YourFatherThe world feels secure with hard kill countermeasures to the anti-ship missile problem. But, a very large percentage of attacks have been foiled soft-kill countermeasures -chaff, jamming, etc.
True. But the USN, at least, has its reasons for preferring hard kill. There’s no point decoying away a missile only to have it continue on and lock on onto a higher value target instead. (Oops :D) I think there was an instance in the Falklands where this exact thing happened? The Atlantic Conveyor being the victim, I think? Jonesy may correct me on this.
YourFatherSize. FACs are and will always be constrained by size. That has a number of severe implications. First is sensor load. There is a limit in terms of number of sensors that can be placed on board. Even if the sensor fit on a 45m ship is the same as that on a 62m ship, the performance isn’t necessarily the same. Why? EM interference issues. More space allows for better antenna locations, giving better performance. Also, because they are small, the radars cannot be located high enough without affecting stability. Thus they are more limited by the horizon and multipathing (and sometimes by the surface ducting phenomenon too).
Next, is the problem of vibration. Because the ships have lower seakeeping performance, and combined with their high speeds, their sensor performance is severely degraded. This was why the Iraqi FACs which were well armed with 76mm and 40mm guns coupled to modern fire control (which theoretically should have been able to take down the helis), ESM and Dagaie decoys were not effective. The UK Lynxes only needed their Orange Crop ESM system to tell them when they were getting painted by the FCR on the Iraqi FACs, and simple maneuvers were sufficient to break lock. Thus the UK Lynxes found that they didn’t even need their ALQ-167 ECM, and so these were sacrificed for increased Sea Skua loads. Conversely, even with ESM the radar emmissions of the Lynx needed to paint the FACs for the Sea Skua never seemed to alert the FACs that they were under threat. No decoys were launched. As a side note, the Iraqi FACs were armed with MANPADs too. Only one SA-N-5 was able to be launched, and the Lynx evaded the missile.
Next is survivability. The small size means critical components of the ship must necessarily be situated close together, thus allowing for a catastrophic kill. Sea Skuas were effective even with their small warheads because of this.
You can look at the RSN as a very illuminating example of how FACs fell out of favor. The Sea Wolf class missile Gunboats (45m Lurssen FACs) were replaced by 3,200 ton frigates. There is good reason for such a move. Even the larger Victory class corvettes (62m Lurssen designs) were regarded as less than satisfactory in terms of their stability. Placing the required sensors for combat effectiveness gave it excessive topweight.
YourFatherSo far, the proponents of the “missile boats are worthless” view have assumed overwhelming superiority of strength & technology by the opponents of missile boats
Doesn’t matter. This event simply highlighted the fact that FACs were ineffective, and debunked the promise that FACs were cost effective alternatives to larger vessels. FACs are not capable of carrying a battle management system and incapable of self defense, hence they were restricted to close-to-shore operations. In that case, why not just utilise shore based anti-ship missiles?
Taking the events of January 1991 as a yardstick is misleading. In none of these cases the FACs and motorboats that were sunk by Lynx were on a mission against surface units – in fact they were misused as transports and minelayers or just bobbing around.
They were far from bobbing around’. Some were in fact quite modernly equipped, and they were actively trying to fire back at their harassers. They never managed to mainatain a lock onto the helis.
YourFatherThere were a relatively small number of FACs, with a large enemy fleet offshore, no air support whatsoever, pretty much dead if they switched on radars, being hunted by helicopters with massive backup.
The small number of FACs and the large enemy fleet offshore are irrelevant to an evaluation of the results of the engagement. This was purely an engagement of Facs against helis. That the FACs were unable to handle the helis without air support is indicative of the fatal flaw of the FACs. As I recall they actually did turn on their fire control radars but were unable to maintain lock. Slight evasive maneuvers by UK helis were enough to break lock because of the poor seakeeping qualities of the FACs. (I think that info came from a very old issue of Naval Forces. That, or Friedman’s Navies in the Nuclear Age. Will have to look it up if you want a source.)
FACs are a complete waste of money in some circumstances.
FACs have been very effective weapons in some circumstances.
A more accurate statement would be
“FACs are a complete waste of money in most circumstances.
FACs can be effective weapons in some circumstances.”
YourFatherThe UAV changes all that. Cheap enough to cover large areas by a swarm (well, a very thin swarm currently, but nevertheless), UAVs organic to the FAC dramatically increase the awareness and reach. Now it’s not pointless any more to put a SS-N-27 onto an otherwise naked go-fast boat, form a group of them and add another one as UAV launch platform. For size think German S-100 class Schnellboot.
A FAC is already chronically short of available deck space. Only larger FACs can handle a heli platform, but that’s going to cut significantly into what other weapon/sensor systems can be put on board. Then there’s the problem of recovery on a FAC with its poorer seakeeping qualities.
