Anyone who re-reads the first page will see it’s mostly about how “removing the divider would be a warning to PLA”, “road not designed with fighter landing in mind”, “not enough space”, or how “ground targets are easy to find”. The logistics were barely mentioned, and no in-depth logistics discussion whatsoever.

What utter BS. :rolleyes:

I pointed out that Taiwan’s roads were not designed to act a reserve airstrips in my very first post, and expanded on that to explain why (lack of fuel nodes and side roads for planes to disperse to etc) in my second.

There was little ‘in-depth’ analysis because this is a discussion forum and we are not making frigging acidemic papers to be published in journals. I gave a brief summery of the main points and hoped people would have the sense to work out the implications themselves without having to be spoonfed every last minute detail.

Most people seem to be smart enough to join the dots themselves, but it appears I was overly optimist about the mental abilities of some on this board. 🙁

For dispersion – if basic reading of map was not even done, the entire paragraph is junk. If the limitation were understood, then it would be clear why it becomes an advantage in dispersion.

More BS, trying to tire the argument down in pointless details so as to avoid the actual points. A cheap trick that is getting distinctly quant.

Unfortunately, the final conclusion is that no real “details” about the exercise were examined in this thread – only subjective opinions with no basis in reality or even basic facts.

Yet more diversionary BS. This thread was never about the frigging excerises as a whole, but about using highways as emergency fighter runways and its viability. If you can’t even figure out that simple fact, then I see I have been wasting my time with a moron.

And once again you are completely avoiding expanding on your bland and generalistic summery and is providing absolutely zero evidence or logical argument to back up your claims. Its pretty obvious that you don’t have a clue and is only continuing this discussion out of sheer pigheadedness and I have more important things to do with my time then trying to teach sense to a stubburn fool. So unless your posts show a marked improvement, I will not bother wasting any more time on replying to you.

” the level of molbilisation before the opening of hostilities does not need to be much” means there must be mobilization. No more needs to be said.

I have seen toddles twist words with more grace and skill. :rolleyes:

You forget what all this talk about moblisation was about? It was about whether there is a good chance of anyone getting wind of a possible invasion by the level of mobilization of the PLA. The whole point of the PLA training for rapid responce is not because China is facing some threat that may attack at an moment without warning, but rather to have units that can be ready to move into battle at a moment’s notice, and these units probably have enough manpower and firepower to win the ground war by themselves with air support. Even if they do not, there will be plenty of time to call up other units as the air war is progressing and SF operations being conducted.

Much of the PLA’s doctrine and history is also public information, people are freely to make any different interpretations they want. All I can emphasize is that western doctrine cannot and should not be applied directly to PLA’s doctrine.

And no one has applied western doctine and tactics directly to the PLA. All this talk of ‘history and tradition’ is fair enough, but it would be stupid to think that the PLA is trapped by history and tradition and is unable to adapt and evolve. There are plenty of literature and physical evidence of the PLA undertaking a major cultural change to embrace the new concepts of modern warfare, in fact, it would not be going too far to say that the PLAAF is using the USAF as a rough model on which to build itself.

Air power is a tool – an useful tool, but only a tool nevertheless. Applying the western framework of “Sending the bullet (Air Power) or sending the man” will serve no purpose in understanding PLA doctrine.

Again, only seeing what you want. :rolleyes:

No one has ever tried to apply western tactics and doctring directly to the PLA, in fact, I have stated a few of the major differences between the two since the start. Yes, air power is a tool, a critical tool to modern warfare, but what you are suggesting is that the PLA purposefully not use that tool dispite all its efforts to build it in the prosecution of a war. Thats plainly obserd.

Besides, using air superiority to support ground operations is hardly a purely ‘western’ approach to war. Every side on every major war has done it. The Russians have developed an extensive PGM inventory and potent strike capacity just like everyone else. Precision air strikes and intergrated joint forces ops is the domiant and only model for the modern army. Everyone will try to build their forces around that model because it is the best anyone has, and it will remain the model for warfighting until something better comes along. The PLA has to change with the times just like everyone else.

In spite of all the accusation of how I am only talking about what I want PLA to do, other people can decide who is doing the mirror-imaging here. And ditto on the “softening up first” vs. “no mobilization until softening up first”.

Thats just plain BS. You cannot find any physical evidence to support your claims, and the logic for doing things your way are simply unexistant.

