Interesting way to slant your argument… compare CVF’s cruise speed with USN-CVN’s top speed.

The USN’s CVNs have a top speed* of right about 33 knots.

That means CVF is about 6 knots slower in max speed than USN-CVN… which should come out to ~4 knots slower in cruise.

* In the real world, fully loaded and 3 months into a cruise, this is the “shudder/shake/strain-to-reach speed.

Despite all the internet/”this is no ****” blathering about 40-knot nuke-powered wonder-carriers, this is reality… the USN’s CVNs are designed for right about the same max speed as its oil-burning “supercarriers” were in the late 1950s/1960.

CVNs being nuclear powered means that their top speed is also their cruising speed. Aren’t you the one comparing the CVF’s max speed to the CVNs cruising speed then? At around 20 knots cruising speed, isn’t the CVF around10 knots short of the cruising speed of the CVN?

I never thought that the Ohio SSGN are worth the effort, or that doing a SSGN(X) is worth it.

If I wanted to do a cruise missile saturation attack I’d build a plug’n’play rack/conveyor combo to put it into the back of the large cargo planes. Gives a much more flexible and scaleable response over a much wider geographic area, opening a lot more attack vectors.

Doesn’t matter – the USN thinks it is a great deal of additional capability for minimal conversion cost. It is more than just an invisible arsenal ship that can provide more Tomahawk strike power than a CSG, which in turn can free up VLS cells in surface combatants for other duties like ABM. It has the capability to be loaded with Special Forces teams and to launch UUVs/UAVs in their support. Demonstrated capability in Giant Shadow exercise. And a less well publicised capability is their ability to seed an area with distributed sensors such as UUVs and sonar arrays for ASW by virtue of its large diameter and high volume missile tubes. There was a concept called PLUSNet that was tested. Think how powerful is the capability to covertly deploy and sustain such a network just off the coast of a notional enemy in event phase leading up to war but before hostilities break out.

they don’t need to have perfect coverage. But we know from plenty of articles that ROCAF fighters get locked on by Chinese SAMs across the straits. And that was before the latest deployment of PMU2s. And when ROCAF is in operations, it always has to be mindful avoiding getting too far into the S-300 kill zone.

Oh, so they get locked on and that proves… what? :rolleyes:

China’s SAM coverage in yellow and orange rings….

Taiwan’s SAM coverage, including the fans…

Courtesy of Gemint Blog.

Chinese planes shouldn’t get too close either. :dev2:

they will be targeting both.

And Taiwan will be defending both. :rolleyes: Please, for every pointless statement you spew, I can counter with another. How about trying to think whether what you are advocating is feasible? How is China going to do the BDA with a denied airspace? How long will it take for the necessary BDA, even if doable, and the associated retargeting?

The initial waves will obviously be for more prized targets. They are not designed to completely put Taiwan out of commission but rather to just soften it up when PLAAF comes.
And once that happens, China has plenty of more surface to surface missiles in its arsenal aimed at attacking Taiwan. The so called 1200 missiles really isn’t a lot when you think about it. But that’s not counting YJ-62s across the straits, the number of WS-2 and SY-400 they could be deploying there too. And of course, the biggest part are the PGMs, AGMs and such.

And I assume PLA plans include the SAM crews putting a gun to their heads and carrying out collective suicide for the sake of their beloved comrades across the Straits?

AGMs like KD-88, KH-59 are stand-off weapons that can be fired while the PLAAF is under the protection of S-300. They only need to be used more in the beginning stage as a second wave to further soften ROCAF defense.

The problem is that these missiles require BDA in order to be utilised effectively. Or are you going to fall back on the “China so cheap China can rain smart missiles” argument?

Same with YJ-91, which will be used to neutralize the Taiwanese batteries.

Check the range of the KH-91.

They actually have thousands of AGMs that they could use for this purpose.

What, not millions? :rolleyes:

And they can always ramp up domestic production close to wartime. My question about delivering AGMs is not the missiles they have in reserve but rather they can get enough JH-7As and Su-30s out there to deliver the necessary damage. But that I think is more of an issue for PLAAF.

