LordJimWe are currently operating without MRA coverage at the moment and given the size of the MRA4 fleet just how much coverage will that actually be able to provide especially if one is always providing suport for out submarines starting deplayments. It is a classic case of capability over capacity and the RAF will be tempted to use it more as a ISTAR platform anyway. The MRA4 is simply overkill for standard MP operations.
If after 2015 it is deemed that a dedicated high end MPA/ASW is required than there is a case for a OTS pruchase of the P-8 Posidon but serious consideration needs to be given to the puchase a number of a simpler MP platforms, with the costs shared with other departments as they will be providing rescue and other civilain capabilities. In fact this could be tied in to the replacement Air Sea Rescue plrogramme to replace the exisiting Sea King and S-61 platforms.
LordJimI am a strong beliver that the C3 platform is the key to the future of the RN. IT will carry out most if not all of the deployments to duty stations unless there is a threat level high enough to warrant a Frigate or Destroyer. As I tried to explain above is basic configuration would be a medium multirole gun of either 57 or 76 calibre and facilities for a small medium helicopter. I would be equipped with basic passive defence systems and other elctronics. However the ability to have its capabilities enhances with it being fitted for but not with or plug and play would be something to be seriously considered.
The RN is in danger of becomming fixated on the high end T-26 as it has been on the CVFs. Yes there is need for a number of GP high end platform to work with the T-45, or providing escorts for the CVF and detachments in High threat environments but the bult of the RNs commitmetns do not require such a platform. I therfore see no need to build more than 6-8 T-26 to meet these needs. I would however ensure the T-26 had sufficient C£C capabilities to act as a flotilla leader of a TF comprising itself and 2-4 C3/2 platforms. This is why I would like to see the T-26 fitted with something better than just CAAM, Aster 15/30 so it can act as a additional magazine of the T-45 in high end operations and provide AD for medium and low end operation by itself. This would mean CAAM could be scrapped, the T-23 retain VL Sea WOlf until their retirement and an alternative land based sytem purchased OTS to replace rapier if at all, but then again how many Rapier rounds have been fired in anger since 1982? Could this also not wain until the 2015 SDSR.
In fact I would combine the C3 programme with the C2 producing at the lower end a platform with capabilites similar to the French Floreal and at the higher end a platform of similar size and capability to the USNs old OHP class frigates although I would be more inclined to aim for the former. The same hull would be used to produce a modular support vessel class for survery work etc.
Yes this design is more capable than a beefed up OPV/MCV but it will need to be to operate worldwide, but as long as the design keeps to within its brief I can see it being affordable and capable.
LordJimIf the MoD has to make savings of 10-15% over the next five years the only way I can see it to cut manpower, running costs and cancel or delay major programmes that are requireing payment during this time.
For the RAF the prime target has to be the tornado fleet. Additional saving can be made from removing additional legacy platforms and reducing manpower accordingly together with the closure of stations. There is a slim chance though that given the delivery schedule that Typhoon 3B could survive as it is not due until the very end or after the 5 year timescale and would definitely make the fleet more viable rather than the 4 squadron frontline force being talked about.
A major rethink on the planned new training scheme should be carried out given the reduced size of the RAF unless the comercial plan is to actively seek foreign pilots to train ot offset costs.
The Chinook buy could be reduced to attrition replacement or scrapped as it is of no benefit for Afghanistan which was the reason publically given and the Puma contreact also scrapped. I do not know the delivery schedule for the A400, but the C-130J should be safe but the legacy C-130K could go sooner.
THe Nimrod MRA4 is a bit of a tricky one. If the criteria being used is capabilities me must have now, it would appear to be a “Nice to have” item and could be vulnerable especially if the Rivet Joint platforms are deemed to be more important, but the opposite is also true so I think the RAF will get one or the other even if we have already paid the bulk of the costs for the former.
