Funny, with all of the resources available to Iran. That it hasn’t replaced its old fleet of American Aircraft.:confused:

Despite US as the Big Satan in Iranian eyes. They are obessessed with American warplanes that they are waiting for the sanction to be lifted before buying spree begins. :diablo:

New Chinese Missiles Target the Greater Asian Region

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by Richard Fisher, Jr.
Published on July 24th, 2007
ARTICLES

Imagery made available on Chinese web pages on July 13 and July 15 appears to confirm that China has developed new short range and medium to intermediate range ballistic missiles for use in the Asia Pacific region. First viewed in an unclear image in November 2006, the new medium to intermediate range missile may be a version of the DF-21 (NATO code: CSS-5) or it may be the long-awaited DF-25. The other missile appears to be a new version of the DF-15 (CSS-6) with a terminally guided warhead. The significance of these revelations is that China is upgrading its regionally-targeted missile forces, which will soon pose additional threats to, among others, India, Russia, Japan, South Korea and to U.S. forces in the East Asian region.

New Medium to Intermediate Missile: While the top is an altered image, the appearance of other images of the transporter and missile at least indicate that China is developing a new medium to intermediate range missile to deploy against its neighbors. Source: CJDBY web page

China’s Medium and Intermediate Range Missiles

China has long employed medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles as part of its nuclear, and increasingly, it non-nuclear missile arsenal. These missiles target Russian, Indian, Japanese, South Korean and U.S. military forces in East Asia. Early MRBM and IRBMs include the 2,790km range DF-3 (CSS-2) and the 5,470km range DF-4 (CSS-3). Both are liquid fuel missiles deployed in hangers or caves and towed to launch sites. Both of these weapons date back to the 1960s, and although they have been continually improved, are considered obsolete and due for replacement. In its 2007 report on the PLA the Pentagon notes there are 14 to 18 DF-3s and 16 to 24 DF-4 missiles.

Starting in 1987 China started deploying the DF-21 (CSS-5), a new solid-fuel missile derived from the JL-1 submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM). In its latest report on the PLA the Pentagon notes that 34 to 38 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) are ready to fire between 40 to 50 DF-21 missiles. The DF-21 is now reported to come in an initial variant with a range of 1,770+km to 2,150km, and the DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2), with a range of 2,500km. The DF-21 can be armed with nuclear or non-nuclear warheads.

DF-21: The DF-21 was the Second Artillery’s first solid fueled and mobile ballistic missile. Source: Chinese Internet

Asian military sources have told the author that a version of the DF-21 is expected to be the first PLA missile to carry a new terminally-guided warhead to create the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). Both U.S. and Asian sources have stated that this missile was tested in 2005 and in 2006. With the April 2006 launch of the Jianbing-5/YaoGan-1, China’s first dedicated military synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite, and a related new high-resolution digital imaging satellite Jianbing-6/YaoGan-2 last May 25[1], China’s new ASBM may be close to achieving an initial operational status. Russian technology SAR and electro-optical satellites dedicated to counter-naval missions may be launched later this year. These satellites can join existing Chinese long-range Over-the-Horizon radar and land-based electronic intelligence sensors, aircraft and even ships to provide composite targeting data for ASBMs. China will also use its future “Compass” navigation satellite constellation to provide precision guidance for this and other missiles.

First Possible Image of DF-21 ASBM: Appearing on a Chinese web site last May, this image shows an apparent mockup of a DF-21 size missile with a maneuverable warhead shape. The photo is likely copied from a Chinese brochure or publication and dates from early in this decade. Source: Chinese Internet

China’s new ASBMs pose a strategic as well as a tactical challenge to U.S. forces in Asia. At present the U.S. does not have anti-missile capabilities to defend large U.S. ships against this threat, so vulnerable targets, most importantly aircraft carriers, will have to remain out of missile range in order to survive. This factor will further limit the effectiveness of their already range-challenged F/A-18E/F fighter bombers. U.S. Aegis cruisers and destroyers now being outfitted with new SM-3 interceptors with upgraded radar and processing capabilities may in the future be configured to deal with this threat, but if so, they may not be available for other missions, like protecting people. The fact is that no anti-missile system is going to come close to providing reliable defense. For China, ASBMs provide a means for saturating U.S. ships with missiles. While ASBMs are bearing down from above, their attack can be coordinated with waves of submarine, air and ship-launched anti-ship cruise missiles.

