S-9 – I don’t know that it is “unknown territory” but it seems to be trying to achieve an acceptable success rate with a hook/wire relationship that is off-nominal at best. As I understand it, the basic idea behind the original hook shape, or the Hornet hook, is for the wire to contact the hook above the apex of the hook tip, thereby trapping it in the throat.
And it is not to be forgotten that rolling tests are only the beginning. People will be crossing fingers, to some extent, to see if the modified hook will catch a trampled wire in a landing, and then on the carrier itself.
J-20 – The F-35’s problem is that the engine nozzle is far forward – legacy of STOVL, because of front-rear balance in powered-lift mode – but the MLGs are a long way aft, because they are attached to the first full-depth frame behind the weapon bays.
Hence there is no good place far aft of the MLG axle line to attach the hook.
Neither the Boeing nor the McDonnell Douglas design would have had the same problem.
aussienscale – One tends to guess “signatures” (1) because the issue is classified (2) because many of the other aspects of the design – structure, aerodynamics, subsystems, display avionics – are covered openly and (3) because almost every other LO program has had issues with LO technology, whether in terms of performance, manufacturability or repairability.
I’d call it an educated guess.
F3 – “adding improved pilot orientation”
You mean, throwing away the HUD in favor of an HMD that doesn’t work?
“and maybe even the UCAS-D automatic landing software”
Which of course no other aircraft can use, because the testing on an F/A-18 was a fluke.
F3 – Will you provide a primary reference to an F-35 skeptic predicting “melting decks”?
If you can’t (and I am pretty sure you can’t) will you apologize for making stuff up? (My bet is “probably not”. You’ll just complain about being picked on again.)
As for the drawing, good on them if the proposed solution works. And it is logical to try for the quickest fix first. However, it’s clearly an attempt to get a positive result in an off-nominal engagement, with the cable flat on the deck.
Perspective here from “Engines” on PPrune:
http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/424953-f-35-cancelled-then-what-12.html#post6905912
You can read Engines’ post history if you want, but he appears genuine. And he is usually a JSF supporter.
Fox – I didn’t actually say that LMT would prefer endless R&D to production – although in the defense world, unlike the commercial world, endless R&D and no production equals revenue and profit and is not a surefire way to destroy your company.
“Locking in” takes many forms. Canada has been led to believe that even opening a competition would jeopardize JSF partnership. All partners know that even muttering about alternatives will prompt nastygrams from the 2000x zip code. And no hard cost estimates – essential for such a decision – have been made available.
“Obviously aircraft other than JSF have demonstrated SA, and JSF’s magic-wizard-hat helmet does not work; and 25 years and close to $100 billion later, we don’t know that stealth can be made affordable in a tactical aircraft.”
Which of these statements can be controverted by proven, demonstrated fact?
Fedaykin – Some of the participants here need to be reminded what a scratched record sounds like.
But the point is not that anyone sounds repetitive. The overt critics of the program have been hammering points home repeatedly, but the points need to be made. As ELP’s quote from Davis should remind you, this program has a long track record of responding to outside criticism (Navair, GAO, JET) with LALALALA I CAN’T HEAR YOU, to the detriment of good management. (That’s why there are jets being parked at Eglin, that’s why testers were twiddling their thumbs in 09-10 waiting for jets that were in pieces in the Fort Worth barns.)
F3 – In common with most JSF fans, you are adept at coming up with loaded responses (“precious, shock horror, crazy”) to points that haven’t been made.
The extinction of other fighter programs remains part of the business plan (most recently a presentation in Canada in October 2010). Anyone else’s capability to design a new aircraft is moot for the time being, since so much of the market has been locked in with the help of rosy predictions.
You also make the assertion that the “warfighter” wants “stealth and SA”. Obviously aircraft other than JSF have demonstrated SA, and JSF’s magic-wizard-hat helmet does not work; and 25 years and close to $100 billion later, we don’t know that stealth can be made affordable in a tactical aircraft. But in F-35 land, LockMart PowerPoint > competitor in combat.
And it’s funny to talk about Dassault getting social security when the JSF team is trousering $22 billion and counting in overruns alone. What’s that called? Poverty relief?
You get one point right: “Lockheed Martin is driven by one thing: shareholder return.” But production is not necessarily the goal: it’s 50 years of sole-source upgrade and support contracts.
“and how long it will take to integrate the info from all the individual systems”
I will go with “longer than they think”. Because that’s what everyone else has found out, and how every other part of the program has gone.
The “only unknown”? Have you read the QLR? Because the report seemed to predict further issues in buffet and fatigue, talked about no answers to fix the IPP, and noted multiple HMD issues that have not been solved.
