Relying on Osprey support could be entertaining given the relationship between Osprey payload/range and the F-35’s fuel load. Trucks? Have you not watched the news for the last ten years?

The JAS 39E is particularly interesting in comparison to the F-35B, since the Marines talk in practice about using 3,000-foot runways for the B.

Also, so far it looks as if the 39E will reach full-capability IOC before the F-35, while the 2B/3I interim configuration looks less useful by the minute.

The Gripen’s biggest problem is that Sweden has almost nothing to offer in terms of political quid pro quos, which play a huge role in fighter acquisitions. On the plus side, many air force leaders and defense ministries around the world are only just beginning to realize that the pounding sensation on their heads is Adam Smith wielding the clue-by-four.

For instance, when the US service leaders lined up on June 19 for their rah-rah-JSF session before the Senate, nobody asked them what they were ready to sacrifice to get their planned F-35 numbers.

It’s amusing when people cite ASH as a “risk” or “unknown quantity” versus a jet that has failed the most basic carrier qualifications, failed fly-in arrests with a redesigned hook, and that is now going for bite 3 with another hook redesign which has yet to be installed on an aircraft.

ASH also comes with largely developed, tested and service-proven software, which is a bit of a big deal. It will cost somewhat more than the current SH, with a few additional bells and whistles, but even at a 15 per cent price increase (remember that avionics, basic structure and systems &c are largely untouched) it is cheaper than F-35C (Average Procurement Unit Cost projected to be $115 m in BY2012 dollars, at full production rate and including the engine).

It’s not an either-or choice in any case. It is now obvious to the meanest intelligence (you know who you are) that the Navy will have lots of SHs well into the 2030s, so plenty of time for the benefits of an MLU to be realized.

On the acceleration: Boeing has been quoted on that number with CFTs and the weapon pod, and the uprated engines.

Re 767s and 787s: Not sure that the maintenance costs are much lower. The bulk of the op cost saving is fuel and most of that is engine cycle and SFC, with some help from aerodynamics.

Reading is hard!

Also, given that the structure, engine, and many systems of the F-35 are similar to those of other fighters, and that it burns the same fuel, to airily dismiss any calculations of operating cost as “based on 4gen” seems illogical.

The Navy and AF requirements – strike-led, no supercruise, 2x2k internal – would have been met by identical or closely related designs, as the French did (that is, the CV/CTOL bit) with no trouble at all. Moreover, an excellent powerplant in the correct size range (2xF414s) was available off the shelf with untapped growth potential.

A sensible national strategy would then have evaluated the cost and value of meeting Marine requirements, which would first have meant defining them. Organic CAS was the core and anything more than rudimentary air-to-air was a 1980s add-on with AV-8B Plus. Adding stealth and making the Marine version the basis of the Navy and AF versions would have been seen as illogical.

It might have been possible to develop a Marine/UK(RN+RAF) ASTOVL with some common avionics and other core techs to the AF/Navy aircraft, most likely with an advanced F110-type engine and LPLC, but as we have seen adding stealth to the mix results in an unaffordable solution (eg Marines still operating AV-8B when the basic design is 70 years old).

The other problem is that making the jet supersonic means making it bigger, and this diminishes flexibility, both in terms of a ship’s ability to support more than a handful of aircraft, and in austere base ops.

The better answer for the Marines would have been Harrier III with a new engine and flight controls, while the RN – if what it wanted was a strike carrier – would have been pushed down the road to a CATOBAR solution because the ship gets big enough to do that anyway.

Unfortunately, what prevented this from taking place was that (1) the contractors promised the moon at a discount, in terms of a cheap jet that would do everything and monopolize the global market, (2) the civilian leadership, elected and executive, bought the idea as a way to seem to address TacAir needs while punting the big bills to a post-2000 administration and (3) the military had been de-skilled in procurement and was unable to argue that the plan was infeasible.

You’re using AIM-120A/B capabilities, in making this assessment. Just as a refresher, we can go over some of the range improvements that have occurred over time. The C5 variant’s range is ~50-60+ percent further than the early models. The C7 variant improves upon this by a tactically significant margin. The D model has a ~50% improvement in range over the C7.

Errr… sure about this? Cos if “tactically significant” is >20 per cent that is a threefold range improvement with the same motor + 7-inch stretch.

The D is a bit of a mystery. My own guess FWIW is that the main function of its long-range improvement is to allow interceptors with AESA to do shoot-look-shoot against a cruise missile attack.

Loke – Three observations. The first is that, regardless of merit or risk, SK is looking at three very different offers, whether in terms of capability, industrial participation or technology transfer. Second, KFX is the X factor and highly controversial in itself. Third, the conflicting signals emanating from Korean sources indicate vigorous internal log-rolling in process.

PS – Snafu is right about Eurofighter…