From the same link:
Greece to upgrade its P3 fleet
one bit of additional detail on that Greek P-3 upgrade
Greece looks to reactivate P-3 Orion fleet
“The MLU kits will provide service life extensions for 15,000 flight hours,” the DSCA says.
Blackarcher
Again you seem to type a lot but actually communicate very little in the above. As per usual, you make out a best case scenario for the IAF and worst case for the PAF. Again making assumptions that are clawed in order top present a picture that fits in with your reality.
You say for instance J-31 may not be exported whilst Aviation Week and Defence News indicate it may have been developed for the very purposes of export.
Here is not a time to talk about what the IAF will be fielding, but to suggest PAF will definately be facing numbers of MRCA and FGFA when you and I both know that there is a possibility production deals for these may never be signed at all considering how badly both procurment projects are being run. The whole “Pakistan cant afford it” argument was the same one used just before PAF inducted 8 AWACS planes, 4 refullers and SPADA 2000 Air defence systems, so really hard for me to take it seriously.
Right now PAF is actually in the process of manufacturing the Block II version of the JF-17 and has finalised what Block III will be about.
By 2027 PAF will still have very large numbers of F-16s and JF-17s, I already mentioned that, but to think somehow they will have a “procurement holiday” is not accurate at all
Well, the truth hurts. Resources are scarce for the PAF and they’re being used to scrounge for every possible second-hand F-16 available..and that’ll continue into the future too, just like they did with the Mirage. Now, is the IAF supposed to be worried about F-16 Block 50s in 2020? or 2025? When they’ll have a vastly larger and superior fleet of FGFA and Super-30s along with MRCAs that will be joining the fleet? I hardly think so. 🙂
As for the JF-17, it basically allows the PAF to bulk up on the cheap. Capability wise, it’s ok. But well if you have a really limited budget then you make do with it and try to improve upon it. Which is what the PAF is doing since there is no other real choice as of now.
So where is the great qualitative jump for the PAF in 2025 that we all are supposed to be in awe of?
He must be referring to Pakistan. of course the PAF operates the most advanced jets in Pakistan. Not outside of it. Not by a long way. 😉
As for funding constraints, those are real. the J-10 fiasco was a result of that..then we had Pakistani posters telling all and sundry that the J-10A wasn’t advanced enough for the PAF, so they were waiting till the J-10B arrived. and now we all know its a result of funds that the acquisition was canned, so they can allocate scarce resources to trying to bring the JF-17 to 4th generation level.
They’ll have to make do with JF-17s and hand me down F-16s for the most part. Expect a struggling PAF in 2025-7, given the pathetic state their overall funding is in & that the US no longer needs them once the Afghan drawdown picks up. J-31s etc? Hardly. They couldnt even buy J-10s
the point that Mountain was making was that achieving a service entry date of 2025 (deliberately adding 5 years to the current target date) for the Tejas Mk2 would mean it would be obsolete and the only non-stealth airplane entering service anywhere in the world..now I know that he wasn’t doing it to elicit a civil response and have a healthy debate, but his jibe about the PAF not being stationary and somehow the IAF being stuck in time got me thinking about what the future really holds for it and what their plans are.
apart from being factually wrong (with Gripen E being available around that time or a couple of years earlier and perhaps even Rafales), the idea that somehow just by not having a chined nose and maybe a DSI intake (with very questionable affect on RCS), the Tejas Mk2 would be obsolete was obviously far from the truth. If that was the case, 3/4th of the PAF would be obsolete by then, and that is assuming that a JF-17 Block 3 has a chined nose, other RCS reduction features and somehow they miraculously manage to fit internal weapons carriage bays on it. or it must carry an external weapons pod like the Advanced Super Hornet, which can be developed for the Tejas Mk2 and Gripen E as well.
When one looks at the most likely orbat of the PAF around that time, the bulk of the PAF would be non-stealthy 3rd and 4th gen JF-17 Blocks with the newer JF-17 blocks getting AESA and 4th gen F-16 Block 50 jets. A credible threat, but hardly one to be giving the IAF sleepless nights.
