The source for the list I produced was Warfare.ru. The list covers all units that are not mothballed, in reserve or pending disposal. I do not hold it up as the be all and end all mind you. But with only a pool of 8 major surface unit from which to deploy a taskforce ie not all are going to be available at any one time, it really show the state of the Russian Navy. The is epecially so as they are now saying it will be 2050 until they have a balanced navy capable of regular deployments os any meaning size or duration.
The followign units are currently shown as active with the Russian Northern Fleet;
Surface Units – 21
Cruisers/Carriers [3]
1 Kuznetsov CVN
1 Kirov CGN
1 Slava CG
Destroyers [5]
2 Sovremennyy DDG
2 Udaloy DDG
1 Udaloy II DDG
Frigates [0]
Corvettes [13]
4 Grisha II FFL
4 Grisha IV FFL
2 Nanuncka 1 FSG
2 Nanuncka III FSG
1 Nanuncka IV FSG
Submarines – 21
SSBN [7]
4 Delta IV SSBN
3 Typhoon SSBN
SSGN [2]
2 Oscar II SSGN
SSN [6]
6 Akula SSN
1 Sierra I SSN
1 Sierra II SSN
4 Victor III SSN
SSK [6]
5 Kilo SSK
1 Sarov SSK
Aircraft
The Northern Fleet with the exception of the Kuznetsov Air Wing, currently has no offensive aircraft under its direct control. The only 2 remaining Anti-Ship Regiments of TU-22M2/3 [45 ac] are those stationed in the Far East as part of the Pacific Fleet. No ASW aircraft are under its command though it can utilise the Bear/May Regiment at Ostrov (Pskov) which also serves the Baltic fleet.
As I am sure you can see the largest Soviet Naval Force currently available is truely a shadow of its former self and is only slightly larger than the RN but far less flexible/ deployable than the RN, especially when the Light Frigates/Corvettes as these are only of use in littorial defensive operations and cannot be easily deployed.
More obviouly this force would be totally unable to handle the US Atlantic Fleet with more units stationed at Norfolk than the whole Northern Fleet alone.
In a wartime situation there is little or no chance of the Russian Navy inflicting serious damage on a CBG. If it went on the offensive and try to enter the Atlantic it would be engaged by numerous NATO assets as well as the USN. If it stayed defensive then it playes no real role and can be ignored It cannot be effectively rienforced by any other fleets during wartime either. Therefore the only way a Carrier is going to be attacked and sunk is a surprise Day one attack and even then this would be highly unlikely.
Cheers
I know I am going to get shot down for saying this but the Soviet attack on the USN Task Force at the start of the conflict in Red Storn Rising is quite a good representation of how thiongs could have gone. Larry Bond who advised Tom Clancy on the Naval Aspect of the novel is quite an authoritative source.
That was the Cold War when Soviet power was at its zenith. Nowadays with Russia prioritising spending on its land based nuclear assets would have a much much harder time carrying out an attack on a CBG, if any chance at all at that goes for most nations. Under wartime conditions no aircraft is going to get within effective launch range of a CBG unless on a one way mission. You have to swamp a CBG’s defences and that requires numbers and ISTAR is going to detect the launch of that many assets. Against a majot threat the USN is not going to send a single CBG either but multiple assets.
Neither India or China currently have the airborne assets to seriously engage a CBG let alone a number of them and will not have them in the near future.
As for submarines yes these are a threat but again you need numbers and Russia simply no longer has these. India and China are not even in the game at present. An attack by an Oscar II would scare the hell out of a CBG but would in all likelyhood fail to sink the carrier and the Oscar would only get one attack. How many Oscar IIs doed the Russian Navy have?
Diesel subs have had some success in exercises against CBGs but these are rare and have been by “friendly” navies and they knew roughly where the CBG was! Can SSs do 30kts submerged?
Until someone can launch 50+ long range aircraft (Backfire class) at a CBG and had intel on its location without alerting the CBG, or deply multiple underwater assets to attack of different directs at once again without detection at launch, the CBG will be the King of the Seas.
Whilst I fully understand that the V-22 is expensive, it does offer unique capabilities.
Can anyone provide a comparison on speed, range payload for the V-22, Merlin, chinook and C-27J Spartan, and also information on typical in theatre loads? I know the C-130 exceeds all of the above but could a V-22 carry out some of it’s in theatre roles? For example supplying forward deployed troops directly from a main base rather than moving stores/personel forward on a C-130 then to the troops via Merlin/chinook.
