Don’t hold back, Spud, tell us how you really feel…
Not really. Carrier testing is just one of the remaining risk areas, but as DOT&E has made clear, the big one is still software schedule. Since the USMC is going for IOC with 2B software, wedded to original hardware, and the Navy is sticking to 3F, additional Bs and Cs have nowhere to go until 3F is available.
The value of generating more than a silver-bullet force of Air Force IOC configurations (3i/TR-2) is debatable – it’s certainly time-limited.
Seriously, this is a debate?
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ESM provides 2D (Az-El) data unless it is multi-ship, which is challenging with a short datalink burst. It is a useful cue for other sensors but that is not the case under discussion.
The ESM of the F-22 is so good about detecting datalinks that it can fire an AMRAAM just on that information.
Not that it will hit anything unless the tomfool meat servo in the target is banging on like some digital Rush Limbaugh, but it can fire it.
A good first-order guess is that MADL will not be very high bandwidth, for two reasons. First, it doesn’t have to be and secondly, high bandwidth is inherently compromising to LPI/LPD, because the first rule of LPI/LPD is not to emit at all if it can be avoided.
If the MADL team has done its homework they will realize that the amount of data that needs to pass via an intraflight link is quite small; fuel and weapons state, position and energy state and target or signature data (location, track, ID and metadata, such as which sensor has detected it). You don’t need to send images, because MADL data comes out of one sensor fusion engine into another identical one. The Swedes grasped that years ago with TIDLS and compare two Gripens to human twins, who understand each other with a minimum of words.
Connecting MADL with the world outside the red bubble, OTOH, remains a challenge. Note in BiO’s last slide that the ex-bubble connections are confined to RCDL (radar common datalink), a high speed, narrow band burst out of the radar array, direct to an AWACS (and it only works +_ 60 deg. off the nose): a daisy-chain to a nearby F-35: and a B-2 (probably something else, actually) that has MADL and secure satcoms. All a bit complex to implement.
I don’t think that there is any evidence that the DoD held SDD spending down. If you look at the profile, SDD is already a small and declining percentage of program funding.
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652948.pdf, page 24
Throwing more assets at the problem does not work in and of itself, although note that the post-2010 restructure included more assets on the critical path of software.
Along with DJCross and the “blame the test mafia” meme, this is another comforting myth for JSF supporters.
I think one of the biggest errors in planning during SDD was the decision on how to address increased test & development demands. The DoD decided to delay IOC (in order to maintain year-to-year SDD funding) rather than increase year-to-year funding with an eye towards keeping to the schedule.
I don’t know at what point in the last few years you think that happened. But given the fact that production is only now getting on schedule, and the double-digit-month delays in the delivery of most of the SDD jets, I doubt that there was a point where pouring in more SDD money would have helped. Ever tried to clear a clogged toilet with a second flush?
BiO – IRST mode on a pod (and EOTS is no more advanced than the latest pods) is not the same as a dedicated IRST. The pod has a focal plane array with optics that zoom out to an image area, and a slew mechanism that matches target and platform movement. The IRST is a telescope with high magnification and small field of view, and has a very fast mechanical scanning mechanism (fast enough for a navigation video on the Typhoon). Thus, although its instantaneous field of view is smaller than the EO pod, its ability to scan a large area may well be better.
Note that Singapore and Korea (followed by Saudi) have IRST on F-15s, in addition to modern targeting pods, which does imply that the capabilities of the two systems are different.
Trident – The Sus shown at early air shows (Paris 89, Farnborough 90) did have vortex trippers. Just rechecked an old photo.
A few random thoughts…
Obligatory’s fascinating link to the analysis of the Gripen points to some canard advantages that US commentators tend to overlook, including very neat packaging with the engine(s) right at the back and no structure to carry H-stab loads around them. Consider also that the original Gripen has much the same fuel fraction as its bigger contemporaries despite the fact that things like the cockpit, radar and other avionics, and the gun don’t scale.
Higher sweep also seems to avoid buffet and transonic roll-off. The art is to avoid pitfalls, such as the canard wash interacting with the wing.
One thing I’d add about the Gripen is that, like the MiG-29 and (I believe) the Su-27, it has small aero devices on the tip of the radome to trip vortices consistently and symmetrically. IIRC from long-ago discussions, asymmetrical vortices are one reason for alpha limits on some aircraft.
On the Phoon and ALSR: One goal was to achieve high supersonic maneuverability without TV. I have been told on occasion that (1) the Phoon is near neutrally stable supersonic, (2) that it would be about neutrally stable without the canard and (3) even in early flight tests with nose ballast it was less stable (subsonic) than anything except the Grumman X-29 FSW. The low-speed departure was a BFD, and kept from becoming a big issue (at a point where the Germans were wobbly about the whole program) with the help of BAE’s little friends, to wit:
I don’t think Dassault or its customers were as sold on supersonic maneuver as the UK and Germany had become, and I suspect that the Rafale doesn’t tread as far into the instability zone as Typhoon.
BiO – When you do assessment-by-comparison, my experience has shown that the most reliable way to do it is to minimize assumptions and go with the classic specifics of wing loading, thrust/weight ratio and fuel fraction. If the technology base is similar (for instance, comparing the F-4 to a modern aircraft gets risky) it will point you in the right direction. You also have to be clear about loadings and mission profiles. And I agree that trying to extrapolate into E/M diagrams is risky, which is why I don’t do it – there are lots of things that affect aerodynamic efficiency or can crimp or expand the envelope.
And sometimes you can be thrown off by technical surprise. Way back when, it was very difficult to reconcile what we knew about the MiG-25, post-Belenko, with the range and speed seen in radar tracks from the Sinai and western Europe. It turned out that the former were flown with the 5300 liter drop tank and the latter were Tu-123 drones, neither of which were public knowledge – indeed, I’m not sure that Western intel knew much about either of them, and if they did it was from such sensitive sources that it was little disseminated.
BiO – Ol’ Sarge Mac-and-Cheese says he knows how to spell “assume” but there are some pretty big assumptions in that series. Max STR is only one element of air combat kinematics, and not the only area where the F-35 may not match its contemporaries – and the relaxation of STR specs does not bode well for other performance aspects because it can only mean that the aerodynamic or propulsive efficiency is not where it was projected to be. And speaking of contemporaries, the F-16A was designed 40 years ago, and it’s another large assumption to say that it’s still the gold standard in STR or anything else. And indeed, Mac-and-Cheese’s evidence that it was the gold standard almost 30 years ago is a set of documents out of Fort Worth. He doesn’t indicate that he knows who most likely compiled them. I do, and it’s fair to say that the author doesn’t share the good Sgt’s enthusiasm for the F-35.
Well, good-oh. Let’s see if that works out better than your 2010 prediction that Block 5 would be operational with six internal AMRAAMs in 2017-18.
Sure WW. Just like this plan:
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