The engine is AL-31 😀

yes for the J10, for the time being.

but at least one J11 is already flying with TWIN WS10s. wont be long before the new J11s are all WS10 powered. then it will be the J10’s turn. 😎

No problem!.

ahhh, much better, cheers mate! 😉

Gunships as aircover for FACs is a bit of a stretch isnt it?

well, not really if the opposition is only ship-bore helos.

the harrier would be ideal, but then nothing is perfect.

If you want to cover a patrol zone you dont do it with a vessel who’s primary search sensor is limited to 20nm or so!. You do it with a vessel that, preferably, has an aviation capability. If it is in a contested area that better be a comprehensively equipped GP hull too!. China has a very comprehensive new FFG design in the 054 thats were the money should be going – into a decent patrol frigate.

unfortunately, ATM, there is not one chinese warship that matches that description. the only chinese warships that comes close are the 052B/C. however, one is lacking in AA while the other is deficient in ASW.

the 054 with only eight short-range, point defence HHQ7/9s will have little chance against the Su30s everyone in the neighbourhood seems to be buying.

given the current situation, submarine threats in the area seems to be low while air threats are high, so the 052C would be the best vessle to patrol the area. unfortunately, the PLAN desperately needs all the 052Cs it got around taiwan, and cant afford to have any of them wondering the south china seas while RoCAF F16s and FCK1s are shooting up the chinese fleet.

[this is going to go into some of the other points u meantioned in ur last post, but i think its best to keep the train of thought going.]

do keep in mind that no matter if it is FACs or frigates/destroyers that are patroling the area, they/it will not be able to stop a well planned and determined land grab on their own. if someone is truely determined to take an island or a dozen from china, they can shoot through any reasonable defence the chinese can put down there during peace time.

this is pretty much the worst case scenario, and then the question would be, ‘what did u loose on the first day’?

with the FACs on patrol, u loose a couple of FACs (sounding very cruel here 🙁 ) that can be easily replaced. with the 054 (and god forbid!) the 052C on patrol, u loose one of the major components of ur entire navy! and with it, perhaps even ur very ability to effectively respond!

remeber that a military presence is meant to be more symbolic then it is military. for example, from what i gather, argintina only finally committed to taking the falklands AFTER the UK had decommisioned its arctic partol ship, (removing almost all military presence) and the argintinians took that as the UK not take the falklands as too important. and there is a great deal of speculation that argintina would not have attacked had the partol ship not been laid off.

the FACs will be sent there to remind ppl that china is still interested in the disputed islands. they also act as a political ‘tripwire’, as in order to take a disputed island, u will most likely have to kill chinese servicemen in the process, hence drastically increasing the chances of china taking the issue to the next level. the flip side is that these FACs will be fairly unimportant to the PLAN’s capabilies in general, so loosing them will not hinder the PLAN’s ability to respond. (there is a difference between deterrance and temptation 😉 how tempted would argintina have been had the RN sent one of its carriers to partol the falklands on its own before the conflict. )

before, without a military presence, if someone takes a disputed island, then the only realistic way china can get it back is to send troops to expell the ‘hostile’s who have landed there. but there is every chance of bloodshed and escalation, and so the difficult political decision will have to be made by beijing, and beijing will most likely take all the international wrap for a small shooting war if things get out of hand. (thats why china is stuck to complaining about landgraps so far).

however, with FACs there, it will be the ppl who decide to take the islands that will have to make the hard decisions (and face the political baggage if things go wrong). this effectively raises the stakes for them, and so it is hoped that this will help to deter them from further ‘advantures’.

if it doesnt, (again sounding creul) the PLAN wont loose anything important, and it gives china the inititive and political mandate to re-take the islands.

