YourFatherBut then again, you are not detecting from the main beam, you are detecting from the sidelobs, which are not often aimed at the sky either.
And this helps your argument how? The Rivet Joint still receives the signals, from both the main beam and the sidelobes.
Against a JDAM no. Against a HARM maybe because the second or third blinker may still be within that geographical zone.
As said before, the radars can be pinpointed with great accuracy. (they have to be or JDAMs will not work) So unless they are going to so obligingly place two or more radar sets so close to each other, the HARM will not be confused.
Well I know it can go Mach 1.5 at 50,000 feet.
Good for you. Now you know that Lt Col Krumm said it can cruise at M1.9 at 60,000ft.
No, the 48N6E2 has a transversal control system that works like jets on the side. The missile is also intended for limited ABM purposes.
I’d like your source on this. What I have found only mentions this for the 9M96 missiles.
0.5m is the 48N6E2’s physical cross section. Your RCS can range from that to lower.
What has the F-22’s RCS got anything to do with the 48N6E2’s phisical cross section?
And somehow frequency agility and hopping is lost to you. By the time you have set the frequency, the frequency of the target may have changed.
Doesn’t matter as long as the frequency lies within the HARM’s receiver freq range.
In order to get close it has to know where the radar is in the first place and not a decoy, which can mimic the sidelob, waveforms and frequencies. this assumes the radar isn’t in EMCON.
Determined before launch. If the radar is in EMCON, good. shutting down the radar was the whole purpose in the first place. Virtual attrition, again.
As a matter of fact, I think increasingly they will be. Or at least they can serve as processing nodes linked to UCAVs who will do the actual search.
You are entitled to your opinion. Doesn’t make them true.
I never said that HARMs won’t be useful against older radar sets, equally like AGM-88s to Tombstones and Flap Lids. Newer radars may get a lot iffier. AEGIS does scan for missiles, AshMs in particular. That can make them ARM bait if the missile that happens to receive the scan isn’t the AshM.
You are contradicting yourself again. So only the phased array radar scans the skies, but somehow other phased arrays don’t scan the skies thus the HARM cannot get a lock? If the radar set is not aware of an incoming HARM then it will not shut down, and hence it is providing a guidance signal, right?
Oh yes, somehow advanced AESAs like the F-22 can provide guidance to ARH missiles as you earlier asserted… but flip the situation around and it doesn’t apply anymore? :rolleyes:
And the same way, the radar sets are also being evolved to address rapidly changing threats including HARMs.
yes, that’s true. But what makes you so sure that ARH missiles are rendered obsolete versus new phased array radars. In fact, if they were rendered obsolete, why are there new ARH programs underway? Quick, go tell them of their folly. Tell them they are building weapons valid only against old threats.
:rolleyes: Every side is advancing, not only radars. Digital RWRs and ESMs provide big improvements over older analog RWRs.
For all your talk about Compass Call and Rivet Joint, they could not kill all the Serbian units, didn’t they? Even after months of hunting and bombing.
In serbia the Coalition suffered heavy virtual attrition as a result of attacking decoy tanks. There is no indication that they suffered virtual attrition from attacking decoy radar sets – which happens to be the topic here. Putting up a strawman argument wont help.
I don’t see how SAR surface mapping in combination with JDAM bombing would rely on off board information. You can have one plane doing the mapping, sending the data to the other planes that would deliver the strike. I don’t have to rely on an additional command layer.
SAR only shows vehicles. The JSTARs can differentiate between tracked and wheeled vehicles, but that’s about the publicly acknowledged limit of its discriminatory capabilities. Knowing which blip is a radar set, or a SAM command vehicle, requires aircraft capable of SIGINT.
“Any suggestion that an F-15 pilot could rely on data-linked information from airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft, to the exclusion of its own radar, would be inaccurate and unwelcome.
Similar limitations exist with other sensors. Electronic surveillance (ES) sensors removed from the immediate battlefield have serious physical limitations; they are not generally in the radar’s main beam and are often unable to see weak signals. Air-breathing sensors may be blocked by terrain and the curvature of Earth. All of these factors combine to make a distant sensor’s picture incomplete.
Low-power signals are particularly difficult for our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors to pick out at long range. The distant collector often has to detect the low-signal-strength sidelobes or backlobes, rather than the main beam. Additionally, the strength of a signal is further attenuated by distance3 and atmospheric4 and weather effects.5 Thus, a distant sensor has much more difficulty picking up any signal. For example, a radar signal detected at a tactical range of 20 nautical miles (nm) is 100 times stronger than it is at 200 nm. This becomes a critical detection issue for ingressing aircraft because low-power signals, such as missile guidance, are less likely to be detected by sensors at standoff ranges (i.e., Global Hawk, RC-135, or space-based systems).
Notice that he, unlike you, did not say that they were undetectable by the SIGINT platforms. He said that it was more difficult, and it is true. This has driven the upgrades for equipment in the Rivet Joint, upgrades which are already being implemented.
