So give it an F414 and support for Sparrow?

Why Aim-7 Sparrow’s my friend???

Aim-120 AMRAAM are lighter, smaller, and far more capable in all aspects than that of the Sparrow family of BVR AAM

The rules are clear you only need to follow several simple axioms:

– American made is always superior to European made
– Between European made, British made is always superior to anything else European (mainly French!). Eastern European is disregarded from the term European.
– European made is always better than Russian. Again, Eastern European does not count, since it is a worse copy of Russian made, anyway
– Everything Chinese is a copy or Russian and therefore as bad as Russian made. Chinese stuff based on Western designs is, of course, superior to anything Russian, but greatly inferior to the original designs.

SUMMARY:

– Basically everything else is better than Russian and much worse than American and the rest is ‘somewhere in between’.

NOTES:

The new trends (see J-10 vs J-11 threads and related debates over JH-7, Spey engines etc.) show an interesting tendency: everything indigenous Chinese is starting to be better than Russian. This is based on belief that despite of decades of more or less licensed production of Russian designs, everything Chinese is based on western stuff. 😉 So far this belief only works reliably with Chinese and Pakistani members, but surely this has a potential of spreading out.. 😉

If you keep these relatively simple rules, you simply cannot be wrong on this forum.. :diablo:

I don’t know?

The Czech designed and built152mm ShKH Dana SPH was an excellent design, which has opened the way for wheeled SPH around the world!

The Czech Tatra T-815 truck

The Czech Aero L-39 and L-59 jet trainer was built in good numbers as a jet trainer, which has been adopted by many air forces around the world

The Czech Scorpion 9mm SMG

The Polish W-3PL light helicopter
are all good designs

Regards
Pioneer

Firefox..:rolleyes:

i know one was built not sure if it did fly. don’t forget the A-12

would like to see f111 with sh style intakes, 6 instead of4 swivel under wing hard points, F119 engines with 2D nozzles. :rolleyes:

I like the way you think!!

The General Dynamics TFX or Boeing TFX designed from the outset as ‘TSX’ ‘Tactical Strike Experimental’

– With only ‘Strike/Interdiction in mind, and incorporated into the design.

– With six-pivoting under-wing pylons, and possible under fuselage pylons (Su-24 /
Tornado IDS style)

– Discarding of escape cockpit capsule to save on weight and complexity!

Regards
Pioneer

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/02/21/221747/singapore-2008-boeing-predicts-good-year-for-at-risk-c-17.html

Singapore – they have the US ties and the money, but like israel, i don’t see the need

I don’t know?
Singapore could utilize the likes of the C-17 to support its troop training facilities in the likes of Australia – what with their Puma helicopters and armour units (and do they not have Air Force assets in France for training purposes?).
I think Singapore could find the C-17 very handy!!
They would only need – say two!

Regards
Pioneer

Give us

3×20 F-35a with internal gun ( remember Vietam where fighters had no guns. they soon found that a big mistake.) larger wing of the F-35c(Australia is a very large counrty with vast empty spaces.also has vast areas of blue.)

It’s true what you say about the hard earned lessons of the importance of an internal gun during the Vietnam War, by the US!
But more importantly in the case of Australia, I would be inclined to say the importance of what the Israeli Air Force has never forgotten, and that is the internal aircraft gun is vital for both air-to-air and air-to-ground!!!!!!
For I think that in the not to distant future, Australia (and the ADF) is going to be more and more isolated within the Pacific region. What with the growing power of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the growing trend of Muslim fundamentalism.
At the end of the day the F-22 is far superior in the air-to-air / air superiority role, than that of the F-35.
The F-35’s stated superiority in air-to-ground is worth squat if it is unable to fight its way through enemy fighter/interceptor defence that is continuously grown at an alarming rate within the Pacific region.
I still think that the F-35 is being driven by the US on political grounds, as opposed to its capability.
I think that to many US Congressmen are influenced by lobbyists.
Our past Minister of Defence ‘Nelson’ want to be one of the big boys, as part of this aircrafts already troubled development, and his wiliness to except the U.S’s openly stated comments that we will have a down rated ‘foreign’ variant of the F-35, will cost the RAAF and the ADF as a whole!

For like the former Government selecting the US Javelin ATGM (over that of the superior Spike ATGM), the F/A-18E/F (over any other aircraft – full stop!) and the M-1 Abram MBT etc………. Politicians are making critical decisions based on politics, for the men on the front-line without consideration, competitive evaluation and without the soldiers/airmen/sailors input.

Like the realistic military forces of Israel, Sweden and the former South Africa, the ADF has to be able to test, evaluate weapons, and systems until they brake or destroyed.
Not because Politicians from another country (allies or not!) says ‘she’ll be right mate’!

Regards
Pioneer

Rubbish.

Go back and study aerial warfare history since the end of WWII.

In Korea, Vietnam, Middle East, Africa etc. More Western aircraft were shot down by Soviet/Russian equipment than Soviet/Russian aircraft shot down by Western weapons.

