which goes back to the circle of debate that the technology sets and designs are done by and subsequently certified by various engineers – project managers can’t. the users don’t necessarily know the difference between a microwave and flat screen TV (being excessively unkind, but reinforcing a point)
anything that comes out of the “good idea fairies workkshop” has to get through the engineers before it can even be considered part of the project.
Again, you only provide perfect examples of what I was talking about earlier.
You cannot get accurate results with experimental (i.e. non working) tools and incomplete coupon tests.
The engineers are not allowed to halt the program to complete things like fundamental model validation or coupon testing. Instead the thing has to go half-cocked to meet some bloody deadline on some irrelevant spreadsheet.
Any engineer will tell you, if the program doesn’t start right, then it’ll fall apart. No foundations = f**ked. Yet the program managers will sacrifice everything to keep the program on track, particularly at the start – even though it is at that point where most of the big unknowns are encountered and have to be shook out. Therefore the foundations get sacrificed and as time progresses, with the program lagging behind time and budget, they get ever more desperate to make the program “appear” on track so cut even more corners. Right up until the point where they can hide it no longer.
You cannot even seem to differentiate between design, technology, hardware and software. As usual, the engineers will get blamed for not being allowed to run the program as they see fit, but instead must ram everything into someone else’s idea of how it should be (even worse, that someone else doesn’t have a clue).
I’d be interested to know what had changed in order to have the F-35 overweight as it is?
Powerpoint met the laws of physics.
when I refer to concurrency I am referring to the parallel build and development of mechanical and software solutions. eg plane frame, flight system
When the rest of us refer to concurrency and its problems, we refer to building production airframes while the prototypes are still flying around and finding problem after problem!
It is natural for the design to evolve with all parties working simultaneously. Indeed it is ridiculous not to. This not something that has not been done before – working on flight controls/aerodynamics/airframe/engines etc at the same time was ongoing long before there were ever program managers on the scene!
If you think the schedule is irrelevant then there’s part of your problem 🙂
The schedule is irrelevant.
It is ready when it is ready.
For examples of what happens when the schedule is adhered to with disregard for things actually being ready to proceed through the gate… see
F-35
F-22
B787
A350
A380
A400M
B747-8
etc
etc
what crap. its done with the sponsor, the user, the senior engineer and the project manager establishing together whether its achievable and reasonable. thats why the engineers are the TRA – they can and do say NO
Rubbish.
The engineers all laugh at the schedules run out by the program team from the start – everyone knows fine well it’ll never meet the targets.
so at what point is your engineering shop suddenly inheriting work which they think is going off the reservation?
From the word go.
Usually because all the tools have not been tested and validated to the degree they should have in the initial stages (those foundations again).
who said anything about bypassing stress results? who mandates the fatigue tests, who defines the test regime, who validates that the test regime is legitimate. Who defines and approves the SHAR?
Who ignores all this and turns their little f**king box green anyway?
Clue: Not the engineers.
You cannot get accurate results with experimental (i.e. non working) tools and incomplete coupon tests.
Doesn’t seem to bother the program crew though – they just blissfully carry on regardless.
the processes successfully used by BAE are whats being used by LM for concurrent development of things like the the ewarfare/combat system deelopment…
And for the airframe.
The bit that is gonna give them the most headache in the long run.
Back to knowing what is important and what is not.
Hold on, thats why the F-22 also has multiple Blocks and where Block 1 is basically an orphan. A mature platform which is still demonstrating technical quirly bits. (accredited and approved by engineers)
Yep. Software and avionics updates.
Things that don’t fall off the damn aircraft, things that don’t require a fundamental redesign of the airframe.
If you want to play the game of the sanctity of engineering over all other elements in a project I’m up for giving more real life eaxmples of where its failed – but as I stated earlier, its a convenient and somewhat demonstration of intellectual indolence to travel that path.
You do realise how many lines of code are in the P8 – and that they’re using similar concurrent deveopment and engineering processes? Boeing also appear to be misguided. As were EB with the Virginias etc…. The latter being regarded as the gold standard on how to build a completely new platform entirely around the digital process and with a minimum of grief.