In addition, radar signals travel in straight lines, and both terrain and the curvature of Earth may block a signal’s line of sight (LOS). For example, a collector must be at 25,000 feet to be able to detect a signal source at 195 nm, even with no obstructing terrain, due to the effect that simple Earth curvature has on the radar horizon.6 The higher the collector, the greater the advantage; at 65,000 feet a collector can “see” a sea-level emitter at 315 nm. Unfortunately, this relationship is true only for very flat terrain or over the ocean, since high terrain can also block signals. Obrva airfield is located in the Kragujevac river valley in the center of Serbia with high ridgelines to the east, north, and west. It was very well defended, and its position made it difficult for off-board collectors to search and detect signals. Therefore, no air-breathing standoff collector outside the target area could reliably detect signals in the valley because their LOS to the source of those signals was blocked by the high ridgelines.In our scenario, if the strike aircraft were reliant solely on off-board sensors, they might arrive at the target without any threat warning. ”
“Putting aside the fact that current RWRs on US strike aircraft were not designed with the modern threat in mind, a hypothetical ES sensor suite (think advanced RWR) in the target area has a much greater chance of detecting a radar signal in its vicinity than would an off-board sensor. After all, the strike aircraft is nearby; and if it is being targeted, it can be assumed that the sensor is in the main beam and has a direct line of sight to the radar. Thus, the onboard sensor detects concentrated energy from a radar beam pointed directly at it rather than a much weaker sidelobe or backlobe that is scattered in other directions.”
And the answer comes again from digital RWRs installed on fighters which are closer to these emitters. The F-22 already provides this capabilities, and the concept of operations envisions the F-22 off-loading the information it retrieves while inside enemy territory to offboard sources in order to benefit every platform in the theatre. The USAF is also investigating the Sensor-Forward concept to place digital receivers in legacy platforms like the F-15 and F-16.
YourFatherTell me how far the sidelob emissions of a modern phase array can be detected.
If the range of the main beam of the ESA based SAM radar is for instance, 50km, the range of the sidelob emission is going to be far less than that.
You really don’t know what you’re talking about eh? Range at which detection can occur depends as much on receiver sensitivity and signal processing as the power of the emitter. Asking for a range simply betrays your ignorance.
“Blinking” as it is called is not unbreakable, however, what you suggested tells me you are not familiar with this one.
Oh ho? Do then enlighten us? I stand by what I said. With geolocation possible within seconds, blinking will not work when a SDB/JDAM is sent to the coordinates of the radar. It will not even work against a HARM, not with its capability to set geographical exclusion zones which will be preset before launch.
Except that turbofans also don’t work very well in high altitude either. You can reach the altitude, not necessarily that you are going to be fast on it.
It is on public record that it could cruise at M1.9 at 60,000ft. (Nelson, Melissa. “Pilots Say New U.S. Stealth Fighter Has No Equal.” Bradenton Herald 21 Dec. 2005. 9 Jan. 2006 ) Eat that! 😀 As a matter of fact, the Raptor was the first plane to get a waiver from the USAF requirement to have a pressurisation suit when operations are conducted above 50,000ft. So you see, high altitude is Raptor territory – it was designed to operate at such altitudes without sacrificing speed and maneuverability.
Not necessarily a Buk, but some SAMs use TVC, and rocket motors don’t lessen at high altitudes. I’m not sure if the Buk uses TVC. The 48N6E2 uses a transversal jetting method for control, which is even better since TVC does impose parasitic losses on the main thrust.
The Buk doesn’t have any TVC or attitude control devices. In fact, most SAMs don’t. The 48N6E2, as I understand, doesn’t have an attitude control system. The 9M96E does.
Another problem of going very high is that you’re exposing the underbelly of the plane and that has a tendency to increase RCS.
I have no knowledge of the RCS values at that aspect. I am not even sure if your statement is valid, which I doubt. However I should say this again – the F-22 was designed to operate at that altitude.
Chill out. No one ever said that the F-22’s radar is easy to detect. Detection against the F-22 will have to be done by other means. I have never heard of anyone trying to target an F-22 with a missile based on the emissions of its radar alone.
Of course you haven’t. Simply because getting a fire control quality data from few transient detections is not doable.
But this does not change that the use of HARM is getting iffy against modern electronic scanning radars. Previous threats have been against old style mechanical radars, like a parabolic antenna that is rotating.
Locking on sidelob emission has been the heart of the HARM. Once you’re tightening the beam, and reduce these emissions, you need to come closer to detect and read these signals.
It seems the implications of the HARM’s Precision Navigation Upgrade (PNU) is lost on you. The HARM can be sent to a predetermined geographical zone which SIGINT aircraft have already identified as containing an emitting radar. Emit and the radar dies. Even if the HARM cannot detect the side-lobe emissions at its full range (which you have no proof it can’t do), by the time it gets close it would be able to home onto the emissions. In fact, this is already an operational mode on current HARMs,known as Pre-Brief mode.
Hence things like EC-130s and RC-135s are not what you want to bring into these ranges, and why do you think they’re investing on UCAVs like Global Hawk? Now things get worst if some sort of active sidelob cancelling is used.
