massive air strikes rather than capturing them. The scale of the air strikes will be increased to also include B-52s flying over the north pole in order to decisively destroy the military, logistical and industrial infrastructure in the region.

It is hoped air strikes against the Kola may help compel the Soviets to end the war on less favorable terms. Massive use of B-52 bombers is likely to yield decisive results quickly and may accelerate the war termination negotiations. However this endeavor is not without risk. There is a fair chance large bomber raids against the Soviet homeland may drive them to some form of nuclear escalation.

Go directly to the download section here:
http://www.harpoonhq.com/harpoon3/scenarios/

__________________________________________________
The Harpoon HeadQuarters: By the Players, For the Players
http://www.harpoonhq.com