Its plainly obvious that the PLA plans to use its new found air power as much as it can, the joint ops excerises, insisting on having multi-role fighters instead of pure air superiority types, the huge spending on PGMs etc all points to the PLAAF planning on usings air superiority to conduct precision bombing. It makes perfect sense to use your hard won air superiority to support the ground troops and help win the war instead of merely relegating yourself to an air denal role to stop the other side applying its air power. Everything the PLAAF has been working towards clearly goes way beyound the latter and is in fact building a force for the former.

I’m not the one who dismisses artillery with a sarcastic comment like “As for artillery, please”. What goes around comes around.

Artillery is useless in the opening stages of a war between the straits because they do not have the range to hit anything on Taiwan. How frigging hard is that to understand? :rolleyes:

Saying ground targets are easy to track for PLAAF’s new JSTAR-like aircrafts is about the same as saying it’s superior to JSTAR. Not all three AEW project are JSTAR-like, so there is no purpose in citing all new programs.

Twisting words again, why am I not suprised? :rolleyes:

No one said ‘ground targets’ would be easy to track, in fact I specifically stated that the PLA will not be able to track all ground targets. However, the size of a convoy for all the support personal and equipment needed to maintain fighters in the field will be easy to find and track because of its size. Also, I have never said the PLA will be relying soling on air assets to locate and track high value units in war time. The PLA has a modest and growing sat fleet pretty much dedicated to Taiwan, as well as human intell on the ground and SF units would also become an option in times of war.

As for military planning, stop shifting the focus. The whole thing is about you suggesting that PLA doesn’t need to prepare enough missiles but rather could rely solely on tactical deception, and then imply that military planning or adequate preparation is not that useful since all plans change during wartime.

Thats just plain BS and a figment of your imagination. :rolleyes:

The PLA SRBMs are on mobile launchers and can fire at very short notice. Similar for cruise missiles and figthers. There is no issue about not being able to ready enough missiles. And you are twisting the advantages the PLA would enjoy from tactical deception to a need for it, the PLA does not need to achieve total suprise to win.

As for military planning, well that was in response to your suggested scenario where the ROC gets wind of an attack and scrambles everything to meet it. In such a case, the PLA commander could use a bit of flexibility and switch to plan B, which could be to wait a few hours until the figthers start running out of fuel, or just to only shoot the missiles and take out the air bases, maybe also to take out the reserve runways or to just wait to see which roads the planes are landing on and then hit them while they are still on the ground.

Ditto on the low level attacks and air defense, not worth repeating. Same with the previously mentioned two other issues.

Not worth meantioning or merely indefensible even for someone as biased as you? :rolleyes:

what a joke !:rolleyes: you’re comparing the Afghan air force to the PLAAF that the IAF has to defend against ?? the PAF’s job is to protect Pakistan from the IAF. the IAF’s job is to protect India from both Pakistan and China. thats a larger “mandate” for you..:rolleyes:

The PLAAF has only obsolete types stantioned to the west, and they are there purely for defence and have effectively no offensive capabilities. Thus the talk of the IAF needing to divide its resources to ‘protect India from the PLAAF’ is hardly accurate. The PLAAF has almost all of its newest and best units deployed in the east facing Taiwan and Japan/SK, just as India has the lion share of its resources directed against Pakistan. Buts thats all beside the point.

“Softening” the ground force by bombardment before invasion starts is a Desert Storm style doctrine. Unlike the Kuwait scenario in which no nations would directly aid Iraq militarily, PLA still has to worry about USN/USAF intervention. There is no indication in PLA’s doctrine that shows PLA intends to drag it out. One of the emphasized main principles in PLA is “seizing the initiative early”. Many Chinese analysts have talked about the importance of quick and decisive battle in the high pace local war under high tech conditions, and said that PLA cannot afford to sit and wait for the enemy to complete assembling forces. While no one said that PLA must launch attacks before any suppression, it is a very serious mistake to think that PLA will follow Desert Storm or Allied Force type of operations.

