’16 vs ’29 in 1995 🙂
http://forum.scramble.nl/viewtopic.php?p=334824

” View from the gun camera. Just moments later we slice this Viper in half…”

HuAF – small fleet: 12x MiG-23MF 4x -23UB

Delivery in 1979, to The Fall of Berlin Wall: only one aircraft lost, pilot ejected succesfully.

In the next period to 1997 the same situation >

Pilots had flown 50 or less per years, growing number of mishaps, incidents

At this low level, the MiGs would have been out of contact with WP GCI, MiG-21 radar was limited in range and didn’t work well in ground clutter…how did these formations locate the AWACS?

We understood the danger of an attack on the AWACS…in the scenario you describe, the threat was one of being overwhelmed by numbers. Being aware of the incoming attackers was not a problem…AWACS capabilities would have had no difficulty in identifying the threat, particularly once the flight had crossed the FEBA.

Lastly, the weapons carried by the MiG-21 limited it to a short range, visual attack in most cases (the semi-active Atoll being the exception). The Flogger with its longer range Apex would have been a much greater threat.

‘AWACS hunting’ in the ‘Soviet Top Gun’ :

quick translate by:

http://translate.google.com/

” Training aerial combat with the MiG-23ML I had to spend at the airbase of Mary during the inspection there Regiment.
LTU Regiment conducted for the destruction of “AWACS” (AWACS role performed AN-12). His team covered the MIG-23ML’s from Mari. Obschee number of LTU, I do not remember, but not less than approximately
2x squadron MiG-21bis, with the objective to bring down an AWACS, and at least 1x squadron MiG-23ML (maybe it was MLA.YA on MIG-23 did not fly, so such nuances do not speak), with the objective to prevent the destruction of the AWACS.
Boy was estimated, if hit by an AWACS, the marovskim two, if not shot down the other way round.
There were some uslovnosti.Vvidu that aircraft Marov was less then a single pair of simulated aircraft, and we were not allowed to bloom in pairs.
Our pair was tasked to perform diversionary attack AWACS, I was paired vedomym.Atakovali we under 90 * to the path of the AN-12.
Distance was great, perhaps more than 40km (can not remember exactly).
Building teams in the task was as follows.
I am writing courses uslovno.Dopustim AN-12 circled on the route with the course 180 * and then flying a certain number of kilometers of unfolding at 360 *. Where were the MiG-23 we certainly do not know.
They had a great experience, they perform similar tasks on a regular basis.
Of course we still had to be guided and safety scheme in the area Marov.
Our group has lined up a long “gut.” It was a shock group (link), it is well prikryli.Fakticheski meaning of the problem of the other groups, it is striking prikravat gruppu.A she was stupid to break through to the AN-12.Gruppy walked out of visual sight of each other and on the sides of the shock gruppy.Upravlenie done with KP golosom.Nasha pair was at the end of the group.
First, the MiG-21 ran parallel to the flight of AH-12, a large intervale.Zatem advance team completed a turn at 180 * and was on the flight line AN-12 and AN-12.Rasstoyanie back was to the AN-12 is large, more than 40 km.
A couple in which there was, I was abeam the AN-12 (as calculated). We turned on 90 * in the direction of purpose and with the reduction to 1,000 m with acceleration speed of the device more than 1000 K / h at flying AN-12.
KP Marov responded that was a surprise for me, I noticed the MIG -23 on the left, at what speed it’s hard to tell us to intercept, but we are very bystro.Zametili pretty far away, on back-to-left crossing, because We were nizhe.Pohozhe visually he could not see us, unnecessarily flew slightly to the side and above us on 500 meters .. The purpose of our couples had to fly in the direction of the target until the last vozmozhnosti.My expected to lure to themselves as much as possible planes of the group cover AN-12, but when the MIG-23 has come to our traverse, he noticed us and came to us dovorachivat.Nam had no choice but to include the afterburner and start turning on him.
He is one, we performed dvoe.My “Node.” Bend to the left leading continued, I began to perform a forward loop in vlevo.Podoydya to the top point figures, looked at the bottom left corner of the lantern, the MiG-23 there, then went to see him in the tail distance 250 meters 300.Dolozhil lead, went drastically leading vverh.MIg-23 remained in the bend, he was vklyuchon forsazh.Pervonachalno I expect that I would have to include the CR, but I was consistently in his tail, and even endured a brand forward to doing a forward traektorii.Veduschy was behind me, so we met a couple of bends, and the remainder stop the fight.
Our calculation lure on a few planes did not succeed with Obou Marov were experienced and not too much anyone not been sent.
A strike force made its way to the AN-12 and shot a remarkable film.
The calculation to cover the strike group has justified itself, and the calculation of a possible breach of our couples are not justified.
Based on this LTU, for myself, I came to the conclusion (which do not impose) that the strike group for implementation of these tasks need to cover.
Probably go to the AWACS nazamechennymi very difficult if not impossible, therefore, have to be a striking force, and a powerful cover of the shock gruppy.Pri development plan should focus on options for covering the strike group. “