I hope that this is taken into consideration when you use the Korean and Vietnam War, when you state that ‘more Western aircraft were shot down by Soviet/Russian equipment than Soviet/Russian aircraft shot down by Western weapons’

With the scenarios like the Korean War and the Vietnam War, one must seriously look at the ridicules, idiotic and almost traitors ‘Rules of Engagement’ that the UN/United States Military forces were enforced to abide by.
These ‘Political’ enforced ‘Rules of Engagement’ (ROE) was to expose UN/U.S aircraft and pilots to unwarranted and unnecessary ground-fire, as well as air-to-air combat.
Unfortunately both sides new this.
It caused stress and anxiety to allied pilots.
While the Communists (PRC, Soviets, North Koreans and North Vietnamese) were able to fully utilized these ridicules ‘Rules of Engagement’ to their full advantage.

Examples that worked against UN / U.S forces were:
-Korean War – UN / U.S Forces were not permitted to attack known airbases in the PRC,
which were being used by enemy aircraft?

-Korean War – UN / U.S fighters were not permitted to cross designated lines to pursue
and engage Chinese and North Korean enemy fighters

-Vietnam War – U.S Forces were not permitted for many critical years to engage and
destroy North Vietnamese ‘Air Defence’ (SAM, Radar, and AAA)
instillations because of the fear that Soviet advisors may be injured or
killed (note: this has to be the most ridicules ‘Rules of Engagement’
that I have ever heard of!!!!!)

-Vietnam War – U.S Forces were not permitted to attack the rail network and trains that
transported the SA-2 SAMs (and almost all other war materials for that
matter) from China.

-Vietnam War – U.S Forces were not permitted for many years to attack North
Vietnamese Harbors and shipping – again for the ridiculous notion that
Soviet advisors may be at the harbors or the ships delivering the war
materials may be Soviet ‘State Owned’

– Vietnam War – For political reasons the USAF was forced for to many years to attack
‘Strategic’ targets in North Vietnam with tactical aircraft (i.e. Republic
F-105 Thunderchiefs), while ‘Tactical’ targets in South Vietnam were
attacked by strategic aircraft (i.e. Boeing B-52 Stratofortress)
This meant that for many years the North Vietnamese new in which
direction they would be attacked, because of the range and payload
limitation of the ‘Thud’ would dictate an almost predictable route –
hence is the reason that the Thud and their crews would endure one of
the greatest lost rate of any one type of aircraft during the Vietnam War,
and the poor F-105 getting such a bad rap and reputation

(Note – This reminds me of what Luftwaffe bomber crews must have endured during the Battle of Britain – They were forced to fly a fair distance into harms way, in their ‘Light / Medium’ bombers designed for tactical support of the Army, with a small bomb load against strategic targets – knowing in most cases because of their limited bomb loads, that they would have to return once again and again to take out their assigned targets. This meant running through the same defences again and again.
‘What some Luftwaffe bomber crews would have given for purpose designed and built long-range, heavy bombers!!)

– Vietnam War – For political reasons the USAF, USN and USMC was forced to close
to a visual distance of their opponents to identify before being allowed
to engage North Vietnam (PRC and Soviet) aircraft.
This meant that the advantages the U.S had in pilot training and aircraft
and weapon design were thrown away – forcing U.S pilots to close to
within dog fighting distance with NVA fighter/interceptor assets, as
well as running through well planned and prepared Air Defence
corridors and concentrations

– Vietnam War – US Forces were not permitted to take out North Vietnamese airbases
from day one! (This rule is almost criminal, as it breaks the most
fundamental rule of warfare – ‘The gaining and holding of air
superiority at all costs)
Every North Vietnamese airbase, fuel dump and support facilities
should have been destroyed twice over and left burning.
With any inclining of a new air base being built or used destroyed forth
With
(with U.S recon, AWACs and radar picket ship assets, no North
Vietnamese aircraft should have been permitted to leave the ground
without it and the place it took off or landed being engaged ASAP.)

Examples that worked for Communist forces were:

– Korean War – At any inkling of a UN / U.S attack against North Korean airbases, the
North Korean aircraft would flee too the sanctuaries of air bases in the
PRC.

– Korean War – If and when the odds were against the North Koreans in the air, they
could and did retreat to air space and air bases of the PRC with known
safety and impunity.

– Vietnam War – The North Vietnamese were able to position and concentrate their air
defence assets and improve and strengthen them around instillations, infrastructure etc that they new could and would be attacked, which would otherwise be needed to defend traditional ‘Strategic’ assets like air bases, Radar, Command, Control and Communications (C3) centres, rail yards and harbours that were off limits to the U.S military might for years, due to U.S political restrictions and fears of drawing the PRC and Soviets into direct conflict.
– Vietnam War – Due to the ridiculous and well known U.S ‘Rules of Engagement’,
the North Vietnamese were able too utilize cheep and otherwise
obsolete aircraft like the Mig-17 and MiG-19 as their principle fighter
interceptors for many years, with great performance and economical
success due to the U.S aircraft having to close to within a visual
distance of their opponents to before engaging North Vietnam (PRC and
Soviet) aircraft.
This meant that the slower cannon armed and more nimble older
generation North Vietnamese fighters were able to do much damage to
both U.S aircraft and their pilots moral, who’s more advanced higher
speed, higher speed and predominantly missile armed designs were
unable to match

