bring_it_onF-35 PEO: FY-20 budget informed by $10.5B C2D2 cost estimate
* The F-35 joint program office estimates its Block 4 plan will cost $10.5 billion over eight years, plus an additional $2.8 billion to modify 441 jets to the new configuration.
*The estimate includes money for 66 F-35 capability enhancements — a slate that was refined last year from 53 capabilities. The plan, according to Winter, is to release new capabilities every six months, the first of which is an automatic ground collision avoidance upgrade that is expected to be delivered this month. The second release, a radar combat identification system, is slated for delivery in October.
* The budget is also informed by new estimates of the cost to upgrade 441 U.S. jets in the current fleet to the Block 4 configuration, which requires a key technology refresh upgrade known as TR-3. Winter said the program office’s initial estimate to upgrade the entire fielded fleet for all three services was $6.2 billion. The services have since prioritized which jets will receive the mods, which lowered the estimate to $2.8 billion. According to Winter, the Air Force will upgrade 302 jets, which includes low-rate initial production lots 8-14. The Navy and Marine Corps will upgrade jets in lots 11-14, which includes 80 F-35B and 59 F-35C aircraft.
bring_it_onI’m having difficulty imagining a scenario where Japan could participate in NGAD or PCA in a meaningful way.
First, NGAD and PCA are significantly different in their goals. NGAD’s primary purpose is to extend the US Navy’s fleet defense IADS bubble around the CSG, since Navy is terrified of losing a CVN to AShM-equipped H-6s or H-20s. But NGAD mission systems capabilities will be software-defined, which provides for a minor purpose of strike warfare. IMO, NGAD’s capability split will be 80% fleet defense/DCA, 10% OCA and 10% strike. NGAD can be satisfied by a new-build 5th Gen jet, not F-35C/NATF. PCA is to provide a non-nuclear option to the Joint Chiefs by operating within an adversary’s advanced IADS, while simultaneously conducting OCA and kinetic/non-kinetic strike. PCA requires a 6th Gen jet.
Putting myself in the place of a Japanese planner, NGAD would appear to be too fleet defense centric and may not perform as needed against PLAN Surface Action Groups, or prevent PLA IRBMs from raining down on Japanese cities and military bases. PCA will be EXTREMELY expensive and PCA’s requirements are not in keeping with Japan’s Constitution which stresses a non-aggressive posture for its defense forces. Japan as a partner in NGAD/PCA makes my head hurt.
Excellent Analysis! I agree. NGAD and PCA are going to be tailored to very specific US national security and Air Superiority needs which would be quite a bit different from Japan’s needs.
bring_it_onEPAWSS first flight (Via Boeing’s Twitter) –
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The BAE Systems Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) completed a first flight on a 29-year-old F-15E assigned to the 40th Flight Test Squadron at Eglin AFB, Florida.
The EPAWSS will replace the Tactical Electronic Warfare System on more than 215 F-15Es and, if Congress approves, also be installed on at least 144 F-15EX aircraft requested by the U.S. Air Force in the fiscal 2020 budget.
The upgraded system is noticeable on both of the F-15Es’ aft fuselage booms. Instead of the single sensor fairing at the aft position on the boom, the EPAWSS features two sensor fairings. EPAWSS integrates functions for radar warning, geolocation, situational awareness, and self-protection, BAE says. It is able to detect incoming radio frequency-based detection signals, develop a jamming technique and then transmit that signal to the source of the emitter.
https://aviationweek.com/awindefense/f-15e-test-aircraft-completes-first-flight-epawss
bring_it_onIt is basically 3 radars that operates in VHF, L and S/X band. Each band have their own antenna and RF equipment but it shares same signal processing and same displays. but it’s “one” system. The differences with actually having multiple radar is that the RLM-M, work as one. All of them looks at same direction and verify each other’s findings. .
As I said, something similar was the premise behind the MEADS architecture and the capability set developed to support that. It will be fielded by the Germans. You can read about it here –
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1256963
To quote the relevant parts –
As indicated in Figure 9, both sensors have identical signal and data processing hardware, and the software is also 80% common. The power and communications equipment, cooling subsystems, mechanical platform and positioning systems are common.Only the phased array receiver/exciter, and T/R modules are unique.