The stations that are definitely safe are Conningsby, Leuchars, Brize Norton, Waddington and Odiham, with Witttering safe as long as the Harrier remains in service. All others are vulnerable to closure if the reductions take place.
Even though the Army appears to have fended off the 20,000 reduction I do not think it can avoid serious manpower cuts. The revised deployable force level of 6,000 means regular infantry battalions are not safe especially if greater use of TA battalions is planned for long term deployments or surge support. With Germany I can see one Brigade of heavy armour being retained, with it being able to form 4 battalion sized battlegroups. Some of the remaing hardware can be mothballed, sufficient for an additional 2 battlegroups to be manner primarily by the TA. The Saxon APC will have to go with those Mechanised Infantry units being re-rolled as Light until a new Medium platform comes on line but this will now not take place until after 2015.
In fact I can see the Army’s reorganisation creating a force of 6 brigade formations each capable of deploying 4-6 battalion battlegroups and each having 25% of its manpower coming from the TA. Support units would be pooled with 50% of the personnel comming from the TA. Of these brigades 1 would be heavy, 2 would be medium, 2 would be light role and the last would be the high readiness formation. ISTAR units should be integral in all brigades. The last brigade would be 100% regular with permenent operation headquarters and intergral support units. It would comprise of the 3 Parachute battalions and the 3 RM Commandos along with SF.
Only 2 Divisional headquarters should be retained together with 3 operations headquarters at brigade level including that of the high readuiness brigade. Only admin function headquarters need to be permently part of the 6 bgrigades
The AAC will suffer major reductions with the retirement of its Lynx AH-7 and remaining Gazelles as well as the cancellation of the Army Wildcat, leaving it with only the Apache AH-1 and Lynx AH-9A. Again if a new platform is purchased it will be after 2015.
Unfortunately I can see specialist training (Jungle and Artic for example) being restricted in future to the high readiness battalions and the RM. The training areas in Canada should be closed given the major reduction in armour with trainig areas in the UK and Europe sufficient to meet the Army’s needs.
Now to the Navy. It’s main programme is obviously the Carriers. HTese should be save as they are the most public programme current being under taken and have been declared the key to the UK’s future plans. The key questions it what form they will take and although I have been as guilty as other wishing them to be brought into service as CATOBAR, QE at least will be lauched as STOVL operating the Harriers, although a belive work will be carried out to allow earier conversion later. The future platform to operate from them will impact outside the 2015 timelime as will PoW so I will leave that to the 1015 SDSR.
So where does the RN make the cuts given it has taken many hits already over the past 2 decades. Well the T-42 are obvious targets as are the T-22 B3 and possibly 2-4 of the olders T-23. The reduction in escorts is fine as long as there is a reduction in commitments in parallel. The T-26 programme will impact outside this SDSR
A single type of MCV should de retained either the Sandown or Hunt calsses based of the operating cost and capabilites of each class. I would like to see the so called C3 programme actually begun in the timeframe of the SDSR as I see the need for a multirole patrol vessel for the RN higher than the T-26. I would prefer the RN to seek a OTS solution to this requirement as there are many platforms available that would meet the requirements of the RN with minimum alteration. The most complicated capabilty need, MCM can be left as the MCMVs still in service can cover this role, but the C3 must be able to adopt this role whether it is built fitted for but not with or plug and play. I think we need ot see the C3 as a “Colonial Gunboat” with a helicopter with a medium multipurpose gun and passive defence systems as its basic configuration. Its prime offensive tool will be the on board helicopter, equipped wiht the follow on the Sea Skua amongst other hardware. It would be nice to beef up its defensive capabilites when required especially its AD but these are all within a cost/benefit equation and should not impact on the inital programmes costs or the numbers.