The DF-21 also provided the basis for the four-stage KT-1 mobile solid fuel space launch vehicle, which in turn, forms the basis for the SC-19 direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile. A more capable ASAT missile may be derived from the KT-2, which Chinese sources at the 2002 Zhuhai Airshow stated was based on the DF-31 ICBM. The massive debris from the January 11 satellite destruction has forced the U.S. to move one satellite[2], and possibly, the International Space Station, to avoid destruction. The threat from the Chinese satellite debris will exist for about a decade to come.

New Missile

The new medium to intermediate range missile pictured above began to appear on Chinese web pages in late November 2006. The first image was clear enough only to determine that a new missile with a new 10-wheel TEL could be seen on a testing range. Days later another image appeared of the TEL on a railroad flatbed car. The TEL is similar to that used by the DF-11A or CSS-7 Mod2 short range ballistic missile (SRBM).

First Picture: This first vague picture of the new missile appeared on Chinese web pages in November 2006. Credit: Chinese Internet

The latest picture to emerge on July 13, however, shows signs of being altered or “photo shopped.” The missile tubes and TEL show significant differences; the TEL in the background may be fake. This is often sufficient cause to discount such a picture as Chinese military fans often have great fun generating such images, as does the Chinese government, to confound observers. Both often alter such pictures merely to conceal certain aspects of a system. However, the presence of other pictures of the missile tube and the TEL lend credibility to the main conclusion that there is a new medium to intermediate range missile.

One can only speculate about this missile, as no official data have been divulged by Chinese or Western sources. It is clearly in the same class as the DF-21 but is also larger, meaning it has a longer range, perhaps up to 3,000km or more depending on the payload. Chinese web posters have alleged this is the “DF-25,” a program from the early 1990s first identified by authors John Lewis and Hua Di (who returned to China and was arrested), as a 1,700km range, 2000kg payload missile which uses the first two stages of the DF-31 ICBM.[3] On July 15 Chinese web reports alleged this new missile has a range of 3,200km and can carry as many as three multiple nuclear warheads.[4] In 2002 the PLA tested a DF-21 with about five or six dummy warheads to assist penetration against missile defenses.[5] So it is plausible that Chinese technology has improved since to include placing multiple warheads on medium to intermediate range missiles.

Possible TEL Image: This image appeared about the same time as the first, showing the same 10-wheel TEL. Credit: Chinese Internet

This missile’s longer range also means it is capable of higher speeds, which would be useful in helping to counter current and projected U.S., Japanese, and perhaps Australian and Indian missile defense systems. Its deployment will likely come before even these at best partially effective systems are in place. A larger payload also means this missile can carry multiple warheads or more decoys, also useful in defeating missile defenses. All of this will only add a greater burden on the U.S. and its allies to devise more effective missile defenses.

More DF-15s

On July 15 a Chinese web poster placed an image of a new version of the DF-15 short range ballistic missile on the CJDBY web page (http://bbs.cjdby.net/). Seen below, this new version features a new warhead shape with a blunt tip and maneuvering fins. This shape is similar to that of the now defunct U.S. Pershing II intermediate range ballistic missile, destroyed in the late 1980s as part of the U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Back then the Pershing II featured a very modern radar-image correlation system (RADAG) to give its small nuclear warhead very high accuracy. The warhead seen on the DF-15 below may also be featured on the new anti-ship version of the DF-21 mentioned above.

