DJ – You are going to see some differences between 12 and 80-100, but in US fighters we are not going to see that relationship. F-35 will run under 150 at the absolute max, versus 40-plus for the F-18.
However, if you look at commercial lines, you don’t see a vast difference between what’s automated and what is done by hand as you go from A320/737 to 747/A380. Machining, tape-laying, riveting are automated. Assembly is largely done by hand. Regardless of rate that is the optimum way of doing the job with today’s technology.
What a lot of people miss is that once you step down from final through module assembly (the second being where most of the assembly hours are) and get into components, you are into a supply-chain that gets increasingly type-agnostic. A door or a rudder or a bulkhead for one aircraft looks a whole lot like the door or rudder &c for another one.
Spud – War is not subject to the economics of package tours. Fine if you have a target with eight points of impact that each justify two 2k bombs, and can be hit on the same pass. Not many of those, all things considered.
Hopefully, Congress will not reduce F-35 yearly quantities until after production efficiencies are incorporated into the build sequence and unit cost has stabilized.
Worthy sentiments but the wrong way to go about it. The time to plan for rates that the customers can afford was yesterday, but failing that, now. It’s entirely possible to build at lower rates than the F-35 program fantasizes about, without a vast increase in unit cost (even the full-rate cost/lb is still high). The priority should be on testing and freezing the design (not on bogus MCAS Potemkin IOCs) which allows you to get rid of the production engineering apparatus early. Then, prioritize lean over automated and shed overhead all the way up the food chain.
DS – Are you some kind of trollbot? Have you made a single constructive point in 38 posts? Checks – negative. IGNORE FUNCTION GO
Exactly. It has also broken the Pentagon’s bank. The price of its acquisition on the current plan is foregoing all other major new systems and still going into 2030 with 50 per cent of USAF TacAir assets being 35+ years old.
Of course, what also went downtown in all recent conflicts, often ahead of the stealth aircraft, were cruise missiles – many of which can now reliably strike fixed precision targets autonomously, using imaging IR sensors, with a hard-target munition. That was basically what the F-117 did in GW1.
Using a lot of CMs is expensive. But so, it appears, is developing a stealthy manned aircraft that is more than an F-117-type one-vanishing-trick pony. And that’s historical fact.
As for operational flexibility: Yes, you can do some missions with less support. The price is that you buy an aircraft that depends for survival on a single attribute – one that you can’t change materially/affordably over the lifecycle of the aircraft, from the first RFP to the last ferry to AMARC. Doesn’t sound too flexible to me.
Contrariwise, Tu-22M, Spud’s proposed standard is an excellent idea…
… as long as your paycheck comes from the JSF program, whose shills and bunco-artist marketeers can conflate their optimistic costs with their fantasy assessments of effectiveness, thereby creating a critical mass of waffle large enough to demolish Alderaan three times over.
A500 and MC have this about right. In that scenario, the combination of a high performance missile such as Meteor or “Python 6” and wide-angle detection systems such as ESA+mechanical radar and IRST becomes very important, which is why these things exist. The ability to pull significant g at supersonic speeds, and the kinematics needed to recover energy quickly, are also important.
If you are up against an LO aircraft, as A500 says, the goal may be to concede the first look but deny the first shot.
The only big question mark over tactics of this kind is whether they are too complex to be applied in combat.
LockMart’s 6:1 LER scenario (4 JSFs versus 8 threats) is interesting in this regard. I don’t see how it can work unless Blue gets missiles away in time to avoid the merge with the survivors, since Blue has to use most or all of its 16 missiles right away to have a chance of taking out the majority of the Reds – not much chance to do shoot-look-shoot. It is highly dependent on the difference in detection/track range between the two sides.
It’s been busy, however…
..Can’t fly, turn, climb BS goes to fans
Well, yes, it can fly, turn and climb. The point was that its kinematics are no great advance on 16/18 and therefore unexciting against more contemporary aircraft.
The context was always “can’t do these things well enough to control the engagement”.
..EODAS goes to fans
..Helmet goes to fans
Neither of those things has been validated as working together, let alone doing anything tactically useful.
..VLO airframe goes to fans
Define VLO. But it’s not controversial that the F-35 is stealthy – the question is whether the stealth is worth the trades.
..Superb radar goes to fans
..Superb RwR goes to fans
How much better than a 2018-IOC version of anything else?
..A2A performance goes to fans
On what basis? Powerpoints from people who have been proven to make inaccurate claims?
… and so on.
Really, you should try not to get so excited.
David,
Here’s a simple question: Concerning what the program has accomplished and demonstrated so far, who has been right, the fans or the critics?
(Protip: Look at the some 2008-09 schedule projections from the JPO or LockMart.)
Question 2, is it correct or not to be concerned about lousy schedule and cost performance on a project that (according to its own business plan) is the foundation of US and allied airpower for the first half of the century?
Question 3, when the story about how wonderful the F-35 will be is the same as the story that was being sold in 2008-09, alongside those fictional schedules, would it not be rather naive to swallow said story whole?
US Navy’s answer to surface warships appears to be better ASuW missiles. And if you do launch them from a fighter you exit the scene immediately rather than hanging around giving them EW support.
Another indication of someone who is out of logical arguments is that they use terms like “sheeple”.
Horde is not Kopp.
That aside, APA’s advocacy has changed over the years, but then, so has the threat.
APA has concluded that only F-22-like stealth + high performance will sustain air dominance against double-digit SAMs, counter-LO technology and a threat force including Su-35S (or equivalents) and J-20/T-50. They therefore adhere to the view that the US should revive and update F-22 (think B-1) and that Australia should acquire it.
You can disagree with this point of view if you like, but it is founded in threat assessment, logic, analysis and high-level simulation. And yes, Virginia, there are a hell of a lot of serious people out there, who don’t all work for the competition, who at least agree with APA that the plan to base airpower for decades on the F-35 is flawed programatically, operationally and strategically, and that we need a Plan B, even if they don’t agree that Plan B is an F-22.
And by the way, APA (like other critics) has been proven right on the programmatic bit, while the program leaders and fans were wrong. Operationally, note users like the USN diverging discreetly from the orthodoxy (pushed by shills) that the F-35 is the ultimate answer to all air combat questions. Strategically – it’s early to call, but watch for USAF to pull back from the PoR production rates to protect other things that are (even today) more important.
Very pretty. I have not heard anything but would not be surprised either way.
Spud – I take it that you have read “1984”?
How can LM have stated that six major elements of CPFH (upper slide) are half or less of an F-16, and that O&S overall is 80 per cent of an F-16, and not be claiming a lower CPFH?
To put it another way, how in the **** are those very specific claims compatible with a CPFH that is not lower than an F-16?
Actually, I’m not sure that the people making those claims lied. Because I don’t think that in 2007 (or 2008, 2009 or 2010 for that matter) anyone in charge, from Burbage and Davis/Heinz all the way up to Gates, had a scintilla of a ghost of a clue how much the airplane would cost to build, let alone how much it would cost to fix. The people who were lying were lower down the chain, telling their bosses or their customer (if they were subs) that everything was going great.
Thobbes – Lockheed Martin “technically lied”? Since they did so in order to promote their business interests, isn’t that “technically” fraud? For which people get “technically” sent to PMITA jail?