Don’t be ridiculous! ‘Softening up’ and heavily fortified position (or even just an enemy) you wish to assault has been part of standard military doctorine since there have been any sort of ranged weapon, starting with arrows and javelins, hell stones cavemen might have thrown at each other would probably count if there was evidence that they did fight like that! Its purely astonishing that anyone would be so ignarent as to attribute that as so modern a concept. :rolleyes:

As for the PLA’s need for a speedy resolution to any conflict. Well firstly, there is the need for speed and just plain stupid, what you are suggesting is not the former. :rolleyes:

Also, anyone who has paid even the most cursory attention to PLA development over the past decade or more will see that they are pursueing a modernisation strategy that is far more dynamic and sophisticated then to merely plan to send human waves in ships against a meatgrinder without at least trying to soften it up as much as possible beforehand. And only those who are incredible minopic or ignarent would harbour such clearly riduculous views about how the PLA wuld fight more for the benefit of their own delusions that any attempt at logical reasoning and analysis.

The PLA’s primary battleplan with Taiwan is not to take the island in the quickest possible time irrespective of all other concerns, or else we would see a far greater emphysis put on things such as amphibious assault ships, hovercraft and landing craft etc. Whereas in reality, the PLA in general and PLAN in particular has been investing the bulk of its time and resources in building up powerful air, sub and surface forces with carrier killing in mind. The PLA high command has rightly seen that the key to a successful Taiwan campaign is nullifying US intervention. The goal is first and foremost to raise the expected cost of intervention in a Taiwan war to a level no US admisinstration or public would be willing to accept. That is the PLA’s ideal scenario in terms of a war with Taiwan, in that the US would lamely protest and maybe try and send arms and supplies to Taiwan without getting into the fight directly (the Taiwan Relations Act is ambiguous and can be interpreted either way just to allow the US such flexibility in ensuring it will never be forced to fight and can always choose not to get directly involved).

Failing that, the goal is to raise PLA capacity so much that the US will need to bring a significant proportion of its global forces to have any decent chance of winning without taking unacceptbaly high losses. That takes time, and it is hoped that the US would stay its hand until it has built up sufficient forces in the region to risk direct involvement. The real military muscle the PLA has built up over the decades means that if the US is stupid and engages in open hostilities without sufficient forces in place, then the PLA would have a very high probability of dealing a major blow to those US forces, that may end US involvement then and there or at least cause them to be far more cautious in its planning and deployment.

Its a two-fold strategy (which is a simplification, but we need not get to obsorbed in detail) of the might of the navy and air force forcing the US to take its time to gather its forces before becoming overty involved. That will buy the air force the time it needs to bomb Taiwan’s defences and defenders to dust before the PLA, paras and marines move in to take the island on the ground. They will not ‘soften’ up ground targets to the obsessive degree the US would, nor is there any doubt about whether the ground forces would need to go in, but they will most certainly use their newly developed precision strike, anti-radition and fighter capacity to try and dismantle Taiwan’s air defences and then progress to intensive bombing for as long as they think they can reasonably get away with (most certainly days, probably between one or two weeks if not more) before launching the invasion itself. Although special forces might start infiltrating from day 1.

Anyone with any knowledge of the difference in ground forces between the two would know that the odds are overwhelmingly on the side of the PLA once a beach-head has been established. As soon as PLA ground forces get on the island and secure a foothold, the war is as good as over. The PLA have the quailitative and quantitative advanatge in men and machines of pretty much every possible field, and would steamrole the ROC ground forces so fast it would make Iraqi Freedom look quant, with or without air support.

Furthermore, it is absurd to think that there won’t be any movements (logistics or forces) before a major invasion. These say plenty about who shows “lack of understanding” on PLA or military in general.

Only to those with only the most shallow understanding of PLA, or any military tactics and strategy would think in such an inflexible manner.

The new Beidou system with full capability is not in service. Even the earliest estimate only said it might be deployed next year.

Tell that to those already using it. They are launching a civilian service next year, but with four sats in oribt, they already have a functioning local sat nav network which is all they need in terms of war in the straits.

Not to mention PLA’s PGM inventory quantity is unknown.

But is infinately superior to the none existent stocks of such weapons the USAF had in 91. Again trying to blur the issue by unnecessarily including other things.

When JH-7, J-10, SD-10 and other PLA weapons appeared in the public, they are all very mature in development (if not finished) – but were only in initial stage of production and employment. If history is any indication, PLAAF’s new PGM is probably not in mass deployment.

Well it might do you to take another look back at history then. Neither the JH7 nor the J10 had been officially unvailed before being in at least regimental deployment, nor has any other PLA domestic weapons project. The only exceptions are in the case of export specific systems, or non-frontline weapons/support equipment like the SD10 and FC1 and trainers etc. Besides, GPS guided munitions are hardly complex if one has already mastered other forms of PGM design and production, and with China’s experience and infrasture already in place that is mass producing GPS related products for the international commerical markets, it will hardly take a leap for the PLA to start mass producing GPS guilded bombs and/or GPS guidence conversion kits for existing bombs.

