VHF is often overrated as an anti-stealth measure. Here’s the relevant part from a Jane’s International Defense Review article titled A NEEDLE IN THE HAYSTACK – ASSESSING STEALTH COUNTERMEASURES, published March 1994.
Some Russian companies have recently offered new radars operating
in the very-high-frequency (VHF) waveband, touting their ability to
detect stealthy targets. Unlike the West, the Soviet Union never
abandoned the VHF band, using it for tactical early warning radars
such as the P-12 Spoon Rest associated with the SA-4 and SA-2 SAM
systems, and for large early warning radars.
Longer wavelengths can counter two aspects of stealth technology:
shaping and RAM. Stealth shapes are designed to reflect incoming
radar waves away from the bearing and elevation of their source, in a
close analogy between radar and visible light.
However, the analogy is not complete, because radar waves can be
reflected in other ways. When the wavelength is close to any
dimension of the body being illuminated, resonance occurs between the
direct reflections from the body and other waves which creep around
it, causing strong signals in the absence of direct mirror-like
reflection. Resonance occurs from components as well as from the
whole aircraft. A gun muzzle may be resonant when illuminated by an
X-band fighter radar with a 3cm wavelength. The Grumman E-2 Hawkeye,
with a radar operating at 400MHz in the UHF band, has a 75cm wave, so
that quite large components – fin or wing tips – may fall within the
resonance region.
VHF radars operate around 160-180MHz, with wavelengths of
165-190cm. At this point, major components of large aircraft, such as
wings and fins, may be resonant. Will such radars work? Probably not
against Very Low Observable (VLO) aircraft, although they may have
some capability against physically small targets treated with
narrow-band RAM (such as missiles).
Part of the VLO designer’s answer to resonance is to eliminate
smaller components from the shape, driving up the wavelengths at
which resonance is likely to occur. The ultimate expression of this
process is the B-2, with its smallest dimension measured in metres.
Longer wavelengths, from UHF upwards, can reduce the efficiency of
RAM. Most absorbers make some use of passive cancellation, in which a
wave reflected from the front face of the absorber is precisely
cancelled by a reflection from the rear face. The longer the
wavelength, the harder it is to achieve this effect with a paint-on
type RAM.
Since most of the claims for VHF’s effectiveness were published,
however, it has become clear that the most critical edges of VLO
aircraft are protected by deep-section, multi-layered RAM materials
which are specifically designed to squelch reflections over a wide
bandwidth.
The USAF, in its 1990 document summarizing its “Red Team”
anti-stealth activities, stated firmly that VHF was not a problem.
“The B-2’s design can deal with this class of radar,” according to
the USAF. “In any case, VHF is not a particularly effective
surveillance tool…. VHF radars have serious problems in detecting
low flyers and coping with man-made interference and jamming.”
And don’t forget the JSOW-C1 anti-ship version!
I am not necessarily talking about the Burke Class specifically. Just the general size of the ship……………The Japanese and South Koreans don’t have Aegis Crusiers. So, they don’t have the capability in there Aegis Destroyers????
At least for the Japanese destroyers, IIRC they don’t have the additional pair of projection screens for a group commander, which in turn means that the other parts of the group commander facilities would be lacking as well.
That is not the point and you know it. The point is the a Burke Class Destroyer is large enough in physical size to accomodate the neccessary equipment. As it stands right now Burke Class within the USN is not currently planned for the role. Yet, that is far from saying that its not large enough or capable of taking on the mission.
Enlarging the CIC will encroach on other spaces. That probably won’t be as trivial as you imagine it to be, considering its position.
you don’t believe the ship the sized of a Aegis Destroyer (aka Burke) can’t accommodate such facilities…………..
As it is the CIC of the AB cannot accomodate the extra equipment needed.
Which, is really the point…………the two classes are very close in size and capability.
No, they aren’t. The cruisers have flag facilities, the destroyers don’t. This allows the cruisers to undertake the AAW command role for the carrier group, which the destroyers can’t do.
I’m seeing plenty of posts about why you want bigger carriers, but not much on why the US taxpayer NEEDS bigger carriers.
Power projection.
Plus some of the answers contradict what the USN seems to be saying with the next gen carriers, particularly the 4-cat point. The new gen non-steam catapults supposedly increase reliability and launch rate so logically fewer would be needed.
Ridiculous. 4 cats are needed not because of reliability, but because of the need to have a minimum launch rate. EM catapults don’t provide twice the launch rate.
with the exception of the E-2s, the aircraft planned for the future air wings are much smaller than the F-14s of the original Nimitz specs, so again less deck space required – and UCAVs will take that further(?).
