LordJimWhat the papers are hearing are “Options”. These are produced on a yearly basis as budgets for the following year are discussed. They are on the whole purly hypothetical. For example every year the option to disband the Red Arrows is brought up as “Option” to save money. The papers are picking up on these discussions and printing them as if they are a done deal.
Mind you the lack of protest from the MoD and the General Public may just let the Bean Counters actually go through with it!
LordJimAs far as the Tank arguement goes the Indian Army think the Arjun is an absolute Dog and are trying to find alternative uses for the 120 or so already on order such as using the chassis for a new SPG. It is years behind schedule and way over budget and still doesn’t work! The exisiting order was imposed on them.
The reason they purchased the T-90 was because of this and that their neighbour had bought T-80Ds form Ukraine and was beginning the manufacture of the Khalid with the help of China.
LordJimThe majority of civilian staff working for the MoD earn less than £20k per annum.
The MoD’s budget is more like £28Bn as against £40Bn as has been suggested.
The MoD has cut over 20,000 staff in the last 5 years.
The Major problems within the MoD are;
1. Poor Senior Management.
2. Unstable budgets.
The management within the MoD has become political over the last 10-12 years including alot of senior service personel. By using a deliberate policy of pitting the services against one another over limited funds the Government has taken a leaf out of the National Socialist Party’s devide and rule policy for dealing wiht the German armed forces in the 30’s and 40’s.
No programmes have a stable budget and therefore know what they are going to have to spend from year to year and the budget can change in year as well. This leads to programmes being slowed, spares not being purchased and platforms entering service at a level below the original requirement. In service it leads to platforms being routinely being used as a source of spares for others, reducing the number of available assets. A simple example of this is that the whole Harrier fleet was needed to support the detachment in Afghanistan, with minimal assets left for training.
I believe there is a lot of truth in the Times story and it may actually be worse. I think the bean counters have won the arguement that the UK will not be involved in a major conventional war in the foreseeable future and therefore the UK will tailor its armed forces for low intensity expeditionary warfare like Afghanistan and the anti-piracy patrols off Somalia. We will have a CVF task force to shop the flag and top of the line equipment but in very limited numbers.
LordJimThe actual job was great but their were proceedural and policy changes every twelve months meaning we never got to see of the changes worked before the next ones were introduced. Most years we ran out of money as funds were diverted else where, usually to the then DPA and stops were often put on the procurement of spares causing bottlenecks as their lead time can be between 12 and 24 months. this was exasserbated but ruducing depot stocks and having to use outdated and unreliable IT systems to manage things.
Most moderisation programmes never really got started unless you could make a case that it would save money, the infamous “Spend to Save” mantra. When I joined the MoD was trying to emulate Tescos with spares etc being bought to arrive “Just in Time”, this never worked so it changed to “Just enough” but we could never work out for what was it just enough.
One of the key tricks the treasury and MoD use invoved the CADMID cycle. This plots the progress of any programme as follows;
Capability
Assessment
Developement
Manufacture
In Service
Disposal
Most programmes are held in the first two phases as that is before the big bucks are spent and they can be there for years if funds are not available to move forward. That is what happened to FOAS, FRES and FCS. Other programmes to save time and money run parts three and four similtaneously with obvious problems. A classic example is the Adour Mk106 for the Jaguar GR3 which was never given operational clearance on reliability grounds, hence why it was never deployed to Iraq of Afghanistan.
LordJimOne of the key problem with the UKs procurement over the past decade has been the emphasis on “Capability” The idea was sound and should have allowed some out of the box solutions put whilst doing so those at the top forgot another key issue “Capacity”, along with others like “Attrition”.
Buying new shiny toys is great PR but you have to have enough to do the job, and maintain the fleet. Politics is the other bane of procurement as what we buy is often linked heavy to what political gain can be achieved resulting in the Armed forces not getting value for money.
Another huge problem in UK procurement has been the introduction of “Resource Account Budgeting” turning all staff, military and civilian at the MoD into accountants. The result is the MoD repaying the Treasury around £1.5Bn a year from its core budget. Yearly accounts also s***w things up as all programmes work to a “Through life Management Plan” yet do not know what money they will get year on year.
The RAF needs orders for more Typhoon, Helicopters, Tankers, Transports just to be able to stand still. If these are not forthcoming then the service will go into terminal decline as staff leave due to the conditions of service, planes will wear out faster and spend more time in maintenance.
I know I am a pessimist but having worked in the MoD for over ten years I find it hard not to be so
LordJimFlubba, that is my point exactly, I can see only a small number of fully equipped C1 being purchased, maybe as few as 6 but between 12 and 16 C2 also being purchased. The old trick of “Fitted for but not with” will surely be attractive to the bean counters and the PR people will be able to say that the C2s are actually C1s, which will be accepted by most people. The old arguements that a unit rarely needs its ASW gear or SSMs will come to the fore.