– Vietnam War – Due to U.S Political Policy, which dictated the use of ‘tactical’
aircraft to attack ‘Strategic targets in North Vietnam (So as to not
concern the Soviets and Chinese of Strategic assets (Strategic
bombers) being used so close to their aerospace and boarders.
As well as not to give the U.S public the notion that this little war
was escalating on the scale that in reality that it was.) The North
Vietnamese were able to rightly predict the direction and targets that
were to be bombed, by the simple fact that the use of politically
stipulated ‘tactical’ fighter-bombers would mean that they would be
heavily laden with external fuel and ordinance and hence limited in
their radius of action and approach.
This again allowed for concentrations of North Vietnamese air
defence assets, and the use of otherwise obsolete fighter interceptors.
The heavy laden U.S Fighter-bombers were not able to use their
primary advantage of speed, and their maneuverability was greatly
inhibited, without having to jettison their offensive warload.

– Vietnam War – Due to excellent self discipline and adherence to their grand strategy
(and possible economics!?), the North Vietnamese did not conduct offensive air ops into South Vietnam or Thailand. This meant that their efforts could be concentrated of air defence, while also minimizing (on political grounds) the U.S cause for an excuse to carry out attacks on North Vietnam.
This adherence to staying on the Northern side of the boarder also meant that other sympathetic communist countries could supply desperately needed experienced pilots to fly North Vietnamese ‘flagged’ fighters with impunity from political fall out, if they were caught if forced to bail out.

– Vietnam War – Both the U.S Political Policy’s and ‘Rules of Engagement’ also
meant that the North Vietnamese could utilize the SAM as a more
economical air defence asset rather than needing a vast fleet of
advanced, and high performance and technological fighter /
interceptors, and the air fields and support facilities, than otherwise
would have been needed. For it may have meant that the economically
and easy to fly MiG-17 (and to some extent the MiG-19’s) would have
had to have been replaced very early in the war, with the likes of the
more advanced and expensive and more capable MiG-21 (or even the
likes of the Su-11 or Su-15) equipped with AAM’s.
For if the stupid U.S Political Policy’s and ‘Rules of Engagement’ did
not exist the US could have attacked from far greater points of the
compass, at targets deeper within North Vietnam, with far deadlier and
purposeful force, which would have dictated the need for a far greater
and flexible reaction fighter/interceptor force than North Vietnam had.

This would mean that North Vietnamese fighter/interceptors would
have to travel at far greater speed to their intercept points, instead of
being near fixed to a given and known part of aerospace that they knew
the U.S aircraft would attack and were simply required to take-off and
wait for the enemy to come to them, after they had flown the gauntlet of
SAMs and AAA and every North Vietnamese farmer and peasant that
had a rifle.

– Vietnam War – One of the biggest coups for the North Vietnamese during the war
was the amount of downed U.S airman over North Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese (and the Soviets) were able to interrogate and
gain huge amounts of information about U.S tactics, their aircraft and
weapons they were employing.
Possibly even more important was the physiological effect that these
airman afforded the North Vietnamese as a weapon against the war in
the hearts and minds of the U.S military personnel, politicians and
most critical the American public. This was denied to the U.S or
South Vietnamese military, intelligence or politicians, due to the
North Vietnamese air assets staying north of the boarder

Finally when speaking in regards to the Korean and Vietnam War, you have to take into consideration that where as the U.S, South Vietnamese and Australians military had thousands of aircraft flying in almost every conceivable role and mission,, this in itself made them far more susceptible to lose than say the couple of hundred aircraft (how many aircraft did the North Vietnamese have at any given time) that North Vietnam had, in the relative safety of their boarders, and flying but only a few types of missions and hence their exposure to combat and damage.
Does your statistics include the one sided helicopter ops and losses of the U.S, South Vietnamese and Australians military in Vietnam?
While the North hardly had any, let alone use them in offensive ops?

So I do not know if your analogy works or stick my friend!

Regards
Pioneer

The simple fact that Grizzly had to explain that tp you shows people have to do more indebt research, as I’m convinced that Russia in the post-cold war times is using “The Art of War” strategy to make U.S./Europe “think” they are weak.

That’s funny my friend!
I thought this too at the time of the Soviet Unions crash.

The problem since the end of the Second World War though, is that some country’s that were a power are no longer, but can not shack the stigma and want to still be!
This I thought applied specifically to France at the end of the war
But know it is Russia.
They should be generating what economic benefits they have back into their own economy, instead of trying to resurrect the past. For the only trouble that Russia faces is internal and the growth of the PRC.
But like all Russian / Soviet regimes, its always easer to focus your peoples attention on external issues and threats to that of internal issues

The other exception to this is China, which stagnant for decades with internal problems, but has turned itself around and continues to grow and grow, learning as it does.
You only need to look at China’s sphere of influence that is growing in Africa, Central and South America and Middle East