As for PLAAF’s level, it doesn’t take U.S. intelligence community to see that testing of Early Warning aircrafts, C4ISR modernization, and pilot trainings take many years. Everyone knows that acquiring the hardware is only the first step. Development of logistics, doctrine, and trainings does not appear overnight.

Except we have no idea when the PLA first started testing them. All we have are leaked pictures that might be years out of date, and its not like US intellgence itself has never been spectacularly wrong in its estimation of PLA capacity over the years, thus it seems a little audacious to say the least for some ameture to claim to be able to read the PLA so easily and clearly.

“J-STAR equivalent in large scale operation deployment” means exactly that, having experimental aircrafts in initial deployment testing in small number is not the same.

And what is defined as ‘large scale deployment’ then? 2 planes? 3 planes? 5 planes? Who is to say how many is needed in conjucture with all the other intel and monitoring assets the PLA already have in place to get a very clear picture of the battlespace? How many such ‘experimental’ panes does the PLA have? 2? 3? 5? You are making judgements based on out of date and inaccurate information and also blindly forcing the US model on China when the realities on the ground means the PLA is operating with different strengths and weaknesses.

U.S. has decades of experiences and testing on airborne surveillance technology, it is unlikely that PLA could have equivalent asset in the first try.

What makes you think that this is the PLA’s ‘first try’ at airborne surveillance? Look back into history and you will see that the PLA also has decades of experience and testing on airborne surveillance tech. No-one is claiming that the PLA will match current US standards, but they do have, or are extremely close to having the key technologies needed.

No doubt PLA’s HUMINT network is extensive, but that is not equivalent of providing targeting information on the ground near real-time. This is something that U.S. only demonstrated during Operation Enduring Freedom and PLA has only begun to explore.

The PLA’s HUMINT network operates differently from that of the US, and there have been plenty of evidence of PLA units training with GPS and other targeting aids to dismiss it out of hand.

Anyone who read any history will know that only the opening stage of Desert Storm is relevant, because KARI and Baghdad were the targets at the beginning. Later on, the focus moved to the ground force suppression, close air support, and the SCUD hunt. Therefore emphasizing the unguided bomb is not relevant.

Many a prominent military analyist and historian would disagree with you on that since it is a well documented FACT that the majority of the munitions used in that war was unguided. It is true that guided weapons punched far above their own weight and hit a far geater percentage of targets they the tonnage dropped, but unguided munitions were still the staple for the vast majority of the allies air forces.

No one said the war in the Taiwan Strait must follow past historical example, only that it is absurd to imply not destroying all enemy aircrafts in one hit is somehow the “worst possible scenario”.

And when has anyone claimed that? more myopia I see.

It is not laughable to suggest that JH-7’s low-level attack capability is not immune to air defense threats.

Again, more myopia, re-read what I have written and understand it might help you to discuss them.

Unlike the statements above, PLAAF take electronic warfare very seriously. Attackers have ARM and SEAD assets, while defenders have jammers and baits. Low-level attacks still have its use, but no one (not even USAF) expects it to be safe against competent air defense networks. Aircraft loss rate could have disproportionate effects on sortie rate, the same applies to both ROCAF and PLAAF.

Again, read what has actually been said instead of what you wish was said. :rolleyes:

Whoever said low level penetration attack is proof against all air defences? Its a plain fact that long range SAMs are ineffective against low level penetrators, but are vulnerable to AAA and short ranged SAMs, I said as much. Do you agree with that or not? If so, stop inventing things to disagree with, if not, state your reasons without going off on random tangents please.

Terrain difficulties also work both ways, if the view is not as open as deserts type, then it also mean ground targets are harder to find – therefore increases the search time and the probability of being shot.

Thats only the case if anyone was stupid enough to use low level penetration strikes against non-fixed targets. Low level penetration attack is meant to be used against very high value, fixed targets whereby the risk to the crew and plane is viewed as acceptable to taking out that target. Mission planning is designed to maximise terrain cover while still giving the crew sufficent time to lock on to the target and release weapons. Again, showing a lack on understanding of the most basic of military tactics and principles.