Now PLAAF is notoriously cheap, so that’s where PGMs come in. That’s why they are fielding so much LGBs and TGBs these days and why they have developed so many variants of SGBs.

Sure, ROCAF is training against PLA, but it’s outmatched by better quantity and quality coming from across the straits

Better quantity maybe, better quality?

that can put its SAMs out of commission and also cause enough damage on the airbases. Which will suffer more with subsequent attacks with cheaper ammunition.

Mere unsubstantiated claims.

Guess the fact that I was giving examples of the two extremes was too complex a concept for you to understand.

Extremes of what? Your silliness? 😀

Yes, on your part. Why do you think Taiwan complain so much about the ” over a thousand” tactical ballistic missiles “aimed at them”? Its because those missiles are based within firing range of the island. If they really needed to, most of the launchers can drive all of 10 meters out of their sheds and launch their missiles from inside their base.

Not that they would ever need to. Many of the launchers would be on rotational deployment in the field as a matter of standard operating procedures. Hence why they have wheels, in case you always wondered what they were for.

The PLA second artillery corps trains hard to be able to launch their missiles accurately in the shortest time possible exactly for this reason. The exact reaction time is a tightly guarded secret. But it would be reasonable to assume that even if the launch order was understood by Taiwan and the US the instance it was issued, the extra warning would not be enough to make a material difference in terms of the number of planes the ROCAF could hope to get into the air.

Yes, to the simple minded all they have to do is just.. drive out and fire. No, no need to account for the readiness of the units in terms of manning or maintenance standards. Very good, you are justifying my point every time you speak. 😎

Any how big is Iraq compared to Taiwan? How densely populated is Iraq compared to Taiwan? Did the US have any meaningful human intelligence operating in Iraq in 91? Did the US military in 91 had the sensors, processing power, manpower and weapons China has today? Do Scuds need a mile long runway and a huge logistical support train to launch? How many scuds were launched and if converted into sorties, would that have made any meaningful difference to the outcome of the war? Do you even think before posting?

Trying to obfuscate? I was responding to this silliness: “Taiwan has no strategic depth at all which with modern weapons that can cover the entirety of the island, places its defenders at a massive tactical and strategic disadvantage that even superior weapons would be extremely hard pressed to make up for.” So the PLA just having some modern weapons means that Taiwan is at a massive tactical and strategic disadvantage? You see that strip of water separating Taiwan and China? :rolleyes: My point was that China has little surveillance capability that will be further reduced considering the non-permissive nevironment China’ sensor assets will have to operate in. Couple that with Taiwan’s geographic and defender’s advantage and the possibility of US intervention, puts China at an extreme disadvantage, tactically and strategically.

Yes, I’m sure you would not be bothered one bit at the idea of having to fly through the optimum kill zones of a “mere” four S300/HHQ9 armed destroyers just to have a chance to take on a superior number of Flankers and J10s, but we are talking about rational people with some basic intelligence here remember.

And why would the Taiwanese fighters have to fly through the optimum kill zones of the 4 destroyers, that’s if those 4 destroyers are even in the Taiwan Straits, considering how dangerous it is to be there in the first place?

So how are Taiwan’s SAMs going to keep their fighters in their air when their runways are being made into swiss cheeze?

Swiss cheese with what? How many missiles does China have to turn runways to swiss cheese? Do you know?

Well a lot of SRBMs would be the answer.

And proof that you don’t. In fact, you don’t want to find out, all you want is to believe that there is a lot of missiles, enough to turn runways ‘to swiss cheese’. Have you tried to think how many missiles are needed to take out one runway? How many are required to ensure the runway is kept out of service? :rolleyes:

Well a lot of SRBMs would be the answer. And there will be far more land based and air launched LACMs coming in as a second wave. Some of the newest PLA MLRS are also reaching ranges that can strike Taiwan from the mainland and these things can have a CEP of around 10m with the latest guidance packages. And there have been pictures of the PLA parking MRLS on ships and firing them at sea so these are very relevant weapons. Might not be first strike, but that can certainly play their part..