The P8?
You mean the same airframe as has existed for ohhh… how many years now?
Again…. knowing what is important and what is not.
[There is a common theme here]
Everyone (and I literally mean everyone) is struggling to work out how to do evolutionary acquisition and define engineering structures for military software solutions in the current environment. Its going 10-120 times faster than it was ever done in the past.
Oh right…
The Light Weight Fighter effort kicked off in 1969.
The RFP was issued in 1972.
The YF-16 first flew in 1974.
The F-16 entered service in 1978.
So, in 9 years, the program went from initial funding to OEMs to service.
The RFP for the F-X was issued in 1965.
The F-15 first flew in 1972.
It entered service in 1976.
Total time… 11 years.
Ignoring the JAST part, the JSF program started in 1996.
The X-35 first flew in 2000.
The F-35 has yet to enter service.
Total time, 15 years and counting.
But things are going 10-120 times quicker? Or did the F-16 and F-15 not feature software?
Or are they only going 10-120 quicker than historical efforts in “the current environment”… as if that sentence can possibly mean anything!
there is no single controlling authority over the project. The project managers and the engineering managers have to work together. At a TRA level the engineering team can kill work immediately. Thats the whole purpose of the TRA
The engineers do not come up with the schedules.
The engineers are not allowed to halt the program to complete things like fundamental model validation or coupon testing. Instead the thing has to go half-cocked to meet some bloody deadline on some irrelevant spreadsheet.
thats nonsense. the program schedule has to be approved and validated by all – its not just the project management vision.
It pretty much is the project management vision. It bears no resemblance to reality whatsoever.
changes to scope, changes to load are immediately put through change control processes and have to be blessed by the approp review group
Yeah, changes. I’m not talking changes – I’m talking the initial **** up in schedules and the inertial of the program team preventing a total stop until fundamental ground work is complete.
and yet its not just the project managers who develop and initiate the timelines.
Yes it is.
They can’t “fudge” dates even if they wanted to.
ha ha ha.
How do you “pass” a CDR without any stress results – none – not a thing?
I know this has happened. I’ve seen it for myself.
BAE is using concurrency on other programs, as are Dassault, and I would strongly assume, Sukhoi. If you develop a platform the reality is with modern ewarfare and ecomm systems that a critical element is going to be done concurrently. Waterfall and Stovepiping have failed miserably to deal with modern ewarfare and weapons systems developments.
An almost perfect example of what I was saying earlier.
By and by large, every project manager I have met has virtually no grasp on even the fundamentals of the technical issues they are “managing”. They are mostly clueless and as a result mostly place emphasis on the unimportant.
How much does a line of code weigh?
How does it affect airframe fatigue or buffeting?
Except project management isn’t done in isolation of the engineers.
It pretty much is. They live in a f**king dreamworld.
and no changes to how production can be made without the endorsement of the engineers, project sponsors (eg Government) and the Capability managers (who has to approve any production or build issues in consultation with the user/principle stackholders – ie Govt)
When the dreamers dream up the program schedule and the resulting ridiculous deadlines without pausing to consider what will need to be investigated – then changes are inevitable as production cannot begin due to late delivery of design.
Your approaching it **** about face…
in fact its the engineers who identify rapid changes that can be made and then propose them for review and endorsement.
Yep – the subsequent changes required to get the program technically ready. Changes (incurring additional expense and more time) that would not be required if the proper time was allocated up front to the task.
I can’t do squat without my engineers blessing every change, and they have the authority as they ARE the technical regulatory authority which I have to ensure that I comply with. As the TRA they are independant and can stop the project at ANY time. and I have seen it done.
You make the program timescales.
We cannot meet them as you don’t know what youse are doing when you dream them up.
It eventually gets to a point where the engineers say – stop, its simply not gonna work, this plan is getting too ridiculous. Then the whole thing goes through the “pain” of “delays” till it gets out the door… in a botched fashion with subsequent (expensive) fixes through production.
But, for much of the project, the engineers are powerless to stop stupid short cutting to meet deadlines.