Emergency air interception will be over in minutes. ROCAF aircrafts will either be shot down by PLAAF, or make the kill and run out of fuel and missiles. By comparison, TBM preparation time could take nearly half an hour. PLA doesn’t have to attack the strips and could very well choose to go after other high value targets, but it is a tradeoff that will allow more ROCAF aircrafts to survive.

So what if TBM take agains to set up? What kind of surveillence assets does Taiwan have that can have much chance of detecting them as they deploy? Even if the missiles are spoted and the ROC goes on red alert and scrambles everything and his dog, who says the PLA have to go through with the attack? They could easily put it off a few hours and attack when most of the fighters scrambled have ran low on feul and returned to base thinking it was a false alarm, or put the invasion off until months later. The PLA is not facing some kind of countdown, it can choose when and if to attack at its leisure.

As for attacking other targets instead. Well thats just stupid. The PLA’s BMs don’t have the accuracy to target much else, and besides, they have enough of them to go round comfortably to cover all airfields and still have a significant number left to target a lot of other high value targets as well as to act as a reserve in case of excpetionally poor scatter in some cases. Then there are all the cruise missiles the PLA have that are far better suited at taking out other high value targets.

If you do not do your own basic research, don’t blame others for what you do not know. For example, why talking how about the road was never designed with aircraft landing in mind, when ROCAF had the planning and tested F-100 and other aircrafts before the highway project was completed?

That was more an afterthough as opposed to one of the guiding goals of the road network, else they did a really poor job of designing a road network that can act as reserve landing strips.

How come there is no mention of the effects of liquid paving asphalt and other strengthening methods when talking about what the road is or is not design for? Clearly, it is a case of assuming just because the lack of understanding on the most basic information.

And that one thing alone makes it a well design reserve runway then? :rolleyes:

As usual, you are mixing too much of your own opinon into everything you see and distorting reality to suit your own goals.

And to have the nerve to ask pictures with the overbearing attitude, then claiming it is something other people ignored for their own benefit. As if that’s not enough, the double standard of saying whatever response one doesn’t like as “diluting the main focus” while freely talking about the nonsense joke as “not limited to other’s whims”, does not contribute to the discussion at all.

Oh cry me a river. And such a good sense of humour too. :rolleyes:

You claimed that this stunt demonstrated the ground crew’s logisitcal skills at supporting planes, so where is your evidence? How dare I ask you to back up you claims. :rolleyes:

Looking back, anyone with basic reading skills can see that it is you who keep vering off on tangents to bring in bits of irrelevent gibber jabber in a pitifully transparent and unsuccessful attempt to show off your limited knowledge and understanding.

Just a casaul skim through the thread yeilded this little jem.

The real shortcomings of the annual exercise aren’t the successful landings, but the missiles missing targets and the F-5 crashing.

Completely out of the blue and utterly irrelevent to the topic, that serves no purpose other then to try and squeeze in as many semi relevent points as possible in the hope of trying to create the illusion that you actually know what you are talking about. Such schoolboy tactics might work against overworked exam markers, but will not score you any points in the real world. That one is free, the next one will cost you.:D

Taiwan, one of the global leader into microelectronic technologies cannot built some portions of road with twice the usual thickness ?
That’s nothing amazing here.

This has nothing to do with technical ability and everything to do with foresight and determination.

Many of Taiwan’s leaders still think that the ROCAF can take on the PLAAF and win, thus it is very unlikely that they would have started designing their road networks to act as reserve runways a couple of decades ago.

If there was such a notion, it would almost certainly have came out as they sought funds for it. The costs involved would have made it very likely to have come out in the Taiwan press even if they tried to keep it a secret and pass it off as a normal road project. Of course, there is also the question of why they would want to try and keep such an asset a secret.

Taiwan wants to deter a PLA attack, not try and provoke one only then to try and pull a fast one and trap China in a longer and more costly war then it originally thought.

The real problem with a “remote” use of airplanes is to have “remote” maintenance facilities.

And a reliable fuel supply etc, all of which would have been designed into the road system if it was indeed designed to act as reserve runways.

There are always warning signs of war. If Taiwan does not figure out PLA is attacking, then that is a strategic blunder. That has nothing to do with the tactical planning, you still need to prepare either way – so in the event that the military does know ahead, something could be done.

There are often ‘signs of war’, only its called ‘heightened tensions’ until someone actaully fires the first shot.