I am just trying to work out if a V-22 buy could actually kill many more birds with one stone and offer greater operational flexibility if purchased for both the RN and RAF?
Finally how expensive would it be to develope a presurized V-22. This would remove many limitations and increase range etc?
Given the need for AEW, COD on the CVFs and a replacement for the Sea Kings in the Transport role I think or at least hope the MoD looks again at the V-22. COD is extremely valuable for Carriers, though the last UK one was a variant of the Gannet back in the 70s. Given the current design of the CVFs a V-22 variant is the only real option for this role. As has also ben stated the V-22 would nicely fill the AEW role and if operated with a High Altitude UAV would cover most requirements. The V-22 would make an excellent replacement for the Sea King as well so in total you would be looking at around 12 AEW/COD/Tanker? variants (As one one Carrier will be at sea at one time) and between 18 and 24 Transport variants.
Now we all know the V-22 in expensive but it provides a much high capability than conventional Helicopters. Like with the C-17 we would be able to tap into the US supply system and most training could be done in the US.
Stretching things a mini gunship variant like that proposed for the Spartan could be developed in time, providing COIN fire support that might interest the US Spec-Ops community as well as the marines.
The GMLRS are only deployed in main bases (not FOBs) and as such are static targets and are vulnerable to hostile mortar and rocket attacks. Yes it is a useful platform but are already stated it is limited to a 60km range. 105mm Light guns are deployed further forward and 81mm Mortars provide local support. However what targets they can engage is limited due to ROEs. Air power offers greater flexiblity as they can use diffrent munitions depending on the target from a 2000lb LGB to a 27mm Cannon.
The main reasons for the limited number of aircraft deployed is not cash but availability and what the military think is adequate for the job. Yes they do have a substantial logistical tail but so do all platforms. The Army hads a very limited number of Firing Units for GMLRS and only 2 or 3 are actually deployed in Afghanistan. All systems go U/S every now and than especially ones as complicated as the GMLRS. Yes planes go U/S but thare are always others to call on.
GMLRS works well if used with other platforms. Once a target has been identified and engaged it can bring addition firepower to bear rapidly if required. As a stand alone it has to many limitation and does not provide the full cover the troops need.
First off the RAF needs the Typhoons as they are the only game in town to regenerate the RAF’s fast jet fleet until the JSF shows up a decade from now. The Tornados and Harriers have been using up the hours at an alarming rate since the 1990s.
As for MBTs well yeas we don’t need new ones but those we have need updating especially the main gun as though effective it is an orphan and a change to the 120mm L55 smoothbore will actually save money.
AS for the Navy well again the ships we have are limited in how much more thay can be upgraded and were really designed for blue water (atlantic) ASW. The T42s are well past their sell by date and the Darings again are the only game in town but a couple more would be good.
Since the end of the Cold War and especially since 1997 the word “Capability” has been centeral to defence policy. However Capacity ans availabilty have been sacrificed to maintain and obtain Capabilty.
In addition Afghanistan and Iraq have led to new equipment but only in limited numbers and without any long term support programme. The concentration on these two conflicts has crippled the armed forces as re-equipment and modernisation programmes have fallen by the wayside and troop numbers have continued to fall. Just look at the list of units that have taken casualties. Almost every unit serving in Afghanistan is in reality a composite of many as the infantry is understrength and undermanned.
A SDR in the last chance the armed forces have to prevent them reaching critical mass where they cannot train or support operations effectively through lack of men and equipment and we will be forced in to the 2nd division or worse. I hope the SDR produces realistic results but I fear 1997 all over again. To work funds will have to be diverted from Health and Education and I cannot see that happening.
The Army has been requesting more Helicopters ever since it began operations in Helmand. As for Strategy, well this has been spun and spun. The Armed force do not decide how much resources they need, that is the treasury as they say how much cash is available. It also depends on equipment availability, again depending on the cash. So the armed forces are given a mission by the Politicians and told how much money is available and the armed forces put together a package within these criteria. Add a fair amount of “Can Do” mentality and there you have it. Usually though the mission and available funding aare out of wack. This has gap has been filled in the past by using UORs funded separately from the main MOD budget by the Treasury. However these are now capped above a certain limit and any excess now comes from the main budget. And surprise surprise the cap is getting lower and lower.
Into the equation you must consider shortage of aircrew abd spares. How many Chinooks are U/S due to spares being robbed to keep the airframes on operations flying. Also not all airframes are the same standard, a by product of UORs is only those on operations get the full kit.