Airwing groups may be increased in future. Even if under-utilized, more deck space still provides bonuses in terms of deck configuration, ease of refueling and re-arming etc which enhance sortie rates.
Those are accidents. The Soviet tugs are there because of the very real possibility of breakdowns due to poor maintenance and condition of their vessels. If you are unable to see the difference, you are beyond help. 😀
Obvious solution: variable-distance decoys, if aerodynamically possible.
Shouldn’t actually be that much of a problem to trail it variably 50, 100 or 150m behind the aircraft, if built for that.
Doesn’t solve the problem that the decoy is still behind the real target. That is a strong discriminator which the missile, if properly programmed, can utilise. The solution is to have some sort of limited propulsion for decoys, though whether that’s feasible or not is another matter.
I can be convinced to see the “error of my ways” if it can be proven to me that not only with this technology work but that it will provide an actual capability that will be worth the money and worth the destabilization it might cause politically if deployed.
You cannot be convinced because you refuse to accept the complexities behind how BMD works. THinking simplistically shoehorns your mind into accepting the arguments put forth by BMD critics.
But do you not see the folly of BMD in this context? Do you not see that the deployment of this kind of technology actually increases the probability that these kinds of weapons may actually be used?
Total horsecrap. You do realise that the existence of a BMD system actually prevented the launching of ICBM missiles on at least one occasion?
Simplistic can be true. In fact the simple answers often tend to be more true then complex ones. Everything does not always need to be complex.
Well, simplistic thinking won’t get you the truth here.
Placing MIRVs and decoys on a single ICBM will always be less expensive than deploying more and more and more defensive systems.
Placing more warheads on MIRVs only make the warheads more vulnerable, since the bus has to release the warheads closer to the target to maintain the same level of accuracy. Decoys are not as easy to make as one assumes. The level of detail with which sensors can observe the warheads make discrimination very effective, which in turn means decoys must emulate warheads to very high degrees of fidelity. Like the trajectory, vibration, size, etc. Not easy to do all that while weighing and costing substantially less than that of a real warhead.
And in the “…hitting a bullet with a bullet…” vein, it is pretty simple to overwhelm defensive measures with more bullets. I like to use the analogy of Tank development as a way to describe how defensive measures are always defeated by offensive ones. The more armor a Tank carries the larger the guns and more sophisticated the projectiles become to overcome them. This back and forth technological race has always eventually been won by the offensive side of things and when it comes to BMD I do not see that changing.
That is simplistic. When the costs that come with fielding every additional ICBM is more than that which comes with fielding every additional interceptor, that line of reasoning doesn’t hold true anymore.
This sort of description of a technological development is what bothers me about the pro BMD lobby. They have been promising the world for 50 years, since the days of Nike Zeus, and have delivered next to nothing for the hundreds of billions of dollars in treasure already spent.
That’s because of the treaties which restricted fielding of ABMs and due to political interference which prevented the fielding of what was allowed under the treaties. Many of the technologies like ‘hitting a bullet with a bullet’ were already demonstrated long before critics said it was impossible (notice how critics no longer use that line of argument anymore?) with Nike Zeus.
Well, the Hornets may have lousy range but the SuperHornet isn’t that bad anymore. It certainly doesn’t qualify as long-ranged, but neither is it short ranged. Jane’s Aircraft puts the range of the SuperHornet with the following loadout:
“interdiction with two SLAM-ER, two AMRAAMs, two Sidewinders and three 1,817 litre (480 US gallon; 400 Imp gallon) external tanks, hi-hi-hi (including flight of SLAM-ER)”
as 945 n miles (1,750 km; 1,087 miles). That includes the range of the SLAM-ER, so subtracting say, 350km from 1,750km for 1,400km, that’s still pretty good range, even though that’s for hi-hi-hi.
Because of what that extra 40k tons bring. Compared to the CVF the CVN has
1. 50% more aircraft capacity which can be utilised in the future
2. More space for munitions and bunkerage for the airgroup and escorts
3. more stability which allow operations under worse weather conditions and allow for nuclear power wihout the need for active stabilising measures
4. nuclear power in turn means her hullform can be optimised for efficiency at max speed as opposed to a lower cruising speed on conventionally powered carriers
5. space for command facilities
6. better survivability
So while the CVF is optimal for the Brits, it isn’t for the USN.