What you describe is still a combination of multiple radars as in multiple radars collaborating to provide a common operating picture. That they act as one system is more important, not the commonality though if you were designing all three together, you would naturally want high degree of commonality. This is same as in case of MEADS or any other similar system. Both radar types are tied to a common integrated C2 system and each operator sees a fused system. There’s also the Raytheon DBR for naval applications which takes that to another level as far as commonality and even shared hardware is concerned.
As i wrote in my previous post, moving over to IBCS provides a tremendous boost to this capability as it links disparate sensors at the Fire-Control level allowing them to be the eyes and ears of the air-defense unit in a distributed fashion. You no longer need to develop these sensors together or for them to be even of the same legacy/heritage. Right now this capability exists between C, X and S band sensors but more sensors would be added over time as the system is fully fielded around 2022 and beyond. Prioritizing IAMD/IBCS was one of the reasons the US quit MEADS. They wanted all deployed and future radars to be linked and behave as one as far as true Fire-Control-Track level connectivity was concerned so they put a halt to all new Air Defense systems until that piece was developed and fielded. A whole host of IBCS compliant radars are now in the works or fielded (AN/MPQ-65, AN/MPQ-64 A3 and A4, TPS-80 and 3DELRR) and all future land based radars would be compliant from the start.
bring_it_onI’m more thinking into RLS-M. Where it is one system But it operates in 3 bands and sharing common processing and command center
Please elaborate so that I can better understand what system characteristics you are talking of. The approach to field multiple sensors each with common processing and high degree of hardware and software commonality and each with a common C2 has already been demonstrated on MEADS for example (i.e. identical signal and data processing hardware, identical cooling system architecture, >75% common software with only the receiver exciter and T/R modules being unique to the UHF and X band AESA radars).
Having IBCS compatibility as a precursor or entry criteria to new sensor development basically alleviates the need for that approach as with the IBCS, similar to what the Navy does with NIFC-CA, the US Army can perform fire control tasks using tracks provided by C, X and S band radars with more radars added as they are developed (likely next gen. L band surveillance radars like the TPY-X). IBCS via its Integrated Fire Control Network essentially allows for distributed and even disparate sensors and shooters to act as one and not just see a combined threat picture. In LUT a PATRIOT battery has already demonstrated the ability to engage a target that was outside its radar’s field of view with the only task assigned to the fire control radar unit being Missile Communication/Uplink.
Perhaps we can discuss US radar development in the USAF Non F-35 thread as that is probably a more appropriate place.
I think simple “no requirement” can sum it up
No operational requirement that would lead industry down that path YES. But that does not mean that no requirements for such systems exist. As far back as mid 1980’s there were requirements to field VHF systems for blue and red force capability assessment. It is naive to think that this went away after 1999. If anything the need probably grew.
bring_it_onI brought in Polyana because that is a command center that integrates multiple input of Radars into 1 big picture. and that is the closest of what i can think of your definition of frequency diversity.
What else do you consider as frequency diversity? Is it not being able to field radars and sensors covering different aspects of the EMS?
I see. So basically no requirement for now.
As I have tried to explain, it is very very rare for the US operators to specify frequencies unless it is for very specific requirements (like BMD discrimination or when modeling threats). The Radar OEM’s have been able to meet all specified current and future requirements including the ability against “5th generation threats” within the space they currently operate in. Only time they have needed to go towards VHF has been when modeling threat systems or when asked to specifically develop models of current aircraft and cruise missiles against threat radars operating in that region. In the future, i expect the operators to demand more “Multi-Function” capability from these radars given tight budgets and the logistical burden of deploying and sustaining multiple sensor types. In a way current AESA radars aleady are able to do this but the next crop will be even more capable and optimized. Besides threat modeling and assessment I don’t see any demand signal coming from the US operators that would force OEM’s into that trade space (VHF)…
Mekker added and concluded: “Dual-band technology is where we have landed forbringing forth this Low Tier Air & Missile Defense Sensor solution. What that gives us, is we can do both surveillance and fire control in a single radar at an affordable price. So, instead of populating all at C-band, we can reduce that with S-band technology (surveillance) and C-band technology (fire control).” https://www.monch.com/mpg/news/17-space/1891-lockheed-martin-aims-to-deliver-low-tier-missile-defence-sensor-quickly.html
bring_it_onWell that’s no different than say integrating S-400 with Polyana which then controls other radar and give common view.
