A long time ago, the tech director of what was then BAE Systems Edinburgh, Prof John Roulston, was asked why they were not going full ahead with an E-Scan version of Captor.
His response was, basically, that they were working on AESA but thought that M-scan Captor would be competitive overall until AESA reached a point where T/R modules were being made with the same technology as cell-phone components and became both cheaper and more efficient. Roulston later formed Filtronics to do exactly that – I believe that they are a supplier to Selex.
(I suspect that Roulston’s team was also working on the swashplate idea at the time. Certainly, the Eurofighter team now say that they didn’t like the AESA’s off-boresight limits.)
Selex AESAs are turning up in a lot of places now, while Raytheon and Northrop Grumman still seem confined to US fighters and high-end UAVs like MQ-4C.
It will be interesting to see if Selex gets offered by any of the companies looking at third-party F-16 upgrades…
You are mistaken.
I have no idea what “signal[s] management” means, because (1) if taken literally, it is so general as to be meaningless and (2) if it is indeed a term of art, it has been kept secret so effectively as to be invisible, on an Internet search or elsewhere.
It’s also somewhat confusing because in plain English “signal” means an intentional act, so it is unclear whether you’re talking about EM scattering from an object, or not.
If you can provide some citations to outside sources using the expression “signal[s] management” in reference to counter-detection technology, it would be illuminating in the extreme.
Sounds like a negotiation in progress – and some reprogramming of funds is likely because the Swedish forces are doing E/F earlier than expected under the timeline agreed with the Swiss.
Negotiated prices are also important because Swedish systems development is covered by (LockMart shills, stop your maidenly ears) fixed-price contracts.
WOOHAAA !! This is how it’s done !
Remarkable… but then Saab has said that the F414 costs less to acquire and operate than the (boutique) RM12, Selex has sold its AESA technology to users that have never bought (or looked at, as far as I know) Raytheon or NorthGrum, which suggests that it is reasonably priced, and the new avionics architecture is more COTS than its predecessor.
“signal management”?
What does that exactly mean in this context? I google it and get stuff about traffic lights. 😀
Swerve has an important point. Time difference of arrival techniques provide instant and highly accurate location – targeting quality against emitters – from a single transmission. I don’t see any reason why TDOA could not be used in conjunction with passive bistatic radar, either.
Not sure – The Czech Vera-E and other time difference of arrival ESM systems seem to have a way around this problem.
MC – Good point.
To elaborate – what you need to do is degrade all or parts of the kill chain until its overall kill probability – the cumulative result of the probability that it will function at each stage – is as low as you require.
So, if you can break the system in steps 1-3, you don’t need to bother with the rest. Mission accomplished.
But…
If you have designed the system in the assumption that you broke steps 1-3, and technological change mean that there is still some probability of (for example) a fighter being vectored accurately on to you, you may have a problem if you don’t have a way to break those last steps, by counterattack or evasion.
A couple of recent examples of adaptation to such changes in the threat are active protection systems for armored vehicles and interest in submarine-to-air missiles. What’s the equivalent for LO aircraft?
First, someone asked whether anyone claimed that stealth aircraft were invisible. Step forward, Tom Burbage:
“Simply put, advanced stealth and sensor fusion allow the F-35 pilot to see, target and destroy the adversary and strategic targets in a very high surface-to-air threat scenario, and deal with air threats intent on denying access — all before the F-35 is ever detected, then return safely to do it again, said Burbage.” (Emphasis added.)
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2008/september/SettingRecordStraightonF-.html
And we all know that Mr Burbage never forgets who he is working for (which, according to the SEC and fiduciary law, would be his shareholders).
Moving on: Passive Coherent Location systems such as EADS Cassidian is advertising, and like Selex’s Aulos, are not being directly marketed as tactical counterstealth systems for the reasons discussed in earlier posts – they leech off civilian transmitters that may not be present in quantity in the AOR in the first place and are not designed to survive enemy action.
On the other hand, they do cause problems if your concept of RCS is monostatic, because scattering that is directed away from the transmitter has to go somewhere. And as they get into lower frequencies, they are less easy to affect with RAM.
And what if your ingress route lies over allied or neutral territory, where the locals may not appreciate losing access to MTV for the duration of hostilities? A PCL receiver on the border can leech off friendly TV stations. And if I can see it on PCL but not on my regular radar, Bingo! Positive ID.
And if I wanted to militarize the system, the receivers are already passive and highly mobile. A tactical transmitter would not have to be large or expensive, and would probably fit on a Humvee or compatible trailer. If it costs less than an ARM the attacker has a problem. (By the way, Mercurius – Vera-E is, indeed, not a PCL, but would be a useful supplement to it.)
In this context, talking about Silent Sentry is muddying the issue, because it is pretty ancient. Most counterstealth technologies (VHF. OTH, PCL, track-before-detect, IRST and so on) don’t involve inventing new physics, but by taking a smarter look at the output and (in many cases) netting the sensors to cover the weak points and maximize the strengths.
By the way, AASR is the most interesting ground-based counterstealth system I have read about.
Is stealth over? Probably not, although all-aspect, broadband LO systems are much better suited to this kind of environment than bowtie/X-band-focused vehicles.
I believe that was a chart done for Saab by the Janes/IHS consulting service.
Hellz no.
Quite the story there, Loke.
So for anyone in the vicinity of Linkoping, here is what a French spy might look like. Be alert!

TC 12f – Very true, and the videographers always seem to have problems staying up with it.
Pterosaur – As far as I know the term “fifth generation”, referring to a post-2000 fighter*, was first used in public by the Russians, who can ID their generations cleanly because they have a top-down system.
I think it went like this (not necessarily including interceptors):
5 – T-50
4 – MiG-29, Su-27
3 – MiG-23/27, Su-22M
2 – MiG-21, Su-7
1 – MiG-15/17/19
However, the 5-gen idea was then coopted by LockMart to mean “some degree of all-aspect wideband stealth”. All other claimed “5-gen” features are either not unique to the F-22 or F-35 (such as networking) or not shared by them (such as supercruise/super-agility) so they can’t be legitimately used to define them as a class.
Also, even in retrospect, and even if you lump everything from an F-16A to a Rafale in one generation, defining Gens 1-3 is pretty much a pointless exercise.
* Hallion ID’d six generations up to the teen series.
Phaid – I think the second mention of an AAM-armed Backfire may have been Hackett’s The Third World War – The Untold Story, which preceded Harpoon and RSR.
This might have been the first:
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1977/1977%20-%203816.html
AFAIK it never went beyond the hypothetical stage.
The metric conversion gremlins inhabit the space between the journo’s keyboard and the final product, whether paper or digital.