Fine. What are the FACs doing in the meantime though?. Very little presumably so there value is equivalently very little isnt it!

well, apply that idea to the military as a whole, and what does that mean? one should not have a military unless one is about to go to war?

hope u see where this is going. 😉

the idea is to be better safe then sorry, and its not a just a short-term thing either. if the PLAN do someday feild a new FFG that emcompases all the expectations u have of the 054, then these will most likely be, first and foremost, deployed to patrol china’s long sea lanes, and also to beef up the 052C/sov centric battle groups. my guess is that only after at least a decade of it being introduced into service will some new FFG be available to patrol the disputed islands of the south china sea. seeing, how there is no such vessel at the moment, and it will take at least serval years to upgrade the 054 to that level, time does not seem to be on ur side here. as by the time u get these FFGs, there might not be much left to patrol (at the rate islands have been ‘disappearing’ off chinese maps).

think of it this way, how much is a dozen or so of these new FACs going to be worth? compare that to the natural resources under these islands and the benefits of fishing rights there.

ideally, the PLAN should send 054s with 052C level of AA capabilties to patrol these islands. however, given the situation at hand, FACs will be the best option until a better FFG or DDG becomes available.

i’ve got other points to make about the rest of ur post, but i really have to go now. so i will post the rest of my reply when i have more time.

cool, thanks.

so, is that pretty common then? if so, why did an article i skimmed claim that china is only the second nation after the US to deploy such blades?

first off, would u mind using the ‘quote’ function please? just makes skimming lot easier. cheers. 😉

Wolf

What use are these FACs without air-support? Remember what happened to the small vessels of the Iraqi Navy when they tried to operate without top cover?. They were easy meat for chopper-launched light AShM’s. Most of, even the smaller, fleets in theatre have some form of organic chopper capability and light AShM’s of the Penguin, Sea Skua or AS15TT types are hardly prohibitively expensive systems for anyone.

well, if they are based on or near some of the larger islands, then there is no reason why gunships cant also be based there should the situation merits it.

however, the main tasks these FACs will likely take on would be enforing chinese claims in the area by patroling. normally it might take a destroyer or frigate, but seeing how china donr have that many of the newer versons of these babies and also that they will be needed much more up north, these FACs can fill in the gap in peace time.

in the extremely unlikely situation that tensions do boil over, these FACs wont be left to fend for themselves. PLAN reinforcements will be sent in. the critical factor is the amount and type.

with the FACs in area, there will already be some seriouse anti-shipping firepower in the area. the PLAN can probably get away with only sending down 2 or 3 of its heavy warships, maybe consistancing of one 052C for airdefence and 2 052Bs or 054s for escort and anti-sub (plus some flankers).

obviously, in normal times, the PLAN wont have to resort to such measures as they can just send in the southern fleet.

however, noting china’s growing military power, i serisouly doubt any of china’s neighbours will make a military move to take disbuted territory without china’s attention first being dirverted elsewhere (que in taiwan).

if conflict do erupt across the straits, and the US opt not to get directly involved in the fighting (as i believe). then some might try a land grab while china’s is focused on taiwan.

having these FACs means that china can maintain a credibale military deterrance even if its main surface fleets are all engaged elsewhere.

also, because the bulk of the anti-shipping firepower will be carried on the FACs themselves, any fighters sent in to provide CAP will not need to carry bulky AShMs. this means that they can loiter for longer periods and also means that a south china sea campaign will not need to pull valuable strike ac like the JH7 and MKK away from taiwan.

What do you need a battery of 200km range SSMs for coastie operations for?. Look at the Indian Navy and coastguard for a good force mix for EEZ enforcement – adapted light transport aircraft and economical, lightly armed, high endurance OPVs with chopper capability are the types of systems you want checking nets and for antipiracy operations. No antiship missiles are really required!

im a little confused, what area of operation are u talking about here? chinese coast or south china sea? china will most likely keep its older FACs for EEZ enforcement around the mainland, while sending the new FACs down south if deemed necessary.

also, u seemed to have gotten the wrong emphysis. the main task of the FACs will be to provide a military presence, with anti-piracy as a secondary mission.

with a couple of c80X missiles onboard, these things will prove very intimidating to the captains of even the largets warships. especially in peace time, when they dont have the option of just shooting at it at arm’s length.

PS. the C803 is only one missile option, if the FAC can carry the C803, i dont really see it having a problem carrying a less ‘wasteful’ c801 (or a mix of the two) for none-specific operations. that is if missiles are to be carried at all. the missile bays could be usful in ferrying SF across the strait with little chance of detection in times of conflict.

