YourFatherAs far as I know first JDAMs could be used only the targets that coordinates known before flight. Has this situation changed?
The Sniper, ATFLIR and LITENING AT pods F-16s,, B-1s, A-10Cs and F-15s carry should give Target Location Errors tight enough to employ JDAMs. The APG-79 AESA equipped SuperHornets are even able to generate multiple target coordinates through SAR maps using their AESAs, and they can send it offboard to other non-AESA equipped units in their flight. Or the other way is to have the coordinates generated by spotters on the ground. So it is not true that target location coordinates for the JDAMs have to be pre-programmed before flight. The AMSTE that Tororo’s talking about is already funded, by the way, under the Enhanced Land/Maritime Mode program. With the very tight tracking accuracy gained through that as well as an INS upgrade to the JSTARS, the JSTARS is also a probable generator of target location data.
YourFatherThat’s the Water Barrier Ship Self Defense System, whose program .pdf has been sitting in my comp since 2001. It’s an interesting idea so I’ve been looking out for it since then, but no news. So I presume there must be some practical deficiencies to this system, or the system doesn’t bring enough benefit to justify its cost. Touted as a last ditch defense when threats reach 300 ft from the ship, advantages claimed include non-interference with RAM engagements and non-degradation of CIWS cumulative Pk. It’s supposedly effective for a number of seconds and in ‘simulated sea states’.
Seems like a great idea so far, but I wonder if it works well when protecting moving targets. By the way, could you tell me which documentary was that? I’d love to see the actual water barrier form.
YourFatherThat is part of the question: the JMSDF ships were designed for that role but how suitable are they in todays environment? Is there still a need for such a dedicated ASW/Sea control platform? Or are there perhaps other roles that such a design could be eminently suitable for? E.g. more oriented toward littoral ops with a combination of armed heli’s (not necessarily primarily ASW platforms) and UAVs like the MQ-8B Fire Scout and with Italian Otomelara guns 2x 127/54 LW gun systems with Vulcano (arty) forward and 2x 76mm SR with Strales/Davide (CIWS) port/starboard on the flank/rear. Coupled to a VLS, which rather than e.g. SAM/ASROC could fit SAM/LAM. Or perhaps a navalised MLRS (e.g. IMI’s 45 km LAR-160 / 90 km MAR-350 or US MLRS/ATACMS or Avibras Astros.
Generally, form follows function. However, in this case there is a given form and there is the question of what functions it can (best or alternatively) perform.
Why has the requirement gone away? ASW is every bit as relevant as it once was during the Cold War when Haruna and Shirane was conceived, considering the PLAN has chosen to focus its investment on subs so far. Whilst the PLAN undersea capability is still some way from reaching Soviet Union levels, with a resurgent Russia and the PLAN continuing its current modernisation efforts the JMSDF would mainly be facing an ASW problem. That is critical considering Japan’s dependence on SLOCs for its survival, so much so that the JMSDF has a requirement to be able to secure the SLOCs up to 1000 miles from mainland Japan. With this in mind there is no perceived need for the ship to be entering the littorals.
To do that they have decided base their fleet organisation around 8 escort flotillas of 3 to 4 vessels each, centered around either a ASW command ship or a Kongou class BMD-capable AEGIS vessel. Within each escort flotilla would be either an Atago or the future 19DD tasked for area air defense.
So what can be ascertained so far is this:
1. no need for any anti-surface warfare capability. So that leaves out any anti-ship missiles or any main gun, though a 76mm Oto SR with the DART munition might be acceptable if it didn’t give much ship impact. On the other hand the Phalax Block 1B or RAM is still the optimal solution for close in defense.
2. No need for an area warfare capability, so leaving out SM-2s. That task is for the Atago or 19DDs. A respectable self defense in the form of the ESSM and a close in layer should suffice.
3. The ship’s ASW requirements means it must have a good sized complement of helis and the necessary bunkerage, stores and spares for them. The original Shirane’s and Haruna’s complement of 3 was probably based around the requirement of having 1 available at all times. With the alleged capability to carry up to 11 helis in the hangar, apparently the requirement was raised to have a minimum of two available at all times. As an ASW focused ship, naturally it should have the full complement of ASW-related equipment like towed array sonars etc. ASROC will also be needed for instances when subs are detected closer in and require immediate prosecution.
4. As the capital ship around which the flotilla is centered it should have good command facilities, and the flat-top 13,500 ton DDH provides ample space for that.
All in all the 16DDH is a natural progression of what the Shiranes and Harunas are. The requirement hasn’t changed, only the possible degree of threat. Designing ASuW and area AAW capabilities into the ship is only counter productive and will only detract from its primary missions. If one had to do further enhancement, maybe the capability to handle UUVs and USVs (and perhaps UAVs as well) should be designed in from the beginning to allow for broad area sensor coverage through the unmanned vehicles, in a fashion similar to the LCS.
