It is not the credibility of EF GmbH itself, but the credibility of UK / German / Italy governments ~ I think that Mr. Jon Lake has explained this very clearly in one of his previous post.

Mr. Cameron declared that Typhoon is superb, and he will do his best to persuade IAF to change its mind and adopt Typhoon. However, because of his own government’s great decisions and well done in the past few years:

1. The Tranche I Typhoons for RAF will be retired after 2018.

2. The Tranche IIIB Typhoons for RAF may never be introduced.

3. The total number of Typhoon for RAF may be reduced to 107 or even less after 2019, and only God knows that how many Typhoons can still be remained in RAF at the time of 2030 ~ when Rafale will become the only manned fighter in FAF and FN.

4. The painfully ultra-slow pace for RAF to upgrade its own Typhoons, and the time for integrating AESA radar, Meteor BVRAAM, STORM SHADOW, Brimestone etc…..onto Typhoon still has no confirmatory schedule, not to mention CFT, TVC, EJ-2XX, or any aggressive project for RCS reduction or anti-stealthy technology.

If you were an IAF officer, would you have any confidence to Mr. Cameron’s declaration and slogan, after watching what his own government has done to the Eurofighter project in the past few years?

I am pretty sure that the IAF looked over one of the two finalists, saw one of them had barely a third of the confirmed orders of the other, had a rather “fleecing” deal for upgrade of a legacy fighter from the same stable, saw the possibility that it might not ever bag an export order and its upgrades and spares might be equivalent to their weight in gold and came to the opinion that both the stables needed this sale very badly for the future of their respective projects.

Nothing wrong in Mr Lake’s expression of “great potential” in Typhoon. IAF believed in that potential and that’s why EF managed to clear the evaluation criteria. I don’t understand how the credibility of EF GmbH ” is close to zero” just because they didn’t manage to make a sale. I am pretty sure Dassault didn’t lose credibility over the last ten years despite not making an export sale.

I think Haavarla already started a new thread ?
http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?t=114721

If Frenchies or Saudies ended up ordering Mirage 4000, would Rafale program even exist?

Interesting. Had the M4K been available, it would have competed with Sukhoi for IAF’s attention.

I like this idea.After all Tata Advanced Systems , Tata Power Strategic electronics divison etc are participating in other areas notably in several army projects and also won some tenders for the Mod iirc.So they surely can contribue in matters relating to air force.

Also think that LRDE is going on working on the MMR with no end result so far even after a JV with elta..I wonder what would happen if the responsibility of developing a fighter radar for the AMCA (suppose) is given to Tata power SED etc who then form a JV with whoever they want..would it be better?

Hopefully the offsets for the Rafale deal are spread out to several pvt cos. as well so that the also get some knowhow..and I am sure the results will be better than HAL or any govt player keeping all the ToT to themselves.

Ray, the problem with this idea is that it looks good on paper. Domestic developer unable to come up with something that is world beater ? lets call in some excellent project managers from the pvt industry, let them bring in consultants for top dollar and lets get our hands on something that works. Sure these companies can handle big projects, but they do not have experience with big R&D projects, where the returns are uncertain and unexpected setbacks guaranteed. When the product is meant to be cutting edge, technology has to be developed instead of being brought off the shelf, and that is the achilles heel of such an arrangement. The Indian companies getting into defence sector specialise more in production and project management than research and design. If forced to “develop” a certain product today for a next generation product rather than getting the “blue prints” from foreign suppliers, you would see 4-5 out of six suppliers coming up with a design that fails the staff requirement and the rest two will probably fail during the product development cycle.

Lets say today you have Samtel marketing topsight hmds in a jv with Thales. How long do you think will a company like Samtel, which has lets say 10 years of experience making small cockpit accessories, to come up with a home grown HMDS ? Or Astra microwave, which is currently making aesa t/r modules and other defence related electronics from technology licensed from LRDE and DRDL. How long will it take for them to expand their line of work into specialised military grade signal processors for next gen radar for AMCA and have the necessary expertise to help the coders to optimise their code for their specific processors ?