Kamikaze boats do not compute with my civilizatory background, but looking at the Burkes I’d say half a dozen should do the job, especially if not thinned out by ESSM at longer ranges (e.g. due to rules of engagement). The 5″ gun doesn’t do any good against fast closing targets from multiple vectors, and how good ESSM is with the illuminators looking directly onto the waves is *very* questionable. I’d feel naked without a 35mm Millennium, now that the 20mm Phalanx are gone. Baaad mistake. Would have been the perfect spot for Millenniums.
ESSM was tested in an anti-surface mode in 2007 against a RHIB. Worked fine. No reason why the 5 inch gun won’t work extraordinarily well against boats, especially when using specialised force protection rounds like Mk 179 and Mk 182. Finally, there’s the Mk 38 mod 2s, standard fit on later Burkes (those without Phalanx Block 1Bs) and being retrofitted to older ones, I believe. Below that there’s the miniguns and other small arms fire. So you’re looking at a very robust multi-layer solution. After the COLE incident, force protection became a very high priority. The USN didn’t sit on its ass doing nothing. Anybody who tries to do a COLE again is probably going to find it a very unrewarding experience. :diablo:
Thinking that helicopters could stop a spirited and coordinated attack is naive.
The Iraqis on the FACs who had to deal with the helis picking them apart would certainly beg to differ.
Number one there are MANPADS that outrange an ATGM or 20mm, number two the helicopter might never see the FAC when stand-off AShMs are used, and number three there are not enough helicopters, especially if they are needed to look for subs and mines at the same time. And then one can only guess what happens at night, since not terribly many shipboard helicopters are night combat capable.
MANPADs do outrange the shorter ATGMs like TOW, but Hellfire, Penguin, Sea Skua which are the common heli launched anti-surface missiles outrange them. And I’m not sure it’d be easy at all to stand and fire off a MANPADs in a FAC doing 30+ knots! Simply put, the vast majority of FACs are totally unequipped to handle helis, and there’s a question mark on the performance of the systems on those that do.
Of course you could put two squadrons of Hellfire equipped Sea Cobras on a LHD and fly barrier patrol, but then you need to protect those against SAMs and fighters — develops into a serious break-through battle (what is the English word for “Durchbruchsschlacht”?).
Why would 2 whole squadrons be needed? Only 1 heli with a EO and radar suite need be up in the air at any one time. In fact, early warning might even come from the mass of voice comms needed for C&C of the boat swarm (not a trivial task).
YourFatherDidnt forget it YF I thought the concept of shipborne deployment had been discretely pushed to one side. Last I read about it was an article, in Armada I think it was, couple of years back stating that there was an issue with getting it to hit a moving target?.
To be honest I thought that was the reason for the pressure on MQ-8 to fit APKWS and Viper Strike?.
Happy to stand corrected if you know better?
Doesn’t seem like an issue anymore, going by the latest releases. It’s definitely still on the table. Can’t see how the USN will regard the NLOS as worth the trouble if it’s confined to hitting stationary targets.
http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1261&pagetemplate=release
Captive Flight Test Moves Raytheon and Lockheed’s NLOS-LS Closer to U.S. Navy Live Fire Testing
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, Fla., May 4, 2009 /PRNewswire/ — NetFires LLC, a joint venture between Raytheon Company and Lockheed Martin , conducted the second captive flight test of the Non Line-of-Sight-Launch System Precision Attack Missile (PAM).NLOS-LS provides the warfighter with immediate, precise and responsive fires on high-payoff targets with real-time target acquisition and battle effects. It is also one of the key Littoral Combat Ship mission modules.
“As a key part of the LCS ‘layered’ surface warfare capability, NLOS-LS counters the small-boat threat,” said Capt. Mike Good, U.S. Navy program manager for the Littoral Combat Ship Mission Modules. “The success of this captive flight test increases our confidence in the over-water capability of these missiles. Combined with the recent successful U.S. Army guided tests, these are important steps toward the Navy-guided flight tests scheduled for later this year.”
The LCS Mission Module can fire as many as 45 NLOS-LS PAM missiles from three container launch units. With a range greater than 25 miles, the PAM missile gives the LCS an increased surface warfare weapon capability.
“These tests prove the plug-and-play missile seeker ability to detect and track targets while filling the warfighter’s capability gap for precision engagement of moving and stationary targets in open and complex terrain,” said Scott Speet, executive vice president of NetFires LLC and Raytheon’s NLOS-LS program director.
Would you class a modern FAC like Qatari Barzan class as a ‘small boat’ when it packs 8 SSMs, a full air defence hardkill/softkill suite and a medium calibre gun forward?. Christ alone knows what kind of gun platform it is if there is the slightest bit of chop, but, there is no denying the vessel has a comprehensive fitout. Yet its only 400tons in displacement and, with OTH targetting support from shore based air, in its littoral it would be dangerous.
