An update to an old pod does not automatically make it better than Spectra or Praetorian. That’s an unsupportable statement. And as any fule kno the F-16C does not have AESA. And as even bigger fules kno, nobody has claimed that A-10 is superior to anything against fighters or RF missiles.
And assuming (you know how to spell ASSUME, don’t you?) that the threats were advanced is faith-based. No logic involved.
So let’s get the argument straight. Against an unspecified threat with unspecified RoEs, F-35s proved more survivable than 40-year-old designs with unspecified self-protection systems. We know no more than that.
Nobody respectable has ever argued that this could not happen, either. The issue is the relative capability of the F-35 versus contemporary aircraft and its relative survivability against advanced threats.
I think you may have misunderstood me. I mentioned “evidence” not “fanboy opinions”. Besides, USAF F-16s are not particularly modern or well equipped.
On further checking the A-10 has indeed had the rather ancient AAR-47 installed. And how new/capable is any pod on the USAF F-16 fleet?
It’s not at all surprising that you could construct a fighter and GBADS threat that would drop A-10s and USAF F-16s and fail to engage F-35s. The A-10 is not a fighter and doesn’t even have MAWS, I believe. The USAF F-16 has primitive MAWS and RWR and no active EW. If those jets did not have Growler and F-15 cover the exercise was a joke, and its public portrayal a fraud.
Also, there are no grounds to conclude from the evidence here that contemporary, properly equipped jets like Rafales or Gripens or Sufas would not have done as well or better than the F-35.
I have heard it suggested that after seeing the price tags for MLUs on the F-16 Block 60 and the M2000-9, the UAE has sworn a horrible oath to never bankroll anything UAE-unique again.
Besides, Dassault/DGA seem to be doing a decent enough job of MLU-avoidance via gradual upgrades.
FBW – Those changes had to do with making the airplane fly (which the winning ATF design would not). And certainly by 1990 the challenges involved were well understood and there would have been no tightening of requirements.
I doubt greatly that anyone drafting the ATF requirement in 1986 would have aimed at sub-117 RCS numbers. It would have been crazy to do that while pushing for supercruise, agility/maneuverability and tactical R&M.
Likewise, why would the JSF JORD have tried to undercut F-22 numbers? The critical requirements were low cost and exportability.
The F-35 stealthiness is a bit better than the B-2 bomber,
That sounds improbable, unless over a specific bandwidth and aspect. And is that sourced to anywhere except Dunnigan? The golf-ball/marble analogy was reported by Dave Fulghum in 2009, cited here…
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31673.pdf
…but not a word about the B-2 or F-117. And to cite that comparison is to presume that Fulghum knows better than Mike Hostage, who as we all know declared last year that the F-35 was stealthier than the F-22, so I would presume that the f-16.net fankiddies will now burn you as a heretic. Roast Spuds om nom nom nom.
Not only is the F-35 a “generation” beyond the F-117 in terms of stealth
Please provide evidence that its RCS is significantly lower than the F-117’s.
Still it is not anymore like during the first gulf war, it would no more possible now to send an aircraft against a modern, updated air defense network by stealth alone.
They didn’t do it then, either…
It seems illogical to think that a market so small that it has already contracted to two US players and three Western companies/teams will now support new entrants.
Stealth airplanes with line of sight would provide EA support to stealthy missiles in terminal phase to counter ship’s CIWS.
Wot? Jamming a CIWS, which has a range in single-digit-km, from standoff distance is going to take you a few jillion watts at the transmitter.
There certainly hasn’t been a hate storm for 15 years.
There was no public challenge to the program in 2000.
GAO started asking questions about schedule in 2006, at Navair’s prompting.
Even Kopp’s first critical report is dated Jan 2007, which is eight years, not 15. Even then, only a paranoid lunatic would have called the criticism at that time a “hate storm”.
If Lukos or Siddar want to present evidence to the contrary – a surge of hostility prior to 2007 – please either do so or shut up. (Although I know you can’t do the first and won’t do the second).
DJC – You specifically mentioned stealth aircraft. Stealth missiles are a threat, of course, but so are very fast sea-skimmers that are hard to detect, stealthy or not. So switching your argument against the CNO to missiles is disingenuous. And as you know very well, the DDG-1000 is completely irrelevant: the decision to stop at three ships was taken three years before Greenert became CNO.
Vnomad – Are you saying that being a submariner makes a person unable to comprehend the advice of air warfare experts?
DJC – That’s at least an original explanation, aside from the fact that there is no stealthy maritime strike aircraft in sight from any adversary (the J-20 weapon bays don’t appear big enough). And “shoot-the-archer” doctrine aside, missiles, not aircraft, are the direct threat to ships.
Maybe but there has been a [sic] anti F35 hate storm raging across the internet for at least 15 years.
That’s delusional. Completely false.
Speaking of the F-111: The program did end up producing some usable airplanes – C, E & Fs and FBs – but almost half the airplanes built were non-deployable junk. The critics were right about the program’s terminal mismanagement.
Likewise, the critics of the F-35 who asserted that the program’s schedule and budget were fantasy, in 08-09, were right. Another core criticism – that the F-35’s stealth technology was vulnerable to countermeasures – is far from disproved and has been obliquely endorsed by the CNO. The related prediction that potential adversaries would deploy VHF AESA and other counterstealth technologies has proven accurate.
Yes, Hops, there were a few “serious programmatic and management issues” that included winning a competition with a design that couldn’t be built, vastly underestimating the impact of the consequent redesign, and misinforming the highest levels of government about that schedule impact when it did occur.