Comming to aviation assets, this SDSR will mainly affect rotary assets. The Wildcat should proceed for the RN with the Early retiremetn of the Mk3 Sea Lynx. The transfer of the Merlin HC3/3A to the FAA should continue but funs must be made available fo rthere modernisation withing the current 5 years timeframe. Whether this is simply a sea proofing exercise or includes folding rotors and tail will also be covered by a cost/benefit equation, but I can see a staged approach with the former carried out immediately and the latter after 2015 with the possility of additional units being purchased after that date also
The Amphibious units are targets as they role is going to be primarily to transport equipment not conduct amphibious ops like the Falklands so Bulwark and Albion are expensive units compared to the Bay class to operate. Options could be to transfer them to the RFA, mothball them or scrap. I think the latter is unlikely though. Ocean could go sooner though a comparison of operating costs with Illustrios and Ark Royal should determine its fate. If it is deemed cheaper to amintain Ocean until its OSD and operate it into the ground, retiring an Additional CVL earlier that could be an option.
With the reduction in units and commitments, to replacement of RFA units will now not take place until after 2015, with older units being sold retired.
The Astute is the Future of the RNs submarine capability with fleet of 7. The RN could give up 2-3 legacy boats earlier than panned to secure the Astute programme and I think this would be a worthwhile tradeoff given the large capability increace the latter gives the RN. At least 1 sdditional unit could be manufactured post 2015 to maintain manufacturing given the delays in the Trident replacement programme but that is outside the SDSR.
All of the above would result in manpower reductions but naval bases are also vulnerable. Faselane is obviously safe, and so i
should Portsmouth. Devonport is not is the reductions take place as predicted as are all but one of the FAA’s flying stations.
Much of what I have said has been said before but I felt the nned to state my opinions
LordJimOne thing I haven’t heard talked about is the creation of a Joint Officer Training College. All three services combined their Staff Officer training a Shrivenham could they do the same closing two of the following, Cranwell, Dartmouth and Sandhurst and retaining the third as a Tri-service esteblishment.
Nother suggestion is to dramaticaaly increase the civilain to military ratio at DE&S. There are thousands of Officers and Senior NCOs currently working in Bath and Bristol. They cost at least twice as much in post as the equivilent civilian and their is little lost in experience and ability. One reason for the large numner has been the Armed Forces desire to retain slots at various ranks especially Squadron Leader (and its equivilents in the Army and Navy) and above.
LordJimSwerve.
Thanks for the detailed reply and yes I do understand the current crisis but knowing how money CAN be moved around the MoD if there is the will to do it I still see a possibility of the Design being changed. Saying that this would be the last chance to do it but thare has been a substantial amount of work done both on a CATOBAR design for the CVF and the PA2. As construction is still at a very early stage there would be extra costs but not so much as to make it a none starter. As for schedule well although the Government has declared that the SDSR will not result in programmes being put back, given the need for immediate savings a small delay to cover a redesign/reschedule might happen.
The main problem with all this is that we are all in the dark regarding the costs of the various options etc. Given the workings of the Commercial and Financial departments within the MoD anything is possible especially the way the SDSR appears to be being run. Anyone got a time machine to jump forward to the next SDSR when actual common sense and logic may actually be part of the process
LordJimIf people are going to throw their toys out of the pram can they at least state how much the F-35B is going to cost to buy and operate, how much the F-18E/F will cost to buy and operate, how much it will cost to complete the CVF as CATOBAR as nothing built yet is unique to either design and how much this is an increase over the STOVL design, and what would be the increase in operating costs. I think people will find that on the whole we haven’t got the answers yet so everyone is free to post their opinions but the “I’m right and everybody else in wrong” attitude is stupid.
If we are talking about immediate saving then even talking about the CVF is nonsense as they aren’t due to be finished let alone enter service until after the next (2015) SDSR. Catapults of what ever form should not break the bank but their purchase can wait.