I mean it’s not like the IAF would be facing an array of a large 5th gen force on its western border for stealth to suddenly be the only desirable quality. Which is why the IAF would even invest so much into Jaguar and Mirage-2000-5 upgrades to keep them going into the 2030s. If the IAF was worried about the PAF in the 2025 timeframe suddenly achieving a qualitative jump, the investment in these upgrades would have been smaller with more Su-30MKIs being bought instead.
As I mentioned earlier, with J-20s seemingly not being on the table, and no certainty about the J-31 as yet (and funding will always remain an issue), it is the PAF which should be worried about its future..the only certainty seems to be more second-hand F-16s and a JF-17 Block 3. As MadRat pointed out, a few years ago it was a given that the J-10 would be in PAF service as the FC-20..now the funds have vanished and suddenly we have Pakistani posters telling us that the PAF now wants to concentrate on 5th gen fighters only for its next fighter type. A similar fate could await the J-31 as well..I mean what if the Chinese don’t want to export J-31s? or expect cash for it and the Pakistani economy doesn’t improve drastically by then? Or what if it doesn’t match expectations of performance? The PAF will keep a very keen eye on the J-31 development but for now, nothing seems certain.
Assuming they do manage to buy a couple of squadrons of J-31 and I’m taking the figure as 2 squadrons since they originally intended to buy 36 or so J-10s, that would still mean a fighter force primarily made up of F-16 Block 50s and JF-17s..the F-16s that have been upgraded or bought from the RJAF would not be left with too much life in their airframes and would need to be replaced by the 2030s.. so that would put added pressure on the PAF.
Neither of these seem daunting when arrayed against an IAF with large numbers of FGFA at the tip of its spear, followed by Super-30s, Su-30MKIs and MRCAs, Mirage-2000-5s, MiG-29UPGs, Tejas Mk1/2s, Jaguars..not to mention that the IN itself will have nearly a 100 N-LCAs and MiG-29Ks by then with a possible third fighter being also being considered.
One more possible option could be the Turkish TF-X, but it seems that the Turks have gone in for a twin engined configuration and a relatively large design at that..that would drive up costs and make any meaningful numbers for the PAF quite unaffordable.
Point being ultimately that Mountain’s boast that “PAF will look very different in 2027” doesn’t seem to be completely true. The bulk of the fighter types will be the same. And there is no certainty or guarantee of the 5th gen type. Not a situation one ought to go thumping one’s chest about.
Mountain posted this on another thread and it got me curious..what is the likely orbat of the PAF in 2025-27? The obsolete Mirages and F-7P/PGs will be gone by then and the main force will comprise of JF-17s and F-16 Block 50s many of which would be nearing the last quarter of their service lives. JF-17s will be up for MLUs.
What is the PAF planning for its fighter force for the coming decade? Obviously being a funds constrained air force, F-35s will be out of the question and doesn’t seem like the Gripen E will ever be offered for export to Pakistan (not that they could afford them in any substantial numbers), so that leaves only the Chinese options backed with credit..
as of now it seems that the J-20 isn’t up for export..leaves the J-31 as the only serious option, but even those won’t come cheap..but with even the FC-20 being unaffordable and ending up as an abandoned acquisition effort, just how many J-31s will the PAF be able to afford assuming a unit cost in the $50 million bracket, which is dirt cheap for a 5th gen fighter? Being twin engined, their operational costs will be higher than those of the current fleet and so will the support and acquisition costs.
The world does not standstill. PAF and PLAAF will look very different in 2027. The entire world will. LCA MKII will perhaps be the only non -stealth plane entering service in the planet.
IAF Mirage-2000-5 upgrade update
October 06, 2014: By December, HAL will receive two newly upgraded and certified IAF Mirage 2000 jets, the first of nearly fifty aircraft to be souped up as part of a $2.2 billion deal. Starting next year, HAL’s licensed upgrade technology will be in place from Dassault Aviation and Thales Systems to begin upgrading the remaining Mirages to the Dash-5 standard for the eager IAF.
