I think the Taiwan scenario reasoning is deeply flawed I’m afraid. The Chinese are not going to be suprised at standoff weapons knocking out phone exchanges if the Americans are attacking. They themselves, surely, have targetting lists that incorporate similar facilities in Taiwan – it makes little military sense to allow your opposition such communications channels.

So red lines on hospitals, schools, civil defence installations etc certainly. Telephone exchanges and civillian broadcast centres no chance.

There has never been ‘allowing’ anything when it comes to war. The only limiting factors are treaties and the fear of reprisals. ‘Civilised’ waring states drew up rules of war because they know that if they start targeting enemy hospitals, for example, then the enemy is going to start targeting your hospitals, with the end rules being a great deal more suffering and little if not military gains.

It is up to China to decide what is acceptable to them, and if they view attacking civilian telecomms as a red line, then the Americans can cross it at their own peril. Just don’t be suprised if US civilian sats start getting shot out of the sky. If the US choose to respond by taking out China’s space centres, then that is America’s progrative, just as it is China’s to respond to that and so on.

You may not like where the line in the sand is drawn, but if you choose to cross it, then you must face up to the consequences.

The Vietnam thing does make a bit more sense though. I, with my western bias, naturally equated mobility with surviveability. Perhaps it is more for point of presence than surviveability. Lots of China and limited numbers of fixed militery installations with the kind of technology and trained staff to undertake the C3 mission. Here you have a ready ‘plug-in’ C3I node that can be airlifted to theatre, self-deploy wherever there is road infrastructure, link into the local PSTN/GSM network and be online providing capability relatively swiftly.

I think that makes a lot of sense. China is a vast country, and it is simply unrealistic for China to build up nation-wide C3I networks in the near future, so such systems could act like a cheap stop-gap. This means that effective, modern C3I can be deployed to pretty much anywhere in the country at very short notice to quickly respond to emergencies.

We had a look at attacking the Argentine mainland, just as they had a look at attacking Gibraltar, we decided that the results for the huge effort that would have to be expended weren’t worth it. The decision was military and not political.

Was the RAF too busy to lend the RN a hand? IIRC, the V-bomber fleet were ready and able to make bombing runs, but it was flet that to attack the Argentine mainland would widen the conflict to an undesireable level.

Appreciated YF, but, again the ‘battlefield local network’ at tactical SSM ranges is going to be radio based and subject to degradation either electronic or explosive in nature. Any combat situation liable to see the use of such a C3I node on Chinese soil would, naturally, involve an aggressor who is advanced enough and smart enough to obliterate fixed C2 nodes, such as regional PSTN exchanges, as a significant concern.

I’m, genuinely, curious as to what scenario’s you think would allow for that aspect of China’s civillian infrastructure to remain intact whilst an attack was in progress?.

There is a school of thought in China that it might be possible to establish unwritten ‘red lines’ in the event China and the US comes to blows over Taiwan, whereby both sides mutually agree to the level the conflict would be fought on so as to avoid escalation that might eventually lead to total loss of control on both sides, which may then only end in nuclear war. And that is something no-one sane would want to see.

Thus, it may be argued that one such red line would be the attack of Chinese civilian infrastructure. The Chinese can make it pretty clear to the US that for America to attack Chinese civilian infrastructure would be a step too far, and would demand retribution, such as PLA attacks (overt or otherwise) against American civilian targets and/or US forces based in area such as Korea, Japan, central Asia and the Middle East etc that are within easy striking range, if we are talking further into the future, then attacks by PLAN SSGNs against CONUS targets might also be an option.

That is not that unprecidented, because if you think back to the Falklands, the RAF was not allowed to attack Argintine bases on the Argentina mainland even though they were used for attacks against British forces as that was considered to be an act that is far too likely to escalate the conflict to a higher level, which was something no-one wanted to see.

That so-called analysis has so many holes, baseless assumptions and logical falacies I’m amazed anyone would take it seriously for a second.

– What is the basis for assuming ‘lower Chinese production quality’ for ballistic missiles compared to India?

– What is the basis for using 0.85 successful launch and flight other then it being slightly higher then the 0.8 used in the Indian study?