The Carriers are going to be possibly the only positive headline in the SDSR and this may be highlighted in how funding priorities are set in the SDSR, with funding allocated to whatever version of CVF is to be built and what platform is to operate from it. I expect every other programme to take hits immediately or in the short term. I personally cannot see how this SDSR can be balanced in the current financial crisis anyway and any reference to radical reform etc is going to be mainly spin. Don’t expect any pluses with substance except the CVFs this time around. As I said earlier wait until 2015 and we will see in this Governemnt gamble with defence has worked and things can begin to be put bach together.
LordJimThe Army may have survived this SDSR but another one is due in 2015 to the chickens will come home to roost even if the funding situation improves as both the RN and the RAF will need major investment to bring it into line with needs such as the T26/C1/C2 or whatever and the C3 with the RAF needing additional Helicopters to sort out the rumoured C@#% Up, though the pull out from Afghanistan will reduce the urgency.
I think we are going to be able to sumerise the SDSR as the positive headlien being the Carriers. Everything else will be cut to the bone including providing the minimum essential resources for Afghanistan. See over the next five years what works and fix what is broken in the 2015 SDSR.
LordJimNo money has changed hands on the procurement of the F-35 except for the 3 developemental airframes so no the UK will not be paying twice to set things up for the F-18. As for using US kit of rthe F-18 well we have done it before with the F-4Js operated by 74 Sqn after the Falklands war, the aircrew even had to use us flight suits and helmets. On top of that the Typhoon as a bespoke flying suit etc.
I see no problem in using US ordonnace as the MoD isn’t a charity for the UK defence industry. BAe Systems and RR will always servive especailly as the former earns the majority of income from its overseas assets and RR from its civilian side. We no longer even produce the full range of ammunition for our armed forces, so the Industry card is no hinderance to buying and operating US weaponry, the world has changed.
What is key here are the sums, will the savings not purchasing and operating the F-35B equal the cost of fitting out the CVF as CATOBAR and purchasing a cheaper platform and when I say operating I mean through life costs.
As alternative I would love to see the Rafale but I think that is a non starter. The Super Bug has plenty of developmental growth left in it and should be able to match any platform on the avionics side.
With the F-35, I cannot help but wonder do we need a first day striker. I cannot think of any senario where we alone are facing an opponent that would require it. Can anyone else? IF stealth becomes that vital I would follow the US line which intends to use LO UCAVs as its prime first day strikers. With a CATOBAR CVF we will have that option also.
In the end though, all I hope for is the RN having 2 new Carriers and the platforms to form an effective air wing.
LordJimWith the predicted draw down of the Army’s heavy formation the need for the training bases in Canada diminishes greatly so offering these up would help the Army in the SDSR.
With Germany the saving are not going to be as great as some people think as personnal costs will not be reduced much as the Armoured Brigade to lose its MBTs will probably be the first to re-equip as a “Medium” formation so the army will want to retain them. I have a feeling it is going to be the “Light” role infantry and tail end units that will be in the firing line at first. Additional costs are going to come from rehousing the units returning including their families. Mind you there are going to be a few RAF stations available and this is a well worn path. Lyneham would be a good choice being in Army land and with good access to training areas, as would Marham.
I really wish there was a fast forward button to the end of October as although it is going to be painful I am hoping the Treasury actually has some sense in all of this and a rounded SDSR emerges.
LordJimI don’t think weapons integrating is going to be a problem on the F-18. Firstly Boeing will probably be willing to do a deal to have the UK as a customer and secondly given the amout of ordonnance already qualified on the F-18 how much UK only kit would need to be quallified?
ASRAAM
Meteor
ALARM II
Brimstone
Storm Shadow
Paveway IV
There is at least oneother country that could be pursuaded to share the costs of the first. With Meteor, with its export potential Boeing would probably be interested in addiding it to the F-18s arsenal and the same goes for Storm Shadow.
However given the limited purchases of the above weapons made by/for the UK, I would say only the first 3 need integration with existing US weaponry such as the SDB I/II, Harpoon, JSOW etc would be a more cost effective, with the others being retained for the RAF.
