Sweetman’s comment from Ares

This was foredoomed. The trouble is that the AF knows, within one or two per cent, what the KC-767 and KC-330 will do: fuel offload at range, cargo capacity, fuel burn, maintenance costs, everything. So either you write a vague requirement that culminates in sorties needed to support a notional force mix, and aircraft needed to generate them – which then gets challenged because it’s vague – or you write a classic pounds-and-miles requirement that favors one or the other.

And at the bottom of it is the clear intent of Congress: that the USAF should conduct a fair and open competition which Boeing wins.

UPDATE 2-Northrop threatens to boycott US tanker contest

Defense analyst Loren Thompson of the Virginia-based Lexington Institute said both tanker teams were concerned about the Pentagon’s request for a fixed-price development contract that stretched over 18 years.

“To ask people to bid fixed prices on things that may not materialize until 18 years in the future is simply absurd,” he said. He said Boeing officials saw Northrop’s letter as “some sort of a maneuver,” but they shared the concerns about the amount of risk the contractors were expected to carry.

. . . .

EADS spokesman Guy Hicks said his company fully supported Northrop’s decision not to bid unless the terms were changed.

Senator Richard Shelby, a Republican who joined other Alabama lawmakers in criticizing the Pentagon’s tanker competition rules last month, said as written, the competition amounted to a “sham” and a “sole-source contract to Boeing.”

“If the Air Force wants a true competition — one that aims to procure the best product for our warfighter — it must fundamentally alter the current framework,” Shelby said.

Tanker Wars: Northrop No-Bid Threat Is Real

First, the draft solicitation really does impose huge risks on offerors by requiring fixed-price bids on items stretching 18 years into the future. Second, the proposed criteria for picking the future tanker are radically different from those used in the initial round of competition, in ways that make the solicitation significantly less favorable to Northrop’s bigger aircraft. Third, Northrop knows it has less political leverage to compel changes today than it did in the previous competition, because the Republican backers of its plane are now in the minority on Capitol Hill.

And then there is Wes Bush, the Northrop Grumman executive who signed the letter. Bush is slated to succeed CEO Ron Sugar at the end of the year, and he has never been as big a fan of the tanker bid as Sugar was.

. . .

His counterparts on the Boeing team are bemused by Bush’s move, because although they suspect a trick they too find the government’s proposed terms quite unappealing. That won’t deter them from bidding — or accepting a sole-source contract — but they know they could lose big money on the tanker program if their planning assumptions prove too optimistic. The track record on fixed-price development contracts is not good for contractors or their government customers, because it is so difficult to anticipate what problems might arise at the beginning of a program. Bush understands, and Boeing does too, that signing up to difficult terms might one day make the winner envy the loser.

That is a rather vague statement on NG’s part. I was looking for something more specific as to parts of the RFP.

reading through the Q&As I would say most of their concerns revolved around

1. doing things as the KC-135 had done them even though it would be better to do it a new way with a new plane (flight profiles, mission planning, whatnot)

2. not giving enough consideration to how its attributes affect the economics (such as basing fuel costs strictly on a fixed number of hours when they say they could accomplish the same mission in fewer flight hours than the KC-767 so charging them both the same number of hours is unfair) and not giving sufficient credit to cargo capabilities

What changes do they want?

you can read their pdf letter in the link above, but here’s the relevant quote

. . . clear preference in the draft RFP for a smaller aircraft with a limited multirole capability and its imposition of a structure that places contractual and financial burdens on the company that we simply cannot accept

Possibly because once on task the limiting factor in the tankers performance (for example the most limiting being altitude in most cases) is the performance of the receiver aircraft during AAR.

i think they were talking about stuff like speed during climb to altitude that doesn’t impact AAR

Addendum 2 (Nov 23)

Q&A Nov 24

Why is fuel burn calculated for profiles based on what’s efficient for the KC-135 when the most efficient profile for our plane is different (no real answer)

How will airlift be valued (the mandatory airlift requirements are all that are needed)

Given greater anticipated usage of KC-X, annual flight hours (489) should be raised above current KC-135 usage. (no)

One offeror talks about 4 requirements they can’t meet:
1. cold soak quick start – the cost to qualify and re-FAA certify improved systems would be cost-prohibitive (tough)

2. Non-ODS (ozone depleting substance) fire suppression – no such FAA approved system (get FAA approval for one)

3. Anthropometric criteria – redesigning a flight deck that has been in use for years to meet similar yet slightly different criteria isn’t cost effective (require to accommodate current pilot population, but not necessarily anthropometric criteria)

4. Fuel tank inerting – center tanks done, but doing it for all tanks would be complex and expensive (tough)

Requirement to meet cargo handling without additional equipment (ie nose jacks to level floor (A330 but not A330F)) is hard (tough)

Fortunately there is a way out, pallet handling can be powered (no manual requirement)

IFARA is calculated fleet-wide but fuel-burn is per plane, shouldn’t fuel-burn be adjusted by IFARA? (ie if fewer planes are needed for a mission, that is a fuel savings) (no)

Q&A Nov 25

fuel burn is the only considered Operation & Support (O&S) cost. others such as depot maintenance should be included (no)

adjust fuel usage based on gallons per mission rather than gallons per minute since some planes can do missions quicker (no)

fuel costs are adjusted for inflation, but historically fuel costs have risen much faster than inflation so they should use that number instead (too bad)

additional ramp space in IFARA isn’t realistic plus IFARA doesn’t account for everything and requires additional ‘insights and observations’ as from the first RFP (ramp space is accounted for)

milcon representative bases should include more ANG/reserve bases that are smaller (tough)

a flyoff is necessary to properly evaluate certain requirements like handling, performance and tanker operations (no)

does the cargo floor need to accommodate high-weight (5730lb) pallets in every position (not necessarily)