Dear sainz, just to “disappoint“ you no more let me tell you that we never intended to repeat “many false data from Western sources” at all. For 25 years till 1989 our little staff checked and re-checked every bit of available information and personal findings not only once. By doing so and in respect of thousand little bits, peaces and glimpse it was obviously not possible to correct all “false data”. Our intention was, and still is, to document the enormous activities of the Soviet Air Force (SAF) in Germany over the period of 50 years – not an easy task at all! Welcome in the club sainz!

‘LimaFox’

At first – sorry for my late reply, one of my friends sent me the link for your comment few days ago…

As I see, you missed the details of my ‘critical remarks’:

http://forum.keypublishing.com/showpost.php?p=1443915&postcount=253

I know, there are no books without errors…

You wrote about your working standards:

For 25 years till 1989 our little staff checked and re-checked every bit of available information and personal findings not only once.

You published this photo in your book, I am sure, you have the original paperprint(maybe the original 6x6cm b&w negative?) or at least the high-res scan of this pic:

I am sure, you know the source of this photo, maybe you know the pilot on the photo too(?)
Can you tell us the story about the ‘checked and re-checked’ information ?
What was your source for these ‘data’ ? >

” MiG-21SM auf dem Flugplatz Damgarten.(773. IAP/70er Jahre). “

Because this is not MiG-21SM, it is 100% sure even by the small version of this photo in your book…
And Damgarten was not MiG-21SM operator never.

Other same error in that book on page 24:

Obviously this airframe is unequivocally MiG-21SM on the photo…
What can I say ?
A memorial, many people were near, took photos of this aircraft etc…

So if you are going by such books, easy to learn and repeat wrong data.
This book is very useful with the data after 1991 – other question is, those infos and phots are available from other sources for everybody.
But for me obvious – Author took limited research pre-1990, especionally with pilots, techs who served in GSVG in the 60s, 70s….
He copied, repeated many false data from Western sources about the older years.

I think when you wrote that book, you had problems with the basics(relates with MiG-21), to recognize the sub-types of the MiG-21…Sorry, if it is a bit ‘strong’ for you.
There were many very interesting small modifications on 16.VA MiG-21’s, even at regiment level, but to install the smaller spintank from the SM to a bis airframe(and why? 😎 )….I can not imagine at the moment…
The fuselage under the spintank:

To avoid any misunderstandings:
I respect your works, also I learnt many new details from your books…

If you read back, you can see, I did my notes, because of somebody quoted that photo and ‘false-data’ from your book, as reference >

A red 02 SM of 773. IAP is shown on a pic of the 70s. 😉
The first MiG-23s did arrive in Damgarten 1974. The MiG-23ML did enter production in 1976 and 773. IAP got its MiG-23ML too, there is a pic of that in Peenemünde during a common AD exercise.

” A red 02 SM of 773. IAP is shown on a pic of the 70s. ”

If you are talking about this photo in Lutz Freundts book on page 53:

Where I wrote this critical remark:

repeat “many false data from Western sources”

I meant also – here is a classic case:

I do not know the original source of these BS about Damgarten and Köthen, but as you can see, sometimes-somewhere-somebody published these ‘data’ and people quotes like facts:

Till 1973 the 773. IAP at Damgarten did operate MiG-21SM with R-3R and did convert to MiG-23M with R-60 from 1974.
The MiG-21bis was accepted into VVS fighter air regiments in February 1972.

Maybe you have some details, which squadron of that regiment got some MiG-21bis temporary?!

The 73 Gw.IAP at Köthen did replace its MiG-21PF with MiG-21bis, when from 1975 it did convert to MiG-23M.

Holger Müller did some serious research >

His list is very near to the reality 😎
And from my viewpoint – as a reader – this is the ‘fair-trade’ from the author. Where he has no data for the type and date, we can read: ” (-1973) ” or ” 0 ”

Many people try to suggest – these data are insignificant today. Obviously they have ‘double-standards’.
I must to repeat myself:
Currently this is the quality of the public data about the 16.VA in the ’70s. Something, like if I say about an USAFE Wing – it was F-4E operator in the early ’70s…while it was not never. And you can not check this, because you do not have any photos from that airbase, any personal reports etc from that USAFE fighter wing in that period…..and all of these in the 21st century.