New version DF-15: The warhead is similar to that used by a former U.S. radar guided missile warhead, indicating this may be a new terminally guided warhead for anti-ship missions. Second photo appears to show same missile in testing. Source: CJDBY.net; FYJS.cn

This may indicate that China is deploying not one, but two new anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). The smaller DF-15 ASBM is likely more easily deployed on ships and aircraft; such flexibility would be useful in securing Taiwan or other target (such as Japanese islands), following a PLA invasion, from potential U.S. and coalition forces which might conceivably intervene. The smaller DF-15 ASBM may also become an important capability that China’s friends and clients may seek to also deter the United States. It is possible that Pakistan, Iran, even Venezuela might eventually seek to obtain this weapon, along with ground and air sensors, plus access to Chinese space systems for targeting.

In May 2006 the first images of another DF-15 variant appeared on the Chinese web. Subsequently indentified by Asian military sources as the DF-15C, its distinctive feature is an elongated warhead section. This is a new deep-penetration warhead intended to attack underground bunkers and bases. Taiwan and other countries rely on underground structures to shield their primary command facilities and in Taiwan also important air bases. It is likely that this new warhead may also be fitted to longer range missiles like the DF-21 or “DF-25.”

DF-15C: Shown in a test flight, the DF-15C is intended to attack underground facilities. Source: Chinese Internet

Transparency—PLA Style

This week, to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army, China has opened a new display at the Beijing Military Museum for modern armor, air and missiles system. Partial to scant knowledge of these new weapons has existed for several years in most cases. The most important revelation at the display has been the first picture of China’s new Type 093 nuclear powered attack submarine. But the picture is not accompanied by any additional supporting data, even though the 093 program likely dates back to the 1970s. Asian military sources recently disclosed that the third Type 093, apparently an improved version, was launched in 2006.

For the United States and its democratic allies the acquisition of a new major weapon system is usually a matter of public knowledge, if not intense debate, years before the system is put into service. Official data on the system is supplemented by contractor data and press reporting. The weapon is usually designed to carry out publically known military doctrines, which conform to stated strategic and foreign policy objectives. From open sources and with modest effort, any foreign government, including China’s, can with confidence determine the near to medium term U.S. strategic trajectory.

Apparent First Type 093 Image: This picture is the only public information released by the Chinese government about its second generation nuclear powered attack submarine, a program that is likely about 30 years old, and up to three of which have been launched since 2002.

One cannot do likewise for China. It is not possible to truly know China’s military doctrines and strategic objectives, just as it is not possible to know most current and certainly not future planned weapon systems. If you are not a government intelligence analysts with access to very expensive high resolution satellite imagery, which is not the case for the vast majority of non-Chinese and Chinese—and often even if you are- then you learn of a new Chinese military capability by chance: a revelation in a sales brochures; the unexpected statement by a Chinese military official; a surprising revelation by a foreign government official; or a random Internet posting by a Chinese military enthusiast.

Or worse, one learns by surprise. Increasingly, owing to the ability of the Chinese military to conceal, the revelation of a new capability comes as a shock and surprise. China’s January 11, 2007 interception of a weather satellite with a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon was an example of such a surprise. The apparent new medium to intermediate range missile constitutes another surprise. Other than two or three non-revealing photographs from the Chinese web, there has been no official Chinese comment on the new missiles depicted above. Are they nuclear armed or do they employ a new radio-frequency warheads for attacking electronic infrastructure? Or might they carry a new terminally-guided warhead to attack large ships, like aircraft carriers? How many does China intend to build and against whom are they to be deployed? At present one cannot know.

Such Chinese actions do not build assurance or confidence, but prompt suspicion and reaction. China’s missile threat is likely to strengthen resolve in Tokyo and possibly Delhi to proceed with increased missile defense cooperation with Washington. Such defenses pose no threat of harm to Chinese or the Chinese government, other than to lessen the ability of the Beijing regime to coerce its neighbors with the threat of missile strikes. This loss of coercive power appears to frighten China’s leaders the most, motivating its hard-to-overlook political campaign against U.S.-led missile defense cooperation in Asia. Past endeavors like the 640 Project prove China’s past interest in missile defenses, while its recent ASAT demonstration demonstrate it can master the technology for new strategic missile defenses. Rather than let its neighbors rest behind new defensive missiles that cannot reach Chinese targets, however, China instead develops new missiles to overcome their new defenses.