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A team from the IAF visited France earlier this year to witness flight trials of the first two upgraded jets and has reported back their satisfaction on progress and technical efficacy of the programme. HAL is currently still working with Dassault and Thales to prepare to churn out at least six aircraft per year in order to meet the demanding delivery requirements of the IAF, which wants all aircraft over the next seven years.
India puts out RFI for recce and surveillance helicopter
India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) dispatched a request for information (RfI) on 29 September to local vendors for reconnaissance and surveillance helicopters for the Army Aviation Corps (AAC) and the Indian Air Force (IAF).
The Reconnaissance and Surveillance Helicopter (RSH) RfI, which requires the vendors to respond by 11 November, follows the MoD’s 29 August termination of the long-pending Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) tender for 197 imported platforms.
Instead, the MoD opted to locally source around 440 single-engines, 2-2.5 ton platforms under the ‘Make and Buy (Indian)’ category of its Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP). This approach is in line with the BJP government’s policy of indigenously developing and building weapon systems, in order to reduce dependency on imported materiel.
More details on the history behind the Il-112 and the issues it faces in order to be able to replace the An-140T as the light transport for the Russian armed forces.
Russia looks to resurrect Il-114
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Run by the Russian Machines privately held corporation, the Aviacor plant in Samara is not a member in Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). Nevertheless, its owners and the Samara regional administration have expressed readiness to invest into the Il-114 project. The local authorities have promised to invest between 1 billion roubles ($27 million) and 1.5 billion roubles ($40 million) into Aviacor’s modernization, according to Samara governor Nikolai Merkushkin. Estimates place total investment needed for the project at 8 billion to 12 billion roubles. Rework of the original drawings and their digitizing would take another 3 billion roubles to 4 billion roubles.After some hesitation, Ilyushin agreed “refresh” the Il-114, originally designed to a 1987 specification. First flown in 1990 and certified in 1997, the airplane could transport 64 passengers 900 km. Its superb loitering capability makes it attractive to the Russian defense ministry, making it a more likely candidate for a larger production run.
The biggest issue now lay with the airplane’s Klimov TV7-117S/SM turboprops. Even though the Russian engine has demonstrated lower fuel burn than Pratt & Whitney Canada’s PW127H on the Westernized Il-114-100 certified in 1999, it also showed lower reliability and on-wing lifetime in Il-114 revenue service. The engine maker has many times reported developments of newer, more powerful and more mature versions, including the TV7-117SM and Bogatyr for the Il-112 tactical airlifter now in development. None, however, have entered serial production. If not for political considerations, the PW127H (Il-114-100) or the TV3-117VMA-SBM1 (developed for the An-140) might rank as candidates for the powerplant requirement.
Ilyushin developed the Il-114 in the late 1980s as an alternative to the British Aerospace Advanced Turboprop (ATP), which BAe offered to the Soviet Union for local production in 1985. In the early 1990s the airplane entered low-rate production at the TAPO plant in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. TAPO built about 20 airframes. Seven Il-114-100s with Canadian engines and U.S.-made propellers, APUs, avionics and interiors remain in revenue service with Uzbekistan Airways. They have reportedly yielded an annual utilization rate of 1,800 flight hours, barely sufficient to generate a profit.
The Ilyushin’s empty equipped weight, at 16 tons, totals 3 tons more than that of the ATR 72-600; the Franco-Italian aircraft can seat up to 74 passengers in high-density layout, while the Ilyushin can take only 64 (in a cabin with similar dimensions) due to current certification restrictions. The big wing (880 sq ft compared with the ATR 72-600’s 690 sq ft) retards the airplane in cruise flight but gives it superb loitering capability at slow speeds.
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This airplane has been suggested as a possible future alternative to the Il-38 for naval MPA thanks to its loitering capability.