Has anyone got any further information on the current situation regarding the Sea Viper system. Have the French and Italian Horizon platforms had the same issues or is this another case of the UK running into problems with its own bespoke programmes?

Given the lack of surface units in the RN and the superior C3 facilities on the T22 Batch 3 I hope to see their service extended but unfortunately I can see them being either sold or scrapped. The 4.5″ maybe retained as a spare with the Harpoon and Goalkeeper. I am not sure on the life remaining on the Harpoons or which model they are. The T45 is not fitted for the Goalkeeper with the 2 waist positions meant to take Phalanx sized systems, but a use will be found for them.

Regarding the role of the Typhoon, it should become like the F-16 and F-18 used buy other nations and be a true swing role platform. In the current climate when UK based its role will be mainly AA but when deployed it will mainly be an attack and recce platform.

As for the F-35 this is a little more complicated. On land it will be mainly an attack platform with AA capabilites but when deplyed on carriers it will depend on the situation. If there ia an air threat it should be primarily a flet defence asset but many will wish it to be used offensively in the main. Until they or their equivilents are in service we will not know the operations procedures.

Just as high a priority for the axe should be the scores of senior officers who make the Armed Forces so top heavy. Senior Officers retire on a pension equal to their final salary and Senior RAF Officers retain flight pay when they have flown a desk for years.

On the whole the Civil Service is also top heavy, with too much red tape. This is going to be a prime target for cuts but is must be done in a logical manner looking at the whole system, seeing which department can merge, which can be disbanded etc.

Unfortunately all this will not create much of a dent in the funding gap and cuts will still have to be made in the front line and to the number and type of operation the UK can undertake. This is the new reality as there is not going to be any new money made available from the Treasury so a reorganisation and reprioritising will have to happen. It will be more of a case of what can we do without as to what do we need! Some high profile areas will see growth such as ISTAR and maybe transport platforms but the list will be small. As to areas where reductions are unavoidable, look to:
Heavy Armoured platforms
New ground based air defence systems
Fast Jet Squadron numbers
Existing and planned naval platforms and there capabilities

In addition contrary to recent statement, programmes will be delayed or reduced to save funds in year even though it will increase the overall costs so expect additional delays in;
CVF delays in the Prince of Wales
CVR(T) replacement both delayed and reduced
F-35 or whatever platform is chosen, orders delayed as long as possible to reduce risk officially but to avoid expenditure, with eventual orders being split to provide platforms for the CVF first then the RAF second at a later date.
Warrior upgrade, delivery delayed and production slowed
CAAM, off the shelf options examinied
C1, with C2 getting priority to try to keep up the number of platforms for less money but at the expense of capability
Tranche 3b for Typhoon, whether this tranche is delivered with the improvement in capabilites planned or the same as earlier tranches to be upgrades later is a strong possibility.

Going back to my post regarding reduction in A-400 numbers, the C-130J will be kept going until at least 2025 or later given the service life of the C-130K, but if operational use reduces this then without extra funds there will be drop in transport capacity.

In my post regarding reducing the A400 buy, well 12 – 14 A-400 and an additional C-17 to replace 20 odd C-130K would in no way destroy the RAFs transport fleet and considering we currently only have around 8 AAR available, 12 A-330 MRTT would easily meet current requirements. In addition I meant to assume that the A-400 buy was an interim one to spread out the cost with a further buy if required.

As Swerve pointed out I was suggestion the same airframe as the Sentinal be used for a MPA to suppliment the Nimrod MRA4 which I have a feeling will be used less and less for Maritime Patrol and more as an ISTAR platform.

THe idea of the RN and RAF being wedded to STOVL was more through neccesity than choice. WIth the CVA01s demise and the ordering of the CVLs (Through Deck Cruisers) the SHAR was an after thought arbeit a good one. The Joint Harrier Force was a marriage of conveience and gave the RAF a chance to reclaim all FJs and give the GR7 fleet a global role and access to funds to carry out the GR7A and the following GR9/9A upgrades.

I see no reason why the RN should not regain its own fixed wing branch. The CVFs are proper carriers in size and mission. There are may comments on the costs of training to support a CTOL approach but given the aircraft that will fly from them are going to be of US in origin surely it would not be too much to tie into the USN training system. Many NATO countries had their land based pilots trained in the US during the Cold War and some still do. As an additional idea if the RN opperates CTOL platforms and given the USNs shortage of squadrons, like the USMC there would be the possibility of UK squadron being attached to USN CAWs for operations or when a UK Carrier was not available. The opposite could also be true providing an excellent opportunity for closer co-operation as would cross decking with the French.

All three services are going to have to make cuts. For the RAF that means planes, for the RN well some might say they have already done theirs and I agree but in reality I fear they will lose further SSNs and surface units although if the right decisions are made the C2 might be its saving grace regarding numbers epecially regards to mission creep. The Army may gain additional equipment but around a quarter of its front line units cannot be deployed because there are insufficient support units. A real reorganisation is required. The TA need to become further embeded in regular units, say forming a the forth company in regular Infantry battalions or crew for the forth Tank squadron. 1st Armoured needs to be trought back from Germany. One of its Armoured Brigades together with the two mechanised brigades form 3rd (UK) Division need to be converted to a Medium role whilst at least two of the current Light Brigades need to have increased mobility and there own transport possibly using the platforms purchased for Iraq and Afghanistan. IF the Army brings its existing units up the their official strength it does not need additional personnel and in fact could reduce the number of units in some areas.

There is a future for our armed forces but all three must realise that they are part of a whole and cannot simply look after themselves at the expence of the others

Thanks for the clarification on the “Efficiency Savings”! If staff are to be cut it is in the areas of senior Civil Servants and Senior Officers where the axe needs to fall. Reducing low level staff will not really achieve anything. There also needs to be a curtailing of hiring “Consultants” instead of training in house staff.

I think this review needs to move up the priority ladder as both the Military and Industry need to know what the future holds.

When I said we need to look at our immediate commitments I meant looking at what commitments we have now and if they needed to be continued or not such as warship deployments etc not simply concentrate on Afghanistan.

Yes I know new equipment can take up to 20 years to develope, but there are holes in our current equipment needs that can be filled off the shelf now rather than spend years developing bespoke items at greater cost. Helicopters are one, the procurement of sufficient nymbers of Typhoons is another. The army need new AFVs to replace the whole CVR(T) family, the Trojan family and upgrades to the Warrior and CA2 fleets. The Navy needs funds to maintain what it already has more effectively and orders need to be placed for new Frigates as soon as possible as well as additional SSNs. All of these are really short term programmes requiring decisions and funding now hence my assertion that we need to limit the timeframe for the review.

The danger is the review look too much at the future big picture and missies things neearer to home.

Although I am a F-35 sceptic, until we see it fully operational nothing claimed can be seen as true facts. If it works as advertised then great but I fear that the platform will be in a constant state of modification with mixed fleets being an issue from day one.

Another of my concerns is that the RAF will never be able to fully exploit the F-35 to its full potential in order to keep costs down. There are already examples where the ASRAAM is only going to be cleared for external carriage as the UK is not willing to pay for its integration in to the internal weapons bays (This may have changed I am not sure). Meteor is another case in point. Does anybody know what weapons are planned to be carried by RAF/RN F-35s and which are internal and which external? Or should the UK adopt the US weapons package?