Sad enough the former Russian military community wasn’t a great help so far.

No comment…

My personal experience:
The ‘old’ pilots, engineers, technicians are very-very friendly and helpful even with a younger foreign guy, if the topic is their favorite – the flyíing in the USAFE or in the WP in Central-Europe then. East or West, USAFE-NATO or WP…all the same.
Even with my basic English I can get some very unique stuff from ex-USAFE and NATO pilots and we can discuss about the old times with objectivity. Despite the facts – I am a non flyer, ‘non Soviet’ 😉

I am under the impression that even historians on their side (if there are any working on the matter) haven’t a clear picture at all

In the memory and in the drawers of these older ‘WP-guys’ are all the answers to our questions >

slide from a pilot’s archive – MiG-21bis(99% ex 16.VA from 833.iap.)

A few other public shots from pilots archives >

MiG-21SMT Wittstock 1973 >

MiG-21SM Neuruppin 1977 >

Also 1977, Neuruppin’s 730.apib., photographed on one of the grassy wartime airstrips >

To give an example from our side, a “black hole” in research is still the period when the SAF entered the jet age in the late forties in occupied Germany (Jak-15/-17 and MiG-9). Exactly when and where was it happened and who was the operator? What was the overall result in operate these early birds in the Central European Theatre (accidents, effectiveness, weather etc.)? Any help on that, any pictures at all?
Thank you sainz.:)

Unfortunately I do not have any data about these older times. I am focusing to the ‘MiG-21 era’, especially to early-mid ’70s.

p.s.:
‘LimaFox’
Can I ask a high-res scan from the original of that ’02’ MiG-21bis photo from Damgarten ?

I do not remember to hear that deploying flaps(0-25° range flap deflection, flap switch to take-off position) was ever thought during an A2A combat, but perhaps there was a “little room” in the Mig-21 envelope where flaps could be utilized. It is rumoured by some soviet airforce official in various aviation sources, a special fighter pilot excercises called “500s” underwent on some training bases in order to master maneuvers when flying the Mig-21 on the edge. However, how much advantage they might gain from those slow-speed maneuvers is unknown, but the Mig-21 never liked slow speeds in general.

FLIGHT International 25 September 1975
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1975/1975%20-%201968.html?tracked=1

Interestingly this ‘setup’ is puplic for a long while >

” The MiG-21 is unusual among deltas in having no leading-edge
camber but carries large plain flaps .inboard of the
ailerons. These are often extended to the take-off position
during air combat. This is obvious from photographs taken
during the October 1973 war, when the low-speed dogfighting
tactics first developed by the Pakistani Air Force
were applied by the Egyptians. The flaps automatically
“bleed in” under air pressure, beginning to retract at
250 m.p.h., about 400km/hr, and being fully in at 440
m.p.h., about 700km/hr.”

martinez,
What does it mean ? >

I do not remember to hear that deploying flaps(0-25° range flap deflection, flap switch to take-off position) was ever thought during an A2A combat,

Is this your opinion only ?
Or was this ‘setup’ unknown in the old CzechoSlovak AF ?
Please check it with older ’21-pilots’ in your range!

It seems to me more and more(also Your comments about ‘500s’ confirm my feelings) >
The Czechoslovak AF received less support(advanced ACT programs, periodic updates for combat manuals etc.) from the Soviets than many other WP AF’s then…

‘Shield-72’ Zatec AB September 1972, rapid takeoffs, 36xSu-7 + 36xMiG-21
Nice RATO footages from near >

http://ulozto.net/2068441/stit-zatec.mpg

” Interwals between takeoffs were cut down in rehersals to 15s with the Su-7’s and to 10s with MiG-21’s, so the whole show took only approx. 5 minutes “

Same show from ‘Shield-84’ – “The airport was empty in 4 minutes and 55 seconds”:
1stSLP – 12xMiG-23ML + 12xMiG-21MF
11thSLP – 12xMiG-23MF + 12xMiG-21PF + 12xMiG-21PFM
9thSLP – 12xMiG-21F

” One day we went out and as part of some F-4 advanced handling sorties, I showed him slow loops, entered from only 350 knots when the usual minimal entry speed was 500 knots. The F-4 would flop about at the top, and the maneuver was kind of prohibited. I asked him what he thought. He told me he could do the same maneuver in the MiG-21 with only 275 knots of entry speed. “

How many(%) average F-4 pilots(at ‘front-line’ units – for example in the USAFE or in the Luftwaffe) had same experiences(with ‘slow loops’ or with ‘kind of prohibited’ other slow ACMs) in mid 70’s ?