With current financial retrains, cost effectiveness must be key to any or all purchases, especially given the size our armed forces are destined to be. BAe Systems will survive as will RR but companies that rely on UK only products had better diversify or go under. The MoD should not have any obligation to support the UK’s defence industry except in matters where UK proprietary needs are paramount.
LordJimI think the key thing here is to retain the skills and expertise at Barrow whether it is building 2 or more Astute or a replacement for Vanguard. Putting off Trident for this Parliament is a smart move. There are going to be more than enough battles ahead with the SDSR and CSR without adding the future of the UKs nuclear deterent to the mix.
The MoD needs to identify quick savings. Trident’s replacement isn’t one. In fact having just spent £4Bn upgrading the Trident warheads, the missile at least are going to be good for quite a while and with some TLC the Vanguards have a fair amount of life left. Being in sync with the Ohio replacement would be nice but the RN likes to keep secrets especially when it comes to submarines so I cannot see any co-operation on many areas unless there is a major policy shift.
What is starting to worry me more refarding the SDSR is that all Government departments are playing the “We cannot cope with the cuts”, game and given the precidence of the Treasury not funding the last SDR, the same could happen again even if the cuts are as bad as people sometimes think, meaning things could get even worse as money is taken away from the MoD to lessen blows to other more politically sensitive departments.
I can see the armed forces being reduced acreoss the board with many capabilities not currently at the fore being reduced to cadre strength that may allow them the expand over time. The key areas for this are probably going to be the Army’s Mechanised and Armoured formations anthe RAF’s fast jet fleet. As compensation the Army may begin to recieve new medium AFVs to equip 1-2 brigades with some going to TA units.
The UKs main expeditionary air assets are going to come from the RN which may beging to recieve its new platform as early as 2015, having an OCU and 1 squadron carrier qualified when the QE is delivered. Funding will be made available to bring both CVFs into service equipped to operate as CTOL. Other programmes will be reduced or cancelled to ensure this as the CVFs are a high profile and politically important programme being core of future policy. With them the UK can still appear to be a major player, boasting a capability few nations have.
This Government is going to be taking a 10 year gamble with the UK’s defence with many capabilities being reduced to levels that cannot be used operationally at an effective level. We will ahve to see if they have made the right choice over time and hope our brave men and women do not pay the price if they have got it wrong.
LordJimI agree that the UK should purchase the SDB II given its performance and size it is the ideal weapon for today and tomorrow especially with the Diamondback add on giving it a substantial stand off range. AS for needing a weapon with a 600km range I think that definitely falls into the “Nice to have” catagory.
On the subject of the FRES Scout, the Army is no longer looking to field a “Light” recce tank but rather develope a platform the replace its large fleet of 1960s and 70s AFVs with a common fleet based on the ASCOD 2. These would form the core of the so called “Medium” Brigades which will be the core of the new army.
Regarding Rivet Joint, as an alternative the French are going to need to replace their Transall and DC-8 based ELING and SIGINT platforms in the near future. Could a modified A-400 or A330 fulfill this role again with a pooled force?
Finally I do not theing the Army’s Armoured/Medium Brigades are going to be limited to large scale warfare in Europe. It has been a mistake in my view not to deploy a troop of CR2s to Afghanistan as many other NATO nations have done. Having a MBT on overwatch that can reach out and touch someone at 4000m with an HE round costing a fraction of the cost of a ATGW or PGM has both physical and morale benefits. Weneed to find a way to make the logistical tails for these units more mobile and also have a smaller footprint. The same also goes for armoured engineering platforms which again have been under utilised in Afghanistan.
LordJimIn my senario the UK would benefit from other nations reducing their Typhoon buys allowing accelerated delivery. With 3 Squadrons at Leuchars and 3 plus OCU/OEU at Conningsby their should be enough to meet the current QRA needs and a detachment.