YourFatherInteresting but I don’t know how smart it is to throw multiple SM-3s at EACH target as suggested at the end of the article as those things don’t grow on trees and there never will be as many of those as there are targets. Maybe one at each target and let the lower tier get the leakers? Thoughts anybody?
He just mentioned the possibility of multiple shots at each target, he didn’t say it is standard doctrine to do so. The number of shots fired, whether it is shoot-look-shoot, or shoot-shoot-look, partly depends on how how much time the system has left available for subsequent shots and the Pk of each shot. Notice this test (which is an operational test) involved one missile per target. On the other hand the SM-2 Blk 4A involved 2 per target due to the lack of another chance to reengage would the first miss.
YourFatherAs for the GAO they have never seen a Weapon System that they liked! Much like CBS News Program – 60 Minutes. Sorry, respect it earned…..
GAO doesn’t like any program because they don’t like anything which costs money, and the more money it costs, the more they don’t like it. :diablo: But having said that, they are at least fair and do not have an agenda to terminate a program by spreading misinformation and half-truths, unlike organisations like POGO and CDI. So at the end of the day, material from GAO is still reliable. Anything from CDI or POGO isn’t worth the time.
YourFatherOTOH, the Japanese Netters countered with their F-15s don’t fall into manholes, nor fly into the sea at night, nor throw frogs into an engine intake for fun.
That’s mean… 😀
YourFather24 x F-35B
4 x Chinook
4 merlin ASW
4 Sea king AEW
2 Naval Lynx utility/ASW???
Typical airgroup will be 30 JSFs, 6 Merlins for ASW, and 4 MASCs. For surge ops, 6 Merlins can be traded for 6 JSFs to get 36 JSFs.
YourFatherI believe the claims for APAR is 32 midcourse and 16 terminal, though I can’t remember if both are valid simultaneously.
YourFatherMaybe, but they’ve only just begun fielding their next gen anti-ship missile, the SSM-700K Sea Star. Besides, they may not find a supersonic missile to be a solution they want.
YourFatherAlmost definitely the ASM-3, which has been under development for some time. Supersonics as an anti-ship solution works particularly well against most of the ships in the region with combat systems of slower reaction times, which explains why both Japan and Taiwan are resorting to it for their next gen anti-ship weapon.
YourFatherAssumes the missile is properly identified as a HARM and not as an AshM. Usually the means if you detect the missile without any emission like AshM waveforms coming from it. The caveat to that if the HARMs are either followed or preceded by a wave of emitting AshMs.
What advantage is there to using ARMs then as opposed to normal radar or IR guided missiles?
When a HARM loses guidance, it reverts to its INS, and continues on the same direction it received the last valid signal.
Which is inaccurate wnough to not hit even a stationary target, least of all a moving one.
If you have a NULL area, it also becomes a blind spot for the ship if there are incoming AshMs behind it.
A weakness, but how big it is depends on how big a NULL is generated. If combined with a CEC like system, then this is essentially not a problem at all.
Early warning radars generally revolve around a pedestal and scan for a 360 degrees. That would make it difficult to do the above. If you throw chaff in front of the ship’s radar scan, you will also end up blinding the ship, as well as all your neighbors and the area behind the chaff becomes a blind spot.
Chaff operate in different wavelengths, so even if they are thrown in front of the ship they may not necessarily blind it. Who said they have to be thrown to the front and not offset to a side anyway?
If you decide to use you SAM radar beam to illuminate the chaff, then that radar beam isn’t being used to illuminate something else.
Are you aware of the capabilities of phased array radars?
HARMs can be drawn to ECM and potentially even to datalinks.
And decoys meant to replicate these signals as well.
Personally I find anti radiation homing to be overblown in its effectiveness as an anti-ship guidance method. It has advantages and weaknesses just like other seeker methods.
YourFathera) turns on all it’s AD radars, attempts to illuminate the attacking missile for intercept with guns and missiles.
b) does nothing.
c) steer a radar NULL onto the seeker and deny it guidance without affecting own-ship effectiveness.
d) if part of a CEC system, shut down own ship radars without losing warfighting effectiveness.
e) fire chaff and illuminate it with own ship radar to make it look like another emitting ship.
and probably many other things that can be done that isn’t known publicly. ARMs just utilise another form of guidance that looks impressive conceptually, but is just as subject to countermeasures as any other form of guidance.
YourFatherAgain, what exactly is so ‘non-traditional’ about bi/multi-statics? They can be traced back to Julie/Jezebel. Currently operational multistatic systems include Distant Thunder, SURTASS LFA. Again, nothing exotic.
YourFatherWhat exactly is so ‘non-traditional’ about low frequency systems? Low frquency systems have been regarded as mainstream. I would call laser detection, wake detection, acoustic daylight imaging methods as non-traditional, but definitely not low frequency systems like SURTASS-LFA etc.
YourFatherIt’s the Taiwanese Kuang Hua 6 FAC.
Sign In