Fair comment, but, investment into research is a critical method of bypassing technical ‘bottlenecks’. Hell, if they used the money spent on this 2208 vessel and its design to purchase a couple of modern Thales towed arrays they’d be better off!

lol, if only it were that simple. the PLA would probably have been willing to buy Thales itself if it meant them getting at the lastest western sonar tech. buying off-the-shelf western kit isnt really an option for the PRC because of the arms ban. the EU is talking of lifting the ban, and if it does, expect massive PLA perchases of ‘none-offensive military equipment’ like radar and sonar, but at the moment that is still some way off. as such, in the short term, the only viable option is R&D. but there is only so much money one can reasonable put into a project without it becoming wasteful.

That still infers that the major surface units of the PLAN would be locked in port, no more effective than the Argentine surface fleet in 82, in the face of a sub threat. That is surely an intolerable situation.

not necessarily. i have already given an example of a situation where the main fleet is unavailable for other reasons.

also, if the fighting is to be limited to purely military targets for political and economical reasons, then the PLAN can concerntrate its ASW assets on protecting its surface fleet. and may indeed choose to use the surface fleet as bait to trade boats, if the enemy only has limited sub-surface assets. (if the enemy takes the ‘bait’, then the PLAN’s remaining surface heavys can roam free after the enemy’s sub force has been destroyed. if they dont, the surface fleet can take on its normal missions.)

the FACs can be employed to keep the enemy surface fleet at arm’s length so that the PLAN’s heavys can concerntrate on a single task at a time.

Wolf I agree with every word you’ve written there. The strides the PLAN have made in AAW and AsuW are considerable and impressive. They still have a long way to go, but, they are clearly on the right track. This is why I dont comprehend the interest in this vessel as anything other than a trials boat to evaluate the hullform. Such a missile craft suggests a reversion to their brown-water doctrine and its brown-water, in this case, that is already well covered, against air/surface incursion, by existing assets.

as i said, the main area of operation for these boats would be the south china sea’s disputed islands. which are brown-water in effect. without carriers, the PLAN’s main surface fleet cannot operate in that area effectively without needing to deploy an unacceptably large force to ensure the security of the ships, or the construction of major AFBs on some of the largest islands.

neither are likely because such moves will carry grave economical and political consequences with little reward (after all, the PLAN already has enough problems down there without having to also deal with the massive arms purchases everyone is going to make if they feel threatened).

Do you think a heavy warship will be approaching a hostile Chinese coast without, at very least, radar reconaissance from its own chopper?. If a captain acted so galactically stupidly he deserves a missile boat closing him down. In reality what makes you think one of these FACs would get to 20nm without some form of air attention?. Remember too that the 20nm I suggested was just a hit on a 70ft masthead so it may take further time to develop the surface plot before they could start with target selection.

well, in peace time u cant just sink someone cos u dont like the look of them (even if u might want to 😉 ), but if u want to maintain a steak on a piece of land, u have to be there on the spot to enforce ur claim, or the otehr guy might take it as u have abandoned ur claim if u stopped patroling there, or didnt show up to drive off anyone who landed there. (hey, thats the way things work down there, and china has lost the most number of islands that way 🙁 )

u see the problem here for the captains of larger ships?

lets face it, the whole point of having a bigger ship is so u have bigger guns and so the other guy is more lilkely to back off from a fight, meaning u can get ur way more often. thats part of the reason why the PLAN hasnt sent FACs to patrol there before. whats the point in having a boat there if that boat is just going to be forced to back off all the time? (its not like china or anyone else other there is going to have an all out war over a couple of sunken boats).

now, if the smaller ship has bigger guns, it kinda defeats the point of having a bigger boat. 😎

there is also the matter of the sheer number of islands in dispute. for the price of one destroyer, u can have at least a dozen FACs, more numbers means more islands protected. and being stealthy means its harder for the others to track u and take the islands u dont patrol.

also, if the fighting is in and around the island chains, then FACs will have a natural advanatge over larger ships, as the islands might interfer with long range radar.