Being ruthless the RAF needs to be equipped with platforms that are truely swing role to be cost effective. The Typhoon will eventually be able to do that and losing the Tornados may free up additional funds to bring this forward, definitely if the Harriers go early as well.
I wouldn’t be surprised if future RN recruitment vids start to seem like the trailer to Top Gun 2 as well as RAF pilots being given the chance to move accross with financial incentives. The RN is going to be the mainstay of expeditionary aviation in future and is going to get funding at the expence of the RAF assuming the NSC dcides this is where the future of the UKs armed forces is. IF not the it will be a whole different ball game.
LordJimThis Government is more concerned about immediate and short term savings. When the idea of scrapping the final T3 Typhoons was put on the table and accepted in principal by the RAF, the loss of the whole Tornado fleet was not on the cards. I hope there is a rethink and the RAF is able to negociate a retention of the Typhoons, equipping 6-7 frontline plus OCU and OEU, more so if the RN are equipped with a platform other than the F-35B.
The way things are going the RAF should be left with the ability to deploy a detachment of 1 fast jet squadron for an extended period of time and surge an additional squadron if needed. This is about the same as now as we have to draw from two different fleets with different logistical tails.
Current MoD talk is for the RAF to operate two types but one type offers saving though also risks such as faults being discovered that affect the type chosen grounding the fleets. I am sure this sort of risk assessment is underway and I hope the two type principal is altered to cover the RAF and FAA, one for each.
LordJimOne of the problems with the whole platform for the CVF is the Joint Harrier Force. Wanting the CVLs to operate more as strike platforms than ASW as originally designed and becfause the GR7 was a far better strike platform than the FA2 it made sence at the time to form this organisation. This worked when both Harrier types were operational with the FAA responsible for AD and the RAF for GR. However when the FA2s were retired early the RAF gained prominence in the orgaisation and the powere that be decided to retain the status quo with the follow on platform being jointly operated (RAF led)
Linking the new platform to a joint fleet immediately made any competion biased towards a STOVL platform as the RAF wanted to replace its Harriers first and formost and carrier operations were second. In addition the RAF wanted to join the stealth club and the Governemnt saw gains for the areospace industry and so the CVFs were designed to be STOVL platforms with a small concession to CTOL if the JSF didn’t work out.
The FAA appears to have been along simple for the ride with its own preferences barely acknowledged, just being happy that it was getting its carriers.
In my opinion the CVFs need to be first and formost strike carriers which can be used in alternate roles if needed. Any purchase of airframes needs to be sufficiently large to allow s CVF to operate at full capacity for an extended period of time (2-3 months). It needs a good multirole platform capable of AD, GR/CAS and ASuW. In addition it needs a good ISTAR platform for AEW&C and as a node for over the horizon data transfer, and the need existes for a rotary ASW/ASuW platform. Finally it needs a COD platform to allow operation to be maintained at a suitable tempo as only a finite amount of stores and replacement parts and engines can be carrier aboard a CVF. By the way with the CVF have a UETF like the US carriers do on their stern. If not then the need for a COD to fly in addtional engines is even greater.
What the FAA can do without is stealth. This puts too much of a compromise on a platform and increases its costs. (I am not going to role off comparison table and this is my opinion) If a stealth platform has to carry external ordonnance then the extra cost for LO is wasted. 5th Gen avionics can be duplicated in any existing platform and with good AEW&C any foreseeable threat can be countered. Lets face it we are not going to be facing 5th generation opposition over the next decade if one is realistic. Some might say I haven’t a crystal ball and I haven’t but I have got common sense.
The F-18E/F/G would be a good platform for the FAA which is combat proven and low risk, but with plenty of growth. The F-35C would be a option if funding were not so tight, but given that the F-35 prodiuction run will probably match the F-16, it will still be available then at a lower cost of the next gen that replaces it will. STOVL will probably end with the F-35B.
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