On the plus side though if equipment levels allow 4-6 C2s to become C1s in a surge than things aren’t so bad.
LordJimI believe the procurement by the UK of UCAVs is a long way off. It has already been declared that the RAF will not retain its Reapers after Afghanistan and given the way MoD programmes are managed any UCAV programme wii be stuck in the assessment phase for decades.
Yes 200 top of the line fast jets seems alot, but that is based on only 8x 15 ac squadrons. Given that 2-3 ac in each squadron are likely to be in maintenance etc that leave around 50 Typhoons and 30 F-35s to meet all obligations. Remove the Typhoons on QRA and the F-35s on a Carrier and the pool is getting very small indeed. this will be worsened if not all the Typhoons are of the same standard. With only a small pool of attrition ac the ac are going to be worked much harder and hours remaining are going to tumble.
In the end the RAF might be able to maintain one oversees deployment. Remember it took the whole of the Harrier force to maintain 8 ac at Kandahar!
LordJimI don’t think it will be a question of cuts but rather not ordering replacements for platforms that retire from service. With only 5 frontline Typhoon units and the 3 RN/RAF F-35 units and nothing to replace the GR4. I would love to see more Typhoons ordered but as the RAF wants UCAVs, teh navy new frigates and the Army will need to totally re-equip replace old and worn out equipment I am not holding my breath. Our economy is too tied to the service sector to fully recover so money is going to be tight for at least a decade. Units will also close as will other infrastructure and the flood of experiences NCOs and junior officers leaving will continue. I really want to see a positive future but I am too much of a cynic/realist.
LordJimI thought the reactor design in the Vanguards and Astute were a UK design. US help was brought in on the Astutes as BAe Systems had difficulty with their new CAD system, whilst US builders had been using such systems for years.
LordJimI am starting to believe that the C1 and C2 will evolve into the same design with the C1 fully kitted out and the C2 “Fitted for but not with”. This would allow a C2 to replace a C1 when it goes in for refit but have the required systems transplanted. Otherwise the C2 can deplay to areas “as is” when a platform with a greater capability than a C3 is required. Finally if a surge is required a number of C2s could be fitted out as C1s.
I can also see that the above could lead to a dumbing down of the C1s but I believe this will happen anyway with them having the capabilities of a T22B3 with Aster 15 instead of VL Seawolf with the appropriate new radar etc.
LordJimA defence review is more critical than ever now. The defence budget was continually cut even when the UK’s economy was doing well and a line needs to be drawn. It is time for other departments to go under the knife to highlight and remove the wasteage that has developed through years of massively increased spending.
Regarding the Navy well a strong case should now be made to build the CVFs as CTOL platforms and cancel the F-35. Can anyone name a conflict since WWII where we haven’t been fighting alongside the US and were facing opposition with a state of the art AD network? Yes MANPADs are a threat but they are to the F-35 also if used in daylight in the CAS role!
Instead buy 60 odd Super Hornets off the shelf, which are and will be more able to meet the needs of the RN and if neccessary purchasr a number of LO UCAVs for both the RN and RAF when the technology matures. A CTOL CVF will also allow th eoff the shelf purchase of E-2D Hawkeyes for the AEW role and allow the RN to use the USN training programme of Aircrew etc.
For the RAF, well they would eventually get a number of LO UCAVs as mentioned below, but I also see it becoming a single type force based around the Typhoon. 10 frontline plus 2 reserve/training units would provide the RAF with enough platforms to meet its obligations as the entire fllet can be drawn upon for deployments etc whereas today we have to switch between a number pf smaller fleets. Typhoon offers the best value for money as the infrastructure is in place and the production lines open. Purchasing the UKs full order plus an additional 20-30 airframes will secure jobs and allow furutre tech to be installed as it become avaiable.
Full tech specs will be available for the Typhoon and the Super Hornet as the US is far more likely to release those of the SH than the F-35.
This number of operational Fast jet units would meet all the UK needs and allow greater co-operation with our allies and save money.
LordJimAlthough dated the Kirovs could become superb flagships if updated. Their size and scope for the instalation of modern hardware would make them formidable.
12 x Naval S-400 launchers with 96 missiles
6 x SA-N-11 Grisom/Kortik (Kashtan) Systems with 192 missile incl reloads
20 x Quad packed launchers for SS-N 26 Yakhont/Oniks SSM – 160 incl reloads
1 x Twin 152mm based on the prototype twin 2s19 Msta
3 x Helicopters
I am not sure of the capabilities of the S-400 but given the ability of the Russians to obtain other peoples secrets having a system near to or equal to the USN Aegis is surely a possibilty. Give it and the other vessels in the taskforce a networked capabilty and put a carrier in and it takes thins to a new dimension. Give the SS-N-26 a land attack capabilty or swap up to half for conventional SS-N-21 Sampson cruise missiles. Not invulnerable by any means but no ship is but definitely worth having and updating IF the money is there and I would like to see it.