Who would try and challenge the PLAN, PLANAF and PLAAF in China’s 200 mile EEZ (the effective radius for a small FAC such as we’re discussing) with a single carrier group? Come on wolf your stacking the deck a bit in your own favour there. Like I said Desert Storm saw the employment of no less than six carriers! You think China would warrant less attention?

did u miss the section when i explained why it is unlikely the USN would be able to amass a force the size u are thinking of before the war is over? :confused:

Here your missing the true power that full-up attack carriers bring to a Navy. Mobility, mobility, mobility!. Right now there are three carriers within roughly 7 days steaming of the South China Sea – Kitty Hawk and Stennis on PACFLT deployment and the Kennedy attached to 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf. Are you suggesting that the PLAN could assemble the naval assets you are talking about – 100+ FACs, major surface units, subs and hundreds of tactical aircraft for a major fleet action in the South China Sea without tipping off the US more than 7 days in advance?

first off, there is currently only one US carrier group based permanatedly in the asia-pacific area, there is talk of adding a second one, but as far as i know, that is not final yet.

secondly, the chinese will never fight an all out war with the US over some islands in the south china sea. if there is any fighting at all down there, it will be low intensity frictional fighting between a couple of hot headed captains. at worst it will escalate into a limited war, focusing mainly on sea and air battles. no reason whatsoever for the USN to get involved in the fighting. at most the USN will show up to break it up.

See above – they dont need months of warning!

they will do if u are thinking of amassing a fleet the size u want (6~7 full carrier battle groups). u cant just pull ships away from their previous ops without finding replacements to fill in, and u cant just pull that many ships away without consequences and reprocussions.

So if the PLAN has the ability to pick and choose its fights as your suggesting what does it need these FACs for? They are little use in a battle against the USN even in absurd numbers, they’re little use forward deployed to island bases as, according to what you say, the top-cover they depend on cannot be guaranteed too far out and for coastal defence really they just reinforce a capability that hardly needs it when you consider the other requirements the service has!

well, the only thing the PLAN is really afraid of is the USN, and maybe very intimidated by the JDFN. however, there is only one remotely likely scenario that would bring the PLAN in direct combat with any of those two – taiwan. as such, its not about picking and choosing what battles to fight, but rather proparing for the only likely one. (just think about it, what is there in the south china sea is worth china and the US having a go at each other over?)

currently the PLAN has the ability to respond to any seriously agressive land grabs in the south china sea. (and the US would have no excuse to object under those circumstances). fine, problem arises if the land grap takes place during a taiwan conflict, when the bulk of the PLAN will be tied down and unable to respond. and by the time the war is over in the straits, the PLAN might not have the ability to assure victory in another war (and by the time the PLAN recovers, so much time would have passed that the international community would see china as an agressor if it went after its lost territories).

here is where the value of the FACs comes in, as meantioned above, with minimal support, the FACs could pose a serious military threat to anyone wishing to take advanatge of the PLAN’s temparay absence, and so, hopefully deter agression, or at the very least limit its damage.

Very much not the case and I’ve already given you part of the reason why. This boat is trialling the SWATH hullform. One of the main factors that the PLAN will be studying is platform stability and the effects of that stability on weapons mounts are particularly pertinent.

might be a case for the AK, as it can somewhat help to simular the main gun, but the YJ83 missiles are completely out of place. unless they are planning to fit ICBMs on the ‘full sized’ versons, there is little useful data they can get from such weapons trials.

I would really disagree with that though!. 100 FAC’s in line abreast with a safe amount of sea room (presumably you want these things blatting along at 30knots) is a formation over 3km long!. I dont think many opponents will give your flotilla commanders enough time to assemble that kind of formation really because it certainly wont be difficult to miss and wont be accomplished quickly!

well, i said it before in another post, but when i was talking about the 100 FAC example, i wasnt thinking of having them all in one massive ball charging at the enemy. but rather in serveral smaller groups of no more then a dozen each coming at different directions.

this will of course be difficult to co-ordinate, but by no mean impossible.