Likewise if you step down the scale to something like the Thondor class boats the Iranians operate. 200 tons deep loaded yet a pair of them have the SSM loadout of a frigate!. In close, with offboard targetting, they will be dangerous and, in both cases, the LCS will be hard pushed to do much about an old Super Frelon or similar standing off 60nm and doing all the targetting necessary to draw a bead.
Thats why I say that LCS isnt really there to take on the FAC(M)’s as a threat system all by themselves. Small boats yes – speedboats and light gunboats yes definitely, and NLOS will be useful there as a layer outside the Mk110 gun, but anything with a missile armament with sufficient potential to saturate the RAM mount will be something best avoided.
Personally, I think it has less to worry about the FAC boat threat than the Heli threat you highlighted. The heli threat’s whats worrisome. FACs with AShMs rely too heavily on external cueing for missile launch (and most don’t have that targeting network), and here the LCS with its external sensor assets has an advantage. Should the enemy have a viable external cueing network however, then the LCS has a problem, which brings me back to my main beef with the LCS – a lack of comprehensive self-defense hard kill capability and the necessary sensor fit to support that.
YourFatherSame difference: CAP is part of group AAW
Which then proves my point. That it requires CAP cover for basic self defense (without which the only hard kill defenses which are left would be short range systems) is indicative that its hard kill component of its defenses is lacking. It cannot be assumed that a CSG is available all the time to provide protective cover (say, if the LCS was escorting a ARG instead, or the CSG was too far away to provide effective coverage), or that it can provide protective cover even if available. (eg. for reasons of operational deception etc)
If, through offboard assets, it detects a small flotilla of FAC(M)’s inbound it will be running from them at the rush screaming rape whilst trying to get an MQ-8/MH-60 to pot a couple with APKWS/Hellfire or at least guide in a Harpoon strike from the attendant fleet unit over the horizon.
You forgot the Netfires, Jonesy. Countering small boats/FACs, MCM and littoral ASW are the 3 main jobs of the LCS at the moment. If the LCS has to run away from the FACs, they really should just end the LCS!
YourFatherWhat makes you think combat ops with e.g. MILGEM in the Med would be any less demanding than US would typically face with LCS?
What makes you think it’d be just as difficult?
a) stealthy design is harder to detect/lock
b) layered defense including both soft kill systems (e.g. 3x SRBOC or Terma SKWS soft-kill weapon system) and hard kill weapons (Bofors 57mm Mk3, RAM)
c) backed up by group AAW
As said before, I agree that the LCS hinges its survivability on denying the enemy the ability to localise it by its speed and stealth. And it does have a soft kill and a limited hard kill suite. My point is that its hard kill suite isn’t sufficient. That, along with its sensor suite. Sensor wise, that’d be remedied to some extent with the change in subsequent vessels SeaRAM which gives it a dedicated horizon search radar, though at a further cost to its hard kill loadout. Still, for a 3,000 ton vessel expected to operate in the littorals to clear the way ahead for the battlegroup (implying that enemy capability isn’t very much degraded, if at all), that little hard kill defenses simply isn’t reasonable.
Currently, the group AAW isn’t sufficient since they are limited to horizon engagement range. Going according to the scenario in the LCS video, the CBG and its escorts would be further back beyond the horizon. Only when the SM-6-CEC-E-2D combo comes online will there be some protection against sea skimmers. And that is also iffy, since with the LCS operating so far forward the geometry might not be favourable for an interception before the ASM reaches the LCS. As I see it, the only way to mitigate this deficiency is to dedicate more CAPs over the area the LCS is operating while the CSG is held back.
YourFatherThe OHPs SM-1 was the short range version coupled with a marginal illuminator. The 40 round magazine of the Mk13 launcher carried harpoons as well as SM-1 MR missiles. While this gave the OHPs a robust AA self defense capability, no one I know would characterize it as anything more than rudimentary area air defense against the occasional “leaker” threat.
How does repeating what I said in other words do you any good? Notice I said ‘limited area defense’?
The LCS fitted with the ASW mission module has multiple towed arrays, dipping sonars, sonobouys and fixed sonars attached to semi autonomous vehicles. Depending on sea state and atmospheric conditions some or all sensors can be used effectively in blue water as well as brown. To say only the SH-60 is applicable in the blue water environment is preposterous.
LOOK at the speeds of the USVs and UUVs, and the displacements of the USVs. Now tell me how will those USVs and UUVs provide cover for the CSG while in transit at say 28 knots. Trying to push the notion that they are suited for blue water operations is what’s preposterous.
What is the RAM launcher and 57mm gun do on these ships? Take up weight?
Is everybody trying to look daft all of a sudden? Where did I say the LCS had no hard kill defenses? I said it didn’t have sufficient hard kill defenses.
