One rather important point among the LM propaganda: How much do they actually know about how the “other guys’ systems” work?
Probably a reasonable amount about the in-service Super Hornet Block II, is the answer – but that’s more than a decade ahead of F-35 3F, which is the only standard that the Navy’s going to accept. Two years ago (the date of Spud’s slides) they knew almost nothing about Advanced SH and its big-screen cockpit.
Rafale, Typhoon and Gripen C/D? In 2011 LM sent a guy to a European conference to talk F-35 datalinks. He had no knowledge at all of Sweden’s experience. So I’m guessing that at best, they know what they read in the media. Fort Worth’s once-mighty competitor intelligence system is a shadow of its old self.
So how much do you think that they know about JAS 39E?
Also: Who’s to say that the hardware-interconnected approach is better than a correlated approach, given the processing I can attach to each sensor today? And can anyone see a problem with “automated ID and RoE”?
DJC – Leave it to journalists to get it wrong.
So exactly how long can you sustain F-35 operations if ALIS malfunctions for any reason? Can you explain to the class how it operates globally while being air-gapped from any other network?
Not sure what “pulse for pulse” means in operational terms. But someone may be talking about the use of digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) which does permit you to memorize, distort and retransmit the incoming signal much more rapidly than older technology. This means that you are much better able to jam an unpredictably changing signal. On the other hand, anyone who thinks that DRFM is exclusive to the F-22/F-35 needs to get out more.
If it is ASQ-239 that he’s talking about, then he is right as long as the threat has 1980s technology (analog RWR, no modern IRST, no networking) and is actively participating in its own demise through profligate use of radar. ALR-94 and ASQ-239 capes are real, but get less exclusive every year.
djc – “In some measure, the OT report disregards the fact that the test program is only half complete.” I don’t think this is true. The report methodology has been to track historical progress against plan, and project any shortfall forward. I don’t think the program has ever beaten DOT&E’s projections.
Gilmore doesn’t talk off the cuff very much, but this may be interesting:
The government can now frame it as “do you want an AF in 10-15 years’ time, or not”?
I would think that it would make more sense to sell or lease C/Ds if the opportunity is there, rather than using a few of their parts to make E models. I find no source suggesting that there will be many C parts in the Swedish Es. And as long as the flyaway unit cost is $42m fixed, does it matter?
2. The “Procurement Unit Cost” or PUC he keeps quoting INCLUDES development and will change from year to year and get higher as the flight hours get higher. Btw, when dev ends so do the dev costs. Funny how he does not take that into account.
I believe that’s incorrect. The charts above state specifically “Annual Procurement Costs Only”. They also align with the P-40 numbers.
3. The PUC INCLUDES items that are only bought early in the program like simulators and new base stand-up costs. Again, he thinks these will go on forever.
Not forever, but as long as you are building new aircraft.
Why don’t you back up your insults with data, Spud? Show (with citations) where WW
– mixes up REC, Flyaway, and total cost numbers (rather than pointing out that a URF is not what the customer pays for a flyable jet on the ramp)
– mixes in Concurrency and upgrade costs into the annual mix (for bonus credibility, explain why those are not to be counted in the procurement cost)
– “pretends” that LRIP costs are what the costs will be going forwards (rather than observing that the cost has been somewhat flat since LRIP 2).
I don’t expect you to do any of this, of course.
I would not draw conclusions from any comparison between an Indian contract and a DoD contract.
The Swiss CAS said that the CPFH for Gripen was half that of Rafale/EF. As for predictions about the JAS 39E: airframe and systems are largely known, engine is known. Avionics can mostly be extrapolated from known quantities (eg Selex AESA installed base, Typhoon IRST).
“Screaming Mee Mee Of The Apocalypse”.
“I’ll take AIPAC’s Response to Gulf Getting Stealth Fighters for $50 Billion, Alex”.
It might be a good time to whack the “great little fighter” meme over the head with a lead pipe.
The most comparable types out there are the Typhoon and Rafale. I would argue that they both do just one thing better than JAS 39E: carry six AAMs and a large A-G load at the same time. In addition, Typhoon is faster and Rafale has ultimately more payload and range. These differences, in operational and strategic terms, are at the margin, and cost 2x in LCC.
And if you set the 39E and F-35 side by side, it’s rather obvious to the meanest intelligence that one is a “fighter” in the way we have understood that term since the 1960s, and the other is a marginally supersonic-dash-capable bomber with some self-defense capability.
It has a 27 millimeter Mauser, which is either a big gun or a very small cat.
Glendora – I did some measurements on Google Earth and that particular shelter is about 70 feet across… which makes the UAV 60-some feet tip to tip, which suggests an X-47B.
Stealth and speed/altitude are both elements of survivability. You can look at the Blackbird, ISINGLASS, the RQ-180, the F-22 and the T-50 and they all represent different trades, at different cost levels.