Believe me there is no way a 10knt sub heading south is going to get an intercept in on a 30knt carrier group going east-west. Like I said SSK’s dont do much chasing!.

well no offence, but i really dont have much taste for such blankest statements (mainly because i get an erge to take it as a challenge and end up spending way too much time trying to disprove it 😛 ).

but anyhow (loosing willpower to restrain), as i said, its not about chasing after a target, but rather trying to guess where he is about to go, and heading for that spot. have a good number of boats and there is everychance one or more will get lucky. and as i said before, this is only a sideline issue, so please, dont temp me further with it. 😮 😉

The Culinary Institute must be itching to return the favour and “debrief” a
“missing” J-10 in langley, virginia 😉

same goes the tech inside the SD-10 … a vital secret that the Culinary instt would love to know and feel for the future 😉

we all know the Culinary instt has pretty much run of the place now in
a certain place. squeals of anguish in the media about the “loss of
sovereignty” reinforce that image.

and what does that have to do with anything? :rolleyes:

The driving force? The thought that after the fall of USSR, US had to take the task of being the police of the world. The little glitch in their thought was of course that the rest of the world really wasn’t waiting for a policeman…

er…not quite. thats the neo-conservitive idea of what the new world order should be. however, even by their own admitions, the US has not persude that course of action, and they argue that that was the reason why the world is such a mess at the moment. :rolleyes:

while that sounds alot like flag waving to try and get the US to be even MORE assertive in world affairs, there are still grains of truth in such statements.

the US has not taken up the role of world policemen, and never really wanted the responsibility (never mind the massive bill) associated with such an undertaking until 9/11 (not even bush had such grand ideas for the world to start off with, he was more interested in fishing :rolleyes: ).

the evidence is all around. pre-bush II, the US only had major military operations in the gulf and in kosovo. in the former’s case, the US was acting under an UN mandate in responce to saddam’s aggression against a western ally, which the US could not have planned for. in the latter’s case, the US only got involved after years of media reporting had galvanised public opinion to the point that not acting would have been more politically damaging then acting. had kosovo been geographically located elsewhere, the US would most likely not have bothered, as was in the case of congo. dont exactly fit the profile of a trigger happy neo-con iching to try out his new toys.

also, the areas where the US spent its military budget is another clear indications of its motivation. NMD, carriers, F22s, F35s, seawolves…not the first choice for humanitairan intervention wouldnt u agree?

and what would be the point that? the USSR tried to compansate for its lack of high-tech with superior numbers, china cant afford to do that. (well it can, but then it’ll just wear itself out like the soviets did).

no, what i meant was that in order to maximise their potential (against something like a carrier battlegroup), its best to use them as i described. against lesser oppents, less support is needed.

Well a lesser opponent is hardly likely to try forcing an entry into Chinese waters to within the deployment range of these vessels is it!?. A lesser opponents fleet that would be equally as vulnerable to PLANAF air launched weapons it should be mentioned!. 🙂

some dont have a choice in the matter. many SE asian nations have territorial disputes with china in the south china sea. this has been a traditional worry for china as its hard to get decent aircover for PLAN taskforces in that area, even today with things like MK2s and tankers.

while the south china sea seems a long way from the PLAN naval bases on the mainland, the size of FACs means that they can be easily stationed near or on some of the larger islands (with minimal additional infrastructure needed). that was the ‘lesser’ oppent i had in mind.

even hear, the FACs wont be expect to hold off a determined assault, but merely to act as a deterance, as well as patrol against pirates and illegal fishing etc. far more cost effective and safer then to send out destroyers or frigets.

also, one of the very reasons that these vessles are important to the PLAN is exactly because of the PLAN’s lack of comprehensive ASW capacity! subs might find these things, but it will be hard for the subs to effectively deal with them given that the sub’s torpedos are designed to sink lumbering (in comparison to FACs) heavy warships.

The answer to a submarine threat is ASW!. Its not spending money on assets that are too light to target with a HWT!. What is the point of the massive expenditure China has made on AAW destroyers, Moskit-armed Sovremenny’s and all the other major surface units if they have to sit in port, awaiting air/cruise strikes, in the face of a submarine threat?!

and the PLAN is trying its utmost to fill in that gaping hole. although there is no solid evidence in one way or the other, i feel that it is technical bottlenecks that are current restraining the PLAN’s efforts in that feild and not financial. as such, it could take quite some time before a suitbale ASW suit can be perfected to be fitted onto new PLAN ‘heavys’ to filling address the issue.

however, in the meantime, threats still exist, and these FACs can act as a stop gap should something happen before the PLAN proper is fully ready to take on a strong oppent.

as for the AAW 170s and sovs, well everyone has to start somewhere, and i feel its far better to stretch out purchases over a long time, building what u can based on what level of tech u have and gradually building up to a fully spectrum force. as opposed to waiting until u have mastered all the tech needed and then suddenly laying down a hundred or so hulls at the same time.

also, not everyone has state-of-the-art subs yet, and the 052Cs and sovs will be very important against an oppenent with only a strong air and surface force.

no, firstly, i never said they can only be useful if off-board targeting info is given. they can attack using target info from their own radars, but they will need to get in closer.