– So what if Taiwan has 12 airports? Are all fighters distributed equally between all those airports? Of course not. Thus the main fighter bases will get the main focus of attention, and other back up strips and civilian airports can be taken out by cruise missiles and/or fighters in the second wave.

– A 4-6 hour repair time might sound impressive to those who have no idea what they are talking about, but the ROCAF would be hard pressed to keep the PLAAF at bay for long at full strength. How long will they last and what kind of kill-loss ratio can they expect fighting with only 50, 40, 30% of their numbers? In 4-6 hours, the air war could easily be over and those runways and planes trapped on the ground would be ready to be used just in time for the next wave of bombs and missiles to fall on them.

– The blind obsession with CEP pays absolutely no heed to how the employment of submunitions would effect the outcome, other then some superfical lip service that did not affect the results except when twisted to try and make it more favourable for the ROC.

– The equations are stupidly simplistic and the author completely fails to realise that the real meat of the analysis he based his work on depended entirely on having accurate and realiable figures for all the P values that can only be obtained with first hand operational evaluation and testing. The equations upon which he based his entire case is just basically stating the obvious! To treat them like some gem of true knowledge speaks volumes about the total lack of basic analytical skill of the author and gives a good indication of his level of intellegence.

The author had no realiable p values whatsoever and all he did was copy and paste the figures for the Indian missiles (which in itself my be inaccurate) and applied it to the Chinese case. Well the Chinese are using different missiles, and considering the longer length of time China has been designing and making ballisitic missiles as well as the complexity and capability of Chinese missiles compared to Indian ones, it can be safely stated that the figures from the Indian missile would be inferior compared to Chinese missiles.

I can go on if I could be asked. But its quite clear that that the author of that blog had an axe to grind and went about it in a very clumsy and inaccurate manner. His entire methodology is wrong, he ommitted factors from the analysis that are likely to yield unfavourable outcomes, and he made some extremely questionable and unsustaintial assumptions to to produce the result he wanted and that renders every conclusion he comes up with null and void.

Its the kind of dime a dozen internet garbage that will only be a waste of time to read. I wish I hadn’t, but since I already did, I might as well try and save others from making the same mistake.

First off, if you want NATO to stop launching simulated attacks on the Russian bombers, then perhaps the Russian bombers would be so kind as to stop launching simulated cruise missile attacks against North America. They aren’t sightseeing. This is what they are training for. Complaining that the NATO air forces conduct their own reciprocal training to intercept and destroy said nuclear distributors is ludicrous.

Well, first off, I never said anothing about NATO not having a right to intercept the Russians, so I’m not sure where that impression came from.

Secondly, pointing their cannons at the NATO fighters would be perfectly justified, provided they do not fire. But then be aware that NATO pilots will likely obtain a radar lock on the BEAR to ensure that retaliatory fire is assured. Somebody actually goes and points a gun at me, that’s what I’d do, point one right back.

My point was that if NATO pilots were practicing mock attack runs on the Russians, which could very well include radar lock and simulated missile launch, straifing runs etc, then that is already the equivilant of ‘pointing a gun’, and the natural response, as you so effectively demonstrated, would be for the Russians to point their own guns right back.

However, that would entail an escalation of tension that I do not beleive is in anyone’s interests. After all, a loss of trust is one of the unavoidable consequences of pointing guns at each other, and from that point on, it might not take much to turn ‘pointing guns’ into ‘firing guns’.

In reality this should be treated as two separate events. MPA and ISR aircraft and the like are one thing and should be afforded a certain degree of civility and good airmanship. Nuclear strike aircraft training for the decimation of an entire nation are another thing entirely. In that case, I’m all for mock attack runs and the like.

I actually agree with you that MPA/ISR and bombers are different and should be treated differently from bombers, but from my point of view, the treatment should be the reverse as what you suggested.

What is the likelihood of all out nuclear war in this day and age? And in the event of such a war, bombers are not going to make much of a difference to be honest. On the other hand, conventional war is far more likely, and the info and training those MPA and ISR planes are collection could easily lead directly or indirectly to the deaths of thousands and could influence the outcome of an entire war.

