What an odd system!.
A mobile C3I node is definitely smart, but, a mobile C3I node that relies on the surviveability of the local, presumeably unhardened, PSTN?. Are Chinese civillian telephone exchanges usually installed in extensive bunker complexes?.
A system that can develop and hold the evolving battlespace plot will be a fantastic capability for the on scene commander, but, as with all of these systems its the comms that need to be there, and secure, before the C3I team can start working.
If we assume that the public phone network will probably be a high priority target for an opponent and, likely, unavailable what is the current state of PRC battlefield comms to drive a system like YWT-1?.
From what it says, it doesn’t seem to be wholly reliant on public phone network. It can leverage on existing public network as an additional capability over and above the battlefield local network, that’s all. That’s not a bad idea, considering that relying on existing commercial infrastructure means the network can be made more robust and range can be extended without much additional hardware cost. Besides, it is a C3I system for tactical surface to surface missiles, not strategic missiles, so it can be reasonably expected that in a good number of scenarios China’s civilian infrastructure would remain untouched.
Here we go again…
From the 2009 USAF Budget:
http://img512.imageshack.us/img512/1096/26859944bi4.jpg
Page 43
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Initial costs for the first lot or so will be higher priced. But notice the trend is downwrads with respect to per unit cost – that’s because as production volume increases and production lessons are learned cost savings cut in. The $50mil quoted would be the average fly away cost. Not the cost for the first few batches.
The article I got it from didn’t mention which year’s dollars it is in, but the LM vice president for business development said the cost didn’t include “the cost of parts, maintenance or through-life support”. Either way, at $58 mil it’s a very reasonable price.
LM quoted a fly away price (no spares, no support etc) of $50 mil. Presumably that’s the price the US gets.
The F-22 will never have TFR modes, and it is highly unlikely the F-35 will have it, either now or in the future. The F-22’s mission and flight profile obviously doesn’t require it, and both their LO qualities makes low level flight pointless. Low level flight is, anyway, undesirable for a multitude of reasons.
Aha, you’ve got to give me points for sidestepping the pitfall that loomed at my feet. :diablo:
it appeared like you were discounting them entirely from any discussion of air warfare over the strait.
That certainly wasn’t what I had in mind. I know the extent of SAM positions along China’s coast opposite Taiwan, in no small part due to your .kmz file. Thanks for that effort, by the way. (Just using this an an opportunity to show some appreciation)
Based on the type of target, a long-range system like the S-300PMU-1 should be effective around 80% of the maximum engagement range. Get to the 80% line and you won’t have enough time to turn around and exit the engagement zone before you get whacked.
First, coverage isn’t cylindrical – remember the general shape of missile engagement zones being in the general shape of a diamond. Second, even venturing into the NEZ (assuming 80% of range is the NEZ) doesn’t necessarily mean the aircraft is definitely ‘whacked’. EW does help.
Anyway, as a result of the above my point holds – land based SAM coverage doesn’t help in providing air cover in an amphibious assault. Which in turn allows fighters and attack helis to operate. Especially attack helis, which can stay concealed behind land terrain while picking off landing forces and directing rocket arty fires.
Are you kidding me? There are numerous S-300PMU-1/2 sites along the strait!
Yes, but notice I said ‘practical SAM coverage’. Simply taking the max range of the missiles and drawing a circle around that point only shows theoretical max coverage, but surely you know that SAM engagement zones don’t look anywhere like that.
It’s called the 64N6 battle management radar used to control S-300P batteries.
I was referring to sea based SAM coverage, which would usually be more effective due to closer proximity to the landing zone. However, as I pointed out, even that is degraded by clutter from land and blind engagement zones, something that only a JLENS or E-2D like system can fully resolve.
The whole assertion that you can use an equation to determine an out come of an engagement is absurd simply because there is so many factors you can not account for.
Poor ignorant fool. Never heard of “Operations Research” eh?
ALL assumptions.
Look If it is a coordinated attack of BM and a follow up with fighter bombers then ROCA has little time to prepare for emergency scramble. BTW this is not how the missiles are envisioned to be used. You don’t even understand the basic principle that PLAAF don’t own the missiles and have no jurisdiction to call on them. The missiles are long range artillery to PLA and it will be used to soften landing zones or be used as coordinated attacks pre PLA push inland.
LOL. You self-contradictory fool. First you insist that BMs can be used against airfields, then you insist that PLAAF has no jurisdication over them and is used as long range artillery.
And using them as long range artillery only reinforces the conclusion that ballistic missiles cannot realistically be used against airfields.
And no every military specialist agree with me that no missile will be wasted by ROCA to engage BM with dubious outcome. Missiles would be saved for engaging PLAAF fighters.
Again, brilliant display of your ignorance. Why do you think PAC-3s were purchased if not for use against ballistic missiles?
And you are a military planner in the PLA?
No, but the PLA isn’t as stupid as you. They understand the need for air and sea superiority, even if only for the duration of the assault. Air superiority is a basic requirement for amphibious operations because the enemy must be suppressed during the transit and landing phase.
PLA has its own air cover in the forms of SAM.