No. The first part of your post claimed a lack of frequency diversity. To quote – “No diversity in frequency ?”. Is fielding a myriad of sensors within the L-S-C-X- and Ku bands not diverse?
Perhaps! But then my definition of diversity may be way off.
Well that’s no different than say integrating S-400 with Polyana which then controls other radar and give common view.
What equates to the Polyana? Are we not talking about fielding diverse sensor types here?
why US dont market VHF band radar or deploy one.
Because the US develops and deploys the systems that it needs to meet the requirements and mission. As I tried to explain, the only time they have specifically sought a “VHF” system was to model a threat system and to validate its aircraft and cruise missile designs against it. They asked and an industry and academia led team delivered. Specificly on that aspect of “requirments” we have to perhaps wait for some time to see what was requested in a post 1999 environment for similar roles to support F-22, F-35, B-21, LRSO etc etc. Those will be highly classified for now.
Maybe i should be more specific.. on what technical reason ? Does VHF always considered inaccurate or does it simply too big ?.
Probably a combination of multiple factors. To sum up, there are no operationally relevant requirements that have been posed to industry at this point that have led to the Industry moving towards that end. They can more than meet requirements within the L-Ku band space that I mentioned. A couple of times industry was led to UHF band for example was because of a need to balance VS requirements with physical limitations on host platform or deployability. Multi Function and dual aperture arrays are probably where the industry is going as it tries to optimize performance. Lockheed’s ARES offshoot is probably going to be part of its proposal to upgrade the Sentinel and most BMD radars are already moving from the UHF EW space to the S-band GaN AESA space. Wouldn’t be too much of a stretch to think of the future TPY-2 replacement to be a dual aperture (S-X band) system utilizing advantages of both in the surveillance and discrimination roles.
bring_it_onSo your telling me that the pukkuksong-2 is basically the same as a kinzhal missile in terms of capabilities?
Show me where I said that? You provided a link to a Diplomat article that is educating its users on how the US MD Agency characterizes ballistic missiles based on their range. The writer then informs its users that the said NK missiles fall into a certain range class as do every other class of missiles, whether Russian, American or Martian that meets that range criteria.
Using that and spinning that as evidence that somehow the missile modeled was a Pukesong-2 (besides having its range – as in an MRBM) is borderline trolling and a complete waste of time to respond to.
Guidance syatems trying to intercept a manuevering target have to re-calculate the interception points giving a less reaction time to intercept the target. However i believe that the kinzhal is a more advanced target than the pukkuksong-2. I will let you stick to your beliefs until there is an official source like a sparrow missile being intercepted.
WOW….
Thank god the forum offers an Ignore list..
bring_it_on[USER=”4698″]bring_it_on[/USER]
I am under the assumption that f-16.net is really a hivemind which is why i have mistaken mig-31bm for garrya and mixelfick for scooter. Can you give atleast one source where a manuevering mrbm target is intercepted. It looks the target they failed to intercept was a simulation of a mrbm that has no manuevering capabilities. Of course the sm-6 and sm-3 improved but you and i have no sources if the mrbms intercept ed have manuevering capabilities correct?
My freind, the very fact that the SM-3 and SM-6 are deployed at sea to protect against Anti Ship systems is enough for most reasonable and well informed folks to assume that they are capable of what you describe. A non maneuvering ballistic missile cannot target a ship unless the ship is docked. You need to be able to strike a moving target. A layered BMD system designed to protect a surface force element has only one BM threat to counter – ONE THAT IS MANEUVERING. There is really no point in repeatedly putting the SM-3 and SM-6 through testing against a non maneuvering ballistic missile target. It has no operationally relevant use to the surface fleet.
I’ve provided you with references to systems that the test community designed to test Ground based air-defense systems against the MaRV threat. Here not all your threats will be maneuvering but they still went out and tested their primary interceptor against that threat type regardless because this was important given the more sophisticated threats can maneuver. And they did it in the late 1990’s.
