The EL/M 2052 is built upon fairly mature technology so I would say that is a fairly weak argument by Thales.

I highly doubt that your hybrid twin+2 idea would go anywhere MadRat, interesting but a non-starter in my opinion. Current idea is CF34 which has a certain degree of logic albeit it should be noted that the 757 engine nacelle pylon was designed with 100% mechanical compatibility with the B52H pylon attachment points. This was done with an eye towards any future engine upgrade and the main reason why both the RB211 and PW2000 were explored as an option.

They are already modernizing such a young ship?

What was inadequate about the initial design?

I guess for much the same reason the two 052 have also had a deep refit, it is an orphan class of one with a system fit rather different to the rest of the fleet. I always got the impression that it was a low risk follow on from the 052, it will be interesting to see what is done with the similar 051C that is also a unique two ship subclass. I have always had the hunch that the 051C were a low risk back up if the 052C proved to be unsuccessful. With the success of the 052C they didn’t need to build more, the pace of Chinese naval technological development has rendered new vessels obsolete in a matter of years in some cases. It seems to be the Chinese are keen on utilizing the hulls hence the deep refits!

Further from my previous reply it is interesting to note that Northrop still want to use elements of BAE Systems technology in the new aircraft. Personally I see opportunity, BAE Systems should suck it up and look to becoming a partner on Northrop’s program with major sub assembly construction and avionics input not unlike that of the F35 lightning. That way UK PLc has potential access to a huge market and a possible future Hawk replacement.

I would guess it is a temporary cover to allow the application of the deck paint and anti skid surface.

To be fair to the pilots, it should be noticed that -at some point- the situation became a bit more complex than what you suggest.
The speed eventually dropped so low that it could not be read by the pitot system and this caused the stall warning to stop. When Robert appplied full stick forward to get out of the stall, the speed increased and could be read by the system, which triggered the stall alarm. The pilots could not identify the reason behind this stall warning and were probably feeling that pushing forward was creating the stall. That’s perharps why they felt so confused and did not manage to recover from the stall.

I hope I’ve been clear.

torp

I am well aware of the pitot tube icing, nevertheless he had 60 seconds stall warning alarms and his altimeter was spinning off altitude like a windmill. He had altitude the prudent course would be to apply what every pilot is taught in their PPL and put the nose down and advance the throttle, he would have had nothing to lose by applying that most rudimentary of flying procedures.

Another thing the correct procedure on the A330 when you have a failure of all the air speed sensors is to manually select 85% thrust and hold 5 degrees nose up. That will set the aircraft at an attitude that will maintain a safe speed and maintain control allowing the aircraft to get to the first divert airport.

I watched the video and yes that is what the computer would do under “normal” conditions. But my question still deals with flight outside the normal flight envelope that can be caused by storms. What if the pilot put the a/c in the same condition during a storm and was pushed way beyond bank or stall, what would the computer do. Would it let the pilot do a normal recovery, or would it hinder him. And then————-when the pilot would put in the the inputs he felt he needed to, and if the computer let him would the a/c stay in one piece? It is known for sure that off Long Island the pilot put in large rudder movements, and the verticle stab broke off.

The point of this thread remains is the Airbus a safe plane, and a strong enough plane? It just seems with all the crashes that seem to have structual failures these questions need to be investigated.

In respect of your first question I turn you back to Bernard Ziegler Airbus and former French Air Force Test Pilot. The research they did around crashes giving pilots full authority over the flight envelope increased the risk of a fatal incident. Actually their attempts in his words to “tear the wings off the aircraft to get out of a situation” only exacerbated the accident. Pilots like to imagine that they have the skills to get out of any situation but as Ziegler observes the vast majority are system managers and not highly skilled test pilots like himself.

In respect of your second point you seem to be inferring that Airbus have a greater propensity towards structural failure, how much so vs other aircraft? Have Airbus had structural faults identified certainly but so do many other aircraft some fatally so. You ask is the Airbus a safe plane with all the crashes which is a rather strong assertion to make. Many aircraft crash it is not unique to Airbus, per million flight hours you will find the Airbus fleet have very similar fatal crash stats to Boeing and there certainly isn’t any clear sign of an anomaly.

Finally you bring up the Long Island Crash as an example of the problems Airbus have with structural integrity and FBW not allowing the pilots full authority to deal with a situation. As pointed out to you before the Crash of American Airlines 587 could not of been affected by FBW or flight control logic for a VERY SIMPLE REASON! The Airbus involved was an A300B4-605R to give its exact model number, the A300 has an entirely conventional hydraulically assisted mechanical flight control system with no FBW.

Of course the real answer is Nicolas Cage!