Hmmm… riddle me this one folks:
Although Boeing says its Block 1 versions will all meet the performance guarantees to individual customers, it acknowledges that the aircraft are overweight and suffering fuel-burn shortfalls.
Are Boeing’s customer guaranteed targets quite conservative so they can miss design targets and meet guarantees? Therefore the shortfall is relative to design target?
Or is that sentence nonsensical?
Please elucidate with regard to “hard limit authority.”
Hard limits is not the problem. I agree with you that Airbus has hard limit authority.
Your use of the term “full authority” for Boeing is what the problem is.
They have soft limits; both in rates and absolutes. They may even have hard limits on some rates – but that I am not sure of.
Is the floor structure under/around door 1L (or 2L on occassions) reinforced to account for the increased usage?
Oh no no.
The extra load of a few people walking along the aisle would be nothing compared to the limit load case (a vertical crash commencing at 30 m/s I think – maybe!)
Mods, can we just lock this thread?
Behave.
The thread title is about A380 production numbers.
Ollie is just adding more info to it on a continuous basis.
OK, new posts (not production related) would be quickly lost; but just use a new thread for it.
If you don’t like the thread – don’t read it. As long as everyone knows it is A380 production status updates only, then there is no harm whatsoever in it.
I’m surprised there is not more awareness of this basic difference in flight control philosophy.
I’m well aware of it – Boeing even tried to use it as a differentiator in the KC-X competition.
Your use of the term
full authority
Implies things that I have since found not to be true.
As I thought was the case, Boeing have kept with soft-limit authority. Airbus has hard-limit authority.
The 787 has full authority (no artificial hard limits ala Airbus) fly by wire flight controls and many computers.
No yaw damping?
Please keep stringent electronic records and written records avoiding using liquid paper [delete with a line through and initial and date so change is visible].When things slip or cheating is evident – please go to your management and if they don’t do anything think hard of the next best course of action.
WTF!?!
Sorry – way too busy actually working to waste my time maintaining some stupid needless tracker.
The place is coming down in project managers with their bloody pointless trackers – pretty much one of the big reasons so many projects are going wrong – they think they can “manage” the unknown. Idiots.
I am not sure though in civil test flying if a parachute pack is part of the regulation safety issue.
It is.
Indeed, there has been a requirement for having a means of exiting the aircraft assuming the doors don’t work.
This is usually accomplished by exploding the a section of the skin away or having explosive bolts on a door.
Actually… I’m not 100% sure if this requirement is still active… anyone? I would guess it is…
That settles it you’d never wish to be a test pilot I guess :rolleyes:
I know I would.:D
I’d love to be, and had considered going down that route.
Test pilots can play with parachutes… not that it would make much difference in the failure scenarios envisaged.
I have a horrible feeling that the concerns (not just of mine, but of many other engineers working on the programs!) will become acutely clear over the next few years.
When engineers are being forced to meet unrealistic timescales by managers who understand the technical issues only on the most abstract level, who in turn have been forced into a corner by marketing people and airlines insisting that composites be used, it is not inductive to a good environment to make an aircraft using new and potentially dangerous technology.
I’ll be delighted if I am wrong though – but I fear MSR777’s comparison with the comet may prove grimly apt.
That is why ramps, loading platforms, and ground service are being managed a ‘tad’ differently and so will repairs to any external fabric damage be different at customer locations or back at Boeing.
The bu!!sh!t approach to dealing with potential problems.
You reckon some wee guy on $3/hr out in, I dunno, pick anywhere, could be in India, could be China, could be the US (ok, bit more than $3/hr then), Europe wherever… is gonna admit to knocking into the aircraft if he doesn’t see a dent?
“Managed” :rolleyes:
You sound like your about 16 years old putting in a sentence like that.
I fear (as do many others) Boeing, Bombardier and Airbus have jumped 5-10 years too soon. They are all using badly understood black-metals to build their aircraft ‘cos the marketing “gurus” dictated so. Its a bit like Intel with the Netburst Pentium… and we all know how that worked out.
I look forward to flying on one, as I do the A350.
Really?
I (along with many others) am going to be actively avoiding both of them for at least the next 10 years.
Also, perhaps the industry has a potential for improvement when it comes to preparing flight crews for dealing with problems outside the scope of existing SOP. As far as I know, this is a known issue.
Hmm… there is a thought.
Instead of focusing on immediately fixing/compensating for an/the issue, perhaps crews should be taught the first objective is simply to buy yourself time. i.e. put the thing into a position where you know you’ll have a relatively slow descent (for example, a nose down angle of 3 degrees and 50-60% N1*).
So what if you lose altitude, squawk it to anyone around and veer out of the lane. You can turn & climb back in later on when the problem is fixed, or ad-hoc’d.
Obviously not applicable for loss of engines, but the problem then is immediately obvious.
The last thing the travelling public need is line pilots acting like test pilots.
😀
Thinking… not acting!
Well no. Alot of us have been in the same conditions, the type of aircraft is largely irrelevant because my argument to Amiga is all about what it is like to operate in those kind of conditions, i.e. in a thunderstorm, in severe turbulence, in severe icing, whereas he is sat in his little armchair sipping soup in front the fire pretending he knows what it is like. If he has then fair play, but he has chosen to ignore this part of the argument because he most likely hasn’t.
Not in icing thankfully.
But, that is pretty much irrelevant. Again, as I said earlier, I’m not commenting on this on my personal experiences of flying – I’m commenting as an engineer.
The thought process is completely wrong, and it is completely wrong because too many pilots don’t think but blindly follow numbers. “Oh, thats too high, I need to reduce it” and visa versa. No thought of “why is that too high?”.
Maybe I am being unfair as I would think more along the lines of a test pilot than a regular line pilot – but I don’t see it as unreasonable to expect a line pilot to think along those lines either.