On the ship-based systems the ENTIRE threat is capable of maneuvering. If the threat could not maneuver, then it would no longer be a viable threat to the surface fleet and the surface fleet wouldn’t need to develop or field a system capable of providing a defense against it. With threat specific.
SM6 has been evaluated and cleared for use in the Sea Based Terminal mission so you can go through and develop a sense of what it needs to be able to be capable against as far as actual target testing or M&S are concerned to be cleared for that mission.
On the SM-3, it intercepts in the mid-course so the target’s ability to maneuver in the atmosphere does not come into play.
It looks the target they failed to intercept was a simulation of a mrbm that has no manuevering capabilities.
And you were able to deduce the target’s performance characteristics HOW? Very little is known about the exact performance of Type-1, 2 and 3 MRBM TS or the eMRBM or the eLRALT. Even less is known based on open source data on the multiple types of IRBM class targets that are fielded and used for testing.
From what we know they (some MRBM targets mentioned above) are used in AEGIS developmental and operational testing, which would go to show that they are credible targets to simulate an Anti-ship Ballistic Missile.
Asking for ACTUAL PERFORMANCE parameters for these targets is akin to the Russians making the exact specifics and design parameters of the EW/EA capability they used to test the Kinzhal’s seeker against. No one is going to share that level of detail.
At some point for things like the ability to maneuver one may just have to use a bit of common sense given that being able to maneuver would probably be an entry criteria requirement for any system being considered as an Anti-Ship ballistic missile target.
bring_it_on[QUOTE=panzerfeist1;n3858828
There have been some failed intercept tests. [/FONT][/COLOR][/LEFT]
https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/miss…ntercept-test/[/QUOTE]
Did anyone say there hadn’t been any failed intercept tests? The SM-3 IIA is/was in developmental testing at the time so these tests are there to find and fix any bugs or more serious changes before the system is transitioned to operations.
Following a successful intercept in February 2017, a test that same year failed after a sailor error caused a IIA launched from the destroyer John Paul Jones to self-destruct in flight. A second test failed in January 2018 went awry because of an as-yet unnamed component misfired, the significance of which Greaves has downplayed.
“The component that we’re concerned about has flown successfully nine out of 10 times,” Greaves told a Senate panel in April. “So, as of now, I am not concerned that it is a true design issue. And we’re following through to identify the problem and then correct it.”
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/20…-missile-test/
For example I do not think a missile like the pukkuksong has maneuvering capabilities as advanced as the russians.
And the point being? Do you think AEGIS would not base its capability requirements on threats that it is likely to encounter? Do you think the Kinzhals seeker ECM performance is modeled after an EW system on board a North Korean ship or one modeled after a USN destroyer/Carrier? Could you provide me the exact specifics of how and against what threat type the seeker was tested? NO you cannot but it is assumed that if the Russian Air Force is putting this system out there and aim to field a credible threat against a representative target they would have worked hard on developing capability to confront some of those challenges.
owever a certain someone is this forum has not provided sources about the size of a MRBM being intercepted by an SM-6 nor if it has maneuvering capabilities but assumes they are the same.
Let’s see, the SM6 is not land based. Its entire raison d’être is to provide OTH AAW and SBT against an anti-ship ballistic missile threat right up to MRBM class for the standard variant (likely higher capability for the IB variant). Would you model its performance, or test it against a threat system that is only capable of attacking ground based fixed (a mission that isn’t even in its portfolio of mission requirements) targets or at sea mobile targets?
Both the SM-3 and SM-6 (in the BMD role) are first and foremost designed to provide Mid-Course and terminal defenses against Anti Ship Ballistic Missiles. The SM-3I B and IIA now have capability to provide coverage inland but their primary role is to provide protection to the deployed surface fleet and the Aircraft Carrier. By definition the threat is maneuvering or else it won’t even exist (and you wouldn’t need to develop capability against it). The last I checked the Aircraft Carrier and surface ships were mobile assets.
P:S – Please use the quote feature so that it easy to see who and what you are quoting.
bring_it_on[USER=”28771″]TR1[/USER] ?