Like Roel said the radar horizon from a mast-top radar on one of these FACs is limited. Optimistically I’d estimate a horizon range i.e first detect, against a 70ft masthead target, of no more than 20nm. Some use embarking a 100nm ranged missile is if you have to close to damn-near guns range to employ it!. Offboard targetting is the only way this ship works!

well, it has the ability to sink a heavy warship even if it has to close to 20nm, still works. and remeber heavy warships arent the only targets in the sea, so for some heavy targets, 20nm is more then enough.

secondly, its not a ‘this or that’ choice between one or the other, but rather both. one backs up the other just in case, cos overkill is always better then no kill.

Standard defence/offence team split covers this. Your suggesting a coordinated layered air-surface attack, well the defence plan is equally layered air and surface. Its not news. If there is an action that brings a huge commitment of PLAAF/PLANAF air assets plus hundred-plus PLAN surface and subsurface combattants then the attacking force is half the USN plus friends!. Just like the individually tasked command ships we discussed earlier USN doctrine calls for seperate E-2’s to be lofted to control offensive and defensive air and surface engagements.

well, i was thinking more in terms of one carrier battle group or a surface task force with shore based fighter support, as there is no way the PLAN and PLAAF can take on half the USN never mind friends.

another important elemint of the attack plan is suprise (hence the emphysis on stealth FACs), so the enemy isnt given the chance to concentrate his forces and position them as he would like. depending on how well the PLA plan and co-ordinate the attack, it might be possible to focus the bulk of the attacking force on a small number of warships on picket duty, and so overload them with the conbined air and sea attacks. this would open up a hole in the enemy fleet defence for a short period, in which follow on assets (most likely air) can move in and strike at the heart of the enemy fleet, be it the carrier, flagship, supply ships/tankers or troop ships.

if long range target info can be provided by something like the JH7, then chances are the enemy will know that he is being lit up and will send fighters off to try and shoot down the fighter. this means that the CAP will be carrying AAMs, so it will be harder for the fighters to attack these FACs with only guns. but even if the CAP also carry AShMs, the missiles will take up valuable pylons (and reduce manoverability if they encounter the figters first) which will reduce their efficiency against the fighter support of the attacking strikers.

Your assuming a very small opposing force here Wolf. Remember that the USN had no less than six carriers in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf for Desert Storm!. Opposing China in her backyard would require at least equal commitment!. Even with todays, leaner, USN carrier fleet your looking at four carriers and, more importantly, sixteen squadrons of tactical combat aircraft in theatre!. Seeings as the missile craft have no significant air defence capability an F-model ‘Navy’ Maverick would be sufficient to engage them. The Hornets could standoff 10nm and flip AGM-65s at these missile craft all day without chllenge!. Question is how many AGM-65F’s can a Hornet carry? Using an arbitrary 4 missiles per aircraft that means just two of those 16 squadrons are lofting 96 Mavericks!. Further using an equally arbitrary 50% hit rate thats 48 dead missile boats off one strike – theoretically – and, what, 8 or 9 ready squadrons for fleet air-defence at any one time!

well, first off, u are assuming that the USN is going to know months in advance of the conflict and have a steady build up of forces. that just doesnt fit the operational realities in any probably conflict scenario involving the PLAN and USN!

first off, the only possible situation where the USN would get anywhere near that level of advance warning is if taiwan told the US that it was about to declear independence and start a war, and ask the US to send in thousands of its boys and girls and come fight and die over the matter.

problem being, the USA wont go along with that ‘nice’ little plan some might have. its interests are best served by maintaining the status quo, and not have a full blown war with china. (cos if war with china was in the US’ best interests, the US would have attack by now seeing how china is strengthing with each passing day). this means that if taiwan told, the US would come down hard on it and force it not to declear independence.