China’s new missiles are creating significant new burdens for U.S. forces dedicated to deterring Chinese military forces in Asia. Few in the US government expected that China’s missile program would be as robust as it has turned out, or involve large numbers of missiles. The conventional wisdom was that China would pursue “minimal deterrence” and spend its money on desperately needed social reforms. But from one missile, the DF-21, China has devised new versions that can target U.S. aircraft carriers and the space information system essential to their successful employment. Additional missiles are now being developed for both missions. Should the U.S. 7th Fleet’s sole aircraft carrier based in Japan be neutralized by Chinese missiles, it may be weeks before another can arrive to face the same Chinese missile gauntlet.

What China’s leaders appear unable to understand is that before too long, Japanese, Taiwanese and even Australians will determine that mere defensive measures, as well as reliance on insufficient American forces, are in turn no longer sufficient to deter China. They may conclude that they will also require their own independent deterrent, maybe even a nuclear one, as India (and North Korea) concluded long ago.

http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pub…/pub_detail.asp

Wow so much goodies on show on the 80th aniiversary of PLA exhibition!
DF-15 Anti ship version, Type-93 SSN that looks like trafalgar/LA instead of the speculated russian SSN, and the following goodies for the PLAAF:

Look at that J-10 pictures. It’s weapon configure is sucided. No BVRAAM. Courting death….

If J-11B is a licensed copy and need Russia consent. I seriously doubt PLAAF will be interested in building it. Allowing intergration of Chinese weapon is a big prove that J-11B is fully indigenous plane without Russia consent. We have seen avionics and ECM install on Russia plane. But a Russia plane with basically a Russia airframe doesn’t makes sense and much profit for Russian.

Time will prove J-11B is completely a Chinese stuff. Just make sure bookmark this thread and when the time comes to prove our theory correct and let us re-active it to prove the Thread starter wrong! Just like how those non-believer of operation J-10 being shut-up few months ago?

(J-10 is only in prototype stages and available only in a few in 2006. LOL!!
Now they keep quiet abt it!) :diablo:

Crobato

Russian Sources and even western books do not claim what you are claiming, any aircraft manufacture needs to make money or die for sukhoi a batch of 30 or 40 J-11Bs represents huge losses, same for the Lyulka, as huitong claims and Boris Aleshin says, cooperation and respect of the license are realities for both Russia and China in the J-11B program.

Why you are trying to imply is Shengyang has built J-11Bs without the consent of Sukhoi, the J-11 is not a Chinese design, it is a Su-27 China does not posses the right to build more that what it is stipulated and allowed by the contract and that means only when money is paid.

If China did not sign a further contract saying we do not want more Su-27 also means they can not build Su-27 by their own without Sukhoi`s and Russia`s consent

The Su-27Sk/J-11 is a USD $30-$35 million product, a batch of 30 is close to a billion dollar enterprise, grasp it Crobato the Russians are not stupid to let China build them, and China has not build them China has kept its word, China is modifting not building, if not the Russian press already would had reported.

There is no evidence as you claim in fact Russia forced China to buy Su-30MKKs because they did not allowed them to build them, it was cheaper for China buy them than build them that forced China to limit the J-11 assembly to only 110 aircraft;)

If ask Putin to choose between American or Chinese. I will say he hate the American more. To beat the American and preventing the spread of US influence in Central Asia. Russia alone is impossible to accomplish that!
China has a veto power in UN plus plenty of loan for Russia. With US missile shield threatening Russia,getting into a row with Chinese over such small incident is not wise. What Russia needs now is forging a strong aillance with China.

Just a reminder that this is the JF-17 thread.

JDW May 9 2007

Russian-built RD-93 aero-engine looks set for export to Pakistan.