AN/TPS-80. 2-4 GHz GaN AESA,
AN/TPY-2 being upgraded with GaN TRM
New Patriot GaN array for export (Poland)
LTAMS Patriot replacement for the Patriot, GaN
TPY-X L-band GaN
Legacy AN/FPS-117 L-band (currently being updated)Not counting dual use large fixed arrays used mostly for BMD/DEW
GaN TPS-77 MRR (L-band) and S-band AN/TPS-80 (both GaAs and GaN variants) are operational with Latvia and USMC. The first TPS-80 with MACS-4 actually forward deployed to Japan in February and will be permanently based in Okinawa. The Marines also took it to Trident Juncture last year. G/ATOR was designed to have capability against Low RCS threats to include “5th generation aircraft” as would all future radars like LTAMDS and 3DELRR etc.
There is a possibility that the entire legacy Lockheed surivellance portfolio could be upgraded with its L-band GaN product (DART).
GaN TPY-X will likely replace the AN/FPS-117 with NWS but it is entering production in 2019 so may have picked up an undisclosed customer. It is also a candidate for the eventual USMC TPS-59 replacement as I doubt the USMC will stick to the 3DELRR given some of the trades made there by the USAF given that it is going to be a fairly large C-band system though probably inadequate for the pure surveillance demands of a TPS-59 replacement. TPY-X has really been designed with that specific mission in mind.
US largely ignored Air Surveillance/defense radars and systems for the better part of two decades after the Cold War. That has changed in a hurry the last 8-9 years.
I don’t think this area was ignored by many members of that community. It was ignored by the acquisition community but lots of really cool sensors were developed, prototyped, and tested to support various programs. The USAF was able to test 3 full up GaN prototypes (and one GaA prototype to evaluate a GaN derivative) earlier this decade and the US Army was evaluating, in the 2000s and into this decade, multiple AESA radars in the UHF – X band to support the Lower Tier programs. The Navy just wrapped up testing of the SPY-6 and Lockheed with its GaN SSR is now cornering the AEGIS ashore market (and even picking up a Naval customer while at it) with the radar having Air-Surveillance capability as well.
I also don’t think there is anything like Lockheed’s ARES or Northrop Grumman’s Vanguard out there so the NG of surveillance or MMR is going to be quite interesting.
No diversity in frequency ?
The Russian and Chinese approach is not limited to increase of power aperture. Or does the US consider going VHF is not a necessity ?
I could be looking at this wrong but from what I can see having Surveillance, MMR’s, C-UAS and BMD systems in the L, S, C, X and Ku bands offers frequency diversity. But that’s just me. They’ve even supposedly deployed a Long-Range Persistent Surveillance (ALPS – Passive) system in the pacific this year embedded with PATRIOT batteries in the region. Also as others have mentioned, the US Navy already fields the UHF band AN/APY-9 in an airborne surveillance capacity tied to its common operating picture and integrated fire control tasks.
Or does the US consider going VHF is not a necessity ?
The US services and programs very rarely specify frequency requirements (except for BMD where the trade space is narrower) when it comes to surveillance radars. Usually it is a specific threat type and capability set which is then used by OEM’s to develop sensors. Pick the USAF’s 3DELRR for example, each OEM basically showed up with a different radar frequency with 2 L band GaN radars, one C-band GaN radar and one S-band GaN radar being on the menu for the USAF to choose from. All OEM’s provided prototype sensors which were extensively tested in the 2010-2012 period.
A decade before that on the MEADS system two radars showed up with one being a UHF band AESA and the other an L-band AESA. The former won because it could meet volume surveillance requirements and still be C-130 deployed with the latter being sized for C-17 deployments only. So the operators don’t sit around and contemplate which frequency set they need but instead look at what capability gaps they have against current or projected threats. Once that is done they develop requirements and float those out to industry. Industry then offers what it thinks is the best solution to meet those needs and as is evident from the couple of programs mentioned above at times they offer diverse solutions.
The one time the DOD specified VHF radar as a requirement was when they wanted to model threat systems. They also do this with training threat systems as I believe a couple of the ARTS variants had frequency coverage specified in their RFI/Ps.
The Pentagon demanded a VHF “threat representative” radar system in the 1980s and had used it to model performance against cruise missiles and radars all the way through 1999 when the radar was de-commissioned. With an exponentiation increase in US VLO aircraft (F-22 and F-35 came online afterwards) and cruise missiles (JASSM and JASSMER) do you think it would be a stretch to assume that they have capability to that end now given the stakes are much higher than what they were in 1999 (China and Russia both developing or fielding CVLO capability)?