But thanks for underscoring the point that the JSF sensors are not in any respect revolutionary.
JS – Since you are all over the “curious motivations” of critics, and their “less than accurate” predictions (and no “melting LHD deck” strawmen, please), maybe you can cite a critic being less accurate than this:

The hook attachment location and the length limit of the hook are fundamental to the basic configuration, which was designed by a team with no carrier experience.
Changing either would have reduced commonality and added weight and complexity.
I would guess that there is are PowerPoints out there, dating back to at least the CDR and probably PDR of the F-35C, explaining the magic solution to the problem to the uninformed Luddite peasants at NAVAIR.
Mercurius –
The customer was deadly serious about affordability. When this started, the A-12 was a freshly smoking crater (the root cause being not only technology, but the attempt to develop on a fixed-price contract) and the F-22, although nobody was going to admit as much, was well on the way to taking its predicted place on the Augustine’s Law log scale.
The key to reducing cost was to seen as building the aircraft at commercial-airplane rates of around 200 aircraft per year. With post-Cold War force sizes, however, this was the maximum requirement of the entire US alliance community. Consequently, the aircraft would have to be tri-service (and that, as we have seen, meant that STOVL would drive the design) and the European fighter industry would have to be closed down.
There were also technical solutions aimed at reducing cost, including integrated ECS and secondary/emergency power, electrical actuation and large unitized structures, precisely none of which appear to have worked.
At some point, however, someone realized that the plan offered an alternative route to success, other than achieving affordability: which was, to promise low production and support costs long enough for the competition to shrivel away, thereby securing a monopoly in which the customer would be forced to pay the real price or exit the airpower game.
That has been the ruling strategy since 2003-04, at least.
MC – The difference between what should be done today and Cook-Craigie is low rate initial production, introduced after the messes of the 1960s (C-5 and F-111). LRIP bridges the gap in rate between the building of the development aircraft and full rate production.
It’s also a period when the contractor builds the production system, trains workers, exercises the supply chain and works out any kinks. Because it is low rate, too, not all the expensive capital investment has to be in place for LRIP-1, so there’s a bit more flexibility.
The exit criterion for LRIP is completion and reporting-out of IOT&E (Milestone C). The law also says that you can’t build more than ten per cent of the run in LRIP.
JSF was always on the sporty side. The 2003 plan had the final LRIP batch at 168 aircraft (low relative to what?) and 565 total aircraft in LRIP – which was where the program leaders decided that the B2FB technology of modeling and simulation would solve all their problems.
It wasn’t called ASQ-239 then, at least in public.
The general tenor of the discussion was that the JSF suite was designed to deliver ALR-94 capabilities with less cost (which also meant fewer apertures) using more modern technology (FPGAs versus ASICs and so on), some of which would be “spun back” into F-22 upgrades.
I’m sure it’s all delivering on those promises, just like the rest of the program is doing.
Mercurius – He Who Must Not Be Named discussed the JSF EW suite in IDR some time in 2005.
It’s most likely that the ASQ-239 is mostly as described then – a modernized, simplified version of the F-22’s ALR-94 with a smaller footprint and (hopefully) price tag.
The ALR-94 is purely passive (I don’t think there is any doubt about that) as far as internal components go. 1991 philosophy said that was the way to go. JSF was defined not long after that. Neither system has a towed decoy, although active RF expendables are a possibility. How the JSF works when it is carrying external weapons and has a Super Hornet signature is not known.
It seems pretty clear, however, that JSF (and possibly F-22 Block 35) can use the radar array as a jammer. The only problems are that it only works in X-band and that it involves trapping the threat in your 10-to-2-o’clock. (I’m sure one of the fankiddies can explain why this is a tactically supercalifragilistic idea.)
Final perspective note: When stealth + ESM was defined as the way to go for F-22, in the mid-80s, automated active self-protect jamming had a near-unbroken record of total failure. I think that has changed.
F3 – Seems like everyone around here is attacking you.
Seriously – I think that the reason people are getting a little short with you is that your primary argument (that stealth and superior SA will compensate for unfavorable kinematics, lower missile load-out &c) has been aired over and over again. JSF critics don’t buy it, and you’re not presenting an iota of new evidence to suggest that it’s correct.
Instead you say things like: “If you have a flight performance disadvantage but adequate SA you can still survive to fight another day. If you have a flight performance disadvantage but superior SA you can use the later [sic] to control the engagement and get the kill.”
Both these things can be true, if the performance disadvantage is small enough and the SA large enough. But without that “if” you are uttering slogans.
And you might explain how JSF processing is unique in establishing a bigger SA bubble than anything else. And would that be the current processor, or the as-yet-untested processor that is needed for full combat capability?