Russian industry sources have confirmed to Jane’s an earlier report stating that the
Kremlin has given permission to China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corporation
(CAIC) to re-export to Pakistan the Russian-built Klimov RD-93 engine.
The engine is the powerplant for the JF-17 (FC-1) lightweight fighter aircraft being jointly
developed by CAIC and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, but India, a traditional customer of
Russia, has strongly opposed the export of the engine to its rival nuclear neighbour.
The Moscow business newspaper Kommersant had previously reported that 150 RD-
93s would be supplied to China as part of a contract worth USD238 million.
The engine isamodified version of the MiG-29/-35 fighter’s Klimov RD-33 engine, but
has been redesigned for a single-engine configuration with the accessory pack rotated in
order to accommodate maintenance and servicing on the JF-17.
The Russian press reported that the decision to permit the re-export of the RD-93, and
the signing of the actual contract, were all overseen by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
However, sources in the Presidential Administration hastened to add that permitting
China to supply these engines to Pakistan does not mean that this is the beginning of a
long-term military industrial partnership with Islamabad. The contract is strictly a “oneoff”
deal, according to sources, and does not imply any future co-operation.
Lobbying for the approval of the contract apparently came more from the high-level
interaction between the Chinese and Russian governments than from Russian industry.
Russian industry representatives state that this was an entirely political decision into
which they had minimal input. Rosoboronexport, the Russian state arms export monopoly,
and the Russian Defence Ministry were reportedly involved in the deliberations.
The RD-93s to be shipped to CAIC will be supplied by the Chernyshev engine plant in
Moscow. The contract will be administered by Rosoboronexport and initial deliveries will
begin this year.
This may appear to bring an end to a contradictory and long-running saga, which has
seen claim and counter-claim from Indian, Pakistani and Russian sources. In February,
Russian industry sources told Jane’s the engine would not be permitted to be exported to
Pakistan; less thanamonth later, Pakistan said approval had been granted.
APakistani government official responding to the RD-93 report said it has only confirmed
what Pakistan had been saying all along: that the engine issue was on its way to being
resolved. Over the last year, Pakistani officials have repeatedly said that they have been
assured by Chinese officials that supplies of the RD-93 will not be halted. “We proceeded
with the knowledge that this wasn’t as big a deal as was being talked about,” said a Pakistani
government. “We are glad this licence issue has been formally resolved,” he added.
Western defence officials in Islamabad said the Russian decision may have been prompted
by expectations of rising demand for the JF-17 fighter aircraft – so far delivered by China
only to Pakistan. “The Russians probably see future demand for the JF-17 coming potentially
from parts of Asia and Africa in the long run. Their decision must have been a commercial
one, knowing that this project has a future,” said one Western defence official in Islamabad.

Reuben F Johnson JDW Correspondent, Moscow

From this saga,we can come to one conclusion. THat is only the Chinese statement are reliable!

Two killed in India army helicopter crash SHIMLA, India, May 24 (AFP) Two pilots were killed Thursday when an Indian army helicopter crashed in a northern hill state, police said. The multi-purpose Cheetah craft went down after getting tangled in wires from a pulley system transporting goods across a mountain gorge. The crash took place in Himachal Pradesh, about 200 kilometres north of the state capital Shimla. (Posted @ 15:55 PST)

http://www.dawn.com/2007/05/24/welcome.htm

Here is an interesting article I found on a blog. Its by our very own SOC.

The FC-1 seems to be a lousy piece of cr@p thats going to get blown out by the mighty Yum-Kay-Eye 😀

The article ends with a feisty account of how the evil pakistanis are not rounding up the taliban and how they should be isolated, wonder how the hundreds of pakistani soldiers dead from fighting there are going to feel about that 😮

Personally, I’d like nothing better than Pakistan breaking out of the US feifdom and following its own foreign policy, sell nukes to Iran and build a NATO like organization with China.

China, Pakistan, and the FC-1

A few weeks or so ago, China delivered the first two FC-1 fighter jets to Pakistan. The FC-1, also known as the JF-17 to Pakistan, is a Chinese designed single-seat fighter jet. It’s powered by a Russian-made engine and equipped with Chinese avionics and weapons (although the prospects of Pakistan incorporating Western kit isn’t out of the question).