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With the DOT&E being as nitpicky as it is, as is evident from it venturing out and investing tens of millions of $$ to develop a 5th generation aerial target (because testing against QF-16 was not enough) to test current generation of aircraft and radars, it is pretty safe to assume that there is plenty of “hard” and “synthetic” capability to test current and future systems against those specific types of sensors in an operationally relevant environment (not in a chamber somewhere but out at a range). To your point about US ground force demands, they usually provide performance requirements and leave it to the industry to develop their best solutions and then evaluate them. Sometimes, as part of the AOA they narrow down on frequency (like X band for TPY-2, and C or X band for LTAMDS) but this is usually the exception and not the rule in non BMD capable radar systems.
Yeah they definitely exist, but organizationally and in mil theory land-based AD plays a more minor role in the US mil mindset than the Russian one (after all NATO is next door, US is more navy and air force centric) – plus I was more thinking about smaller F-35 operators, the kind who will get a few dozen planes in the next decade.
They generally have a few (or will buy) 3d AESA for early detection and airspace control in a more or less permanent fixture, with occasionally lip service to field dispersion..
The US fights in an expeditionary environment. No matter what OPLAN you think about or what Combatant Commander’s perspective you take, fighting has to involve the movement of large amounts of land, air and sea based forces from CONUS. The way the joint Air-Surveillance or Defense mission is set up is also reflected and influenced by this. The Navy and the Air Force have a large burden of providing Air surveillance and other Situational Awareness whether that is out at sea, in the air or on land (Marine Corps and USAF land based surveillance capability). Similarly, in most theaters the US fights as a coalition partner whether that is with NATO in the European context or with other partners elsewhere. Here too, the capability of what the other partners bring in is looked at while developing organic capability as often times they are there and only have to mobilize via land.
bring_it_onBut in real wold and in wartime the enemy will be thinking and wont play by your book and there are many other factors that will come into play , He will try to exploit the weakness of your system and vice verse ….this will all play out in real time , things may not work as they have been tested in test ranges and those targets tested against may not exactly behave as the real missile would do ……too many variables to play with that you cant test it out in ranges and have to face in real war.
Also in the real world this argument can be completely flipped on its heads and used to question the claimed advantages of the offensive system as well. It is a two way street. Also in the real world, having ample testing resources and oversight and being able to technically develop threat representative systems for developmental and operational test and evaluation has its advantage both in terms of develop the TTP’s and doctrine associated with deploying a defensive or offensive asset and in having the right sized inventory.
I do not care how many times I will keep screwing up your goal posts. But any sources of a hypersonic manuevering target being intercepted by Aegis instead of simple trajectory hypersonic missiles?[/FONT][/COLOR][/LEFT]
What you are asking for is not going to be publicly shared (i.e. finer details and performance parameters of TS). The MDA and other agencies assigned with funding and development TS purposefully keep the information they share about them scant. From what we know, between Short Range and Intercontinental ballistic missile range threat classes there are more than a dozen land or air launched TS or TS variants including some that are designed to replicate some very specific/narrow, though unspecified, threats. That is all that the powers at be are willing to share and for good reason. Logic would dictate that if they are investing tens of billions to support these efforts over the last couple of decades then they would field a fairly diverse range of threat characteristics that they will use towards developmental and operational testing especially with the DOT&E always keeping an eye and always having the option of asking for funding so that that team can go out and devleop its own TS (like it did with 5GAT because the O&T lacked that asset).
As far as maneuvering targets, we do have information on at least one system that the test community has used in the past as part of IAMD testing (to support development of the PAC-3 interceptor missile). No reason to believe that if they go out and create variants and sub-variants designed around specific threats then they would just shut efforts around MaRV’s and not pursue that when their main threats are totally invested towards that end (DF-21 and DF-26 are probably what is driving AEGIS development in the MRBM and IRBM classes).
The Storm II is a single-stage rocket using the SR19-AJ-1 second stage of retired LGM-30F Minuteman II ICBMs. It is normally flown as an MTTV, and as such uses the maneuvering reentry vehicles of discarded MGM-31 Pershing II missiles. The Storm IIwas first fired on 29 January 1997. It is equipped with a GPS/INS guidance and control system to achieve accurate flight paths, and can launch payloads weighing between 900 kg and 4260 kg (2000-9400 lb). At the time of this writing at least six Storm IIrockets have been launched to provide targets for tests of the PAC-3 missile. http://www.designation-systems.net/d…pp4/storm.html
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On the Air-Breathing side they even added the High-Diver mode on the GQM-163A which can now begin that maneuver at Mach 3.8 at altitude and can still hold supersonic terminal speeds right at interceptor impact (depending upon angle of dive). An Air-Launched variant is probably in the works to recapitalize the supersonic air launched target capability.
Next round of AEGIS Interceptor system OT is going to happen over the next 5 or so years to support ESSM Block II (Cruise and Ballistic Missile targets) and SM-6 IB with the latter being faster and larger than the current SM-6. It is quite probable that they will want to test these two interceptors to the threat that currently exists so there could well be additional enhancements to the TS. The primary threats confronting AEGIS from a ballistic missile perspective are all capable of maneuvering – hence the Anti Ship ballistic missile class of missiles against which AEGIS must provide protection to the surface fleet.
The one capability that the combined IAMD test community in the US currently lacks is a Hypresonic Boost Glide Vehicle and they are fully invested and partnered with the three other US services in their efforts on various fronts, so that they can leverage this and quickly field a target for testing across the IAMD enterprise. They should be able to field a HBGV threat representative TS by around the mid 2020’s which will be just a couple of years behind when these systems are fielded in an offensive capacity.
bring_it_onI thought I read something about how the RAM turbine was supposed to be lower drag than the propellers but I can’t find anything about that now. So it’s probably nothing… Well maybe they just hoped the new design would reduce drag.
Anyway, my suspicion that the new pods are draggier is true: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon…ck-their-range
Yes this was based on the protest materials released after Raytheon lost out the down-select for the LB pod. As I said, with CFT’s on the way and potential for engine enhancements down the road some if this can be recovered. Glad that they stuck with a pod and power and thermals that are adequate for the mission and for future growth. These pods will be in service for a long time and with Open Systems and other non-contractor owned IP in many aspects of their design there would be entry points for competitively adding capability over time.
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Also, Just noticed that one my my tweets was referenced in the article as well :).
bring_it_onYet, the USAF never asked or budgeted for the F-15EX to replace the F-15C Fleet either. The plan was to upgrade the latter. Until enough F-35A’s could be produced to replace them….
Can the F-15C fleet meet the readiness requirements into the 2020’s as per the notification from General Mattis while he was the SecDef?
No the plan was never to upgrade the F-15C’s and produce the F-35A’s to replace them. Replacing ANG F-15C’s was never part of the F-35 program of record. The Air Force never made a case for that and never increased the program of record. They never advocated or made a push to seek that.
Sorry, you just can’t make a merit based case for the F-15EX. That has been painfully obvious over the last couple of weeks.
No one is making a merit based case. This is an IB decision taken by the OSD. The AF will play along because it will get new tails while also increasing the F-35A buy (see the Congressoinal support today for the UPL).
Nonetheless, Acting Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahanis under investigation by the Pentagon’s Office of Inspector General because of allegations he improperly advocated on behalf of his former employer. (i.e. Boeing)
Being under investigation doesn’t really mean anything though. There was a complain and the IG decided to look into it. This will likely not go anywhere.
In short no final decision has been made to acquire the F-15X. Which, may never happen when all is said and done.
I am not sure anyone ever indicated here that a final decision has been made. The President of the United States via his budget request has requested the aircraft.Ultimately it is to the Congress to fund it.
bring_it_onThe problem is that you and I may want that, but the USAF has never ever asked for the program of record to be increased to support additional ANG recapitalization needs. Not in any budget discussion, not via indirect routes and not in any policy paper or document that explicitly calls for that. So the point is moot. In that vacuum when faced with a certain sunset of the F-15C fleet in the 2020’s they took whatever the OSD could get them without threatening the F-35 program. Even at the elevated defense spending levels this is probably the best they can manage before B-21 procurement peaks up in the 2020’s. Defense budgets are at best expected to keep up with inflation and are believed to have peaked.
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