Persistence. Not survivability/replaceability. The GH is not cheap – they are not going to send it into danger just because it is unmanned. Did you really think the EC-130s and RC-135s were made obsolete by phased arrays? :rolleyes:
Another problem is the fast scanning. ARM seekers require a certain dwell time in order to get a lock. An electronic scan can go so fast and won’t even provide the dwell time for that lock. Add LPI, frequency hopping and pulse compression into the mix.
Funny. Why didn’t I hear this argument when you were arguing about how capable the ARH KH-31 is against the (gosh!) electronically scanned SPY-1? :rolleyes:
Even if your SIGINT has identified the channel and the frequency, and the HARMs are set to that channel and frequency, it may not be that frequency and channel by the time the delivery planes can there, thanks for frequency hopping and agility, which by the way, isn’t limited to AESA since TWT designs can achieve this.
The seeker on the HARM has very wide bandwidth. In fact, the AGM-88C was developed specifically to address rapidly changing threats and the need for a new guidance and control section that could cope with more sophisticated radar systems that have frequency-agile and spread-spectrum capabilities.
It suggests that the targets are not in EMCON in the first place. A tactic with SAMs now is stay quiet and you are literally flying over them, then all hell breaks loose underneath. Cooperative/conditional initiative is not a good model in the long run. Its better to hunt the SAMs even when they are in EMCON, using another system of ISR, preferably SAR surface mapping. That gives you total nonconditional, noncooperative intiative. Furthermore it better deals against technological advances in SAM radars. And looking at things, this is the direction where everyone is headed.
This works only when there is something out there to provide early warning on when to start up the radars. That means reliance on off-board information. Which means the links have to be working (what do you think the Compass Call and Project Suter is for?), and the EW radars have to be operational. (Guess who’s going to do the low freq jamming?)
YourFatherExactly how do you know if the missile is in terminal stage or not? Steering something into a missile means detecting and tracking something with an RCS smaller than 0.5m with a speed like Mach 3. (Mach 6 for the 48N6E2). Must be one great sense of Superman timing to click on and off at the exact point against a Mach 6 missile.
AAR-56. And what? American SDB can be detected but Chinese/Russian made ARH cannot?
That is why you have different channels. Otherwise a squadron of the same aircraft would be jamming themselves.
Exactly. Since they are operating on different channels they can be differentiated. In fact, ARH decoys do not work against SIGINT aircraft. They work by trying to mimic the sidelobe emission pattern of the radar they are trying to protect. The other way is to saturate the ARH seeker, but that would require an unacceptably large decoy and too much power. The sensors of SIGINT aircraft are able to extract far more exquisite information from emissions than that of the ARH seeker, thus differentiating which are decoys and which are the real radars. For example, the lack of a main beam-like emmission from the decoys is enough of a give away.
Because the signal does not necessarily travel that far. Weak signals, EMCON on the part of the SAMs, terrain obstacles like mountains and buildings, ECM rich emission environment. Oh and besides that, surveillance assets always have to work not by the direct beam of the emission, but almost always on the sidelob emissions. In other words, they work with scraps.
And the signal does not necessrily not carry that far. Besides, if the emissions of the decoys do not reach the Rivet Joint, then you have been contradicting yourself all along by when you tried to say that the decoys would have prevented localisation of the real emitters, doesn’t it? :diablo:
You didn’t exactly answer me how far you have to do this.
Outside of SAM range would be sufficient.
You don’t know what blinking is, do you?
Actually, from the way you hold out blinking as an unbreakable method against SEAD techniques, I suspect you are the one not too clear on what you’re typing. :rolleyes:
Lol. The higher the plane is, the less maneuverable and the less power it has. At a certain altitude, the F-22 is already a flying brick. And it isn’t just the Buk.
Now you know why the F-22 has thrust vectoring. Not for airshow acrobatics like the Su-27s, but for high altitude maneuvering, where even its large wings do not provide the requisite maneuverability. Now think about the maneuverability of a 9K37M with its small fins at those altitudes. The missile is essentially travelling ballistically by that point. It also seems that you have little understanding that as the target gets higher, the range of a SAM gets smaller. Add to that the fact that there is a minimum range for the missile (3km for the Buk) and what you get is only a small band in which a missile can be fired at the F-22. Add again the F-22’s speed and you probably might as well not have bothered.
Even old missiles like Guidelines have intercepted as high as 90,000ft.
Indeed it has. But you might want to find out against what targets and the numbers that were fired.
SAR gives a high fidelity resolution of the target. EMCON or not, and even with zero emission, you will simply see what is decoy, what are the trailers, what are the radars, pin point them, pass it through the data link, and have another loitering aircraft come to bomb them. SEAD/DEAD operation remains a timed response. The simpler, the faster.
Technology will make it even harder on the long run, because you will inevitably be dealing with LPI and ultralow to no sidelob emissions,. so trying to identify targets alone by their signals is ultimately a dead end as a technology route.
LOL! What?! Dead end? Excuse me but I think your knowledge has reached a dead end. :rolleyes: So SAM’s radars will have undetectable emissions but somehow the F-22’s radar will be found. Oh nevermind the fact that it is LPI. All the programs out there continuing research on passive emitter location techniques must be a failure then? You should go to DARPA and tell them the folly of their ways. Expert Crobato forsees the end. 😀
YourFatherThat’s a chicken vs. egg situation. What comes first the chicken or the egg? SAR (ISAR does not work here) requires direct line of sight and a constant flight path (no it won’t work if the aircraft is wildly maneuvering to avoid SAMs). For that matter, geolocation using SIGINT requires LOS. You have to bring another asset, be it a satellite in LE orbit (has some real time constraints); recon UCAVs, or have the F-22 do a dash scanning. On the other hand, the last two may still be subjected to some SAM attack.
The asset can be quite far away and remain in LOS. What makes you think LOS means being in SAM range?
Ah yes, so I have to bring in, relatively slow moving aircraft within LOS of various emitters, especially if the emitters are not long range.
Rivet Joints and Compass Calls will ALWAYS be brought in in a major war. These are required assets against any networked system.
If something is sending out radar data to another unit, chances are the link is weak, which does not give much distance, easily obscured through signal traffic and requires direct LOS with the receiver. True you may find that signal, but how long will it take?
The whole mission of the Compass Call is to isolate those comms signals and jam them, although as a result of Project Suter, it now has the additional role of network attack. It won’t take too long to isolate the signal – already the ASIP SIGINT suite on the U-2 soon on the Global Hawk moniters very large swaths of the comms and radar bands without needing to scan through them. Also, the HDAM has been tested against ‘low-powered emitters’ specifically.
Decoys can use the same frequency and waveforms as the SAM supporting assets, all of whom the channels are field selectable, and can be changed.
Find out more about traffic analysis. Simply using same frequency and waveforms won’t cut it. By the way, you might end up jamming yourself.
As long as it has to be geolocated by signal, it would still mean bringing SIGINT assets within LOS of the emitter. You have to be able to deploy your PGMs fast enough before the whole convoy shuts down and move again.
They don’t shift quite as often as you imply. Crash down time takes at least 5min, while setting up also takes time. The more often they are forced to deploy, the more sketchy the coverage of the AD system. Geolocation of the target can be done within seconds using the AT3 network.
Did I say IR seeking SAMs? I said cued. A large SAM, the size of a Buk or Guideline, that is command guided by an IRST, for example the unit used on SA-3s.
The Buk would be ineffective against the F-22. Look at the max altitude of the missile. 85,000 ft. With the F-22’s operating altitude above 60,000 ft, that means that the range of the Buk system against the F-22 at that altitude would be minimal, even with the optimal engagement scenario of the F-22 coming head on to the Buk.
Which is not going to help you find the SAM sites amidst decoys.
Please don’t be so simple minded as to believe decoys will make SAM sites unlocatable. :rolleyes:
That would still keep the missile flying on the same path.
Except when you shut down the jamming, the missile will start seeking and locking again. Immedietely.
As I said before, a null can be steered onto the ASH to deny it any guidance. Also, a pure ARH is useless against aircraft. Switching off the emitter only near the terminal stage of the missile and it will just go by merrily on its way.
And what if the radars blink?
Wow, you must think blinking and decoys make for an invincible air defense system. :rolleyes: As I said… traffic analysis. And location of the radar within seconds is possible. Blinking won’t do no good against a SDB. Would make detection of a SDB harder too. And one more thing. Blnking requires coordination between SAM sites, meaning that disruptive events like relocation have to be minimised.
Would have been simpler if you just come in, SAR the entire suspected area, then bomb all identified targets. If you want to do it once, do it simple fast and right.
You don’t seem to understand the limitation of SAR. SAR doesn’t identity the target. The AT3 network does.
YourFathercrap. took too long to reply, sferrin and the rest got there first. 😀
HARMs are no guarantee that it will shut down a ground network.
* There are always decoys.
Decoys can and will be identified through traffic analysis. For example – decoys won’t be sending out radar data to other units. That’s already one discriminator. Determining this is the job of the Rivet Joint and Compass Call.
* Complicating the decoy situation, is that there will be other AD radars for involved, as this is a layered defense. Your HARM can end up pointed at a Tunguska rather than the S-300 unit.
New HARMs can be programmed to discriminate targets within defined geographic areas, if not within designated frequencies.
* The S-300 works with at least two to three units. Chances are your HARM is likely to, asssuming it isn’t attracted by the decoys or the other radars in the network, it may find itself drawn to the volume search radar. Destroying this radar does not destroy the fire control radar, which would already be locked against the incoming aircraft.
Read earlier about HARM’s target discrimination properties. BTW, destroying the VSR would be a coup as great as destroying the FCR.
* When you bring your own network in, you remove the stealth advantage, since all these other assets have become vulnerable. ECM assets will get HOJ’ed at.
Assets like Rivet Joint and Compass Call will not be placed within SAM engagement zones. :rolleyes: HOJ? Shutting down the jamming for a very short period would be enough. Unlike a ground based radar it is moving. Fast.
* It gets really complicated even more if bistatic and multistatic radars are involved.
Indeed. Stealth isn’t the panacea of survivability – why did you think the USAF has re-emphasized jamming and developed network attack techniques with its programs like Project Suter? Then again, why are you putting up non-existent systems as a counter to existing measures?
* There are tactics that can be used against HARMs. I’m not talking about shutting down the radar. HARMs can still go after a target by sheer INS. Tactics like blinking can be used by a ground network to literally confuse a HARM, causing the HARM to jink multiple times and run out of fuel. There are also other stuff like frequency hopping. You don’t need AESA to do that.
As said before, HARM can already be made to attack targets within a specified geographic zone. The coming-soon AARGM will have an onboard MMW radar, permitting attacks even against radars which have shut down.
* The S-300/400 missiles, as well as its radar network, has a range exceeding far greater than any current ARM. Chances are, they would have a fair first shot advantage.
Perhaps. But
1. Those extremely long ranged missiles are not and cannot be fielded in large quentities.
2. Decoys and jamming will dilute these long range attacks significantly.
* If that is not the problem, layered defenses mean shorter range SAMs, especially like the ones that can be cued by thermal/optical devices, may also be set frontward, and the attacking aircraft may end up flying over them without knowing they’re there.
The F-22 simply overflies them. The F-22’s operating altitude is simply higher than the max altitude of SHORAD missiles.
* Technological advances, such as those towards reducing sidelob emissions, can make it even harder for the HARM to detect something. It does not necessarily have to be AESA. The technology has reached to a point that even MSAs can produce very low sidelob emissions. Another development, totally independent of AESA, and can be used in any radar design, is pulse compression, which lets you create an LPI signal or pulse.
Indeed, technology is progressing. HARMs are already decreasing in importance in the DEAD role, simply because the USAF’s network is rapidly getting to the point where it is capable of localising signal emitting targets with enough fidelity to send a gps guided bomb to it without the need for a specialised ARM like HARM. Look up AT3 and the latest GRAND algorithm BAe came up with.
YourFatherSo, if the ZSU can engage any target within 5 miles (quite conservative), that gives it around 2 1/2 mins (see my earlier estimation) to deal with 8 fixed path gliders each.
I’d take those odds. (around 20 seconds a SDB, or going at 4,000 rds/min approx 1,000 rds per SDB – thats alot of lead in the air).
5 miles is overly optimistic. As said before, maximum range of the search radar on the Tunguska is 18km. From the point an SDB enters 18km from the Tunguska, it will take at least a few seconds to detect first the SDB, establish a track and then generate a fire control solution. Longer without the aid of any external cueing. This means that by this time the SDBs are already getting closer. Note also the long 2.5km minimum range of the missile. Don’t always assume the SDB is coming head on – it won’t, unlike what a naval CIWS will face. If the Tunguska is to protect a target complex you won’t afford to place one beside every possible aimpoint. That means in many cases a crossing target may be presented, which means that engagement envelopes are reduced even further.
4 ZSUs with each S-400 battery sounds pretty realistic to me.
Besides, if the airspace is blanketed with jamming and covered in support aircraft, I don’t see how the F-22 is more survivable than an F-15E.
4 ZSUs per aimpoint, since you are trying to claim impenetrability. A battalion is geographically separated meaning multiple aimpoints. Place enough of them and you run out of ZSUs to place around your other targets.
Besides, if the airspace is blanketed with jamming and covered in support aircraft, I don’t see how the F-22 is more survivable than an F-15E.
Find out more about signal to noise ratios then. Then you’d understand why an F-22 is far more survivable under jamming conditions than an alternative non-stealth aircraft. That’s why measures are made to reduce the RCS of non-stealthy aircraft like the SuperHornet. Not to make them undetectable/untrackable like the F-22/F-35, but to increase the effectiveness of their jamming/decoys.
What, with 2 sidewinders each? 4 aircraft = 8 SDBs and 8 sidewinders… hardly significant self escort.
Your maths need some working on. Each F-22 can carry 8 SDBs, 2 AMRAAMs and 2 Sidewinders in a strike config. That means 32 SDBs, 8 AMRAAMs and 8 Sidewinders in a flight. Note also that because the of the F-22’s stealth, speed and altitude it retains the initiative – it is very hard to intercept. Remember, you have to track the detect then track the Raptor in order to vector in interceptors. Add to the fact that Raptor is a dynamic target with high altitude and high speed of >M1.5 makes it a very hard to intercept with anything less than a Mig-31. (likely only the MIG-31 possesses the speed and altitude necessary to actually intercept the F-22)
True, wonder what an anti radiation missile would make of their jammers though…
Jamming does not need to be sustained. All it needs to do is to break the targeting cycle required by the Tunguska, forcing the cycle to be restarted. Also, anti-radiation missiles are poor against aerial targets. With the AESA radar it is very possible to steer a radar null onto the anti-radiation missile thus denying guidance to the anti-radiation missile.
Again, broadly correct, if 2 factors are true:
1. The stealth aircraft can get close enough to launch their weapons without being detected
2. The stuff they launch can actually get to the target and neutralise it
Why not? As I said, a flight of Raptors alone holds 32 SDBs. 4 Tunguskas alone won’t be able to handle that. As for getting close enough to the target, the USAF has stated quite clearly that the F-22 is able to launch from outside the engagement zone of the S-400. Not unbelievable, considering how severely the engagement zones of SAMs are reduced against high speed high altitude targets.
Very much a question that would depend on the situation, I can’t even begin to answer that one.
India bought 150 of these impenetrable Tunguskas+ZSUs. One wonders why they didn’t get more since they were so capable.
YourFatherNot by a SDB only strike unless you are talking massive amounts of aircraft within the strike package to get massive amounts of bombs in the air, as well as EW aircraft to beat back the radars somewhat etc etc.
Who is yammering on about needing support systems again?
Why not? A flight of 4 Raptors carries 32 SDBs. That would require at least 4 Tunguskas, assuming each has the time to engage the SDBs in sequence, which would not be the case. This also assumes no jamming by the Raptor/any other asset.
Why not just do the strike with F-15Es and their attending jammers then?
because the F-22 is far more survivable, silly. And there aren’t that many targets that can be afforded so heavy protection, not without stripping protection from other targets to an unacceptable level.
Nothing is invunerable. Ever. Not even the F-22. No matter how much some on here would like that to be true.
Bottom line is this, a low-profile F-22 strike consisting of a few aircraft, launching a handful of SDBs at max range against a target with S-3/400 and ZSU defenses is much more likely to fail than it is to succeed.
If you need jammers – F22 is no addition to the strike package.
If you need overwhelming numbers and jammers – F22 is no addition to the strike package.
If you need Tommahawks – F22 is no addition to the strike package.See what I’m getting at now?
Duh? Whoever said the F-22 was invincible? And overwhelming numbers are not required.
F-22s carry 8 SDBs each, are capable of self escort and are capable of jamming with their AESA radars. Not as many platforms are needed as with non-stealthy aircraft, which require fighter sweep escorts and heavy jamming for them all, as well as additional tanking assets for the rest of the aircraft. Tomahawks may be used against a VERY heavily defended site in order to saturate its defenses, since the Tomahawk’s low flight altitude cuts the engagement zones for SAMs drastically, claims made by S-400 proponents notwithstanding. (Oh its true, but what they don’t say is just how badly the S-400 engagement zones vs cruise missiles are cut) Again, how many sites can you afford to have these kind of defenses put up for?
YourFatherWhats the range on the HARMS?
Not known. The USAS has not revelaed it. Estimates vary wildly.
It’ll have to be a helluva jammer to beat back such a radar to within 10 k of its emitter.
I assume you are aware of the squared relationship with distance and all…
The Tunguska doesn’t have a strong emitter, and the SDB isn’t a large target like a fighter. Increasing the noise would be enough to delay the detection of the SDB. Meaning that the available engagement envelope for the engagement would be reduced even further.
What is going to kill them?
Your effectively saying an AEGIS ship is crap, ‘cos its point defense systems will be the only things operating…
That is your thought pattern.
i’m sorry, but you were the one who implied that the ZSU alone effectively made the SDB useless, not me. As you have since acknowledged, the requirement support from otehr systems is required, otherwise they are effectively useless by themselves. Those systems, even if protected by Tunguskas themselves, can still be saturated. In effect, no, they are not made invulnerable just because they have a ZSU covering them as you seem to foolishly believe.
YourFatherthe onboard radars have ranges that easily exceed the ranges of the weapons used, tunguskas radar for example can detect, track and classify targets at beyond 30km range.
BS. 18km max for the search radar, which would be less for the considerably smaller SDBs. Also, with a crossing target, the range of the guns are reduced by half. Missiles will naturally also have their range reduced.
Are you slow or what? Tunguska is designed to move with armoured units and could be deployed to any threatened area within hours. I doubt the F-22 would be plinking tanks with its SDBs,
Oh what about all the possible fixed targets? Did you really think the F-22 was going to be used to plink tanks? Can anybody afford to place Tunguskas to protect all the sites? A suadron of F-22s holds at risk all targets within its flying range, which in turn means that to protect them all, all will have need to have Tunguskas assigned.
first it would likely attempt to engage S-400 sites and long wave radars. Placing extra SAMs like tunguska and Tor near such targets will protect those assets while the S-400s and long wave radars track and engage the F-22s.
Then these high priority targets will be saturated with jamming, decoys, SDBs and Tomahawk strikes. Take these few high priority sites down and watch the effectivess of the air defense network crumble.
Operating long wave radars 24/7 is dumb. Having air defences on standby 24/7 is dumb. Having a lower state of readiness and not operating your radars all the time so their positions can be logged so any inbound aircraft can give them a wide berth is smart. Why not use acoustic sensors? How many sonic booms will be heard over a countries borders? And how many of those don’t show up on normal (civilian) radar. A cue to take another look perhaps?
Ah yes, the infinite money approach to solving problems. How much do you think such a vast network will cost? That money will have to be diverted from something else. All for what? Notifying the network that there’s something out there? You’ll spend yourself bankrupt before the US needs to attack you. Now where have we seen this happen before? :rolleyes:
I was not making a case for or against the F-22s suitability as a strike aircraft, but replying to a comment. Personally I think using F-22s as strike aircraft is a complete waste… wasn’t that what the F-35 was for? Direct equivelents to F-15C and F-16… except much much more expensive. If you are going to use the F-22 for things you were going to use the F-35 for why bother with the F-35?
It is not a complete waste. It is a very survivable platform, even more so than the F-35, by virtue of its stealth, speed and operating altitude. There is no need to confine it to the anti-aircraft role, as the USAF has realised. It’s ability to penetrate the air defenses of the adversary, and thus be in close proximity to enemy systems and its exquisite ESM suite enable it to collect some information that not even specialised platforms like the Rivet Joint can, for example those signals coming from low power emitters. Trying to confine it to the traditional role of a ‘fighter’ betrays a lack of understanding of how the USAF views it and intends to use it.
Is an SDB smaller than a Hellfire end on? The current model Tunguska missiles are supposed to be able to defend the vehicle from helicopters…and their weapons. Tunguska also has backup optical guidance with thermal sights for night and all weather capability and an autotracker to follow manouvering targets to allow a non emission mode.
So? The Tunguska is limited to engaging only one target at a time. Unless you saturate the target with Tunguskas to cover all possible bearings and in numbers to prevent saturation, the site can be destroyed by an airstrike, no matter how desperately you believe having Tunguskas makes one invulnerable to airstrikes. Before you get to the number of Tunguskas needed to prevent saturation you’d probably have them become self-jamming with all their emissions.
The traditional buyers of Russian hotcakes used to expect them at heavily subsidised rates or even to be given them for free. Either that or they are now part of NATO and don’t want Russian gear as a political statement. Unless you have had your eyes closed for the last decade or so you will also have noticed very few have actually been buying new military equipment till recently.
Ah, yes. So you have the perfect antidote to airstrikes but nobody wants it because they have no money for it and those that has the money are buying ineffective western systems even though Russia has the perfect system at lower cost. Nope, the likelihood that they see the Tunguska having no clothes just doesn’t cross your mind doesn’t it?
YourFatherOh please man, think before you post!
We are talking about a multi-layered defense here (and have been pretty much since post #13).
You think that a S-300 or S-400 radar will not detect an SDB at 10km? If so can I have what your smoking?
Oh and the S-300/S-400 is going to be happily radiating with no HARMs bearing down them? No jamming to suppress them? No network attacks to make them see targets that are not there, and not see targets that are there?
You need all the systems to make it work
Indeed. Which makes your first statement questioning how the SDB is going to get by a ZSU sound so silly. What makes you think the other systems are going to be happily up and running?
YourFatherTunguska can be cued to Ranjir(9S737) command and comunication system,also Ovod-M-SV(PPRU-1) or Sborka(PPRU-1M).
Indeed it can. But this illustrates the point that the Tunguska cannot on its own protect a site without the support of other early warning and C&C facilities. Facilities that will be suppressed or destroyed before other targets are engaged. Sure, the Tunguska may shoot some bombs down – that means that it will be a case similar to naval AAW where saturation of the target defenses is required. I don’t hear people say that AEGIS is inpenetrable just because the SM-2s can shoot down missiles – why should the Tunguska be so just because it is claimed to be able to shoot down bombs?
YourFatherHas already been replaced in frontline Russian units a long time ago.
Are you trying to turn this into a US vs Russia thing? I am talking about in world-wide service.
Yeah, the F-22 is the best example of this.
Indeed. But the US has many other platforms to handle lower end duties. It doesn’t need more of them.
Why do you assume that? The naval version of the SA-19 is designed to kill supersonic sea skimming antiship missiles, and the changes made to make it able to do that day night and in any weather were retrofitted to the Tunguska in the 2S6M model.
The naval version can rely on other shipboard radars for early warning of an attack, as well as target cueing. The Tunguska has no such facilities.
I’ll wager you run out of F-22s before Russia runs out of tunguskas, they basically replaced the Shilka in frontline service, they have thousands of them.
Are you slow or what? The Tunguska is limited to the site it protects. The F-22 holds at risk every target within airborne tanking flying range.
They don’t use them to track, they are to detect its presence. Long wave radars are much better at tracking the target which allows the relevant SAM site to prepare its radars and missiles for launch so they can get optimum shots to increase kill probability.
Then that’s stupid. Long range low freq radars are already capable of detecting the Raptor. Why use acoustic sensors? Painfully dumb.
Assuming that the target itself is not a decoy. US intelligence has not been living up to its name recently. Money has been spent on air defence before the F-22 was even on paper and will be spent long after it is gone.
Utterly irrelevant to the discussion on the Raptor’s suitability as a strike aircraft. Putting up strawman arguments like this only makes your case weaker.
The tunguska would likely use missiles to engage such targets as it can do so at much longer range. BTW the ZSU-23-4 is not really that much different from Phalanx, except if fires a more powerful round. Rate of fire is very closely comparable, and a bomb is hardly a target that is manouvering hard to evade interception.
Read Doug’s statement on having to detect, track, target the SDB. Just because the missile range is 10km or so doesn’t mean it can engage the SDB at that range. The SDB presents a small radar target, meaning that detection is likely delayed, thus extending the whole sequence. This also means that the area of protected space provided by a Tunguska unit becomes smaller, forcing more units to defend a particular area.
One thing to consider – if it was judged so effective at repelling air strikes and so cheap as you claimed… why isn’t it selling like hotcakes? 😀
YourFatherWhy do you assume a Shilka… he said ZSU… how about saying that the ZSU-57-2 would have a poor engagement performance against such targets… or he could have meant the current in service Tunguska…
I assumed the Shilka because it was the most ubiquitous of the ZSUs. Remember that as we move up in sophistication of the platform (and hence effectiveness against SDBs), the platform cost goes up too. That in turn means that number of platforms that can be purchased goes down for the same amount of money. Which in turn dictates that the number of defended sites go down. Not even the Tunguska is necessarily able to defend a site from SDBs. The question is how many will be required to fully protect a site from SDBs? I wager that you run out of Tunguska platforms long before you run out of sites to protect.
And if I bought the worlds fastest car there is no way the cops could catch me because none of them would have a car fast enough… of course they do have radios and can set up ambushes ahead of my projected direction of travel…
Do not mistake a transient detection of the F-22 for a kill. Think before going gaga over such a silly plan. How many of such acoustic devices would be required to be placed all over the country (and even beyond its borders) for the system to even achieve a detection of the Raptor, least of establish an awfully inaccurate track of it?
That is a bit optimistic isn’t it? What PGM can wipe out a whole battery of SA-17s for example? Each launch vehicle has its own tracking radar so hitting one vehicle would just annoy the others. Same with a TOR battery. Larger systems like S-300 etc use all sorts of tricks to avoid ARMs, including false emitters connected to their radars, and of course specialised lighter SAMs co-located to prevent the defences from being overwhelmed.
The SDB doesn’t have to wipe out the battery. All it has to do is hit its target (which the SAMs are defending). Then the SAMs would have failed their purpose. Do you get it? If the Raptor forces the enemy to spend so heavily on its air defense until there’s not much money left to actually acquire stuff worth defending, then the Raptor has achieved its purpose without even firing a single shot. Virtual attrition at work.
YourFatherCare to point out how you are going to get enough money and manpower so that you can saturate all targets with ZSUs so as to prevent any SDBs from leaking through? Note that the radar on the Shilka is also of very limited range, and it is also not suitable for searching for targets due to its very narrow beam. Putting out a statement like that and feeling smug about it just makes you look rather silly.
YourFatherJust to clear up a few issues.
1. The range of the SDB is more than 60nm, as clearly stated here. http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/missiles/sdb/index.html
The SDB’s accuracy is to be every bit as good as the JDAM, in fact it was designed to be even better, due to its smaller warhead.
The Raptor, in a June 2006 test, dropped a Mk83 JDAM at a speed of M1.5 and at at an altitude of 50,000ft. The speed and altitude boosted JDAM travelled 24nm, hitting its target. Imagine the range extension afforded for the SDB when launched from the Raptor’s speed/alt regime.
2. If the airspace is too well defended to be penetrated by even a Raptor, then no other plane is going to cut it going in there. A Raptor has the advantages of stealth, speed and altitude. That doesn’t mean that a Raptor is going to be used alone. If the situation calls for it, external jamming can be provided, and the Raptor’s already very low RCS will be almost certain to be lost among all the noise.
3. Speed and altitude. These are often disregarded contributions to the Raptor’s survivability measures. Speed and altitude serve to decrease the range of enemy missile systems as much as it serves to increase the range of the Raptor’s weapons. The air at altitude is also thin enough to require thrust vectoring for the Raptor even with its large wings. Think about what that does to SAMs which have small wings. Only those with thrust vectoring/ Aster-style PIF-PAF have the excess maneuverability to actually have a good chance of getting near the Raptor for a kill.
4. Even if the Raptor is not flying head on against a SAM position, thus reducing its stealth advantage relative to the SAM site, the Raptor’s speed and altitude advantage ensures that unless the Raptor is very close to the SAM launch site, the Raptor is probably outside the range envelope of the SAM, since the missile will have to travel further to reach it (pythagoros theorem) and have to catch up with it. Not exactly the best intercept geometry for the SAM missile.
5. Acoustics. By the time you hear the Raptor, it is over you. And it provides nothing other than the general location of the Raptor. BFD.
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