And China has ‘a lot’ of ALCMs and GLCMs. :rolleyes:

If the PLA allowed Taiwan to launch a large proportion of their fighters, all they need to do is take out the runways and keep them out for a few hours. After which all the jets buzzing about in the sky will be reaching bingo fuel with nowhere to land and refuel. Any super secret hidden airbases might as well put up a massive neon sign as soon as they start taking planes and it would be a pretty straight forward job to track these planes and direct some missiles onto the tightly packed airfields. The odd plane might land on a nice straight stretch of road. But without its support vehicles, its staying there.

Its a simply impossible position to be in, and only someone without a clue and have massive blinders on could not see that.

Silly boy. What makes you think Taiwan is capable of, or even wants to, sortie off all the aircraft it can? And how many runways do you think China can take out at once?

To illustrate the two extremes in terms of the number of fighters Taiwan can get in the air before a PLA attack is immaterial to the final outcome. Was it really that hard to grasp?

Oh really? Seemed more like how a fanboy is trying to show what he did not consider.

No, only someone with your level of “intelligence” would make such retarded assumptions. Here’s a newsflash, not everyone is restricted to the same limited number of IQ points as you.

Ah yes, the building of the straw man. Yes, well done, you win against arguments I never made. Here’s a pat on the head. Now run along and go play with your imaginary friends and leave the thinking to people with enough intelligence to not make a total fool of themselves when trying it.

Ah, I see that when confronted with the silliness of your suggestion, you are now distancing yourself from it. Good move.

This has been discussed to death many times before. Taiwan has no strategic depth at all which with modern weapons that can cover the entirety of the island, places its defenders at a massive tactical and strategic disadvantage that even superior weapons would be extremely hard pressed to make up for.

To illustrate how easy it would be for the PLAAF to break the back the ROCAF, we can look at two possibly simplified strategies.

The first one is a surprise attack scenario whereby the PLAAF launch a massive surprise attack at Taiwan, with airfields being a top target. How much warning time will Taiwan get between detection of SRBM launches and missiles hitting their targets? A matter of minutes.

How many airplanes can they hope to get in the air in that time frame? Even if by some miracle some runways remain operational, how many fighters can be lofted? Still a fraction of the ROCAF’s full strength. Take into account the disruption to C&C and communications as well as the lack of dedicated support aircraft (AWACS and electronic warfare planes as well as tankers) and the combat effectiveness of the ROCAF is reduced yet further.

Even if Taiwan enjoyed a modest numerical superiority in fighters, the lack of strategic depth could easily cancel that out.

The second scenario is a little more likely but more to the PLAAF’s advantage.

Say Taiwan declares independence and is fully prepared for attack and can expect to get a significant proportion of its fighter strength in the air before the runways are hit.

All the PLAAF need to do is move their SAMs and AAW warships into position, launch a massive fighter wave to trigger a ROCAF full force scramble and then bomb the runways with SRBMs.

The PLAAF fighters give the ground and naval SAMs air cover while the SAMs cover the fighters. The PLAAF does not need to even attack, just simply loiter and wait. They can use their flanker fleet for this role to take advantage of their superior fuel load and combat endurance. Shorter legged fighters like the J7, J8 and J10 can stay on full alert in nearby bases ready to come up as a second wave if the ROCAF looks like they want to make a fight out of it.

If the ROCAF move forward, they fly straight into a SAM shooting gallery as well as the PLAAF top cover. If they stay back, with their runways taken out they have no means to land and refuel and the PLAAF wins by default after a few hours without having to fire a shot.

What Taiwan really need is aircraft carriers of its own.