What makes the situation in the straits pretty unique is that the PLA has pretty much all the assets it needs to start the fight based literally within firing range of Taiwan. Almost all the units the PLA would need for the opening stages of any attack can leave their base and be within striking range of their targets. There is unlikely to be need for any major troop and asset re-deployment on the part of the PLA before the fighting starts, so the warning time Taiwan will get can be measured in minutes (the time it takes for the first wave of BMs to travel to their targets, which air bases will be high up on the list). How many fighters can you realistically expect to get in the air in that time frame?

It’s all about mobile logistics. Each ROCAF base personnel must be prepare to move between bases when necessary. If the team could operate at the exposed environment without base infrastructure, then it is a step toward preparing for the chaotic wartime attacks.

Except what exactly did they do ‘at the exposed environment’? Did they re-fuel the jets? Did they re-arm them? They have not, to my knowledge, demonstrated the ability to support the fighters that do manage to land on the highways and get them back in the fight.

If PLAAF does not bomb the reserve strips in the first run, it is even better for ROCAF. Because the fighters took off for emergency intercept could land at the strips, re-fuel and re-arm, and take off again. Harden Aircraft Shelters and mountain bases will protect half of the fleet. SRBM do not have the accuracy nor the power to destroy HAS.

But the issue would be, how many fighters can the ROCAF realistically expect to get in the air from the time the first wave of BMs and cruise missiles are launched to the time they all slam home on their runways?

Aircraft in HAS and mountain bases are not going to be able to make use of reserve runways if they are grounded because their base runways are all cratered.

Also, it will take more then a few maintaince crew waiting in the bushes to re-arm and re-fuel fighters. That requires very specialised equipment that will be difficult, time consuming to move around and easy to spot and track.

PLAAF is not so naïve to believe that it could destroy all ROCAF aircrafts on the ground in one try. Back at Desert Storm, USAF did not destroy Iraqi air force aircrafts on the ground in the first strike. So are we suppose to believe that PLA’s cruise missile is superior than Tomahawk and has a much larger stocks of CM; PLA’s PGM stock is superior and higher quantity than USAF… Iraq is much larger than Taiwan, but the operation back then concentrated on Baghdad (which is comparable in operation size).

Just because the PLAAF plans for the worst is no garentee that the worst possible scenario for the PLA will come to pass in times of war.

As for PLAAF today v USAF in 91/2, well thats a difference of decade and a half mate. And yes, I do expect the PLA to have at least comparible if not more and better PGMs compared to the USAF of the gulf war. Something to remember is that while pictures and videos of LGB and cruise missile hits were dazzling the press during GWI, the war was fought with ‘dumb’ munitions as the staple. The vast majority of munitions dropped by the coalition forces were unguided.

Add to that, the USAF did not start the battle with a massive BM strike like the way the PLA is almost certain to do. BMs might not have the accuracy to target aircraft and shelters to destroy an airforce on the ground, but they do have the accuracy and numbers to have an extremely high probability of being able to take out all of Taiwan’s fighter base runways maybe as quickly as within minutes of the start of hostilities.

Change the subject of training costs into an unfunny joke about pilots “forget” about landing and taking off is meaningless. PLAAF does base transit exercise all the time, but no one makes a joke about PLA pilots “forget” about the way to fly from point A to point B. If anyone doesn’t like being called an amateur, don’t act like one.

#

So what other skill besides landing and take-off did the ROCAF pilots managed to practice with this highway landing and take-off ‘excerise’? Even transit excerises are pretty simplistic and hardly a major part of any training programme.

There is no “opportunity cost” involved for air defense, because Area defense SAM systems already cover those highway strips. There is no need to move long range SAM specifically for that purpose. Read the map – that is the first step for doing real military analysis.

The long range stuff are going to have more then enough on their plates trying to deal with all the SEAD ac the PLAAF is sure to send in, provided they haven’t already expended their munitions trying to stop the BMs. Long range SAMs would also be ineffective against the fast, level penetration attacks that JH7s are designed for. Using one’s head is also pretty useful when doing any sort of analysis.

The mobile point systems are supposed to move around anyway, also not a problem. Taiwan’s small size spells death in strategic depth, but smaller area also makes it easier to build up the SAM density. It is the one thing that ROCAF does not lack (only thing perhaps).

‘Mobile’ point defences are not that ‘mobile’ and will take time to re-deploy, so they can only cover so big an area. Thus its pretty obvious that even though mobile SAMs are meant to move around, they will generally linger within a pretty small radious of the fixed asset they are trying to protect. Pulling those SAMs too far away from their original objective to guard some stretch of road in the middle of nowhere has obvious opportunity costs.