Now, the idea of Pakistan receiving a modern, lightweight fighter jet would seem to be ideal, as their air force is severely lacking in terms of quality equipment. Their current air arm relies mainly on comparitively ancient aircraft like the Mirage III, A-5 (a Chinese variation of Russia’s MiG-19), and F-7 (a Chinese variation of Russia’s MiG-21). Sure, they’ve tried to keep up appearances by continuing to operate a small fleet of early-block F-16As and upgrading their other aircraft with newer systems, but truth be told, the PAF has some serious shortfalls to address. Pakistan even lacks any sort of BVR AAM, internet propagandist spoutings to the contrary. So reequipping with a modern fighter would seem to be a logical step, given that Pakistan’s main rival India has an air force festooned with modern high-performance aircraft (the Mirage 2000, MiG-29, and Su-30MKI, to name a few).

That all being said, the FC-1 is clearly viewed as an inferior product by Pakistan. If the FC-1 was a top-tier fighter jet, then why in the world would Pakistan be consistently pushing for the acquisition of more F-16s from the United States? FC-1 fanboys will allege that Pakistan wants to replace the old Mirages, A-5s, and J-1s with a mix of both FC-1s and F-16s. Okay, sure. Then why is Pakistan also trying to acquire China’s other new fighter, the J-10? Do they want a three-jet fleet? Or is the J-10 intended to backstop a potential failure in the F-16 acquisition plans? Something is clearly amiss here. If the FC-1 was the superfighter that some Pakistani aviation fans would want you to believe, then why aren’t they clamoring for more FC-1s in place of those F-16s? Or is Pakistan’s infatuation with the F-16 just so intense that not even the vaunted FC-1 can break it down? But enough of that, let’s examine some of the FC-1’s current problems.

1-it has a limited weapons load, and to tote a large payload it needs to waste hardpoints with fuel tanks. This is somewhat curtailed by the fact that the FC-1 would not have to go very far to find its targets in or over India, however.

2-the FC-1’s flying ability is at the mercy of Russia at the moment, given that Russian engines are used to power the aircraft (as of right now Russia is apparently turing a blind eye to China’s re-export of said engines, but that could always change).

Then there’s the issue of the FC-1’s true effectiveness in combat on the subcontinent. Pakistan wants about 150 of them. Unfortunately for them, India is buying and license building a similar number of a true 4.5 Generation fighter jet, the Su-30MKI. TVC, a PESA, and a robust long-range weapons fit for both A/A and A/G combat make the Su-30MKI a world-class fighter jet, and pretty much hands air superiority over the subcontinent to the Indian Air Force, easily. Sure, people will argue that “the FC-1 is smaller so it’ll be able to get really close before the Indian pilots see it”. Wow. Ignorance reigns. As if it worked that way. By that logic, the B-2 should be really non-stealthy as it is rather expansive. Oh wait, it’s not, claims by bitter anti-American internet ranters like Venik (who, amusingly enough, apparently lives in Philadelphia…) about Serbian B-2 shootdowns over the FRY notwithstanding. Read up on RCS, aspect angles, and PESA before assuming that just because Pakistan bought it it has to be just fabulous and the best of the best, geniuses. Lots of corner reflectors, external weapons carriage, and other features of the airframe make the FC-1 a pretty decent radar target. For that matter, they make the Su-30MKI a decent target as well, and then it comes down to avionics fit and weapons load, as well as pilot ability.