Sorry, practical SAM coverage from mainland doesn’t extend to Taiwan’s shores. And shipborne SAM coverage is still pathetic with only 2 052Cs capable of providing area air defense. Their capability to provide SAM coverage over land will also be degraded unless they have a system like the E-2D & SM-6 combination.
BTW in any aerial engagement in Taiwan will be dictated by the available airspace for air combat. Newbies like you always assume there can be unlimited amount of fighters scrambled but rather in reality only 40 fighters can safely engage each other in an area of 100km2
LOL. Where did I say anything about ‘unlimited amount of fighters scrambled’? Please don’t assume others are as ignorant as you. I remember some poor idiot (hmm, who might that be?) ticked off by a canadian LCol. for thinking exactly that. Now that same idiot is trying to use the same lines as the LCol. LOL. Let’s have a quick look shall we?
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/political-discussions/5041-us-encircling-china-8.html
Too bad you don’t go back anymore. Too hot to handle eh?
Oh, by the way. Number of fighters which can be fielded in the air by each side is determined by sortie regeneration rate, battle management capability (which includes IFF and airspace deconfliction capability) etc. Not strictly by available airspace. On this count the Taiwanese are better off in terms of training and equipment.
k, did some digging and here’s 2 quotes from JDW from 2 different articles in April.
“The per-unit procurement cost of the F-35 in 2002 US dollars rose by 38 per cent to USD69.3 million: up from USD50.2 million in October 2001 when the programme began. Maj Gen Davis said those cost increases are largely due to changes in the procurement figures, inflation and the cost of titanium. ” from US DoD reports slight drop in F-35 costs
and
“He added that the JSF would be delivered for about USD50 million per aircraft, although a Lockheed Martin spokesman later confirmed that this did not include the cost of parts, maintenance or through-life support. ” from Possible F-35 JSF buyers await price discussions
$110 million probably refers to the first few aircraft production cost, not the average unit production cost.
So what does any calculation prove when you can just change the numbers at will to try and produce the outcome you want?
Except that the figure of 0.8 came from an assessment of similar missiles to the Prithvi, so that figure wasn’t pulled out of nowhere. Even if a 95 % reliability is used, as can be seen the required number of missiles are way beyond what China has. You can try to calculate for 100% reliability. The ultimate conclusion still holds.
Firstly, of all those airfields, only a few are major ones and the majority of Taiwan’s fighters are concerntrated in a few fields, largely in the mountain shelter.
Uh, which part of ‘Those are the fighter bases’ do you not comprehend? And this study doesn’t even include emergency airstrips and taxiways which can be used for takeoffs/landings.
Secondly, since when was this been an all or nothing issue? Taking out one field could easily deprive the ROCAF of nearly 10% of its fighting force, assuming the fighters are distributed evenly, which they are not. Taking out a major field can significantly change the dynamics and outcome of any air battle.
The point being disproven is that SRBMs can by themselves achieve aerial superiority on their own. Which is what many like to believe since they know that the PLA cannot conduct an amphibious landing without aerial superiority, and the PLAAF cannot as yet do that.
So China can only take out one runway at a time? Are you even thinking your responses through before posting them?
Do you have anything to prove that China can take out more than 1 runway at a time using SRBMs? With only around 250 missiles (max) able to be launched per wave, that is pretty much the max of what the PLA can do.
So do you know what kind of submunitions are likely to be used and their distribution radius, yeild and number? The key in such analysis is the actual P values, not the simplistic equation you seem to love so much. And the P values from the Prithvi study are useless when used to try and estimate DF15 and 11s.
Well, the P values reach a maximum of 1, since you don’t seem to know that. And as proven above, even giving a value of 1 still results in a value far larger than what China has at the moment.
And the Pritvi has a 1000kg payload, or twice the payload of the DF-15 and DF-11. Which means that 1000+ figure for DF-15s is already an understatement. Submunitions cannot be much smaller than that used by the Prithvi in an anti-runway role. In fact, the submunitions would have to be specialised for anti-runway operations, otherwise they’d only do superficial damage which would only require at most a clearance of debris and steel matting place over the runway for flight ops to resume.
Other glaring inconsistencies include omissions of important weapons such as the DF21.
Trying to add in DF-21s with an inventory of around 80 max and a CEP of 300 to 400m? ROFLOL. You’re getting desperate aren’t you? Put a nuclear warhead in that then it’ll be worth something. As a conventional attack weapon it’s useless with such (in)accuracy.
Have you actually seen what a proper mathematical or statistical equations looks like? Defending those equations like they are some inspired piece of maths only proves to demonstrate your own lack of knowledge and common sense.
Yes. Have you? Apparently you didn’t look at the Prithvi study and the Polya-Williams Approximation. Too scared to look at them because they’d confirm your fears? :rolleyes: You have only been trying to cast doubt but rather evidently your words are those of a desperate man trying to deny what reality has presented to him.
And using the Indian study’s P values to approcimate Chinese missiles is going to be grossly unreliable, just like using the accuracy of AK47s to guess the scatter pattern of M16s are inaccurate to the degree of pointlessness.