Hell, even MPA planes and ISR planes should not be classed together since MPA planes are specifically designed to kill subs and having them hounding subs is little different to subs hounding carriers. They both represent a clear and immediate threat to their targets and can deal a devastaing blow to their target at a moments notice. In such cases, I see nothing wrong with figthers from the other side pointing a gun right back at the MPA.

Intellegence planes can snoop up highly sensitive electronic data that can make some weapons all but useless and cost lives if there is a shooting war.

So in balance, while nuclear war carries a much greater cost, the likelihood of it happening are remote in the extreme, and the role bombers can play in such a war is so small that the overal effect has little more then political value.

Otoh, MPA planes tracking subs and ISR collecting military intellegence represent a far more clear and present danger to the militaries these planes are targeting, and it is my belief that the response to these planes should be propotional to the credible threat level they represent instead of a purely arbitray classification which conveniently places the types of aircraft western powers tend to send to the boarders of others as those that should be treated with “civility and good airmanship” while those that are likely to be sent to western boarders are fair game to be intimidated and harrassed at the leisure of the fighter pilots sent up to intercept them.

1. I fail to see how a radar lock equates to “conduct various maneuvers around them and violate flight safety rules in every way” particularly as Russia does the same damn thing.

I was refering to the ‘attack’ part of the alligation.

2. Are you also one of those that think the Bear is a single-seat aircraft?

No, but you seem to be one of those people who think bombers have perfect 360 views; that their crews have nothing better to do then press their faces to the windows to look out of pesky NATO fighters; and that NATO fighter pilots are not trained to know the blind spots on enemy bombers and instead fly from an angle that would make it very likely that the ‘target’ would see them coming in when practicing an attack run.

If NATO fighter pilots were really practicing attack runs on the Russians, then it would not be beyond possibility that they would do ‘slash and dash’ runs on the Bears. And if they are doing the attacks right, they would be coming in from a blind spot of the bomber and would pass the bomber very quickly. The distance the fighter passes the bomber can wary, but I would not expect them to be too large, and if the distance is too small, that can be dangerous and would not give the Russians much of a chance to get damning evidence. Something I would expect from media savy western militaries.

The issue is China never has been allowed to take part in Sukhoi`s market

Since when did anyone need Russia’s permission to be ‘allowed’ to operating in the international market? :rolleyes:

when Peru bought the MiG-29s Russia did not want to service the peruvian MiG-29s becasue these were not sold by Russia.

And this is relevent because?

If China services the Malaysian Flankers, it is already competing with Sukhoi for the same market that is Sukhoi`s natural turf.
China should not try to engage the Russian markets when the Su-27 is basicly a Russia product and the Chinese are trying to take over the customer and profit that is reserved only to Russia.

What kind of messed up reasoning is that? You compete on the international market on merit not some baseless impression of entitlement. Russia has no ‘reserved’ market other then maybe within Russia itself. Everyone else is free to choose to buy from whoever they want.

If China works along with Russia under a mutually accepted agreement that is not bad, but if China does it just to test the Russian willingness to take action it is just a sign of direct political confrontation.

If China was thinking of selling fresh built Flankers, then fair enough. But Russia has no basis wahtsoever to think it has a monopoly on the supply of parts, services or even upgrades to Flanker operators. Their customers can choose to hire whoever they want to do whatever they want to their Flankers and the only issue would be possibly voiding the servicing warranty with Russia. And anyone can sell whatever parts and services as they want. If someone takes offence at that, then he is stupid and need to learn what a market is.

thats what you wrote. Based on [b]Service[b] provide Malaysia is going to chose [b]Chinese[b] Plane.

Not only is that a total misquote of what I said, it also has absolutely nothing to do with China supplying parts for Malaysia’s Flankers.

it is like saying that malaysia willl chose LCA based on service provide by IAF.

Only to someone who can’t read. :rolleyes:

I said good service provided will be “a factor that will be counted as a positive for choosing Chinese planes next time”.

A factor, not the entire criteria. Please learn to read.

Evalaution of fighter jet is very indepth, long and detailed process before anything is signed up. Every airforce come to different conclusion. It take typically 3 to 5 years in most export cases unless ur chosing F-7.

How does that make it that the PLAAF have been operating flankers for 20 years? Yet more totally irrelevent and pointless spam thrown out as digital chaff to try and distort the fact that you can’t count. :rolleyes: