Harsh criticism for the ambiguous F-35 from the jdw.janes.com.

According to Pierre Sprey and Winslow Wheeler the aircraft is going to be too expensive but hardly capable. They also point the risk of getting 513 pieces with only 2% of the tests fulfilled and having 83% of the flight characteristics via computer simulations (!!!)

The two authors, estimate the final price of the aircraft might reach $200m.
A piece.

OTOH, the capabilities of the fighter are far from impressive.
Stealth characteristics are compromised, and at the same time, WVR potential are “disastrous”. !!

Of course nothing new here. Some of us are writing in this very forum, all the above, many years now.
What make the criticism so important is the names of the authors.
Pierre M. Sprey is a member of the design team of the F-16 and Α-10 and
Winslow T. Wheeler is director of Straus Military Reform Project of the Center of Defence Information.
no carlo kopp.

I have much respect and admiration for Pierre Sprey – primarily due to what he contributed to the F-16 and A-10 programs.

It is because of his condemnation and criticism of how and what the USAF decided to do to the original LWF / ACF concept of simple, cheap daytime dogfighter, by adding weight (additional fuel, sensors and strengthening for multi-role reason), while not adding additional wing and tail plan area, which he stipulated what was needed, is why the basic air-to-air performance (PWR and agility) has degraded so much – as he warned it would!

So I would be inclined to take note of what concerns him and what he says.

Wasn’t it also Sprey and Boyd who also predicted the problems, delay’s, degradation of performance (especially in range) when the US Navy pushed for the modification of the Northrop YF-17 over that of the navalised YF-16?
And were they not right again???????????

As for Winslow Wheeler – I’ve never heard of him!

Regards
Pioneer

I must say – I have always been somewhat fascinated with how those little stub wings of the Starfighter can hold so much weight:confused:

Regards
Pioneer

Ummm… there is no Independence link… just two identical Yamato links.

I second that!:D

Regards
Pioneer

Taiwan To Build Own Diesel Subs

I say good luck to Taiwan!
They know the importance of their defence better than anyone else!
More and more, the United States is going to lose their ‘golden age’ of exporting of weapons (which greatly helps off set the R&D of their own military programs!)
First Japan, then South Korea has become more and more self dependent with indigenous weapons systems and platforms, hopefully next it will be Taiwan!

Regards
Pioneer

“Australia’s submarine force is facing significant challenges”

08:40 GMT, April 9, 2009 Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Russ Crane outlines the Navy’s plan to dramatically improve Australia’s Submarine workforce.

“Well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and thank you very much for your time today. I’d like to brief you on some major changes to the way we’re managing one of Australia’s most important assets, our submarines.

You all know Australia’s maritime force is facing – Australia’s submarine force is facing significant challenges. Rest assured they remain a very capable force and I am extremely proud of the service and capability that our submarines provide.

But I am concerned that their long-term sustainability cannot be guaranteed unless we act decisively. The challenges facing navy submarine force today may well be felt by the wider navy in years to come unless we put our people first.

Navy is sometimes accused of ignoring our submariners. But while they make up about five per cent of our total workforce, they require a substantial percentage of Navy’s total budget and deliver a very substantial element of our fighting capability. So we owe it to them to get this right.

Today, I am announcing significant and widespread reforms to the way Australia’s submarine force is structured and the way in which it operates.

Navy is implementing a submarine sustainability program which will do four things; it will stem the number of qualified submariners leaving the submarine force by improving their working conditions. It will speed up the training process to get new submariners fully qualified and to see faster.

It will increase the number of new submariners through an aggressive external and internal recruitment program and change the prevailing mission focus submarine culture so that there is a greater focus on the wellbeing of submariners and of their families.

The overall goal is to grow the submarine workforce to enable a fourth, sustainable, seagoing crew to be formed by the end of 2011. To achieve this, we’re spearheading a five-pronged process, the first of which has already been completed. Phase one which occurred in 2008 is an analysis phase.

This phase included the conduct of the submarine sustainability review and other surveys to understand the problem, followed by implementation of initial actions and some quick wins. Phase two is a stabilisation phase and will run from 2009 to 2011. This phase will achieve three sustainable crews of 58 personnel, up from 46 currently; assisted by a submarine support group of 27 people to provide high priority technical and administrative support services to our crews when they’re alongside.

Phase three, which is a recovery phase, will run concurrently from 2011 through to 2012. This phase will achieve a fourth sustainable crew of 58 personnel to consistently meet submarine readiness requirements, a fully manned and sustainable submarine support group providing a broad range of support services to crews and sustain manning of the submarine shore positions.

Phase four, which is a consolidation phase, will operate from 2012 through to 2015. Now this phase will include evaluating alternate crewing arrangements, three crews to perhaps two platforms, as was recommended in the review.

By evaluating the need for more crews, depending on the effectiveness of the new construct of four sustainable crews backed up by a fully resourced submarine support group. Phase five, which is a growth phase, will occur from 2015 onwards.

Now this phase will implement workforce expansion plans, to meet strategic guidance and lay the foundations for the transition from the Collins Class submarines to our future submarines under C1000.

Last year, Navy commissioned several studies; the most significant was handed to me in November. Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt’s submarine workforce sustainability review pulls no punches. And I invite you, navy members and the Australian public, to read it.

Since November, we’ve been working hard on stabilising the submarine workforce. As I’ve made clear, this phase will achieve those three sustainable crews of 58 personnel each and to support them with a submarine support group of 27 people to provide that high-priority technical and administrative support to our crews at sea and alongside.

By 2011, my aim is for our submarine force to have recovered enough to be able to sustain that fourth crew. From 2012 we will consolidate by evaluating what we will have achieved so far and thoroughly examining options for alternate crewing strategies. Now this might involve a form of multi-crewing.

We’ve already taken the first step in this area by separating our crews from hulls.

The most critical element of any warship is its crew. And we’ve now taken an approach in the submarine group which aims to focus on the crew and rotate crews to submarines rather than the other way round. That’s not unlike the approach taken in the airline industry or indeed in the offshore industry.

Now, I should point out that our efforts to improve Navy submarine force are already beginning to show some results. There has been a small increase in our retention rates for submarines. That’s an encouraging sign, but we still have a lot of hard work to do.

But we have already had some success. Actions now underway include improved shore accommodation standards for submarine crews when their submarine is alongside, away from home port, fewer submariners will be required to keep watch in port, giving them additional rests and respite, a 25 per cent increase in submarine crew size in order to ease the workload on sea-going crew members to enable more sustainable work routines both at sea and alongside, internet and intranet access is being provided to our submariners, the number of shore-based postings for our submariners is being increased, ensuring posting stability for our people in the west, an establishment of a new submarine support group, as I’ve mentioned, to take over some of the workload from our crew members.

Australia’s submarine force remains critical in the defence of this nation. Let me repeat, if we are called upon today, our submariners are well able to meet any challenge. But we can’t afford to burn out our people. I will not allow it and neither will the Australian people.

The time has come for strong action to safeguard Australia’s submarine force now and into the future. I’m now happy to take any questions that you might have.

http://www.defpro.com/news/details/6697/

Very interesting!
But also very embarrassing from an Australian perspective!

And this is in peace time!:eek:

For a long time I have been very concerned about the ADF’s and what I like to call the ‘Bling Factor’.

Regards
Pioneer

I hate to say it, but the Australian DOD / ADF (with much support of the previous Federal Government – as self-declared ‘Sheriff’s’ of the region!) has been off the rails for almost a decade.
I can not but help seeing the ADF like the proverbial underprivileged child who has for so many years (decades) gone without and had to make do with the thread bare equipment.
Then after the East Timor incident (and more so 9/11), the child is then let lose in a confectionery shop with the family’s scarce mortgage money.
I call it the modern ADF ‘Bling Factor’
For whilst it has been a very useful operational experience working with the likes of the US and British military for the past 10-years, the ADF has become some what entranced with the desire to acquire some of these allies very high tech and equally expensive weapons and weapons systems, without truly thinking it out, or what is truly needed!
The Army has been forced (by government commitment!) to predominantly gear up, train, deploy and fight a war on terrorism / COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq, while carrying out more and more peacekeeping in the likes of East Timor and the Solomon’s.
While at the same time it is re-equipping heavily for conventional warfare, in the form of M1 MBT’s, SPH’s, attack helicopters etc……
The Air Force has some grandeurs want of equipping for a high tech conventional war of Cold War proportions, with its ‘balls-and-all’ approach and wet dream desire to be one of the big boys in the F-35/JSF program, which has been continuously to be delayed, incurred massive cost blow outs, and no guarantee that they will be able to get the top of the range variant (full sensor and stealth capability), and the need to purchase an expensive stop-gap measure in the form of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.
Apart from the long over due purchase of the capability likes of the C-17A’s, I have not seen too much in the way of cohesion / inter-service cooperation and operational support between the RAAF and Army
For while the long over due and much needed Caribou replacement program has already been postponed again and again, the army need for a true and versatile STOL transport aircraft (which would be most welcome in Afghanistan!) is to be Band-Aid fixed with the lease of a handful of Beech King aircraft. What a joke!
The RAAF may as well outsource the Caribou replacement to Qantas airlines (Sh*t – I better not give them ideas…….)
Now for the RAN
What the hell is going on there????????
I am of the firm belief that the RAN should be slapped around the office some what.
For they are without doubt the biggest integrator and perpetrator of the ‘Bling Factor’
Let’s look at what they have had the opportunity to do and what they have bungled.

ex-US Navy Newport Class LST’s – HMAS Kaminbla and Manoora.
After all the RAN history and skills, the purchase of the bargain basement priced ships proved to be an expensive exercise, when it was discovered that they were full of rust, and need extensive and expensive work done to them to make them sea and operational worthy (this was on top of their extensive modifications so as to make them into the LPA’s they are today)

The ANZAC Frigate Program
Possibly the biggest and most expensive patrol bouts ever built!
Based on the West German Meko 200 Frigate design, the RAN agreed (with the Government of the day) to build and operate these potentially good ships in a poor-mans configuration with the fantasy that in time of war, they could be upgraded with the click of a finger.
In reality they have operated for almost a decade without a combat effective ship-based helicopter (the helicopter that was to operate from it would be delayed and then canned altogether!).
Our service men and woman have been deployed into harms way in a class of ship, which for over a decade lacked an adequate CIWS or Point air defence missile capability – oh that’s if you don’t include the good will of the Australian Army who would be so kind to deploy their very limited number of RBS-70 PDSAM system onboard these ships to give them some form of air defence – but saying this what was defending army units???????????

Bay class Minehunter Inshores
This was a creat opertunity for the RAN to develop and operate a taylored design inshore minehunter, which was credited by many to be an exceptional design.
And what happened to this advanced class in the end?
The RAN got cold feet (or was it the case that this advanced design was seen as being to small and did not offer enough ‘Bling’)
Two prototype ships were ordered in 1981, with the first ship, HMAS Rushcutter, commissioned in November 1986. The two ships experienced delays in construction, and the RAN resorted to acquiring six minesweeper auxiliaries (MSA) to provide an interim mine-warfare capability, while also keeping Ton class minesweeper in service until 1990, well beyond her intended decommissioning date.
After all this effort, time and money, the RAN chose to aquire the Huon class minehunter (Based on the Gaeta class minehunters designed for the Italian Navy).

Collin’s class diesel-electric submarine program
Hell where does one start with this program????
I think the RAN was way over ambitious about the whole program – from Australia’s ability to construct such an advanced vessel, with no previous sub-building experience, to the RAN’s, want of U.S advanced sensors and electronics, incorporated into the existing Swedish design sensors and electronics systems, which was to become a operational / inter- phasing nightmare.
Compounding this over-ambisouse dream of the RAN, for the want of an SSN in a SS, was the enduring noise problem, which contradicted the entire concept of a modern submarine.
All in all, the RAN’s handling of the Collins class submarines has had a major impact on the RAN/ADF capability, moral, retention and recruiting in the submarine arm.
Way to much time and money have been spent trying to rectify (and save face) these poor management problems, that the ADF, has missed an opportunity of acquiring an additional option of two further hulls, or the opportunity to fit the class with AIP systems, which would have given the Collins class a vast improvement in operational performance.

SH-2G(A) Super Seasprites program
This was a program that I knew was to good to be true.
Firstly the bargan basement price of the ex-US Navy Seasprites which we payed raised my eyebrows, followed by the actual age of the design itself made alarm bells start ringing in my head (after all the US Navy retired its last Seasprite in 2001!!!).
Then the bomb shell hit hit me like a train.
The RAN’s ‘Bling Factor’ struck again.
The RAN’s want for a design of the 1960’s to have the sensors and weapons capability of the newer and larger Seahawk fitted and operational was the final staw.
What the hell did they expect to achieve?
Instead in the end long after the New Zealanders had their Super Seasprite operational, the RAN were still hanger queens, in a thousand pieces, and many RAN officials and contractor enginners and technicians scratching their heads.
In the end the so-called cost-effective bargan, became another RAN management nightmare, the project was running six years over schedule, and its cost had blown out to A$1.1 billion, only to be cancelled in the end.
I for one always thought the then and ready to go small and combat efficiant Westland Lynx the design for the RAN’s needs.
Then again with the RAN’s track project management record, they would enevatably stuffed this too!

Hobart Class AAW Destroyer program
I must admit that I was very surprised (but not disappointed!) at the RAN’s selection of the small, lighter and cheaper Spanish based F100 design, over that of the American evolved version of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer.
I for one thought that the RAN, with political consent of ‘Sheriff’ John Howard would have went for the larger, heavier, more expensive and more complicated American design – so hats off to ever was the deciding factor!!!
Although it is still to early to both see and know just how this much needed capability class of ships will go in production and service, my greatest concern is the past governments and RAN’s want for the class to incorporate a Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) capability including carrying the SM-3 Blk1a and Blk2.
My biggest concern is that this ABM ‘Bling Factor’ will add both cost and complication to the design!
Add to this my concern that due to its ABM capability, the Australian government may divert the classes intended primary role of Fleet Air Defence of a Task Force, to that of operating of the Australian coast to provide ABM duty.
It also worry’s me that with the added cost and complication of adding this ABM factor into the equation, the opportunity and want for the fourth hull of this class will most likely be ruled out as to expensive.

As for the AP-3C Orion – I think this plane and its capability still has many years of life left in them.
I’m all for re-winging them, and if need be upgrading them.
I can just imagine the RAAF and RAN wanting the modern and shiny ‘Bling Factor’ Boeing P-8A, but at the end of the day the RAAF would not be able to replace the P-3 on a one for one with the P-8.
And one thing that the RAAF is going to need is numbers.
When it comes to ASW and MP, numbers will always be needed.

The issue of the Global Hawk is a big disappointment – its capability and ability to send it into harms way will be a mistake not to utilize!

Finally at the end of the day I have always been concerned that the ADF as a whole has never really sat down and seriously discussed service-to-service what equipment / weapons systems are really needed to achieve a thorough and decisive defence structure to defend Australia.
For like the late South African military discovered, even if it was able to obtain weapon systems from other country’s during the Apartheid era, not all this equipment would have been effective to the South African’s way of fighting, let alone have the ability to survive its harsh climate.
In many cases would like to see more of the ADF operation needs being evaluated more thoroughly and this need being put out as Request For Proposal (RFP) for tenders to meet this requirement, as opposed to the ADF’s tradition of adopting an existing weapons system / platform, which has to be modified extensively (which more time than not leads to delays, added expense and operational restrictions in the field!) to meet the ADF’s requirement.
But I am a realist!
Not now or in the past (since WWII) has the Australian Government had the ‘balls’ or will to commit to such a way of thinking or supporting and encouraging an indigenous military industry, which could design and build tailor made equipment and weapons systems for the ADF.

I’m sorry, as I thought I would never say it, but the ADF and its weapons acquisition programs must be scrutinized much closer and made accountable to keep the ADF on the tracks.
This is especially more important now than ever with the giant rise and fast building and expanding conventional military forces (with the consent of their so-called political leaders!) within the Pacific region.
For I think that within the next 10-years the ADF will discover first hand conventional warfare on a scale it has not seen since WWII in the Pacific.

One other thing I would like to see would be a bipartisan agreement by both major political parties (past and binding in legislation) in Australian to structure the ADF in a way that allows the ADF to concentrate on its primary task of defending Australia and its interests, instead of continuously shock upside down and forced to restructure and re-train every time one of the two major political party’s get into power!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Regards
Pioneer

The problem that I see here is
1/ With the Corporate take over of so many U.S Aerospace companies (i.e. McDonnell
Douglas, General Dynamics, etc…….), which has left only three viable and relevant
aerospace companies – ‘Boeing, Lockheed-Martin and Northrop-Grumman’, the U.S
Military is going to be limited in potential design solutions to its future needs.
And because of this ‘closed’ shop (limited competition to Request for Proposals –
RFP’s), anything that is military based will be expensive!!
After all wasn’t the JSF program original meant to be the ‘you beaut’ design that cost
no more than the ‘then’ price of existing aircraft (I think it was US$ 40m each.) it was
intended to replace!
What happened?????
Do not answer this – there is enough about the to and against the F-35 to sink a carrier!

2/ I agree that there is a significant difference in Tactical and Strategic transport
operations and performance!
And I don’t care what the Boeing advertising brochure says – at the price of a C-17,
who in their right mind is going to risk putting it into such a dangerous situation, and
so close to the pointy end of a front line.

3/ The biggest and still growing problem with the U.S Military is they do not no the
meaning of, or how to implement these simple words – ‘keep it simple stupid’
The last time they managed to achieve this was called the Lockheed C-130 Hercules!
The C-130 was and is a simple, but very rugged work horse, that has proven itself in
wars and crisis the world over, and over and over again.

The last time the US had an efficient and real tactical capable transport aircraft was the
Caribou – woops that was Canadian!

4/ The U.S defence industry is way to powerful and influential on the political
system and government, which it is supposed to be subordinate to.
For I am a strong believer that there are many more cost effective foreign aircraft /
weapons that can meet the U.S Military’s requirements and needs, and at a much better
price.
But U.S defence industry lobbyists plant their seeds, with sympathetic Congressmen
and Senators – ‘It will mean loss of American jobs’,
‘It will be inferior’
‘Our troops deserve better’…………………………………………..
One only needs to read the rubbish about the USAF’s KC-X Aerial Tanker
replacement program!
At the end of the day the Northrop/EADS proposal is a cheaper and more effective
Platform, than its older Boeing competitor.
But what has happened?
How much money has been wasted?
How long do U.S service personal have to wait to have this equipment in
their
inventory?
No – regardless of its so-called capability, the C-17 is way too expensive
for what it is!
Its cost and the USAF’s insistence and demand for it, comes at the
expense of the true
number that the U.S Military both wants and needs!
It’s technically way overboard for a transporter.
At the end of the day it’s a transport aircraft – A trash hauler!
Not a strategic bomber!
Not a Concorde!
It’s a transporter aircraft for Christ sake!!!!!!!!

At the end of the day I do not care what people say, but the C-17 can not carry what the C-5A/B Galaxy can and does!
I also do not care what people say about cargo variants of civilian airliners – they are next to scrap metel if they can not STOL on rough surfaces and turn themselves around!

I have always wondered why the Soviets were able to develop and field the likes of the An-22 (when the U.S failed with its C-132?), the IL-76 (which was more effective and workman like than that of the C-141!), and the An-124 (which is built like a tank, has no structural problems and limitations, better rough field performance, and greater payload than the C-5A/B.

No what I think is truly needed is a brand new ‘conventional’ Strategic Heavy Lift Transport aircraft design to be studied and built, as both a C-5 Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III replacement with the basic knowledge of what has and what does work in the forms of –
-STOL performance (high lift aerodynamics)
-flight aerodynamics, which matches efficient cruising speed and STOL
performance.
-The use of modern powerful and fuel efficient commercial derived high
bypass turbofans, (with greater thrust than need!)
-A large (overly large if need be!!) and volumes fuselage/cargo compartment,
with no wing-box penetration or intrusion
-A high capacity full-cargo hull length overhead fuselage crane to support
self loading and unloading of cargos.
-A simple and very efficient multi landing wheeled landing gear, which will
give excellent STOL capability and performance.
-A wing and fuselage construction which is going to handle the riggers of
being one of the biggest workhorses in the U.S Military inventory.
-Work to the imperative golden rule of cost, cost and
cost!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
With any cost or development blow outs meaning the end of the project! (This will instill the fact that if the aviation companies do not do their research and development (R&D), cost estimates and management system and structures correctly, they would be the one who are penalized more than anyone else.

Know whether these can be built in two variants (not unlike the F-35 concept!) using a modular approach to give a C-5 Galaxy size aircraft, while a shorter fuselage (less fuselage plugs = shorter fuselage length) version would meet the C-17 size aircraft

As for the Tactical / STOL transport requirement of the USAF, I think that the United States should really consider brushing the dust off the project titled AMST (Advanced Medium STOL Transport) and consider revamping the Boeing YC-14 or Boeing YC-15 (as you can see a win/win for Boeing!)
After all most of the R&D has already been done and paid for!
And either design has greater cargo hold dimensions!
For at the end of the day the venerable Lockheed C-130 Hercules has done more than what was ever planned or asked of her.
The times and payload requirements and expectations have changed greatly.
The Hercules overall cargo hold dimensions no longer meet the needs of many modern AFV (although saying this it is the masters of these programs, that issue and allow these modern AFV’s to get larger and heavier!)

Regards
Pioneer