LordJimOne must remember that the RN and USN had totally different way of using their carriers.
The RN introduced armoured decks as it knew it would be operating within range of land based airpower especially in the Med. It also knew that its aircraft were poor and that the carriers would often have to fend for themselves.
The USN operated as a blue water force and concentrated on having the largest air wing a flat top could carry. Their aircraft were far better.
Both trains of thought were found to be wanting with the RN dincreasing aircraft capacity with the Indomitable and Indefatigable and the USN introducing armoured decks with the Midway class though to maintain the same air wing as the preceeding Essex class thay had to be substabtially faster.
In the 60’s and 70’s it was still thought that the USSR would usr nuclear tipped missiles and torpedoes against CVBGs as was expected in the 50’s so armour would be of little use. Modern threats have changed this and now kevlar is fitted.
Regarding the Nimitz senario, well the USN would never send just one CVBG. If they were going through the Gap and aiming for the Kola Peninsular it would have been 3 or 4 with additional SSN support. The backfire bases would have been closely monitored by ELINT and other covert means and there is a high probability that a large rain would have been deteced whilst taking off and forming up. YES Sea Sparrow has a limited range but what of all the other escorts with SM1, Tartar, Terrier and Talos. The latter could reach out to almost 100 miles. With between 24 and 30 Tomcats up each with 4 Phoenix, 2 Sparrow and 2 Sidewinder the USSR would need far more than 50 backfires. and it would need at least as many Badgers as well.
USN CVBGs are not invincible but they are probably are and were the toughest target another navy could engage.
LordJimI admit I am not infallable and yes I know that the Germany Navy’s remaining Tornadoes were transfered to the Air Force hence the use of the word “were”. As for the SU30MKIs I agree some units will be earmarked for Maritime roles but not at the moment and I was trying to present a rough Idea of where things stood now.
As for Soviet MR, well the remaining TU142 Bear F platforms are dedicated MR/ASW and do not have the capabilities that the Bear-D had during the Cold War and they are not going to use the A-50 Mainstays for MR. The cases where Russian MR platforms have overflown USN CVBGs is a peacetime event. In wartime little or no airborne assets is going to get within 300km of a CVBG unseen.I agree some or maybe all to TU-22M2/3 of the Strategic Forces could be used in the Anti-shipping role but give the location of their bases in Central Russia and the limited AAR and flying hours in my opinion they would concentrate training on their primary mission which is now conventional bombing and attack over land..
Training and tactics a crucial to attacking a CVBG, number simply will not hack it. The same goes for Submarines. As for smaller platforms, a CVBG is not going to cruise 100 km off shore and await to be attacked, nor are they used in isolation. The US has been using carriers and refining its tactics since at least the 1930s. Contrary to the opinions of some they are not stupid and know what they are doing. If there is a threat they will take action to deal with it be it conducting aggressive ASW or taking air bases within range of the CVBG out of action. The main advantage CVBGs have is they are mobile and can chose their battles.
The Chinese idea of using SRBM and IRBM to attack CVBGs is inovative but unproven. The SM-3 would be able to engage these and there launch would be known immediately but until the Chinese do a live fire test it is still just an idea.
Today a hostile nation maybe able to damage a CVBG but the chances of actually sinking a CVN are next to none. The cost in men and materal to achieve this limited result would far exceed the benefits and remember the USN has 10+ CVBGs available.
LordJimListing Countries that can launch a co-ordinated long range strike of 50+ aircraft with aircrew trained in anti-ship tactics
China – Maybe with their TU-16 clones but would have difficulty with target aquisition as they lack a true long range MR platform and training is an issue.
USA – Maybe as the USAF can fit Harpoon to its B-52 and B-1B and the Navy has Land based P-3C and its Carrier Air Wings though how often they train is unknown
UK – No as Sea Eagle has been withdrawn from service and only the Nimrod retains an anti-ship capability with Harpoon
Russia – No as it only has 45 TU-22M3 assigned to the maritime role. Remainder have been re-rolled as Strategic Forces and assigned to Engels, Ryazan and Shailkovka Air Bases. The Bear-D is no longer in service and the 2 ASW/MR Bear-F Regiments are assigned to the Pacific Fleet based together with the TU-22M3 at Kamenny Ruchei.
India – No as they only have one squadron of Jaguar maritime strike aircraft
France – Maybe if the air wing off CdG co-ordinated with land based Atlantique 2 squadrons but again training is an issue
Germany – No as equipment and tactics of the German Navy were designed around confines of Baltic
Japan – Maybe as one of the prime roles of the F2 is Anti Ship and they have tanker support.
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