Clear evidence you were too afraid to see the document. The Prithvi study calculated for a range of CEP values. The 1000+ figure was taken using the same CEP value as that of the DF-15.
Only those with an agenda would let themselves be blinded so easly by such flimsy attempts of disinformation. Or the truely stupid I guess.
The truly stupid is the one who can only argue without substance. You cant even give a good reason why those figures are wrong. Poor you. Try harder next time.
How about this. If you think the PLA can deny Taiwan aerial superiority by using SRBMs to take out runways, how about you show some figures to support your assertion? You probably won’t, since you know too well the answer isn’t what you’d like.
Even if the role of the missiles are as he described,
That was a response to claims by CIBs that Air Superiority could be achieved through SRBM attacks on airbases.
his equation is flawed
And we’re to take your word for it?
The point is not complete annihilation of all Taiwan air bases but rather how long can air operations be disrupted and most importantly by what percentage of sortie rate will be suppressed. The missiles are used to open up a window of opportunity. Even a 50% suppression upon the first wave of missile is a good investment.
How can air operations be suppressed if what must be taken out to deny operations on the Taiwan side isn’t taken out? If suppression is to be used in a manner similar to that of artillery fire, which implies small quantities of missiles fired with each time over a long period of time, then that is equally pointless since Taiwan’s anti-ballistic missiles can intercept the incoming missiles and give a window of opportunity for aircraft to scramble.
BTW these SRBM are under direct army control. Most likely It will be used as long range fire support in a cluster wave of 5 missiles. PLA historically never depended upon air superiority and intrinsically no PLA doctrine calls for complete air superiority not even the new joint high tech limited war.
So you think China can conduct a successful amphibious invasion without aerial superiority? LOL. I applaud your stupidity. Too bad the PLA doesn’t agree with you.
The likelihood of Taiwan withstanding a all out PLA attack? Not good…according to Taiwan defense minister, ROCA can annihilate 70% of the first wave of PLA before succumbing. Which really means when it comes to a war of attrition Taiwan will lose. Coming from your own defense minister doesn’t give much confidence.
What makes you think there would even be a “second wave” of PRC troops left considering any amphibious lift is probably going to be part of that 70%? Of course, that’s assuming what he says can be relied on. You people only cherry pick what you want to believe from the Taiwan side.
– What is the basis for assuming ‘lower Chinese production quality’ for ballistic missiles compared to India?
– What is the basis for using 0.85 successful launch and flight other then it being slightly higher then the 0.8 used in the Indian study?
Does it matter when you can vary the figure to what you believe it to be and calculate for yourself the final result? Even at 0.95 reliability of Chinese missiles, 2227 DF-15 missiles are required. Doesn’t change the end result one bit – China still has far less missiles than it needs.
– So what if Taiwan has 12 airports? Are all fighters distributed equally between all those airports? Of course not. Thus the main fighter bases will get the main focus of attention, and other back up strips and civilian airports can be taken out by cruise missiles and/or fighters in the second wave.
Lol, Taiwan has at least 23 Airports. Those 12 are precisely those used by fighters. Meaning that they all have to be suppressed to expect loss of ROC fighter coverage.
– A 4-6 hour repair time might sound impressive to those who have no idea what they are talking about, but the ROCAF would be hard pressed to keep the PLAAF at bay for long at full strength. How long will they last and what kind of kill-loss ratio can they expect fighting with only 50, 40, 30% of their numbers? In 4-6 hours, the air war could easily be over and those runways and planes trapped on the ground would be ready to be used just in time for the next wave of bombs and missiles to fall on them.
4-6 hours repair time means that that one runway (or less) that China can take out in 1 wave of missiles will be out of commission for 4 to 6 hours.
– The blind obsession with CEP pays absolutely no heed to how the employment of submunitions would effect the outcome, other then some superfical lip service that did not affect the results except when twisted to try and make it more favourable for the ROC.
Employment of submunitions can be approximated using the calculations done in the study provided. “Even if we assume that all of the DF-15s and DF-11s utilize sub-munitions, then using the Prithvi study, approximately 12 DF-15s/strip or 32 DF-11As/strip will be required. Which in turn requires (when using 400m x 50m strip size, meaning 92 strips) at least 1104 DF-15s or 2944 DF-11As.” That’s assuming all of them are sub-munition equipped.
The equations are stupidly simplistic and the author completely fails to realise that the real meat of the analysis he based his work on depended entirely on having accurate and realiable figures for all the P values that can only be obtained with first hand operational evaluation and testing. The equations upon which he based his entire case is just basically stating the obvious! To treat them like some gem of true knowledge speaks volumes about the total lack of basic analytical skill of the author and gives a good indication of his level of intellegence.
Accuse the equations of being simplistic without pointing out where they are flawed makes you look like you are in denial.
Its the kind of dime a dozen internet garbage that will only be a waste of time to read. I wish I hadn’t, but since I already did, I might as well try and save others from making the same mistake.
The truth must be suppressed indeed. How else can the myth perpetuate? 😀
How many SRBMs does the PLA require to take out the important runways in Taiwan? If you ever wanted to know the numbers required based on OR analysis, look here.