Massive surprise attack? More like massive evidence of how you have no idea how hard it is to prepare for such a coordinated strike in secret. You think only China has spies? Or that this can be carried out without any noticeable alteration in PLA daily behaviour? Astounding naiveness. :rolleyes:

Modern weapons that can cover the entirety of the island? US had modern weapons that can cover the entirety of Iraq and the world’s most advanced sensors operating in a permissive airspace to boot, that didn’t stop scuds from launching in 1991.

Move their SAMs and AAW warships into position? Let’s talk about Pk at the edges of the SAM envelopes first. Just how many area AAW warships are there? lets count… 4. I am so overwhelmed. Oh wait. Taiwan has 4 too. And that’s not counting Taiwanese SAMs. China can shoot its SRBMs, but how many can it fire at once? They are limited by launcher numbers, while Taiwan has runway repair capabilities. It may disrupt some flight operations for a limited time at best.

And anyway, what’s the point of these 2 silly armchair scenarios? No PLA boots on the ground, doesn’t matter twiddly ****. Or are we to expect a surprise massive invasion of Taiwan in the guise of a military exercise? :rolleyes: I so remember this masterpiece of a suggestion coming from yet again the same joker. Of course, in an armchair general’s planning no PLA troops will die so coffins need not be prepared, stocking up of first aid supplies etc will not be needed. And of course troops will not need to be given a chance to talk to their families since they will suddenly be issued live ammo and simply be told they are going to war. 😀 Great general plawolf, its Taiwan’s loss you are not commanding the PLA.

i’m not sure that on- or off-mount search radar has big effects on system reaction time in all cases. i think more important is the quality and capability from the off-mount radar and the cms. technical it should be no big deal to queue targets into the ciws by the off-mount radar and the cms nearly as quick as the ciws does it on it’s own with an on-mount search radar. but you will need capable off-mount systems to be that quick. or you simply connect an off-mount radar to a ciws in the same way as the on-mount. in this case you will get the same reaction time.

btw the 5.5 sec example means that the supersonic ashm is picked up by the search radar at 4 km. far to close if you ask me. imho targets are queued to the ciws much earlier. so it’s questionable if system reaction time (in terms of first-track-to-kill) is that important.

which search radar is used by the ld2000? is it identical to the shipborne setup? and is the whole system setup compareable? if not the quited ld2000 time is as useless as the goalkeeper time for rating the naval type 730.

but for sure we have to keep in mind that an on-mount search radar has advantages beside the reaction time issue. it’s another high rotating x-band search radar, it may keep the ciws working if some other shipborne systems are going down, etc.

Not necessarily. When dealing with multiple inbounds then target reaction time is the barometer to look at. Target track handover time in particular, becomes critical. The Goalkeeper has a dual band tracking radar, with X band for quick acquisition of the target, thus speeding up the track handover process, then switching over to Ka band for precise tracking.

Of course, we could do it the USN way which is to have the CIWS fed data from the combat system. That would see the CIWS benefit from whatever radars the SSDS system integrates with. Cheaper solution too, without the need to place a search radar on each mount.

I don’t know for sure if the LD2000 uses the same search radar, now that you mention it. There are pics of the LD2000 search radar, but the Type 364 is under that dome on the ships. What I do know is that they both operate in H band, at least.

Stealth ironclad…

but for the CBG escort role, she got very few medium-ranged missiles and lack any long-ranged missiles.

The P17 actually seems like a good all purpose frigate. It takes more than SAMs to be considered a good CBG escort. It’s true that it’s hard kill suite is slightly compromised in terms of rate of fire due to its one-armed launcher, and it’s missile capacity of 24 Shtils are a little on the low side, but it’s 32 Baraks with 2 channels usuable on each side as well as 2 AK-630s make for a fairly robust multi-layer hard kill system. What’s important to note too is that it has a long range radar – and as far it being a battlegroup escort goes, that may enable it to vector fighters from the carrier, in effect making fighters the first line of its defenses.

Another thing going for it is that it has hangar space for 2 helis. That gives it a big advantage over many other frigates with only 1 heli in areas such as anti-surface warfare and anti-sub warfare.