the most (and only remotely) likey scenarios are a suprise chinese attack or a suprise taiwan declearation of independence. neither will give the USN any time to reposition anywhere near the level of forces needed before the PLA takes taiwan (estimates range between a matter of days to a few weeks max).

given the timescale, the USN would likely get 2 carriers and support ships at most in threater in time to help. the plan of the PLA is to present an ability to fight and defeat those two battle groups, and so force them to wait for reinforcements to come in before engaging. however, by the time the USN has gathered enough forces to be able to have a good chance of victory, the war would be over and there will no longer be a reason for them to fight.

the entire chinese battleplan is focused mainly on two things should war break out in the straits. the first is how to take taiwan in the least possible time and with the least number of casaulties (on both sides); and how to prevent US intervention, and failing that, how to defeat it.

as such, it would be pointless to try and address how the PLAN is going to fight half the USN, as 1) that is never likely to happen; 2) if such an event did occur, the USN would so easily domonate the PLA that there is little point in discussion; and 3) if faced with such a situation, the chinese will not be relying on the PLA but rather other means to try and get its way.

well thats a comparative thing, stealth has definately been incorporated into the design, there is no denying that. how good the stealth is is another matter, and i belive it is pre-mature to speculate on that given the little info we have ATM.

If the conclusion WanShan came to, that I concur with, that this vessel is just a demonstrator its irrelevent anyway as the final vessel could easily be more or less stealthy than what we see on our screens here. Using this vessel as our yardstick though (as its the only one we have) we can see enough for some preliminary impressions of its likely RCS characteristics. Those impressions lead me to the belief that this vessel is less stealthy than the mentioned Scandinavian designs.

i dont think it is just a demonstrator, there are too many operational additions. (the AK, the C803 etc). we certainly dont see any of that on the sea shadow, and the presence of such additions would screw up any test info to the extent that u wont get any useful data to apply to the design of bigger ships.

the only thing for sure is that stealth is a major influence in its design, however i seriously doubt it was the only consideration, as i feel other factors such as cost and ease of mass production would have also been major factors.

i never said the FACs wont be totally immune from AShMs, just that current AShMs will not be as effective against them as larger warships.

Thats fair but, like I said, there are many ways to attack a craft who’s air defence envelope only extends 2000yds or so!

well, if used properly, an oppent wont get a chance to employ any other means. 😉

as for missile evasion. well, off the top of my head, there are two ways they can go about this.

The first solution you propose needs a lot of sea room, which you may not have, and relies on luck that a missile decoyed once by chff may not simply re-lock on a second vessel. Happened with Atlantic Conveyor in the Falklands. The second trusts that a 300ton missile boat charging along at full speed will be a steady enough gun platform to engage the inbound missiles reliably. Either way its an imprecise equation and is the reason why I used that arbitrary 50% hit rate earlier!

well, i was thinking of having the FACs form a line perpendicular to the incoming missile, maybe i should have meantioned that eariler, no relock issues there.

fair point on the hard kill probabilities there. thats why i presented two solutions. the first focusing on softkill and the second focusing on hardkill. a commander can choose between the two based on his assessment of things like his countermeasure capacity and available room etc.

when did i say the kilo will be coming in the same direction as the FACs?

Remember that SSK’s dont chase anything!. That rules out an approach from astern or on either beam as they would not be able to get the intercept position. The only workable attack option for the Kilo is in front of the attacking force. Where are the dozens of missile craft coming in from? You try and marshall a flotilla of missile craft on oblique angles to the opposing fleet course track under E-2 surveillance and your asking for your boats to be sunk long before they’ve formed up for their mad charge!. Naval version of Lee Mallory’s ‘big wing’ that one!.

well, i dont see much problem for the kilo to move in from either beam, u can try and predict the oppenent’s course and plot one that brings u into his path. if u factor in things like course changes, well that will also affect an SSk’s ability to close from dead ahead. the key is to put out a couple of SSKs in a pattern and hopefully one will get a chance to close.

obviously there is a sizeable elemint of chance involved, thats why i didnt put that a big emphysis on the kilo and meantioned it almost as an after throught. kilos will be sent out, it will be up to lady luck to decide if they get a chance to have a go.