There is really nothing wrong with amateurs, most people are only enthusiasts only. The sad thing is to see someone lecturing others about “opportunity cost” when it’s clear that not even basic map reading or fact-finding about the topic was done beforehand.

Whats even more sad is an amateur trying to pass off his own views as ‘real’, ie, ‘better then amateur’ and inventing faults to try and discredit someone else’s views because they can’t use logic, facts and reason to do it, and yet is too proud to admit that they might be wrong.

SRBM must be launched in waves because the launcher number is not unlimited. Every additional missile against the highway strips is one that cannot be used in the first wave (the big words “opportunity cost” is a good reminder), and the first wave is the most vital.

And why would the PLA bother with these reserve strips in the opening bombaredment if they can’t spare the missiles?

Unless you plan to station fighters on them on a permenant basis, then they are largely irrelevent when planning for the first strike, as the goal would be to try and ground and/or destroyer fighters while they are still on the ground, ie at their base. Becase reserve runways a few hundred miles away is a hell let of use when your planes are stuck on the ground and can’t take off from base to make use of them. :rolleyes:

Now, with the first wave of BMs and cruise missiles fired, and with friendly fighters establishing air superiority and SEAD aircraft working the area to take out/ supress what SAMs the opening salvo missed, then is when you take the time to go and task a few assets to go and take a peek at these ‘reserve’ highways and see if any hostle fighters managed to land on them, or just to take them out with cheap free falls to cover all your bases.

Fighters must conduct trainings and exercises anyway, so these aren’t “additional” costs. If they don’t fly and land at the highway, they would still need to do it elsewhere.

Oh yeah all those fighter aces really need to practice to land and take off, cos they might, I dunno, forget how to do it. Now that would be embarrassing wouldn’t it? :rolleyes:

PLAAF won’t be so arrogant to think “One J7 can take out an entire line of F16/M2k/FCK1s with just its guns on one pass!” There is a little something call Surface-to-Air Missiles system, perhaps people have heard of it? Unlike the amateurs here (whose only apparent goal is to bash), PLA takes military planning very seriously.

So you are going to cover all your ‘decoy’ highways with SAMs then? Cool, you do that while the PLAAF take out your assets that are now left without adequit SAM coverage. :rolleyes:

Opportunity cost cuts both ways, but it hurts the ROC more cos the PLA got way more toys.

And speaking of economic costs. You noticed the afterburners scorching the road surface red hot? I’d wager that would have left a pretty ugle ‘scar’ on the road surface which might well need to be repaired.

The use of highway is not going to solve the fundamental problem that ROCAF has to face, Taiwan’s missile defense is neither ready nor cost effective. Until F-35 enters ROCAF service (if it does), all measures are short-term patches at best. However, it is really pointless to go out of the way to use biased personal views to argue that the exercise is useless. This thread’s sole purpose was to share the picture and video, so take the trolling and boring political opinions elsewhere.

Oh wow, all bow before the almighty self-appointed forum policeman, judge and jury! :rolleyes:

It is not going off topic to discuss the usefulness and tactical implications of new equipment and tactics shown in pictures and videos, and if you haven’t noticed, this is a discussion forum, not a picture gallery.

If you don’t agree with my conclusions, then argue with logic, facts and reason instead of making up BS and telling others what they can and can’t do.

People who do real military analysis will notice something else. This is not really about the very basic aircraft landing itself, since that was already done previously. Instead, the real news is that the logistics team from the F-CK-1 base has demonstrated that it could support different aircrafts effectively. The real exercise was to test ROCAF’s ability to re-supply and operate in unfamiliar environment. Another thing to check is the preparation time for the sorties, which could serve as a basis for estimating ROCAF’s aircraft turnaround rate.

Oh wow, you also tells us ignarent people what ‘real’ military analysis is – everything cabbageman says, and what ‘amateur’ analysis is – everything anyone who has a different view from cabbageman says. What did we do to deverse your allknowingness? :rolleyes:

How about we cut with all the nauseous self glorifying platitudes and focus a bit more on discussing the merits of tactics instead?

I would take the claim of F-CK-1 maintaince with a pinch of salt, as they have not ‘demonstrated’ anything of the sort. Did they tank up the fighters while they were on the highway or load them up with missiles?