Ticos and DDG-51s provide area air defense.
Look at the video. It mentions the LCS entering the littorals ahead of the CSG. ie. there won’t be the coverage needed.
YourFatherSo eg this here cannot defend itself since it has no ESSM?
Please don’t play daft.
1. We’re talking about the LCS in USN service, not the MILGEM. Different environment, different requirements.
2. I never said ‘cannot defend itself’, I’m talking about not having the required level of survivability coming from hard kill measures under the CONOPS it is expected to operate with.
Look at the video. It is expected to head into contested littorals ahead of the CSG/ARG and operate in that hostile environment pretty much independently for a period of time. It really seems like the USN hinges the survivability of the LCS more on denying the enemy the ability to localise and target the LCS based on its speed and stealth than on terminal defenses like hard kill, considering the sensor and self-defense weapons fit on the LCS.
YourFatherESSM has similar range to SM1 on Perrys. How hard would it be to devise an AAW mission module? One could model on the STANFLEX ESSM container with 6 missile canisters. With twin packing, a single such container gives 12 ESSM. Two 24 ft standard ISO containers, each 1 with set of ESSM canisters and a STIR and you’re halfway in business. You’ld need a suitable containerized search radar as well.
What AAW module? That’s (the radars and the VLS) going to displace the other modules, which are the whole purpose of the LCS in the first place. The ESSM should be an integral part of the LCS’s self defense suite since it’s what’s required to have the survivability to carry out it’s functions!
What does it matter is LCS is not immanently suitable for blue water ops? It is part of a group! I’m sure carrier and DDG51 can handle threats in the oceanic spectrum. SO long as it has a reasonable self defense capability and is not a burden on the group it is part of, who cares?
Exactly. It just transits the blue waters. I totally dont have any problem with its lack of ability to fight in blue waters. I’m just arguing that it isn’t a replacement for the Perry, even if it has a roughly similar displacement.
Likewise LCS will be in its element in the littoral zone, where the rest of the group is rather helpless apparently (don’t hear anybody complaining about that).
Not quite helpless. Just too pointless to risk the HVAs running over across a SSK or over a mine.
YourFatherAside from the tail which not all Perrys and very few Knoxs had where do you think their ASW capability came from. Hint, begins with an h and ends in an r. It has nothing to do with similar displacement and everything to do with how they accomplish the mission. In fact the LCS has less displacement than OHP.
Perrys didn’t have tails at first, which limited their blue water capabilities and is why the upgrade program was instituted to fit them with it. Even those that never got tails still had the SM-1 at least, which provided for a limited area protection capability to give them a blue water/convoy protection capability. And the Knoxes which didn’t have VDS still have the long(ish) ranged SQS-26 LF sonar, whereas the LCS only has a tiny HF mine-avoidance set. Essentially, whatever blue water capabilities the LCS has are minimal and pure happenstance. Just look at the ASW module and where the sensors are located. RMMV, USV and SH-60. Only the SH-60 is applicable in the blue water environment. Like it or not, the LCS was built to be able to transit the blue water envoronment, not fight in it.
YourFatherDistiller, the DDG hull numbers are adequate, the USN doesn’t have a requirement for more of those, since those are CSG and SAG assets. What they need is hull numbers for presence missions, like that in the Gulf of Aden. That’s what the USN wants the LCS for.
How you get not including blue water from that is beyond me. In fact it specifically says in company of CSGs, ESGs (those comprise fleet units) and pose a threat to any freindly units. Note, nothing about friendly units only sailing in littoral.
Why is it so hard to disassociate the LCS from the idea that it is the OHP’s functional replacement? Just because it is of similar displacement means absolutely nothing. Look at it’s outfit. It simply isn’t designed to do blue water tasks. It’s combat capability resides not in the ship itself, but in the UUVs, USVs, UAVs and helis it carries. And in the blue water environment, the only thing useful are the UAVs and helis it carries. The only thing specifically blue water about it is its ability to transit the ocean for self deployment. It can be part of a CSG/ ARG, but it ain’t gonna contribute much in the blue water environment.
YourFatherDo you have any shred of evidence that this is a lie? Or are you indulging in some self-delusion? Is all the proof you can come up with is that the US military lied before? If that is proof enough that the US military is lying on every occasion and thus this incident included, then everybody who has lied once in their life must be lying with every breath? You seriously believe that? Then you must be lying right now, or are you trying to tell us you have never lied before in your life? 😀 And so in that case you must also believe that China is a country whose authorities indulge in lies at every turn? Since I recall quite clearly China lying in the SARs incident? See, Devil’s Advocate, your logic simply fails you.
YourFatherSpeaking of the 2 LCS designs, what’s the drawbacks of a trimaran design, Jonesy? What were the issues found with the trimaran demonstrator (Triton, is it?) the RN played with?
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