Let’s put the whole force into perspective. You’ve got FC-1s and F-16s on one side, with Su-30MKIs, MiG-29s, MiG-21BISONs, and Mirage-2000s on the other. You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to realize that it’s not the numerical advantage that gives India the edge here. Inserting the FC-1 into this environment is foolhardy; the J-10 would be a far better option, being more capable of dealing effectively with other truly modern fighters. The J-10 is part of that peer group, while the FC-1 is the cheap alternative. So, if Pakistan wanted to make strides towards being able to actually combat the Indian Air Force, they need something better than the FC-1 and something more politically reliable than the F-16. That would be the J-10. They won’t be able to match the IAF on a 1 for 1 basis, but they’ll be far more capable than an FC-1 force would be. Of course, they could always plan on sticking to the nuclear deterrent option, in which case they could justify the cheaper FC-1 as merely attrition and life-cycle replacements for their older legacy aircraft. This of course is contingent on Pakistan’s actual firing off of a nuclear weapon in the event of a conflict, otherwise they’d pretty much have had it. Not that they wouldn’t go down if they did start lobbing nuclear weapons around, falling themselves under the Indian counterstrike, but at least in that case they’d take India down with them. That all depends on the fortitude of the leadership in Pakistan, I guess. They had no problem taking over the nation and harboring Al Qaeda and the Taliban after ENDURING FREEDOM though, so I would think they’d have no issues with unleashing a nuclear exchange.

Now, in reality, both India and Pakistan need to learn a thing or two about actual air defense. Neither one of them has a real air defense network. India has a small edge by having numerous S-125 SAM sites around major airbases, compared to Pakistan’s solitary HQ-2 site in Islamabad. An actual air defense network with a few modern, long-range SAMs like the S-300PM-1 or HQ-9 would make a lot of difference and help even things out a bit, since Indian air combat aircraft would have a new issue to contend with beyond how many FC-1s they can shoot down at range.

Personally, I think China should just back off of the FC-1 project. Granted, the cheap FC-1 represents a potential export success as a J-7/MiG-21 replacement across the globe. But there are better options. For a little more cash, a nation could have China’s real fighter jet, the J-10. Dropping the FC-1 would enable Chengdu, the FC-1 and J-10 manufacturer, to concentrate more on improving and perfecting the J-10. A mixed force of J-10s and various FLANKER iterations would be a very effective combat force to replace the older Q-5s, J-7s, and J-8s. The FC-1 just doesn’t have a place in the PLAAF except as a token political buy to give faith to Pakistan and other export customers. If the PLAAF truly desires a short-range fighter for point defense, to replace the J-7, then the Hongdu L-15 supersonic trainer provides a far more logical basis. For one, it keeps another type out of your inventory, cleaning up your logistics. Also, it provides an export product to take the FC-1s export niche if foreign nations cannot afford the J-10.

Remember, the FC-1 is the final iteration of a US-Chinese project in the 1980’s that would have modified and updated the J-7 design to feature a large nose radar and side-mounted intakes. Tianamen Square ended that partnership, and China turned to Russia for a time for advanced fighter jets, buying Su-27SK and Su-30MKK/MK2 aircraft. At some point the Chengdu team began work on the new design, possibly with help from Mikoyan, and the FC-1 was born. However, it still represents a sub-par fighter jet, clearly targeted for less propserous buyers who can’t afford top-tier kit like the J-10. It might end up with a great avionics fit, and decent Chinese weapons, but the aircraft is still not on par with the rest of the world’s latest fighter aircraft. Especially the J-10 and the Su-30MKI.

So, China should give up the ghost and drop the FC-1. Yes, they view Pakistan as an ally against India. But there are other products much more suited for Pakistan, like the HQ-9 long-range SAM and the J-10 fighter jet. But that’s alright, Pakistan wanted to go for the inferior product, and that’s their prerogative. Maybe they just don’t have the revenue to make a large enough J-10 buy, what with their lack of recent exports of nuclear technology and their love affair with the F-16.

And really, why we want to sell F-16s to a nation that is clearly neither democratic nor an actual ally (have they rounded up the Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in Waziristan? No? Sheesh…) is beyond me. We picked the wrong ally in that fight. Better to cut ties with Pakistan and move on to a better relationship with both India and China. Perhaps increased diplomatic and economic ties with both nations could lead to a mending of fences, helping to further isolate and marginalize Pakistan.

Until they start selling nuclear technology again, of course.

http://temperedinsanity.blogspot.com/search/label/FC-1

I expect a moderator of this forum to give much better standard article on FC -1.. So disappointing…:diablo: