Just one bit of additional info regarding the Type 45, from Jane’s. CEC will not be fitted before 2014 earliest. Anyway, here’s a pic of the Daring when I was in Portsmouth last week. Anybody lucky enough to be in the area early next month might be able to go up the Type 45, it’s going to have an open house for tours.

The fact that a certain type of ship has weaknesses doesn’t make it ineffective. That is (also) a matter of circumstances under which it is employed and operational doctrine. Every type of ship has strengths and weaknesses.

If a ship has weaknesses which prevent it from carrying out its mission satisfactorily, it’s ineffective.

I’ve read the full articles. Increases in length and displacements do not mean the larger ships aren’t still FACs (even if ‘on steroids’) and employed as such.
You fail to acknowledge even the possibility that to the extent that navies shift from FACs to other larger classes of ships this is the result of a shift in a) (perceived) threat, and b) what the navy is expected to do. If the neighboring country is making territorial claims in mid-ocean and starts building modern large frigates to back up those claims, for example, building more coastal craft is not going to help is it?

Why is it that almost across the board less than 62m designs are abandoned? And those exceptions also see a greater emphasis on stealth as a self protection measure while simultaneously abandoning a comprehensive sensor and hard kill defense suite?

Which mid ocean territory is Israel trying to protect? What naval humanitarian mission are they doing? Israel is facing the same kind of threat it once used FACs to handle. The only difference is that they are now abandoning FACs as a solution. And if long range deployments were required, we’d all see 120m designs replacing FACs. But we are seeing 62m designs replacing 57m designs and below. This is the case in Greece. Surely you are not telling me that they intend these FAC replacements to do the work of their larger major surface combatants?

Oh, so now its not your guy who’s talking? Somehow he is not representative of naval experts opinion?

He did not specify which group of people held that opinion at that time. Certainly if all held that opinion, we wouldn’t have seen FACs in such widespread service and with such heavy emphasis on Anti-air warfare self defense suite.

“Nevertheless, these events showed that the day of the rudimentary FAC was over and marked the end of an era that began with the sinking of the Eilat.”
An OSA is a rudimentary FAC (from its inception 4 decades earlier), various Lurssen derived boats aren’t designed 2-3 decades later aren’t. Note, incidentally, that you author doesn’t mention the captured Kuweiti missile boats,

Yes, to deal with the issues I mentioned, FACs had to be abandoned and the move was towards larger platforms to ameliorate the drawbacks FACs faced.

which you claim the Iraqi’s so fully mastered.

Where did I claim that? Back off or shut up.

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/fearless/
According to The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World by Eric Wertheim, Gabriel II was to be carried in the second group en lieu of the anti submarine torpedo tubes.

And they are wrong. The Fearless class do not carry Gabriels. Go look at pics for yourself instead of stubbornly insisting.

They were not fitted as such, but the design could clearly handle that load without further changes, effectively allowing a Sea Wolf replacement. Even if not installed, it does show RSN what roles considered.

You are clutching at straws now, aren’t you? Are you seriously arguing that because it is possible (according to you) to place Gabriel on the design, it shows that the RSN considered using the Fearless class as a Sea Wolf replacement? Then isn’t them not placing the Gabriel on the Fearless class PVs a further indictment against the effectiveness of doing so?

“The corvettes are noted for their tall mast, making them top-heavy compared to ships of similar class.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republi…Navy#Corvettes
“Suffer from topweight problems due to huge mast housing EW gear.”
http://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/asiapac/singap.htm#4
The (smaller) Saar 4.5, Hetz class has the same AAW missile suite with associated sensors. Unlike the Victory class, the Hetz class does not suffer top weight and stability problems however. Nor do the Aspide equipped Ecuadorian Esmeralda class and the Malaysian Laksamana Class. Nor does the Crotale equipped UAE Murray Jip class.

Quite amazing how you get your info wrong so often. The Saar 4.5 is ‘fitted for but not with’ the Barak system. Don’t be deceived by all the armaments shown on websites for Saar class. They can’t carry them all at once without severe sacrifice in seakeeping ability.

JANE’S NAVY INTERNATIONAL – APRIL 01, 2006

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Israel innovates for the asymmetric
Richard Scott

Although the smallest of Israel’s armed forces, the Israel Navy strives to ensure the integrity of the state’s major maritime artery while at the same time countering security threats along its seaward borders. Richard Scott reviews the fleet

The state of Israel knows better than most the price to be paid for protecting national security. Since its establishment in May 1948, its defence forces have found themselves engaged in conflicts of varying intensities for most of the past 58 years. More recently, they have been fully engaged in responding to the unrest brought about by the uprisings or ‘intifadas’ in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

This hard-won experience of both high- and low-intensity conflict has given the Israel Defence Force (IDF) a deep-rooted appreciation of the value of self-reliance, preparedness, technical supremacy and information superiority. And, despite frequent condemnation from the international community, the IDF continues to take an unapologetically robust stance towards those who it sees as a threat to Israel’s security, whether within its proclaimed borders or further afield.

Today, while Israel enjoys a ‘cold’ peace with many of its Arab neighbours, and finds the ‘eastern-front’ threat once posed by Iraq removed, it is confronted by a range of low-intensity security threats emanating from militant groups operating in the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon. The election of a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority suggests that there is little prospect of this situation improving in the near term.
Furthermore, Iran’s vocal belligerency does not allow for complacency in the minds of politicians and defence planners. Nor does the possibility that Egypt and Syria might one day find themselves governed by radical Islamic regimes more hostile to Israel.

The fact that Israel has traditionally seen its security challenges coming across its landward borders has all too often served to play down the roles and missions performed by the Israel Navy. The smallest of the IDF’s three arms, it has tended to avoid the limelight cast on IDF ground forces and the Israel Air Force (IAF) (although its success in the 1973 Yom Kippur war when Saar missile boats used radical tactics to inflict significant losses on Egyptian and Syrian forces, without any loss to themselves, certainly did not go unnoticed by other maritime powers).

Of course, matters of size should not diminish the contribution that the navy makes to safeguarding Israel’s maritime borders and offshore security interests. In an era where many navies are seeking to transform their own legacy force structures to deal with the asymmetric threats encountered in the littoral, the development of the Israel Navy as a modestly sized but agile, innovative, jointly focused and increasingly networked force offers some useful insights.

Given continuing security concerns, the Israel Navy (as with the other branches of the IDF) remains circumspect in the amount of information it releases on funding. So while the Ministry of Defence (MoD) declares a 2006 defence budget of NIS36 billion (USD7.64 billion), augmented by USD2.2 billion (NIS10.48 billion) in US defence aid, it does not break down spending across the IDF (although informed sources suggest that less than five per cent of Israel’s total defence budget is allocated to the navy). The total full-time establishment of the navy (both professional and national service personnel) is put at about 9,000, with an additional 5,000 reservists available on mobilisation.

Given these resource constraints, and the inherent fixed costs associated with payroll and infrastructure, the Israel Navy makes enormous efforts to focus its scarce funds on those skills and disciplines it sees as critical to maintaining operational capability. For example, as well as operating its own dockyard facility at Haifa, it also manages its own highly proficient combat systems engineering and integration authority (thus choosing to accept responsibility for the delivery of combat system capability to the fleet). In this particular domain it finds itself working with a local maritime industrial base populated to a significant extent by ex-navy operators and engineers, allowing the navy to benefit from the insight and experience these former practitioners can bring to bear in the development of new systems and equipment.

Indeed, pressures on both funding and manpower have made the Israel Navy readily accepting of new ideas and technologies to ensure it maintains a qualitative edge over potential adversaries. Examples of such force multipliers include unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), which will in the medium term assume the roles currently performed by manned maritime patrol aircraft, the employment of federated training facilities aboard major surface units, and the development of a common command control, communications, computers and information (C4I) infrastructure to compile and broadcast a common recognised picture fleetwide.

Maritime security

Situated on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, and lying at the junction of the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, Israel claims an area of 20,770 km2 (8,019 square miles), extending about 320 km north-to-south and 110 km east-to-west. This total includes the Golan Heights area captured from Syria during the Six-Day War in 1967 and annexed on 14 December 1981. Other territories captured in 1967 and classified as administered territories were the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (the Gaza Strip and Jericho area were transferred in 1994 to Palestinian administration). East Jerusalem, captured in 1967, was annexed shortly thereafter.

Israel is bordered on the north by Lebanon, on the east by Syria and Jordan, on the south by the Gulf of Aqaba and to the southwest by Egypt. The total land boundary length stretches 1,017 km, while the coastline covers 273 km including a small strip of shoreline on the Gulf of Aqaba in the northern Red Sea.

Given the uneasy relationships that persist with its landward neighbours, it is perhaps little wonder that most Israelis tend to ignore the strategic importance of the sea. Nevertheless, according to Rear Admiral Yuval Zur, Chief of Staff of the Israel Navy, it is very much a maritime state, “even if it does not necessarily behave like it”.

His perspective is born out of the hard lessons learned from Israel’s survival through a short but turbulent history, particularly an appreciation of the enduring strategic value of its sea lines of communication (SLOCs). “Our sea lines of communication are vital, and have been fundamental to the state since 1948, particularly with regard to supplies of energy and security-related goods.”

Certainly, Israel’s geostrategic position has in the past proved critical for the movement of energy supplies at a global scale. The Red Sea port of Eilat was developed to receive tankers bringing crude oil from Iran, then still ruled by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In 1968 the Trans-Israel Pipeline was opened to carry oil received at Eilat overland to Ashkelon on the Mediterranean coast. (At that time, the Suez Canal was still closed following the 1967 war, with Israel holding the eastern bank and Egypt the western bank, so the pipeline saved tankers having to make the long and costly journey around Africa.)

“The development of the port at Eilat meant that Israel was able to bypass the Suez Canal during two conflicts [in 1967 and 1973],” points out Rear Adm Zur. “Furthermore, the construction of the Trans-Israel Pipeline allowed Israel to feed oil supplies through to Europe between 1974 and 1979.”

But the need to establish a modern and effective naval force was something which took a little longer for Israel’s leaders to recognise. The conflicts of both 1956 and 1967 exposed the inability of the Israel Navy then in being able to influence the outcome of events at sea. And in October 1967 it suffered the ignominy of becoming the first navy in the world to lose a warship to anti-ship missile attack when the destroyer Eilat, operating 13 n miles off Port Said, was hit and sunk by P-15 Termit (SS-N-2 ‘Styx’) missiles fired by an Egyptian Komar-class fast-attack craft.

“This experience shaped our understanding of a new navy that would be based on small fast missile boats and guided missiles,” remarks Rear Adm Zur. “In a tactical sense, it very much changed the doctrine of the navy from defence to offence.”

This transformation was achieved through the acquisition of a new generation of Saar fast missile craft armed with the Gabriel anti-ship missile system. It was this strike force that, through the use of innovative tactics and brilliantly executed electronic deception measures, was able to wreak havoc on opposing Syrian forces in a sea battle off Latakia on the second day of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Following this and other skirmishes, the Syrian and Egyptian navies stayed in port throughout most of the war, enabling the Mediterranean sea lanes to Israel to remain open.

“This [Latakia] was the decisive battle which won us sea control,” says Rear Adm Zur. “Indeed, the principles of surprise, clever tactics, and the delivery of overwhelming firepower in a very short timeframe to break the will of the adversary, are still absolutely relevant to our doctrine.”

He continues: “The navy is built to fight a decisive battle at sea, which means that in the first days of conflict we must have the ability to deliver overwhelming effect. Our force development is true to this vision.

“How do we do that today? We need the ability to discriminate targets using high-resolution sensors for detection and classification. We need precision weapons to prosecute targets. And we need the wideband communications and networking technology to link sensors, weapons and the command so as to be able to deliver decisive effect at a time and place of our choosing.”

Israel still enjoys the sea control that it won in the Yom Kippur war. “But it is something we must work to maintain,” stresses Rear Adm Zur, “bearing in mind the continued strategic importance of our sea lines of communication”.

Since the cessation of oil imports from Iran in 1979, Israel’s principal SLOC now stretches the 2,000 n miles from the Straits of Gibraltar, at the entrance of the Mediterranean, to the deepwater ports of Haifa and Ashdod, skirting the Maghreb states en route.

“We cannot forget that some 99 per cent of all goods arriving in Israel come by sea,” he says. “Furthermore, 93 per cent of all security-related goods come by sea. Protecting this long SLOC, which runs the length of the Mediterranean and skirts the Magreb for part of its course, is a huge task for a force of our size.”

There is thus an implicit acknowledgement that it is simply impossible to safeguard each and every mile of the SLOC. Indeed, the SLOCs do not necessarily need to be open all the time.

“Because northern Europe and the eastern seaboard of the US are the prime shipping points to Israel, we know that we have a specified period from a vessel’s time of departure to the time it turns up outside one of our ports,” says Rear Adm Zur. “That gives us a defined ‘window’ to sanitise the waterspace and eliminate any threats before inbound shipping arrives.”

Roles and missions

The Israel Navy’s mission is to act at and from the sea, to protect Israel, its sovereignty and citizens, and to maintain its national interests at sea. To achieve this, the service serves as a deterrent, provides protection to the coastline and SLOCs, and participates from the sea in joint IDF operations. In terms of its operational theatre, the navy remains very much focused on the Mediterranean; while it has a very minor presence in the Red Sea through the patrol forces based in Eilat, it does not deploy major units through the Suez Canal based on judgment of the force protection risks.

Today at least, the ‘conventional’ threat is assessed to be moderate. Syria’s naval capability has progressively eroded, reflecting the country’s poor economic situation and the limited funding allocated to maritime forces. That said, the instability of the regime, and its sometimes unpredictable behaviour, compels Israel to maintain a close watch on Syrian military activity.

Similarly, while Egypt is certainly not regarded as an enemy – the Camp David accords of September 1978 brokered a peace that endures to this day – the development of its order of battle cannot be ignored given the uncertainties surrounding the regime that ultimately succeeds that of President Hosni Mubarak. The Arab Republic of Egypt Navy has in the past decade been the beneficiary of a large amount of US military materiel, including four FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and 10 SH-2G Super Seasprite helicopters. Furthermore, US Foreign Military Funding is footing the bill for three new fast missile craft to be built by VT Halter Marine. Another significant acquisition came in 2002-03 with the transfer of five Type 148 missile craft from Germany.

So for the time being at least, the Israel Navy is confident in its ability to maintain sea control in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and ensure safe passage for shipping along the coast of Israel. Instead, the more immediate threat lies in the coastal zone, where increased efforts are being directed at cracking down on arms smugglers, insurgents and militant groups seeking to infiltrate Israeli territory to launch terror attacks.

Such adversaries are by their nature unconventional or ‘asymmetric’. They are also nothing new: over the last 35 years, around 70 terror attacks against targets in Israel have been launched from the sea. Today, with more than 75 per cent of Israel’s 6.5 million populace living on the coastal strip, and with many critical infrastructures (such as ports, refineries and power stations) located on or near to the shoreline, the relative vulnerability of the maritime zone and its hinterlands becomes immediately evident.

“The nature of this threat is extremely varied,” says Rear Adm Zur. “It includes direct terror attacks, ship abductions, merchant ships launching small insertion craft and improvised explosive devices. Arms smuggling is also an ever present concern.”

The problem for the IDF, and the Israel Navy in particular, is the lack of strategic depth on the maritime and land borders to the north and south. The town of Nahariyya is a little more than four miles from Lebanon; Ashkelon is only seven miles from Gaza city; and Eilat finds itself hemmed between borders with Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

This proximity means that threats are measured only in time, not distance. That dictates that the Israel Navy must detect, classify and prosecute threats to its maritime perimeter in a very short time ‘window’.

Its response has been to establish a tightly woven tapestry of coastal surveillance and interdiction assets, running the length of its coastline and networked into regional command centres at Haifa, Ashdod and on the Red Sea (these in turn report to the navy’s Central Command Centre in Tel Aviv). In total, 11 standing patrols are maintained on the Mediterranean coast with a further two on the Red Sea.

Recognised picture

To compile the recognised maritime picture, the navy has established a chain of coastal radar and electro-optical surveillance stations augmented by airborne surveillance assets. At sea, a force of fast patrol craft (a mix of Dabur, Super Dvora and Shaldag type vessels) are used for surveillance and interdiction. These surveillance assets feed into command facilities to produce a single picture, which is then pushed out fleetwide across an overarching C4I infrastructure.

According to Israel Navy Commander in Chief Vice Admiral David Ben-Bashat, the coastal surveillance net is “now being converted into an unmanned, remote- controlled system employing a modern wideband communications network. This system allows us to create accurate situation assessments at much lower costs and, most importantly, enables a substantial preservation of our most important commodity, namely human resources.”

He adds: “We have over time developed to become an agile, flexible and networked force well versed in operations against a range of asymmetric threats. Israel’s experience in its littoral has given us huge experience in dealing with difficult and dangerous threats, which many other navies are only now having to come to terms with as they engage in the global ‘war on terror’.”

It is this insight into maritime interdiction and counter-terror operations that the Israel Navy now values as a currency through which to forge closer links with NATO and other international navies after many years of ‘isolation’. Indeed, an Israeli naval officer is being assigned to NATO’s Joint Information and Analysis Centre as a contribution to Operation ‘Active Endeavour’.

Since 1982, apart from exercises with the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet, and occasional passage exercises with German ships operating in or transiting through the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel’s navy has found operational engagement with foreign navies hard to come by. One naval source noted: “Many navies are happy to engage with us ‘under the table’. But very few want to be seen cavorting with us on it.”

However, recent years have witnessed some developments that reflect an easing of this isolation. Search and rescue (SAR) exercises with the US and Turkish navies, under the banner of ‘Reliant Mermaid’, have been running since January 1998. An initiative to improve peacetime humanitarian assistance co-operation and interoperability between US, Turkish, and Israeli navies on a biennial basis, the exercise’s aim is to develop methods and procedures for SAR operations as well as co-ordination within and between naval and naval-air units of the three countries.

Israel has also been invited as an observer to the NATO submarine rescue exercise ‘Sorbet Royal’. Furthermore, it is now linked into the International Submarine Escape and Rescue Forum.

These engagements, plus Israel’s involvement in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, are seen by Vice Adm Ben-Bashat as a promising portend. “We are very keen to establish relations with other navies in our operating area,” he says, “and I would hope to see [our ships] called upon to contribute to international operations in the generation to come”.

Fleet assets

The major operational elements of the Israel Navy are based at Haifa and split into three flotillas; Flotilla 3 parents major surface units; Flotilla 7 is the navy’s submarine arm; and Flotilla 13 is the elite ‘Shayetet’ naval commando unit.

Three Saar 5 corvettes, INS Eilat, INS Lahav and INS Hanit, commissioned in 1994-95, constitute the most capable units in the surface fleet. Designed by John J McMullen Associates and built by what was Litton Ingalls (now Northrop Grumman Ship Systems) in Pascagoula, Mississippi, they combine a relatively small platform – the hull and topside of which is heavily optimised for signature reduction – with a powerful combat system and C4I facilities. Their weapon fit includes a Phalanx close-in weapon system (CIWS), the Barak-1 point defence missile system, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Mk 46 Mod 5 torpedoes and facilities for the operation and support of an Atalef helicopter.

“These corvettes are the C4I hubs for the fleet,” says Rear Adm Zur. “Indeed, we have updated the command system since commissioning to provide additional facilities for an embarked flag staff or joint force commander.”

Eight Saar 4.5 missile boats are currently in service, the last delivered by Israel Shipyards in 2002. Described by Rear Adm Zur as “the workhorses of the fleet”, they are equipped with the Phalanx CIWS, Harpoon missiles and a 76/62 Compact gun, and are fitted ‘for but not with’ the Barak-1 missile system. Modular davits can be installed aboard these vessels to allow for the carriage of special forces’ boats.

Just two Saar 4 missile boats, Nitzhon and Atsmout, remain in service. Commissioned in 1978-79, they are both equipped with variable depth sonars and are the last ships in the Israel Navy to carry the Gabriel II anti-ship missile system.

Entering service in 1999-2000 as replacements for three aged Gal-class boats, the three 1,900 ton submerged displacement Dolphin-class diesel-electric submarines were built by Germany’s Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW) and Thyssen Nordseewerke, both now part of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. Equipped with the ISUS 90-1 command and weapon-control system, a multi-array sonar suite, Sub-Harpoon anti-ship missiles and a mix of Seahake and NT 37E heavyweight torpedoes, the Dolphin boats have a key role to play in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities, interdiction operations, and support to special forces.

They are also noted to have a ‘deterrent’ role. This has been widely interpreted as indicative of a ‘second-strike’ capability based on a torpedo tube-launched nuclear-tipped cruise missile. The Israel Navy refuses to discuss this issue; indeed Israel will not confirm or deny that it possesses nuclear arms, although independent intelligence assessments have concluded that it has an inventory of up to 200 warheads.

Flotilla 13 is the navy’s commando unit, which operates its own fleet of rigid-hull inflatable boats and fast insertion craft. Originally established to undertake coastal raiding operations, the Shayetet – colloquially known as the Navy SEALs – has in recent years found itself actively involved in covert counter-terrorism operations within the Palestinian territories. Trained to operate from air, sea and land, it has in the past won acclaim for its interdiction of vessels attempting to run armaments to Palestinian militant groups.

Patrol forces stationed around the Israeli coastline are equipped with a total of 33 high-speed patrol craft. Described by one senior officer as the “young bulls of the navy”, these vessels service 13 standing patrol tasks on the coastal frontier.

The Haifa regional command, responsible for operations north of Mikhmoret up to the border with Lebanon, is currently equipped with 11 IAI Ramta-built Super Dvora Mk I and Mk II vessels, while the Red Sea command at Eilat has two Super Dvora Mk II craft plus two older Dabur-class. Also based at Eilat are three Nachshil-class Stingray catamaran interceptors, in service since 1998. One sank in the Red Sea in September 2005 as a result of a mechanical failure but was successfully salvaged in January 2006 and is now being surveyed to assess whether it can be returned to service.

The Ashdod command meanwhile is midway through a phased modernisation programme that is seeing its older Dabur-class vessels progressively replaced by 10 new Super Dvora Mk III and five Shaldag fast patrol craft. An initial Phase A contract for six Super Dvora Mk III and two Shaldag craft was placed in 2002, the order being split between IAI Ramta (builder of the Super Dvora line) and Israel Shipyards (which originally developed the Shaldag as a private venture). A Phase B award, covering the supply of four additional Super Dvora Mk III vessels and three more Shaldags, was let to the two yards in late 2005.

Both vessel types are equipped with a remotely controlled Rafael Typhoon 25 mm stabilised gun system (slaved to an MSIS electro-optical tracker), a manually operated 20 mm cannon and two 7.62 mm machine guns. The Typhoon mounting can also receive electro-optically guided Spike-ER (NTD) missiles to enable precision strikes at targets at ranges up to 10 km.

The Israel Navy’s patrol forces have latterly been augmented by Tzir’a- (‘Defender’) class patrol boats operated by the newly established Snapir counter-terror unit. A total of four 27 ft Tzir’a boats have been delivered to date for use in port protection, boarding operations, shallow-water surveillance and diving operations. Four more Tzir’a-class boats, built to a lengthened 31-ft design, are on order.

Another recent acquisition includes two ex-German Navy Type 745 multipurpose trials and support ships, ex-FGS Bant and ex-FGS Kalkgrund, which have been re-named INS Bat Galim, and INS Bat Yam respectively. The two ships, retired from service in late 2004, were in November 2005 towed to Elsflether shipyard to be reactivated and to be prepared for their delivery to the Israel Navy.

Both vessels departed Wilmshaven as deck cargo in February 2006. Israel Navy sources say that one of the ships will be used for underwater search and survey operations, with the other being tasked for salvage, diving support and torpedo recovery duties.

IDF maritime air assets are tasked by the navy but flown by the IAF. Embarked aviation is limited to five Atalef (‘Bat’) shipborne helicopters (a tailored variant of the Eurocopter AS 565MA Panther) operated from the Saar 5 corvettes and used for reconnaissance and third-party targeting. While flown by air force pilots, the aircraft’s tactical co-ordinator is a naval officer.

Based at Ramat David air force base when ashore, the Atalef is equipped with an IAI Elta EL/M-2022H surveillance radar and a Controp stabilised electro-optical system. It is also equipped with datalink facilities to relay sensor information back to other units.

Three Westwind 1124 SeaScan maritime patrol aircraft, also operated jointly by the air force and navy, have been used for coastal surveillance and intelligence gathering tasks. These will be phased out in the coming years in favour of a two-tier fleet of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs): two examples of the maritime surveillance variant of IAI Malat’s Heron UAV – designated Machatz 1 – are already operating in the coastal patrol role with the EL/M-2022U radar and an electro-optical payload; a new high-altitude long-endurance UAV, known as Eitan and equipped with the same EL/M-2022U radar, satellite communications and beyond line-of-sight control, will be used for long-range reconnaissance.

Force development

According to Vice Adm Ben-Bashat, the “uniquely delicate geopolitical balance distinguishes the Middle East from other regions of the world. Each day carries with it new developments that may emerge as either looming threats or unique opportunities. This ever-changing reality produces the challenges that must be borne in mind when planning naval force design for the next decade”.

He adds: “Operationally speaking, I feel that the future of naval force design should be based on the solid foundations of technological advancement and the efficient utilisation of human resources. Such a force design will allow us to operate in diverse environments, while employing the abilities needed for future operational tasks.”

But the big challenge is budget. The Israel Navy, as the smallest of the IDF’s branches, has always had to fight hard to justify its claims on resources, particularly given the large capital costs associated with major naval acquisitions.

Certainly, the case for additional submarines has been well made as in late 2005 it was announced that Israel was negotiating the purchase of two further Dolphin-class boats to a modified and enhanced design. Both boats will have an additional 10 m section to accommodate an air-independent propulsion system based on fuel cell-technology, allowing them to stay submerged at depth for up to 14 days at a time.

The three original Dolphin-class submarines came to Israel on very favourable terms. Germany funded the first two boats entirely, with Israel in the end paying for just half the cost of the third submarine. This time, only one-third of the USD1.2 billion acquisition programme will be funded by the German government; the remaining two-thirds will have to be funded through the national defence budget.

Yet despite the cost, there was broad support in the IDF and the MoD to increase the size of the submarine force. “The value of submarines is very well understood given their ability to conduct covert intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance at long range,” remarks Vice Adm Ben-Bashat.

New surface ships are not such an easy sell. Nevertheless, after several years debating priorities for the future surface fleet – which saw arguments sway for and against new Saar 5+ corvettes and a large amphibious ship – the navy’s senior command is confident that it can produce a compelling case for the procurement of two new multirole surface combatants. Furthermore, there is a clear aspiration that the design should be a variant of the US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

Earlier studies to define a new-generation surface combatant defined requirements for a putative ‘Saar 5+’ multirole corvette, displacing between 2,800 and 3,000 tons, optimised for littoral dominance and an increased capability to counter asymmetric threats. Compared to the three Saar 5 corvettes, the new Saar 5+ vessels would be substantially larger and feature an improved air-warfare and land-attack capability. They would also offer significant anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, together with facilities to operate and support a medium-size helicopter.

LCS studies

As with the Saar 5 corvettes, the navy plans that the new ships should be built in the US using US Foreign Military Funding. However, the high non-recurring engineering costs associated with producing a unique design optimised for Israel Navy needs alone has forced a re-think of the original procurement strategy.

“Joining the LCS programme offers us the chance to leverage the price efficiencies that come from series production,” a senior Israel Navy source observes. “This means the cost of the ‘seaframe’ will be considerably less than a bespoke Saar 5+. It will also help us contain lifecycle costs.”

As a result, the Israel Navy has commenced a two-year study to appraise the feasibility of using the Lockheed Martin LCS ‘seaframe’ as the basis for its next- generation surface combatant under the informal designation LCS-I (‘I’ denoting either/or Israel or International). Work is examining the cost-effectiveness of adopting the semi-planing monohull design to meet the Israel Navy’s specific requirements, specifically the level of modification to accommodate a combat system based on systems and equipment largely sourced from Israeli industry. Parallel combat system feasibility study activities will be led by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon with support from Israeli industry.

A major aspect of the LCS-I platform study is to assess the feasibility of integrating a new topside structure – hosting a four-face phased-array multifunction radar – into the design. It is understood that the IAI Elta Systems EL/M-2248 MF-STAR active phased-array radar is the Israel Navy’s preferred choice. This would provide volume search, detection, classification and missile uplink commands for the new Barak-8 active radar homing missile being developed by IAI MBT Systems in association with Rafael.

Israel Navy sources have indicated that Barak-8, which will have a range of 70 to 80 km, will be fired from a tactical length Mk 41 vertical launcher system. This would also allow for the outload of other Mk 41-compatible weapons such as VL ASROC; the latter has been baselined as part of an anti-submarine warfare suite that would also include a low-frequency active sonar, launchers for Mk 46 Mod 5 lightweight torpedoes, and a torpedo defence system.

Another key capability is land attack. IAI’s MBT division, through the Harpoon Extended Performance (HEP) programme, has already introduced selected modifications to the Israel Navy’s Harpoon missile inventory, most notably a two-way guided-weapon datalink supplied by Tadiran Spectralink.

For the future, the Israel Navy is looking at a winged guided-weapon – believed to be an advanced HEP evolution – with a range of up to 200 km, an ability to loiter, and capable of precise aimpoint selection through either imaging electro-optical or coherent radar seekers. Two-way communications would allow for data exchange during the mission and provide for operator interaction throughout all mission phases.

The Israel Navy is looking to earmark funding for the first of two LCS-I vessels in the IDF’s 2009 equipment budget. Current planning assumptions foresee entry into service in the 2014-15 timeframe.

Another area where Vice Adm Ben-Bashat – indeed the Israel Navy as a whole – sees enormous potential is in the area of unmanned vehicles. “We are embracing a wide range of unmanned modes of operation, such as unmanned surface vehicles [USVs] and unmanned aerial vehicles, which will improve operational performance while streamlining costs and minimising the threat to human life.”

He adds: “I believe that USVs will, in the longer term, have an even greater impact in the maritime domain than they have already in the air. They reduce our vulnerability and drive down manning to offer us a real force multiplier.”

An operational evaluation of Rafael’s Protector USV began in 2005, with the Israel Navy assessing how the vehicle could be used in an anti-terror/force-protection role as an adjunct to its patrol craft. Naval sources believe the USV shows much promise, although they point out that they are evaluating Protector “as a concept, not as a product”.

decision to approve initial funding for two multi- mission ships currently based on an LCS-I design that would include anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface and anti-missile warfare missions, as well as special operations. (http://defense-update.com/newscast/1…41107_lcsi.htm) Now, that’s a package of tasks far more comprehensive than most navies would have their FACs perform. Perhaps the Israeli needs are somewhat different and go beyond that for a ‘pure’ FAC for sea denial. Certainly, they face different naval threats than 30 years ago.

The reason why they want bigger hulls is precisely because FACs were totally unsatisfactory in these areas which were crucial to the boats’ survivability and effectiveness. That is why they had to migrate to bigger hulls and abandon FACs. So thanks for proving my point.

Have a look at this list of corvette classes. You claim 62m/600 tons as corvette. However in most cases, there is a clear break somewhere between 500-1000 ton 1000-2000 ton or under/over 750 tons. All are labelled corvette, but those under 750-1000 are rather typically craft with a hull built for speed rather than seakeeping and endurance. They are in fact FAC’s on steroids. Those 62m 500-600 tons ‘corvettes’ are much much closer to what is traditional termed FAC then they are to corvettes.
Can you explain why e.g. the Saar 4.5 is classified as FAC and the Victory class as corvette? The Hellenic Navy currently operates the Super Vita-class ships, which are 580 tons[vague] full load. The Hellenic Navy has categorised the class as fast attack missile craft. A similar vessel is the Kilic-class fast attack missile craft of the Turkish Navy, which is classified as a corvette by Lürssen Werft, the German designer of the ship. Is Visby really anything other but a very large FAC and if yes, then what makes specifically it a corvette?

I have seen a good definition that describes a corvette as the largest combatant incapable of independent deployment. Likewise, the same article states a frigate as the smallest combatant capable of independent operations. MY point was never to argue on what defines a FAC. My point was on the limitations of a FAC, something which you seem keen to deny by diverting attention towards what qualifies as a FAC. The point is that FACs are unacceptably small to the point that they are ineffective. As the Victory class corvette shows, even 62m designs, which some call corvette and some call FACs, (call it a dinghy boat if it suits yourself) suffer the same issues, only to a lesser extent. When you get to frigate sizes, then the issues start to really go away.

So, there was no step up in armament from a 20mm gatling on the PG 1-go patrol hydrofoil to a 76mm in the Haybusa? Or a step up in tonnage from 50 to 200 (and thus in seakeeping and endurance)? Or in terms of sensors? In fact, you have no evidence to the effect that armament choices for these ships have anything to do with the (perceived) (in)effectiveness of hardkill measures on small boats. That’s just your interpetation.

What’s your point about the 76mm? Yes, there is a step up in tonnage, which kind of proves my point. The Hayabusa seems more dedicated towards interception of N Korean intruders rather than attack of major surface combatants. The limited numbers acquired and their basing at Sasebo, Ominato and Maizuru districts certainly supports that.

Incidentally, in Italian service that same dinky 50 ton hydrofoil carriers a 76mm with no problems.

Just because it carries a 76mm doesn’t mean there isn’t problems. How do you know vibration issues aren’t a problem? You could place the theoretical loadout of the Saar V listed in wiki on the vessel. You wanna say the same thing that they would work well? Go see what it does to stability?

For starters, the mission perception of the RSN today is different and far more comprehensive than say 35 years ago. If you want to do different things, then you are going to need and get different ships. Also, the threat has completely changed (note e.g. developments in PLAAF and PLAN). Those are two very good reasons for not replacing the old Seawolf class with similar sized and similar armed ships, even if the boats served to full satisfaction.

Sorry, FACs like the Sea Wolfs were supposed to be able to handle surface warships. That was their primary mission. As far as RSN user experience goes, why don’t you look at what the RSN officer said? Do you think he would have said that if what he said runs counter to his experience?

“The addition of varieties of shipboard systems draws us inevitably to the question of space. The larger build of the corvette comes along with the advantages of longer range and better seakeeping. This extra range is a consideration in view of the tighter defence budgets with the recent economic downturn. The new corvette would be expected to fulfil a multi-role function that goes beyond her current� limit for strike operations.
..

The increased stability of the platform is crucial as the shock of high speeds creates undesirable operation conditions for weapon systems.
…

The first notable effect of a smaller hull is seakeeping. Much of the miniaturised electronics is placed in a cramped CIC. Already, there are problems placing new additions to technology because of the space limited by small hulls. To compound matters, all these get much harder in a rolling and pitching CIC. Crew fatigue occurs more quickly. Rough weather also reduces the effectiveness of sensors.

These problems provide reason for the FACs continual increase in size.
…
“

Instability has been a problem especiallyfor the Victory class, which has a quite distinctive tall mast. Given the comprehensiveness of its weapons fit, I’m not suprised something has to come out before something else can be put in. Isn’t that the essence of RE-fitting?

Exactly. You said it yourself, the comprehensiveness of the fit needed to make it combat capable made it unstable. A high mast was required to give the sensors the optimal location, and even on a 62m corvette that made the ship unstable. Guess what happens on a smaller FAC?

It is rather ludicrous to consider both LCS versions as replacements for the earlier FACs. Fact of life is that the FACs are aging and will have to be retired. In considering new ships, Israel will look at the threat, in the present and foreseeable future. The threat has clearly evolved from 20-30 years ago. Just compare the middle eastern navies of 30 years ago with those of today. So why would they necessarily need to get the same type of ship? That does not mean there is something wrong with the type of ship being paid off, however.

Tell us why did they not acquire more FACs to replace the aging FACs? Given how much of a supporter the Israeli navy has been in the past of FACs, and how they expected FACs to be able to handle surface threats, the fact that the Israeli Navy abandoned FACs serves as a severe indictment of the FACs. The threat is still the same – surface, sub surface and airborne threats. Sure the opposition benefits from increased technology, but any FAC replacement can also have the same technology. Unless, perhaps, the inherent disadvantages of the FAC simply don’t allow it to go up against larger vessels effectively, and the Israelis have finally realised that, along with the RSN?

Indeed, considering the Med, have you noticed that nearby Turkey has steadily continued to build FACs through 2007 (8x 436 ton DOĞAN, 2x 433 ton YILDIZ and 7x 552 ton KILIÇ classes, all with similar displacement, sensors and armament of 1x76mm, 1×35/2 or 40/2, and 8 Harpoon).

Sorry, you’d find that the KILIC class is 62m, and actually qualify as corvettes. Corvettes are borderline acceptable. Same for the Hellenic navy, with their Roussen class also a 62m design. Look at their older FACs, and see the trend? Upwards. Why? Think.

Much the same way, these boats are not AAW ships but do have self defence capability.

If shooting ineffectively into the sky and hoping for a golden BB counts, that is. 😉

2 good articles. Note the first is by an officer from the RSN, which discarded FACs for frigates. It also refers to Israeli officers who have once advocated FACs in the past, and how their navy is now realising that they were wrong. Incidentally, the RSN was based on the Israeli navy in its formative years. Both have come to the same conclusion about FACs. Note how even FAC users like Sweden have moved out of FACs towards larger corvettes, in spite of an operating environment conducive for FACs.

Corvettes : The Choice Platform for Regional Navies
by CPT Cheng Ching Siang
…..

The might of these missile-armed lightweights remained untested until 1991 during the Gulf War. The naval war proved to be one-sided, when the Iraqi Navy’s Osa-class FACs were mauled by US A-6Es and the Sea Skua armed British Lynx Helicopters. There was relatively little that could be done to the aircraft, which stayed just outside of the Iraqi FAC’s anti-air defensive battery. Of course, it must be noted that the Iraqi Navy was up against a vastly superior opponent in an exposed environment not particularly favoured for FAC operations. Nevertheless, these events showed that the day of the rudimentary FAC was over and marked the end of an era that began with the sinking of the Eilat.

……

Developments to the FAC since 1991 had discernible changes. Such craft can take on at least an ASM-armed helicopter at standoff ranges up to 13km. The type, termed the corvette, is generally defined as a heavily-armed small surface combatant measuring 60 to 95 metres in length and displacing up to 500 to 2,000 tonnes. A distinguishing feature of the corvette is her capability for limited independent deployment, typically between 10 to 20 days, and usually equipped with self-defence capability against air and submarine threats. It is often also helicopter-capable – sometimes even affording her own hangar. The result can be seen, for instance, in Vosper Thornycroft’s 83-metre corvette design, of which two have been sold to Oman. Besides the eight Exocet MM-40s and the ubiquitous 76mm main gun, these vessels carry, inter alia, an octuple Thomson-CSF Crotale SAM launcher able to tackle air threats, including sea-skimming missiles. The attractiveness of the heavily-armed corvette has sparked numerous replacement p
programs for FACs.

….

FRIGATE OR CORVETTE?

The first notable effect of a smaller hull is seakeeping. Much of the miniaturised electronics is placed in a cramped CIC. Already, there are problems placing new additions to technology because of the space limited by small hulls. To compound matters, all these get much harder in a rolling and pitching CIC. Crew fatigue occurs more quickly. Rough weather also reduces the effectiveness of sensors.

These problems provide reason for the FACs continual increase in size. The Royal Swedish Navy, for example, pioneered the 43.5-metre steel-hulled Spica-class FAC design in the 1960s, then moved on to the 50-metre Stockholm and 57-metre Goteborg-class corvettes. To date, there is the 72-metre YS2000-corvette designated for service.

A conventional argument would be that an increase in size would turn the ‘hunter into the hunted’. That statement is not valid today, as explained earlier, because the smaller FAC is already outclassed. Senior Israeli officers stated in the 1970s that the corvettes or frigates would have no role in the future of naval conflict. Being the first Navy to engage in a missile-to-missile fight in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, their views on the value of small combatants have always commanded great respect. Looking at the Israeli Navy today, we note a different picture, for they have in construction three Lahav-class corvettes displacing as much as some navies’ light frigates.

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_1/3.htm

The move towards corvettes and frigates: in defence, as in life, fashions change. In the world’s navies the fashion some 20 to 30 years ago leaned toward small, high-speed vessels with surface-to-surface missiles–these were known as fast attack craft. Operational experience has since driven more recent requirements towards larger ships of corvette or even frigate size.

The distinction between corvettes and frigates is extremely blurred and is not helped by references to ‘light frigates’. Parameters of length and displacement help definition but are not absolutes; in two of the world’s major reference works, Jane’s Fighting Ships and the US Naval Institute’s Combat Fleets of the World, the corvette corvette, small warship, classed between a frigate and a sloop-of-war. Corvettes usually were flush-decked and carried fewer than 28 guns. They were widely employed in escorting convoys and attacking merchant ships during the great naval wars of the late 18th and tends to be a vessel between 55 and 85 metres with a 1300 to 5000-tonne displacement. The frigatefrigate (frĭg`ĭt), originally a long, narrow nautical vessel used on the Mediterranean, propelled by either oars or sail or both. Later, during the 18th and early 19th cent.
….. Click the link for more information. is seen as between 86 and 140 metres in length with a displacement of between 1300 to 5000 tonnes. But these are not hard and fast rules; in corvettes the Indonesian Sigma class being built by Royal Schelde are 90 metres long and have a displacement of 1700 tonnes, the Russian Almaz Design Bureau Scorpion (Project 12300) class will have a displacement of 470 tonnes but will be 56 metres long while Brazil’s Barrosso class is a 103-metre, 2350-tonne ship.

Both types of ship tend to be multirole escort vessels with a surface-to-surface missile sur·face-to-sur·face missile
n. Abbr. SSM
A missile launched from land or sea at a target that is also on the earth’s surface. system and a medium calibre (57 to 76 mm) gun as well as self-defence weapons. Corvettes tend to be shorter-ranged vessels designed to operate in coastal waters, often under the shield of land-based air power, which means they rarely require anything more than a self-defence anti-air warfare capability. Frigates tend to be deployed into blue waters to protect maritime lines of communication and usually will have some form of area air defence system and often, an anti-submarine warfare “A/S” redirects here. For the Danish stock company form, see Aktieselskab.

“A/S” redirects here. For the Norwegian stock company form, see aksjeselskap. capability in the form of sonar and a flight deck with a hanger for a lightweight (four- to six-tonne) helicopter.

The move towards corvettes and frigates has been driven by two factors:

* for small navies previously using fast attack craft A Fast Attack Craft (FAC) (German: Schnellboot) is a small (100 to 400 tonnes), fast (up to ca. 40 knots) ship for offensive tasks, mainly equipped with surface-to-surface missiles and/or anti-ship torpedoes. as the keel of their capability, personal experience and the lessons of the first Gulf War have demonstrated the limitations of these small, but powerful warships. Because of their size–up to 55 metres long and 489 tons displacement–their sensor range and self-defence capabilities were extremely limited as was their capacity to absorb battle damage. This was confirmed when most of the Iraqi strike force was annihilated by Coalition air power, including Lynx helicopters with Sea Skua

* a larger warship warship means that the radar antenna is higher, extending sensor range, while the defensive capability can be improved in terms of air defence weapons and compartmentalisation. Yet the versatility of corvettes and the lower costs of acquisition mean that some of the larger navies have become interested in them as a cheaper means of deploying a presence in low-risk theatres. The Royal Navy, for example, is considering a frigate/corvette mix to meet its Future Surface Combatant The Future Surface Combatant was the projected successor to Type 22 and Type 23 frigates in service of the British Royal Navy until the programme’s de facto cancellation in late 2004. (FSC FSC

…..

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+move+towards+corvettes+and+frigates:+in+defence,+as+in+life,…-a0127277784

where’s my poodle when you need it? :confused: :diablo:

Leave for a couple of hours and I come back realising I’m getting stalked by a rabid poodle – now that’s what I find so ridiculous, it’s comical. I’m sure the top admirals of RSN and Israeli Navy would agree! 😀

The hyperventilated yowls of the poor, sick canine are quite irritating so forgive me if my thoughts don’t come across as they should as I try to round up my arguments as to why the FACs are failures, and just as importantly, in what sense they come across as failures.

FACs grew out of the 1870s French Navy’s Jeune Ecole argument for poussiere navale, or ‘naval dust’. Part of the idea that small, heavily armed vessels could take on larger, more powerful warships. FACs embody that idea, by being heavily armed, small, fast, cheap and therefore numerous. FACs were sold by their manufacturers as the nemesis of larger warships like corvettes and frigates. That was the promise. That, was why FACs are such failures. The battle of Bubiyan is concentrated on precisely because that battle proved just how incapable FACs are in handling that task. Granted, the force disparity in the battle of Bubiyan is so great that the final outcome wouldn’t be in doubt. That’s not the point. The point is that the FACs were totally ineffective against the ship-borne helis which could have been fielded by a opponent far less sophisticated and resource rich than the UK or US.

It is undeniable that the Iraqis manning the Kuwaiti TNC-45s and 57s were less than able to fully fight their ship. Even so, the engagements illustrated the inherent shortcomings of FACs that even a well crewed FAC won’t be able to overcome. In some instances the Lynxes hovered less than 3km from the FACs to fire their Sea Skuas. Their sophisticated swedish FCRs were simply unable to track the Lynxes. They were functioning – but they never got a track of the helis to guide some return fire. The threat was deemed so insignificant the UK Lynxes didn’t even bother to mount jammers in subsequent attacks, preferring instead to trade them for a greater Sea Skua loadout. A further proof of this is the total lack of countermeasure response of the FACs to the Sea Spray radar despite being armed with ESM. Maybe the Iraqi crew didn’t know where the countermeasure button was? Not likely, but it is everyone’s right to believe. 😉

So we can see that FACs are ineffective – unless backed up by air support. Add off-board sensors and command and control to that. One then goes back to the original rationale for FACs espoused by their shipbuilders – the ability to handle better equipped warships, on the cheap. Once you factor in the costs required to make the FAC mission-capable, the whole rationale goes ‘poof’. Costs just got displaced elsewhere. On top of that you have paid the additional price of limiting your vessels to your coastal waters. Put another way, if that you had invested that money in corvettes/frigates, you would have gotten much better capability for pretty much the same amount of money. Oh, and remember, money is finite. Canines never deal with money, so that rabies infested poodle didn’t quite take that factor into account. Small point to think of. What advantage does a FAC tasked to take on larger warships have over coastal missile batteries and anti-ship tasked planes?

So are the FACs failures no matter what? There are exceptions, of course. If, say, your goal is simply coastal patrol and other light duties. Then not having the ability to take on larger warships isn’t a problem, and in such cases FACs won’t qualify as failures. Also, if the operating environment is like what Maskirovka has shown, then the shortcomings of FACs are eliminated while the some of the advantages of larger warships and helis are eliminated. In that case, large warships, beware.

By the way, if by some 4 legged logic one comes by the idea that helis require off-board sensors to look out for FACs, then I recommend finding out more about APS-143 and APS-147, just to name 2 search radars mounted on helicopters perfectly able conduct wide area search for FACs. They really can be used, even on ASW missions. But don’t tell that to your poodle, especially if it is rabid. They have a tendency to yelp even more. Just wait and see. 😀

Once you have the system in place, you can buy as many FAC’s as you would like though. For example I REALLY wouldn’t want to go up against the massed PLAN missile boat squadrons without an aircraft carrier carrying LOTS of strike fighters.

Once you have paid for everything needed to make the FAC viable, you’d be wondering what the point was in the first place. The whole rationale for FACs is that they are cheap counters to larger, sophisticated vessels. If you are paying the same price in the end as that which could have gotten you destroyers or frigates, then FACs are failures. (Remember, FACs are cheap ($70 to 90 million each)… individually. But they have to be used as a group as a result of their characteristics. Add the cost of fighter cover and a C&C system with the requisite sensors, not cheap anymore)

How does the general trend to stealthiness change the picture. Ie. the latest Chinese, Norwegian, Taiwanese and Finnish boats?

Making them stealthy just makes them harder to find, to a certain extent. One problem is that at high speed their wakes give them away on radar. (And that applies to the LCS too) Other than that, they pretty much suffer from the same drawbacks that plagues all FACs. Once they are found, they get killed. In a sense, the desire to make them stealthy is an acknowledgement of the lessons of Iraq. The understanding is that FACs are ineffective at hard kill self defense – hence there is little point emphasizing self defense based on hard kill measures. Better instead to emphasize on not being found in the first place. How effective though? Since they reduce the search range of the sensors, the effect on the enemy is that the enemy is required to increase the number of assets dedicated to search (a form of virtual attrition), or increase the capability of the sensors to regain the original sensor range lost.

You’re still not seeing all of it. Who are the enemies that FACs were bought to fight? Where were they supposed to fight?

Um, please read. What is being argued here is that FACs are not worth the money, and do not live up to their promise. Remember, FACs were touted as being able to go up against larger vessels.

FACs have been extremely successful, & very cost-effective, against enemies of similar strength and technological level. They’ve been slaughtered by enemies deploying much greater forces, superior technology, & weapons specifically developed to fight them. Big deal.

Then they have failed. Their promise was effectiveness against larger vessels, an assymmetric response to greater forces with superior technology at lower cost. And even now, some here still think that numbers of these FACs can overwhelm larger vessels. By the way, one’s military does not need to be very highly sophisticated to purchase and operate heli-capable hulls with helis. Certainly Iraq’s neighbours would have had the capacity to purchase and operate such platforms.

I would agree that now, with modern sensors & weapons, the usefulness of the small anti-ship-missile-equipped FAC is much less than a few decades ago, but for small navies expecting to fight other small navies, or fighting in complex littorals where any opponent is going to be constrained by complexity of defences, there is probably still a role – as long as you aren’t attacked by a much more powerful country, in which case you’re pretty well done for anyway. And 40 years ago, when they were proliferating – well, look at their performance in combat. They did live up to the promise.

If they are bought with the intention to take on small craft, then yes, they are able to perform well in that role. South Korea’s PKX are designed to handle that role, and there is no reason why they won’t perform. Against other FACs, well, both sides will be similarly constrained by an ineffective hull, so it’s a toss up. Can’t base their effectiveness on such battles – one side has to lose. But where they are expected to take on larger vessels now, (and yes, many navies actually expected FACs to handle larger vessels) the Iraq experience shows that it fails miserably.

I think the reasons for the lack of success of the Iraqi FACs may be quite different i.e. old or unfamiliar ships, poor state of maintenance, low proficiency and insufficient training. It was certainly not the case that most Iraqi FACs were well armed with 76mm and 40mm guns coupled to modern fire control”

Certainly not all were that well equipeed. But it doesn’t matter. Those that were still displayed abysmal performance. Neither does the argument about crew training hold – the equipment performance would have been the same irrespective, since it was the seakeeping performance of the FACs that were the problem.

SA-N-5 = SA-7 GRAIL (9K32M Strela-2).
A first generation manpads missile, dating from 1968, and limited in range (3.6-4.2km), speed (430-500 m/s = mach 1.4-1.75), as well as altitude (1,500-2,300m). It’s a tail-chase missile system with an IR-seeker, and its effectiveness depends on its ability to lock onto the heat source of low-flying fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft targets.

Sea Skua range is 2-25 km

Which brings me back to my point. They’re sitting ducks against helis which can stay safely out of range.