If there is anything that needs to be done, it is to desecrate the researcher-manufacturer divide. DRDO is a research organisation which has to develop vendors and grow them out of the teething phase because the high technology manufacturing in India is not good enough, and only then is one of the DPSU’s able to manufacture the product. Anyone who has worked in production will tell you that your product is allowed to be only as good enough as your sub-vendors and suppliers are, and we have a critical shortage of them. Forget backup suppliers, even the primary suppliers have a tough time keeping up. This has lead to a situation where instead of having one unified management for every single project, there is a musical chair going on between DRDO labs, vendors and the DPSU’s, and that right there is a recipe for disaster.

Mayday, mayday!

The article is a little too harsh.

Had the LCA entered the service by 2004 after meeting all service requirements, there would not have been a need for any MMRCA deal.

There was no way LCA was going to enter service by 2004, especially whn it took the air in 2001 :confused:

A few thousand crores were invested in the LCA programme. This may now become an non-performing asset since the MMRCA is being imported.

This is the amount spent on the LCA project. Compare that with what the IAF is willing to shell out for imports. Also compare it to the project costs of Gripen, which entered a good one and a half decade earlier. Thousands of crores really sounds big, but it isn’t exactly a mount everest when comparing with modern aircraft budgets.

The failing battle to keep the LCA systems and design relevant 27 years after work has become obvious.

Isn’t every other aerospace project without massive govt backing struggiling ? Check out “Eurofighter- Weapon of mass construction” which recounts a similar horror story with EF’s project management.

In 2002, during the India-Pakistan stand-off that followed the December 13 attack by terrorists on the Indian Parliament, the IAF was concerned about the availability of an adequate number of combat aircraft. Had the LCA been inducted in time, these embarrassing difficulties and expenditures could have been avoided, or at least better managed. The loss cannot be counted merely in crores of rupees.

Why stop at operation Parakram, lets blame delay in LCA project for falling squadron strength during Kargil conflict.

A naval variant of the LCA seems unlikely to ever land on a ship’s deck. It may probably need a new engine apart from lots of testing and modifications. There is little demonstrated stamina to take these risks.

Ironically, the current IN, IAF Brass is more supportive and understanding of domestic projects than the old brass and is not hesitant to seek out consultancy from those who have more experience. Unlike the older brass they are willing to get involved in the project from the beginning and bring in operational experience which a designer lacks.

http://www.asianage.com/columnists/art-deal-making-480

The US Navy, which has the most extensive carrier aviation experience, was finally but hesitantly approached for practical advice.
The Indian Navy’s gambit paid off. Its Letter of Request, while occasioning a short but intense debate in the Office of the US Chief of Naval Operations, elicited a positive response. A Letter of Agreement and consultancy contract soon followed, and veteran US naval aviators, deputed for the job, began working seamlessly on the Light Combat Aircraft many months back. The reason for the success of this scheme, according to a Pentagon officer, was that all relevant decisions on the Indian side — from initial contact, drafting the consultancy contract, to payments and arrangements for hosting the American naval aviators — emanated from a single source, the officer heading the programme, Commodore C.D. Balaji, with the redtape-inclined defence ministry having no role. Given its success, this seems an excellent means of encouraging high-value, home-grown, military R&D projects and enabling them to gain from practical knowledge and hands-on expertise transferred by stalwarts of the US armed forces. It is a model Air Force and Army will do well to emulate: create a stake in, and take charge of, projects that will produce in-country worthwhile military hardware.

The Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) prototype has spun out of the sky and the Light Attack Helicopter is being developed at a snail’s pace.

Helicopters are perhaps the only field where HAL has started to emerge as a global player !! 😮
ALH Dhruv is going strong, and is a fairly good product for a first design.
Rudra is about to enter service.
LCH is going at a rather good pace.
IMRH and LUH are likely to be more reliable products based on lessons learned from ALH design experience.

Rafale is a weather phenomenon, like Typhoon, Mirage, & Ouragan (Hurricane). What’s the Hindi for it? Google Translate gives several Hindi options for both the French & English words.

In English:

Or gust.

I’d suggest, Toofani (In memory of Dassault Ouragan which was christened Toofani in IAF service)