IYO, what would it cost to keep 3000+ 4th gen fighters flying (plus the associated increased pressure on IFR, escort, etc assets) for the 8-10 added years that it would take to complete SDD?
Now compare that cost to increased concurrency costs. Which one is higher?
Hmmm…..
If the DoD wanted a cheap way of replacing their fighters on time, they would have started the F-35 program earlier.
In answer to your question; concurrency will be higher – as they will have to extend the hours of the 4gen fighters anyway – since the “5”th (and I use that term loosely) gen “fighter” (and I use that term even more loosely) is likely to have insufficient capabilities (i.e. A2A modes not yet enabled) or is likely to be grounded when needed due to yet another defect that would not have existed with the usual waterfall (prototype-to-build) approach.
Put like this; what will cost more – replacing with known components that have known lives on a known frame… or replacing with unknown components with unknown lives on an unknown frame?
The former is a simple case of build more parts with existing toolsets then fixing them. The latter is designing new parts, testing them, installing them and then seeing the result over service (which may require yet more mods).
Oh and “plus the associated increased pressure on IFR, escort, etc assets” is a complete red herring. Additional support beyond what the new aircraft would need is not required for the conflicts the USAF are involved in these days.
One thing to keep in mind is that concurrency was a DoD plan put in place to save time and money. While there will always be increased “upgrade” costs associated with early LRIP fighters, the overall cost is kept down.
Sorry, that is bull.
Concurrency is a scheme advocated by project managers who think their stupid little Gantt charts and even more stupid little excel sheets with red, yellow and green boxes actually mean anything. The A350, B787, A400M and A380 all used concurrency and all suffered greatly for it.
By and by large, every project manager I have met has virtually no grasp on even the fundamentals of the technical issues they are “managing”. They are mostly clueless and as a result mostly place emphasis on the unimportant.
Any engineer will tell you, if the program doesn’t start right, then it’ll fall apart. No foundations = f**ked. Yet the program managers will sacrifice everything to keep the program on track, particularly at the start – even though it is at that point where most of the big unknowns are encountered and have to be shook out. Therefore the foundations get sacrificed and as time progresses, with the program lagging behind time and budget, they get ever more desperate to make the program “appear” on track so cut even more corners. Right up until the point where they can hide it no longer.
Ridiculous.
Concurrency is a complete waste of time, money and energy.
If the DoD wanted a cheap way of replacing their fighters on time, they would have started the F-35 program earlier. Its not as if it crept out of nowhere – how long was JAST/JSF running?
Can people not accept that Boeing answered a call from 2 loyal customers who wanted a DC-10/L1011 replacement that would fit into their existing fleet.
The 767-400 is just that.
Airframers do not build aircraft for the fun of it.
Building a variant costs extremely large amounts of money, it is not done just for “2 loyal customers”, unless said 2 loyal customers will buy so many they will pay the development cost.
Thinking otherwise is extremely naive.
No one would call the A340-200 unpopular or a failure. The 764 sold more copies than it did.
The whole A340 program was a failure and was unpopular. The A330 paid for the A340; the 340 program by itself would never have paid its development costs.
While there may be many reasons for good Frenchmen to rejoice that they left the Eurofighter programme, it seems self evident that the French share of costs of a five nation Typhoon programme would have been much less than the 100% share of a single nation programme
You’d be surprised at how non-linear the scaling would be.
It also meant the French got the aircraft they wanted and are not as a result drawn into the JSF debacle.
Now, the Brits only wish they were as forward thinking as the French were when they insisted on a carrier capable aircraft when the ECA was being drawn up.
Swiss politics decided to look at the price argument only without looking at the overall operational effectiveness.
No, they looked at both.
Question: Is the Rafale ~25% better than the Gripen? (4.something billion vs. 3.something billion)
Question: When is the last time the Swiss air force used its aircraft in anger?
They made the blindingly obvious and correct decision in going with Gripen ahead of Rafale.
So is it a strengthening measure – rather than aerodynamic ??
Wing fences are not strengthening.
The wing-tip pod may have its weight biased forward, which may help to alleviate aero-elastic effects somewhat by moving the local flexural centre forward.