Finally one of the core reasons for the poor availability of airframes is that the Government/Treasury/Brown took back the money allocated to the Replacement Helicopter Programme. this was to find and purchase a replacement for the Puma and Sea King in RAF and Navy service.
How many new tankers has either Boeing or Airbus sold over the last few years. From what I can see Airbus seems to be quite a way ahead in sales. And why does the USAF has such different criteria for its new tankers compared to the rest of the world?
Under current UK Foreign policy we need those CVF’s for force projection. The MOD procurement system is at fault here if they hadn’t been so stupid about it all we would be getting a carrier in 2012 and one in 2014 for £4bil now we face a situation where it’s going to cost much more or it will be cancelled. If both of these carriers are not built then the UK will need to change it’s foreign policy that is a few hundred years old.
Although the MODs procurement system is far from perfect, as has been said before the blame here rests with the Treasury/gordon Brown. The MOD is trying to manage programmes with what is term a Through Life Management Plan but has to live with annual budgets and constant in year adjustments so programmes are delayed/put on hold repeatedly in order to balance the books. Problem is that you can halt orders immediately but it takes months or years to get back up to speed.
More than ever we need a full defence review and put all the cards on the table. If we want to play with the big boys we have to fund it or admit we can’t afford to.
I have a real bad feeling about the carriers though. I can see them never having a full air wing and also having serious gaps in capability. Everything will end up being a compromise with the Sea King AEW&C being kept in service until they just about fall out of the sky, no COD platform or AAR platform. Finally there will be insufficient escorts or auxillaries available for anything but short term deployments. This will leave the CVFs as PR/show the flag assets but no real stamina or punch
the report I have seen published by a group which includes ex CDS Gen Jackson had looked into the UK’s future defence needs and has recommended scrapping both carriers, the Trident Replacement and Scrapping/selling off the T45s. Are they mad!
I think is may be a ploy to get the Politicians to either put up or shut up regarding defence spending but it may backfire with the Treasury accepting their recommendations as reason to make further cuts.
It looks like whoever is in power over the next few years, defence is going to take some really serious hits and especially the Navy. The RAF will likely lose more Fast Jet Squadrons, most likely GR4 units. Only the army may come out reletively intact but will have re-equipment plans delayed.
The Typhoon IS what the RAF need. Where and A2A threat existed the RAF currently need to use dedicated A2A platforms to support those on A2G missions. It is currently calculated that one Typhoon will do the job of 2 Tornado GR4 and 1 Tornado F3. The RAF will in my view end up with less plaforms than originally planned but these will be all T3 or near equivilents.
The USAF decided in the 1990s that is could afford single role tactical aircraft hence the demise of the F-111. The F-16 and F-18 together with the F-15E have shown the need and versatility of swing role platforms.
Given Germany’s shrinking defence budget I can see all it Typhoon wings becoming swing role as the Tornado reaches the end of its life and see no replacement for the remaining Tornados being purchased other that a few specialised platforms such as UCAVs.
Stealth will no be the “Wonder Weapon” for ever, like altitude was once thought to make aircraft invulnerable to enemy fire or interception. The capabilities of the Typhoon are a huge step up from the lagacy platforms it is replacing in terms of performance, avionics, pilot interface, weapons load/option.
It is not the best plane in the world but it will be able to do what it is asked to and need for the foreseeable future. its only real competators are the Rafale and F-18E as both the F-16 and F-15 are really at the end of their potential growth. Both of the former are excellent platforms whilst the JSF is an unknown quantity until it actually enters service.
The majority of equipment purchased specifically for operations is covered by UORs although the treasury has nor put an annual cap on things. They “Back Hole” is still there and is going to get bigger as in the current climate there will be next to zero growth or worse in the Defence Budget over the next few years.
The cuts you have highlighted are really just to break even with the existing budget and allow other programmes to progress in years to come like the JSF, Carriers, Warrior Upgrade, FRES Recce, Astute, T45 etc
Backhanders were/maybe still are part of business. Don’t forget the F-104 “Deal of the Century” where Belgium, Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, Italy, Norway were “Persuaded” to by the Starfighter after Lockheed had paid out huge sums to ensure their plane won the contracts. Lockheed have since admitted as such.
You could make a case where every deal involving offsetting is open to coruption as which companies get the offset work!
I get really annoyed and the looney morale minority when posts like this come up. They are like people who believe wars can be fought without civilian casualties, not living in the real world.